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Editor’s Note
David Akin’s Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom 
provides a sophisticated reading of Pacific Islander interactions with and 
responses to foreign influences and colonialism. It adds to the rich histories 
and ethnographies of the interactions between Islanders and Europeans and 
exemplifies how Islanders often capture and use foreign ideas and institu-
tions, blend them with local cultures and structures of power, and use them as 
vehicles for protest. This book, while focusing on Malaita in Solomon Islands, 
links the Pacific Islands with colonial experiences elsewhere, especially British 
colonies in Africa and Asia. It illustrates the complex relationships between 
colonial powers and their subjects and the ways Pacific Islanders engage with 
foreigners, their ideas, and institutions while at the same time drawing from 
their own cultures and institutions to make sense of these interactions and 
formulate responses. While couched within the broader context of colonial 
studies, the book emphasizes Islander agency and voices.
In this book, Akin weaves a captivating story that blurs the boundaries 
between anthropology and history, displaying an extensive knowledge of 
the interactions between Solomon Islanders and Europeans and an acute 
understanding of Malaitan societies and histories from the late 1800s into 
the mid-1900s. He draws on meticulous archival research and years of eth-
nographic work in Solomon Islands, allowing him to tell these stories in an 
insightful and refreshing manner.
Akin begins by examining the period from the late 1800s to the 1930s, 
especially Malaitans’ involvement as plantation laborers in Queensland, Fiji, 
and Samoa and, later, in other parts of Solomon Islands. This provides a 
fascinating ethnography of how interactions with Europeans shaped Malai-
tans’ political consciousness and identity. It illustrates the complexity of the 
relationships among Solomon Islanders, plantation owners, labor recruiters, 
Christian missionaries, and the colonial administration. By the early 1900s, 
the British Protectorate government had established its administrative struc-
tures and imposed colonial rule. In the 1920s, in order to help finance the 
administration, the government introduced the head tax. The only way many 
people could pay tax was by seeking formal employment in the plantations. 
This provoked protests, especially in Malaita, resulting in the 1927 killing of 
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a government officer and 14 members of his tax-collecting party in Kwaio. 
The British government responded with punitive expeditions, which further 
influenced Malaitan perceptions of and relationship with the government 
for decades afterward. These events generated a broader political conscious-
ness among Solomon Islanders about their relationship with the colonial 
government. The Fallowes Movement of the 1930s was a more widespread 
expression of discontent that included people from other islands as well as 
Malaitans. Akin tells of how Solomon Islanders were becoming more aware 
of the power relationships between them and the colonial administration.
By the early 1940s, the Second World War reached the Pacific Islands. As 
elsewhere in the Pacific, the war had an enormous impact on the islands 
and Islanders. In Solomon Islands, the war marked a break in British colo-
nial rule. Most of the British colonial administrators left, leaving a power 
vacuum; the Islanders were caught between the invading Japanese and US 
military forces with their military might, massive supplies of “cargo,” and 
ideas about freedom and equality. Many Malaitans worked for the Solomon 
Islands Labour Corps. Akin documents how interactions with American sol-
diers influenced Malaitan political consciousness and led to greater resis-
tance to British attempts to reestablish their rule after the war.
From this background arose Maasina Rule, a protest movement that 
started on Malaita and spread to some of the nearby islands. This was the 
first major protest against the colonial administration in Solomon Islands. 
Although the Maasina Rule story has been told in previous publications, 
Akin’s narrative provides a fresh perspective on the movement, giving voice 
and agency to the Malaitan characters in a way that I have not seen before. 
Information gathered from his extensive archival research is reinforced by 
his distinct knowledge and understanding of Malaita societies and histo-
ries. He tells of Maasina Rule’s interaction with the government and their 
launch of Operation Delouse as well as Malaitans’ refusal to be involved in 
labor on plantations. The colonial government responded with a campaign 
to suppress Maasina Rule, particularly in 1948 and 1949, by jailing leaders 
and trying to force Malaitans back under colonial control. In spite of this, 
Malaitans continued to defy the government, proving that Maasina Rule 
had popular support. This led to the release of the movement’s leaders, 
changes in the colonial administration’s tactics, and the establishment of 
a Malaita Council, giving more autonomy to the island. Akin finishes by 
outlining the successes and failures of Maasina Rule.
The Pacific Islands Monograph Series is privileged to add this volume to its 
list. This book will appeal not only to those interested in Solomon Islands and 
the Pacific region but also to those interested in colonial studies more gen-
erally. As one of the reviewers for this manuscript stated, “There is no other 
equivalent study of this detailed and important Pacific protest movement.”
Tarcisius Kabutaulaka
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Notes on Spellings and Translation
The following is a short pronunciation guide to Malaitan and Solomon 
Islands Pijin words:
a pronounced as in mama
b pronounced mb, as in timber 
d pronounced nd, as in candy 
e pronounced as in egg
g pronounced ng as in mango
i pronounced like e in me
o pronounced as in go
u pronounced as in true
‘ glottal stop (a consonant, treated as the last letter of the alphabet)
Doubled vowels are pronounced as lengthened and accented (eg, Maa-
sina Rule)
Many Malaitan names have English origins—Dio (Joe), Falage (Frank), 
Biri (Billy), Tome or Tomu (Tom), Sale (Charlie). I spell these phonetically 
by Malaitan pronunciations (they vary by area) unless the person adopted 
an English spelling. For some personal and place-names I have only spell-
ings used by government officers in documents, which are often wrong or 
inconsistent. I have been able to correct many but not all of these, and 
no doubt some remain misspelled. Quotations maintain original spell-
ings. Where possible I spell place-names as those who live there pronounce 
them, but for some I know only Kwaio or Kwara‘ae pronunciations.
Regarding quotations of statements given to me, those of Kwaio people I 
have translated from Kwaio language and those of other Solomon Islanders 
from Solomon Islands Pijin, unless otherwise indicated. Solomon Islands 
Pijin pronunciations vary on Malaita and in the Solomons, typically by local 
language conventions. Thus there are not universally “correct” phonetic 
spellings, and I follow pronunciations I am most familiar with, from central 
Malaita.
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Regarding the Endnotes
There are many endnotes in this book, for several reasons. First, all source 
citations are in the notes; their number would have made in-text placement 
too interruptive of the flow of text. Second, one target audience for this 
book is the fast-growing number of young Solomon Islander scholars who 
are interested in this history. Details regarding local people and events are 
important to many of them but will not be to all readers; I have put some of 
these in notes so those uninterested can pass them over. Finally, an aston-
ishing amount of misinformation has been written about Maasina Rule and 
related topics. Many of my endnotes correct these inaccuracies. I think it 
important to address them, but so great is their number that to do so in the 
text would have made for tedious reading for those unconcerned with this 
history of errors.
M
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1Introduction
This book is a political history of the island of Malaita in the British Solomon 
Islands Protectorate (BSIP) from 1927, when the last violent resistance to 
colonial rule was crushed, to 1953 and the inauguration of the first island-
wide, representative political body, the Malaita Council. It is a case study 
of the inner workings of the colonial administration and how its officers 
and policies interacted with Malaitans and their desires for change. At the 
book’s center are a political movement known as Maasina Rule that sought 
to bring about that change, and the movement’s core ideology, known by 
the Solomon Islands Pijin term kastom. Maasina Rule dominated Malaitan 
affairs from the mid-1940s into the early 1950s, and kastom remains impor-
tant in Solomon Islands politics today. Historians, anthropologists, and for-
mer colonial officials have all written extensively about Maasina Rule over 
several decades, and yet, though some of this work has been excellent, the 
literature has been plagued with errors, and basic aspects of both the move-
ment and Malaitan kastom have remained poorly or partly understood.
I am a cultural anthropologist by training, and over the past three 
decades I have spent several years living and studying in the mountains of 
Malaita. But much of my data for this book comes from period government 
documents, complemented by oral historical accounts and additional mate-
rials provided by Malaitans, Christian missionaries, former colonial officers, 
and others. These latter sources bring to light much that is absent from the 
colonial archive and often contradict the picture it presents.1
My concentration on Malaita has advantages and disadvantages. The 
demarcation of the island as my subject is artificial in that throughout the 
period under study Malaitans maintained important political and other 
links with neighboring islands: Langalanga with Gela, north Malaita with 
Isabel, southern Malaita with eastern Guadalcanal, Makira, and Ulawa (see 
map 1). Furthermore, these other islands all had their own versions of Maa-
sina Rule and kastom ideologies, and other Solomon Islanders shared many 
of the Malaitan experiences I will examine. While I do not ignore interis-
land connections and broader economic, political, and religious contexts, 
my focus remains on Malaita throughout.2 The advantage of the tighter 
focus is that it lets me undertake a deeper, more nuanced analysis of events, 
processes, and people than would be possible in a geographically broader 
study. Key aspects of this history emerge from the details: many documents 
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that I draw on may seem trivial on their face—telegrams, handwritten notes, 
fleeting updates—but it is often in such items, more than in formal reports, 
that something closer to truths may be found, not yet sanitized or varnished 
for consumption by more senior officials or the public.
I highlight not only the workings of the colonial administrative system 
but also the actions of individual colonial officers, and in many places I 
delve into their shortcomings and failures. My intent in doing so is not to 
employ hindsight to harp on deficiencies, prejudices, or injustices of colo-
nial rule for their own sake. Rather, understanding what drove Malaitans’ 
political actions and generated the kastom ideologies that anchored them 
requires frank examination of what they rebelled against. Only in this way 
can one appreciate why most of them during Maasina Rule took up the call 
for resistance and change so earnestly and tenaciously, despite extreme gov-
ernment efforts to rein them back. At the same time, we want to know why 
officers acted in the ways they did, including why many at times believed 
acute repression necessary. For this, one must also consider European atti-
tudes of the day toward Melanesians in general and Malaitans in particular, 
in tandem with the Malaitan actions that officers were reacting to.
To argue, as I do, that the colonial project badly failed on Malaita is not 
at all to say that all officers who worked on the island were failures—many 
were diligent and dedicated young men (most in their twenties) who tried 
to and often did do good on the island. Also, readers will become familiar 
with a pattern of district officers finding their decisions overruled by supe-
riors with no grasp of Malaitan realities, who were disinclined to allow more 
progressive initiatives, let alone fund them. Officers served an administra-
tive system that developed its own dynamics, concepts, values, and blind 
spots. Nonetheless, throughout this book I highlight individual officers 
because with only a handful in charge of Malaita over many years, and with 
their workplace so opaque to their superiors, their individual personalities, 
attitudes, and skills had great consequences for what took place there. We 
will see that changes in personnel sometimes triggered radical shifts in poli-
cies and events.
As the field of colonial studies has flourished over the last few decades, 
a most productive research topic has been how colonial states created and 
applied ethnographic, historical, linguistic, and other forms of knowledge 
to construct, categorize, represent, restructure, and manage the societies 
they ruled. Building on Gramscian and Foucauldian theories of knowledge 
and power, Edward Said’s insights on Orientalist discourses, and Bernard 
Cohn’s pioneering writings on India, scholars have studied the “cultural 
technologies of rule” with which colonial officials gathered, selected, 
ordered, modified, and invented knowledge of subject societies for their 
own purposes. This literature has highlighted colonial censusing; ethnog-
raphy; attempted standardizations of languages, texts, and religious codes; 
and the creation of ethnic groups and boundaries, “traditional” leadership 
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structures, codes of “customary law,” and models of race and gender. All of 
these are part of the history I present here.3
The seminal studies of the field addressed British India, where the collec-
tion, systematization, and application of colonial knowledge were particu-
larly wide-ranging and intense, to the degree that Cohn asserted, “The con-
quest of India was a conquest of knowledge,” and Nicholas Dirks described 
India’s late-nineteenth-century government as “an ethnographic state.”4
Early work in this area emphasized the effectiveness of knowledge-based 
regimes in imposing hegemonic orders on relatively passive subjects. Later 
studies from India and elsewhere have painted a more complex picture and 
have critiqued previous analyses as having been overly focused on Euro-
pean domination and agency. They have stressed ways in which colonial 
systems developed out of dialogic processes involving both colonizers and 
colonized. Some studies document subaltern participation in the compila-
tion and construction of colonial knowledge, while others highlight indig-
enous precursors to and continuities with colonial models and institutions. 
Still others question the degree to which colonial regimes really attained 
the sorts of hegemony or control they sought or claimed. In the same vein, 
there is much interest in what Cohn called the “unintended effects” that 
a colonial “discursive formation” could have, since “those who were to be 
the objects produced by the formation often turned it to their own ends.” 
Maasina Rule presents a remarkable case of this.5
Common themes run through different expressions of colonialism, and 
any student of the topic will recognize many of them in the Malaitan case. 
Diverse colonies were connected through core ideologies, centralized if 
often inharmonious policymaking by ruling powers, and—especially signifi-
cant to the Solomons scene—direct transfers of ideas and personnel from 
one colony to another. Nonetheless, once one understands colonial systems 
as the products of interactions between disparate colonists and diverse colo-
nized peoples, it becomes problematic to think of colonialism as a unified 
phenomenon or logic, even when looking at territories ruled by the same 
power. We find that, in Nicholas Thomas’s words, “colonialism can only be 
traced through its plural and particularized expressions,” as assorted colo-
nialisms.6 A case in point is the Solomons, where distinctive strategies and 
forms of rule developed on islands in clear sight of each other and even, as 
on Malaita, regarding different groups inhabiting a single island. One task 
for postcolonial studies has been to work out the relationships of colonial-
ism’s general themes and policies with their specific expressions and prac-
tice in different settings.
Concepts and techniques of rule developed in India were later trans-
ferred uneasily to African colonies, where they contributed to the construc-
tion of formal schemes of indirect rule that purported to adapt African 
political and legal structures to colonial administration. These African mod-
els were subsequently, if haphazardly, transposed to the Solomons. They did 
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not arrive only as concepts and directives emanating from London; from 
1929 throughout the period dealt with here, all of the Protectorate’s senior 
officials were transferred there from African colonies, and they brought 
with them firm views of and guidelines for how “natives” were best ruled.7
By the 1930s, and especially after World War II, the Solomon Islands 
were a British embarrassment (when London noticed them) in that direct 
rule of a colony with no provision for social services or means of advance-
ment had become anachronistic. There was a felt need and mild pressure 
from above to catch up with the times and begin instituting less direct rule, 
but to do so was difficult in that no foundation for such a shift had ever 
been laid. The BSIP government had provided neither education nor medi-
cal care; serious development for the benefit of inhabitants had never been 
on the agenda; and the state had always disqualified “primitive” Solomon 
Islanders from having any formal role in their own governance. A system 
of indirect rule was nevertheless slowly put into operation—at first casu-
ally and then, not long before and just after World War II, officially—that 
loosely but explicitly followed African models. As in parts of Africa, the 
Solomons system entailed a “native administration” grounded in selected 
and modified “native custom.” Particularly important to the official system 
was the government’s recognition and appointment of “traditional lead-
ers” (“chiefs” or “elders”), the codification of selected “customs,” and the 
institutionalization of bodies and methods of dispute resolution through 
which the leaders would apply them, all under close official supervision. 
The leaders and “customs” were to be deployed most importantly in “native 
councils” and “native courts” appointed in each subdistrict. It was expected 
these bodies would ease the workload of overburdened officers at minimal 
cost and also mollify Islanders who were calling for more voice in running 
their own affairs. Thus did the government import and institute a struc-
ture through which to apply colonially ordered ethnographic knowledge to 
govern Solomon Islands societies. But on Malaita, as well as other islands, 
a fundamental obstacle to putting this plan into operation was the govern-
ment’s glaring lack of such knowledge.
I first worked in the Solomon Islands National Archives in the 1980s, 
at a time when history and anthropology were still divided by a sharper 
disciplinary boundary. One day, a well-known historian of the Solomons 
visited the archives and asked me if I had discovered anything useful. When 
I indicated a quantity of materials, he replied with a puzzled look, “I didn’t 
think there was that much anthropology in here.” He was right in the sense 
that colonial documents related to Malaita contain surprisingly little ethno-
graphic information of the sort most people then considered to be within 
the anthropologist’s purview. The problem was that most colonial officers 
knew little about the inner workings of Malaita societies, and what past 
officers had managed to learn was never systematically recorded. In most 
colonies, administrators typically knew much less about their subjects than 
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they believed they did or claimed to, particularly regarding areas they con-
sidered most backward. Yet it is striking nonetheless to realize the degree 
of colonial ignorance regarding Malaitans and the lack of effort that was 
made to obtain, record, or create any body of ethnographic knowledge 
about them. Many officers were conscious of this, though they varied as to 
whether or not they saw it as a serious handicap; one finds fewer claims to 
or attributions of “ethnographic acuity” in these documents than in those 
for other colonies.8
This was not really the fault of district officers. They were never assigned 
the task of, or given adequate means for the concerted gathering of such 
information, and most seem to have given it little serious thought. Even 
those who would have liked to closely study and document Malaitan societ-
ies did not have time for it, given their many and at times overwhelming 
duties: on Malaita, two (or at times three) officers had to administer and tax 
some 50,000 culturally diverse people, speaking ten languages and living 
in thousands of shifting hamlets and villages scattered across 4,225 square 
kilometers of rugged terrain. Moreover, officers were transferred often, and 
with no organized system in place to record for successors what cultural 
information one had collected, research was an unwise use of time and 
resources. At a more basic level, the sorts of unofficial, personal relation-
ships and interactions through which colonial officers might have learned 
more about Malaitans and their lives were precluded by a high wall of sepa-
ration maintained from both sides. Most colonists frowned on “familiarity” 
with the natives, and many Malaitans avoided interacting with officers more 
than was absolutely necessary.
To make matters more difficult still, Malaita, unlike many British pos-
sessions, attracted few anthropologists, linguists, historians, or religious 
scholars who could assist the state. There were a few Anglican clergymen, 
particularly Walter Ivens, who learned languages and wrote useful studies, 
and anthropologist H Ian Hogbin came in 1933 and spent several months 
studying in the far north of the island, yet the government scarcely made 
use of their published work.9 Finally, although an important qualification 
for Malaitan leadership was possession and control of knowledge, very few 
Malaitans were literate and there was no tradition of written scholarship, 
and so the government could not realistically look to Malaitans for a sub-
stantive corpus of texts about their own societies.
Much of what officers did learn they acquired piecemeal in the course 
of their duties, especially when holding courts. Not one of them learned a 
Malaitan language, and some spoke even Solomon Islands Pijin poorly. This 
is not to say district officers were unintelligent or invariably uninterested; 
the obstacle was the system in which they served, which assigned minimal 
value, training, or resources to building serious knowledge about Malaitans 
and their everyday lives beyond what was required to maintain order and a 
steady supply of plantation laborers and to collect taxes.
6 Introduction
Given the lack of ethnographic expertise, broader understandings that 
officers did have of the people as human beings could be deeply flawed. 
We will see that the gaping holes in their knowledge were often filled with 
crude stereotypes, some of which were fully contradictory: Malaitans were 
wholly mystical in their worldview; they were crassly and wholly materialis-
tic. Malaitans cared little about money or wages because they could meet 
their own wants; they coveted white wealth and progress but were too lazy 
to work for it; they were by natural fact the best workers in the Protector-
ate. Malaitans were inherently uncreative, trapped in a world of unchang-
ing “custom,” fearing change and yearning for a return to the past; their 
demands for change were unreasonable since they were already changing 
too fast. Malaitans had no sense of community and their societies were fet-
tered by atomism and disorder; they were radically communalistic in that 
they could not think as individuals but only in conformity with their group. 
Malaitans lacked strong leaders; they followed their leaders slavishly. These 
stereotypes, which of course ascribed traits that Europeans attributed to 
many other nonwhite peoples they ruled over, provided an always-handy 
grab bag of tenets through which to “know” Malaitans, and for making and 
justifying decisions as to how best to deal with and control them.
In sum, there had been no “conquest of knowledge” on Malaita. So when 
the colonial government imported a framework designed to impose aspects 
of an “ethnographic state,” there was little ethnographic information with 
which to give it substance, and understandings of local societies were mired 
in misinterpretation and confusion. To obtain the knowledge necessary to 
constructing the new system, the government was forced to turn to Malai-
tans themselves. Just before World War II, Malaitans, despite their minimal 
literacy, were instructed to codify their “customs” and were told that after 
government had approved these they would be allowed to apply them to 
managing aspects of their own lives. Unlike in some other colonies, officers 
did little to engage with the codification process itself, and this gave Malai-
tans, fully aware of British ignorance, a political opening: indirect rule was 
set down on Malaita as an empty vessel, and Malaitans seized the opportu-
nity to fill it with “customary” contents to their own liking.
After the war, officers revived the indirect rule scheme with renewed 
vigor but soon lost control of it to the Maasina Rule movement. Examples 
are legion of colonized people appropriating and “turning to their own 
ends” colonial concepts and institutions, including for manipulating or 
resisting their colonizers,10 but what occurred on Malaita was extraordi-
nary. Malaitans did not just shape, harness, or exploit the native adminis-
tration scheme. Rather, as Maasina Rule took hold, they commandeered, 
expanded, and extended nearly all facets of it—chiefly offices, legal codes, 
courts, censuses, social engineering projects—and added many elements 
of their own making to create a system for self-government and sweeping 
social reform, one that would no longer require British overseers.
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In addition to the mechanisms and institutions of indirect rule, Malaitans 
appropriated the concept of “custom.” “Custom” expressed a British vision 
of Malaitan societies as ahistorical, static, and to some degree unchange-
able, and “true customs” were conceived as surviving, authentic, pre-Euro-
pean ways of life. Malaitans recognized this as a contrivance, and their con-
cept of kastom expressed their more realistic understandings of their own 
societies as dynamic, flexible, and rapidly changing. Malaitans demanded 
no ancestral pedigree for something to qualify as kastom, which encom-
passed fully new political structures and leadership, social and legal rules, 
innovative programs for great change, even labor strikes. Kastom labeled a 
political ideology and actions founded on Malaitans’ determination to pur-
sue change on their own terms, according to their own sensibilities.
Kastom was like “custom” had been, in the sense that Malaitans would 
oversee it, with the critical difference that whereas “custom” had been kept 
on at the government’s pleasure, kastom would now move forward fully in 
Malaitan hands. While district officers wanted “custom” codified to make it 
more accessible to and manageable by the state, Malaitans codified kastom 
to demarcate a realm that the government was to leave fully to Malaitans, 
and that furthermore would include almost everything. Kastom became 
a voracious category, encompassing all things over which Malaitans now 
claimed authority. In other words, Malaitan kastom was fundamentally dif-
ferent from British “custom,” and it rapidly became a label for the entire 
Maasina Rule project and its ideology, eventually including people’s refusal 
of European rule, at least on its old terms.
Colonial officers persistently confused kastom with their own concept of 
“custom” and saw in the Malaitan usage an ignorance of the term’s mean-
ing, or, increasingly, crude political deceit. To them, kastom was a disingenu-
ous invention of tradition for purposes of political manipulation. The colo-
nial confusion of kastom and “custom” was a precursor to anthropological 
conflations decades later of kastom with “culture,” which led to similar mis-
understandings. Many of the later anthropological errors stemmed from 
an insufficient understanding of the deep historical-political roots of the 
kastom concept in places like Malaita, and one purpose of this book is to 
help to remedy that problem.11
The rest of this introduction previews the chapters to follow and places 
the abovementioned themes in the context and trajectory of the book as a 
whole. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the early history of Malaitan-Euro-
pean interactions, highlighting the labor trade and the imposition of Pax 
Britannica. From 1870 into the first decade of the twentieth century, ships 
carried thousands of Malaitans and other Solomon Islanders to work on Fiji 
or Queensland plantations. For decades before Europeans gained any foot-
hold on Malaita, the labor trade brought new tools, weapons, crops, wealth, 
and diseases, as well as ideas about everything from proper social relations 
to religious practice. All realms of life were transformed. We will see that 
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Malaitans during this period displayed remarkable flexibility and creativ-
ity both at home and abroad, and there is no better historical argument 
against the notion (which appears often in this book and is still held by 
many Europeans today) of Malaitans as inherently conservative and unable 
to adapt, and the companion idea that “custom,” in the sense of precontact 
ways of life, remained intact well into the twentieth century and had to be 
protected by Europeans from unmanaged change.
The period is also important to us because it saw the first emergence of 
a broader Malaitan political consciousness out of the shared Melanesian 
experience of low status in European-dominated settings, and recognition 
of not just the opportunities but also the dangers that white people pre-
sented to their homeland. Here we find roots of Malaitans’ insistence that 
they themselves decide what to adopt or reject from elsewhere, an idea that 
still infuses Malaitan kastom ideologies. But Malaitans have often disagreed 
as to what is suitable to them, the most obvious early example being con-
flicts between those who adopted Christianity and those who rejected it, 
first abroad and then at home. Important here, too, is how early Christian 
churches on Malaita built organizational structures and networks that were 
later harnessed in the service of social protest and resistance movements.
In chapter 1, I also summarize shifting patterns of violence during these 
early decades, both among Malaitans and between Europeans and Malai-
tans. Just as the overseas labor period was ending, the BSIP government 
initiated its first attempts to bring Malaita under its control. At first unsuc-
cessful, these efforts were intensified in the late 1910s and 1920s, culminat-
ing in the final imposition of colonial rule by means of a brutal punitive 
expedition launched in 1927 after a district officer and most of his party 
were killed as they tried to collect taxes. From that point onward, organized 
Malaitan resistance to the colonial system would remain nonviolent.
The second and third chapters examine the government’s attempts in 
the years before World War II to erect a system of native administration. 
The main goals were to maintain order, to carry out taxation, and, above 
all, to ensure a continuing flow of laborers to the Protectorate’s plantations. 
At first a system of “indirect rule” of the African type was planned, but due 
partly to funding problems during the Depression and partly to officers’ low 
opinions of Malaitans and their abilities, that plan was delayed for several 
years. The only Malaitans given power were government-appointed “head-
men,” many of whom had little community standing. Neither Malaitan 
leaders nor institutions were officially recognized, but necessity demanded 
much unofficial reliance on both as officers and headmen tried to apply 
“native custom” to settle disputes and other matters and had to depend on 
local leaders for assistance. Only in the late 1930s did the administration 
finally begin trying to set up a formal system of indirect rule.
Chapter 2 looks at how the administrative system worked on the ground 
and also its flaws. Especially problematic was that officers privileged and 
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granted political agency to “custom” but, as already noted, possessed insuf-
ficient knowledge of Malaitan life to make the system work well. Further, 
partly as a result of this ignorance, the “custom” concept was riddled with 
fictions and contradictions that were on constant display for Malaitans to 
see. I describe Malaitan interactions with and changing assessments of gov-
ernment during the prewar period, giving special attention to legal matters 
because “custom” was particularly important in that realm and because law, 
or loa, soon became a focus of conflict between Malaitans and the state. The 
chapter also introduces several individuals who remain important through 
much of the book. This story has characters, and as readers get to know 
them they will better understand why they acted as they did, and why Malai-
tans reacted to them as they did.
Chapter 3 begins with the Great Depression, which ruined the BSIP econ-
omy and directly affected Malaitans, who were dependent on indentured 
plantation work. Wages were halved and throughout the 1930s resentment 
grew toward the white establishment, especially for its exploitive labor sys-
tem. Malaitans and other Solomon Islanders now began to openly express 
dissatisfaction with their lot under colonial rule. I consider two examples 
of that expression from 1939: one movement started by an Anglican priest 
named Richard Fallowes on the island of Isabel, and another on Malaita 
that was directed by messages from the spirit of a powerful ancestress. The 
first demanded education, medical services, and Islander participation in 
government; the second predicted that American invaders would soon vio-
lently oust the British. Each in different ways foreshadowed Maasina Rule.
As the 1930s progressed, the administration faced two other press-
ing problems: a chronic shortage of staff and funding, and what officers 
believed to be an ongoing and rapid depopulation of Malaitan peoples. 
This chapter analyzes two solutions officers devised to meet these problems, 
and how together they led to the reified “custom” concept becoming a key-
stone of administrative policy, particularly as it directly affected Malaitans. 
Settling disputes was a great drain on officers’ time and resources, and it 
was decided to institute a system of “native courts and councils” presided 
over by government headmen, with recognized “chiefs” and “elders” act-
ing as assessors. Communities were instructed to compile written codes of 
“local custom” for the courts and councils to apply once the government 
had modified and approved them.
The second problem, depopulation, officers blamed partly on a psycho-
logical factor: Malaitans were dying off because they had lost interest in life 
or were emotionally exhausted due to a “cultural fatigue” caused by the 
European “fatal impact.” Melanesia’s cultures were thought to be stagnant 
and rigid, and its people lost and bewildered without the “rule of custom” 
that had once “regulated every detail of existence.” The key to combat-
ing depopulation, therefore, was cultural stabilization, preservation, and 
revitalization, and paradoxically, radical social reorganization. Government 
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policy became that “old native custom” would be authorized, encouraged, 
and modestly empowered. Malaitans were told that officers would avoid 
interfering with their “custom,” “so long as it did not run counter to the dic-
tates of humanity,” and that they would be accorded some powers to admin-
ister it themselves through the courts and councils.12 In this way, the pursuit 
of greater order and control with meager resources and the apparent need 
to save local societies from themselves dovetailed to push “custom” front 
and center in government administration and social engineering schemes. 
One section of chapter 3 considers the courts and councils and how Malai-
tans received them. Another examines a major project carried out at the 
decade’s end to reorganize and revive native populations, which involved 
relocation of the populace into large villages tending communal gardens 
and “the stabilization of custom” through the development of codes to be 
applied by the native courts.
Chapter 4 takes readers into the period of World War II, which scat-
tered the colonial apparatus and exposed Solomon Islanders to a novel 
racial and social order. Several thousand Malaitans, and other Islanders as 
well, worked for the US military in the Solomon Islands Labour Corps on 
Guadalcanal and Gela. There they were astonished by the great material 
wealth in evidence and, more important, by the generosity and camarade-
rie they found among some of the American soldiers both white and black. 
Few soldiers knew or worried about maintaining the colonial racial codes 
that Solomon Islanders lived under. At the same time, with district officers 
away or focused on the war, Malaitans reasserted control over much of their 
island, which the fighting left mostly untouched. Overall, the war experi-
ence suggested to Islanders alternatives to life under British rule and left 
Malaitans determined to resist a return to the prewar status quo.
This was a period of strikes and political discussions—some of the lat-
ter with Americans—and people went so far as to try to secure a contin-
ued US presence and future help by making mass donations to the Red 
Cross. Though Maasina Rule had yet to formally organize, it began here 
among the wartime laborers. As the war moved off to the north, the colo-
nial administration, recognizing and fearing but still underestimating ris-
ing discontent, renewed its pledge to provide education and medical ser-
vices. These had been promised since the 1920s but never delivered, and I 
explain Malaitan anger at this perceived betrayal. Officers also worked with 
new vigor to restart native courts and councils, based again on “custom,” 
which would give Malaitans more say in their own affairs. But what they now 
offered was, for Malaitans, not enough and far too late, and in any case offi-
cers soon found that “custom” matters had been taken out of their hands, 
to be reasserted now as kastom controlled by Malaitans.
Chapter 5 describes Maasina Rule’s rapid rise, its programs, and how it 
transformed life on the island during its heyday of 1946 and 1947. It was 
launched in 1944 in the south where the government’s prewar repopula-
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tion efforts had been most intense. At this time, political movements were 
forming in almost every part of Malaita, and Maasina Rule soon melded 
them into a single initiative to reject the colonial order and work for a 
more liberated and prosperous future. It was estimated that, at its peak, 
95 percent of Malaita’s people were adherents, and the movement in vari-
ous forms dominated the island’s affairs into the early 1950s, in addition 
to spreading in various permutations to neighboring islands. It comman-
deered and expanded nearly all aspects of the government’s prewar admin-
istrative and social engineering schemes: “chiefs” were appointed, kastom 
councils and courts were created, and endless meetings were held to com-
pile kastom codes that registered new rules for community life and forbade 
many old ways deemed unsuitable for the new society. People gathered in 
large coastal villages, or “towns,” and tended communal “farms.” Maasina 
Rule during this phase was heavily engaged in building forward-looking 
social programs and cannot be understood simply as a resistance move-
ment. Malaitans also told Europeans that no men could work for them now 
because their labor was needed for Maasina Rule’s projects at home.
Malaitans put forward “custom”—now kastom—as a symbol of unity. 
Before Maasina Rule, the island had been divided by religious and political 
factionalism, with sometimes-bitter relations not only between Christians 
and those following ancestors, but also between the different Christian 
churches. There were also long-standing enmities between and within dif-
ferent groups, and intergenerational tensions were rife. The most daunting 
challenge Maasina Rule faced was how to unify all of these groups into a 
cohesive and effective movement to pursue radical change, led by “chiefs” 
with little coercive power. I explore at length how they accomplished this. 
Europeans, who had long taken comfort from the assurance that xenopho-
bic Malaitans would never be able to unite as a political force, were shocked 
and dismayed.
Having looked at Maasina Rule from within, I turn in chapter 6 to the 
movement’s interactions with the government, which have been greatly 
oversimplified and otherwise misconstrued in past writings. An important 
task of this and the next two chapters is to present a nuanced account of 
government-movement relations and how they shifted dramatically over 
time. Early government understandings of Maasina Rule and the forces 
driving it can be divided into four general phases. The first, detailed across 
chapters 3 and 4, was the dawning recognition, just before, during, and 
immediately after the war, that Solomon Islanders were profoundly dissat-
isfied and were starting to organize to demand change. This was brought 
home first by the Fallowes movement and then more powerfully by the defi-
ant actions of men in the Labour Corps. Officials were confident that they 
could manage the situation, which they blamed more on the war’s unset-
tling impact than on deficiencies in the colonial system—they thought their 
difficulties would subside if they instituted countermeasures, particularly 
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native courts and councils and—at some unspecified, later time—schools 
and medical services.
Chapter 6 begins at the second phase, with a belated government realiza-
tion that Maasina Rule had organized and extended throughout the island. 
At first alarmed, officers came to believe they could guide the movement 
toward government objectives, many of which harmonized with Maasina 
Rule, and that eventually it would fade as a viable threat to the colonial 
order. Discussions became more urgent regarding the need to grant still 
more powers to courts and councils and to act on long-standing promises 
of social services.
A third phase began in mid-1946 when officers recognized with alarm 
that Maasina Rule was overflowing the channels of government control. 
Nonetheless, for many months district officers kept working with the lead-
ers to try to redirect and harness the movement’s force, and many Malai-
tans envisioned a continuing if much reduced role for the government. 
However, in mid-1947 the scene rapidly shifted when crucial officers left 
Malaita and open opposition to government policies intensified in north-
ern parts of the island. A fourth phase began when a new district commis-
sioner in August resolved, with the resident commissioner’s assent, to arrest 
Maasina Rule leaders and crush the entire movement by means of a series 
of raids labeled “Operation Delouse.” This extreme response was based on 
gross misunderstandings of the movement as well as the resident commis-
sioner’s frustration at the remarkable Malaita-wide refusal to resume work-
ing on plantations. I explain the Malaitan resolve to resist a return to the 
old indentured labor system.
Chapter 7 examines a prolonged period of intense government repres-
sion and Malaitan resistance that followed Operation Delouse, particularly 
during 1948 and 1949. It quickly became clear that officers had badly mis-
read Maasina Rule; it was not, as they had believed, propelled by a clique of 
bullying leaders but was instead a truly popular movement that Malaitans 
were determined to carry forward even in the face of government attacks, 
with or without their jailed leaders. When the main leaders were sentenced 
to prison for sedition, a massive civil resistance campaign was organized, 
and thousands lined up for arrest and jail. Officers announced that the 
government would force every last Malaitan to concede its authority and 
legitimacy by ceasing disobedience, paying the head tax, and submitting 
to a census. Disrupted by the government campaign, Maasina Rule could 
no longer effectively pursue its constructive projects, and Malaitans turned 
their energies to defiance. Once the suppression campaign began, moder-
ate factions that the government might have negotiated with disappeared.
At this time Malaita was also rife with rumors about everything from 
impending arrival of American military ships and troops to drive away the 
British, to government plans to launch murderous attacks on movement fol-
lowers. Some officers claimed such ideas demonstrated how irrational the 
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movement was and why it had to be suppressed. Many anthropologists fol-
lowed their lead and for years analyzed Maasina Rule within the “cargo cult” 
literature. Later writers rejected such portrayals, arguing instead that such 
ideas were never important to the movement and that they distracted schol-
ars from grasping its political and liberationist nature. I examine these diver-
gent readings, and truths that lie between them, at the end of chapter 7.
By early 1950, it was clear that the government’s strategy—the years of 
mass arrests and refusals to negotiate until all Malaitans capitulated—had 
failed. Officers, but not Malaitans, had always said that if people began 
again to pay tax and to labor on the plantations it would mean the death 
of the resistance. Something under half of Malaitan men by this point had 
paid the tax to avoid further imprisonment; more men were signing on as 
shorter-term, non-indentured laborers; and people no longer lined up for 
prison. But, in a coordinated movement strategy, they instead fled from any 
contact with officers and would have nothing to do with any government 
endeavor. Further, resistance was now being guided by what was called the 
“Federal Council,” and its leaders were as unwilling as the government offi-
cers to compromise. The government had failed to attain its goal of forcing 
Malaitans to capitulate and acknowledge its legitimacy.
London wanted resolution and commencement of the political and eco-
nomic development that postwar colonial policy dictated, and the Colonial 
Office sent a new resident commissioner to seek a way out. He decided 
to release the head chiefs from prison on license and to initiate educa-
tional, medical, and agricultural projects on Malaita, though most of its 
people still refused to cooperate. This began a long, slow shift in govern-
ment policy away from coercion toward conciliation, with many fits, starts, 
and regressions along the way. Chapter 8 traces the three-year process of 
attrition and compromise that culminated in 1953 in the formal inaugura-
tion of an island-wide Malaita Council, most of whose members had been 
resistance leaders.
The book’s final chapter assesses what Malaitans, the government, and 
the Solomons gained and lost through Maasina Rule. The movement has 
usually been pronounced a failure, but most assessments of its outcomes 
have been poorly informed and cursory, with little analysis of adherents’ 
multiple, shifting, and at times contradictory goals. Likewise there has been 
no comparative examination of the colonial government’s varying goals 
and its successes and failures in attaining them. A more careful look at the 
changes that Maasina Rule brought about reveals both important gains and 
tragic losses for Malaita and for the Solomons as a whole. As part of this 
appraisal I discuss how kastom has remained a foundation of Malaitan politi-
cal thought and practice in the decades since Maasina Rule. 
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Chapter 1
The Half Century Before
This book’s main focus is a period that begins just after the colonial govern-
ment crushed the last martial resistance to its rule in 1927. By then, Malai-
tans had been interacting with Europeans for well over 50 years, and their 
societies had been radically changed by their men laboring abroad and by 
new technologies, weapons, crops, and political ideas. Many themes that 
appear in the chapters to follow first emerged during these early decades, 
and I want to summarize key aspects of the period for readers unfamiliar 
with Solomon Islands history. Particularly important are the impacts of the 
labor trade and, in the 1910s and 1920s, the imposition of government rule.
The Labor Trade
Pacific historians have exhaustively studied the labor trades of Fiji and, 
particularly, Queensland, Australia.1 Sustained Malaitan contact with Euro-
peans began about 1871 when the Solomons became a new frontier for 
labor recruiters. From the mid-1880s into the early twentieth century, Solo-
mon Islanders, especially Malaitans, made up the majority of Queensland 
recruits; by 1904 over 9,000 had gone there. About half that number of 
Solomon Islanders went to Fiji, some 60 percent of them Malaitans, and a 
few ended up in German Samoa or New Caledonia. Malaita has been the 
premier reservoir of Solomon Islands plantation labor ever since.2
European writers have often portrayed the labor trade simplistically, 
either as based on kidnapping or as a matter of young men, and a much 
smaller number of women, taking to the ship for adventure or respite from 
pressures and responsibilities of home. There is some truth in both portray-
als, but the bigger picture was much more complex. In some areas men were 
indeed kidnapped, or “blackbirded” early on, but as the Queensland trade 
swelled in the 1880s, although deceptive recruiting methods continued, 
most Malaitans went as volunteers or were offered up by their communities 
(sometimes with little say in the matter themselves). Nonetheless, the early 
abductions and the continuing exploitive nature of the trade and mistreat-
ment, humiliations, and violence on the plantations deeply stained Malaitan 
historical memories of the labor trade and their long-term perceptions of 
Europeans. The labor trade’s abuses remain politically evocative even today.3
The Half Century Before 15
The labor period clearly brought revolutionary changes to Malaita, but 
details of how or when many of them occurred, and even at times their 
precise nature, have eluded anthropologists and historians, as have core 
aspects of precontact Malaitan society. Daily life during this period, espe-
cially in the mountains where most people then lived, is mostly invisible in 
written records, and decades of great change took place before Europeans 
ventured beyond the coastal margins. In most parts of Malaita, colonial 
government became a significant force only in the later 1910s and 1920s, a 
half century after the labor trade began. Up to that time, Malaitans gener-
ally were able to deter European intrusions and manage foreign visitors via 
coastal middlemen; historian Clive Moore aptly labeled the island in the 
early decades after European arrival in the Solomons “fortress Malaita.” 
Here we find roots of Malaitans’ insistence that they decide for themselves 
what to adopt or reject from the outside, setting a pattern of what Roger 
Keesing called “compartmentalization”—selective demarcation of outside 
places, ways, and people as conceptually distinct and separated from the 
homeland and home ways.4 But we will see that Malaitans came to sharply 
disagree over where such boundaries should be drawn and what was suit-
able or unsuitable for them.
What is apparent is that Malaitans adapted with amazing speed to the 
changes brought about by European incursions. Beyond initial contacts, 
there is little evidence that they held Europeans in any awe, though for 
many decades, some whites would imagine people gazing at them in child-
like wonderment. Malaitan concerns quickly turned to acquiring new 
wealth, weapons, and other technologies through both peaceful and violent 
means. They soon became adept at dealing with whites and the demands 
of laboring, though this at times required considerable reassessment and 
revision of ancestral and other cultural rules. Many fundamental principles 
for changing and adapting ancestral religions (and later, Christianities) in 
contexts of rapid change evolved during this period.
A prime motivation for labor recruits and leaders who offered them up 
was a desire for trade goods, some of which dramatically changed Malaitan 
life. An early incentive was to obtain steel tools, at first tomahawks and then 
axe blades. Steel allowed men to clear jungle for gardening much more 
quickly, which meant increases in crops harvested and pig herds fed with 
them. Steel also revolutionized the making of many shell currencies used 
on the island (though Langalanga people used stone tools to make shell 
beads into the later twentieth century). These and related changes led to 
enormous expansions of and inflation in feasting, brideprices, compensa-
tions for dispute resolution, bounties paid for killings, and other socioeco-
nomic institutions.
Before long, many men were signing on largely to get guns. For years it 
was legal to import and sell them, and Malaitans acquired imposing arse-
nals. Most were smoothbore muskets and the more powerful steel-barreled 
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Snider-Enfield breach-loaders (accurate to 100 meters) cast off by the 
British army for the 0.45 Martini-Henry in 1871 and sold by thousands to 
recruiters. They also obtained Spencers, Winchesters, Martini-Henrys, pis-
tols, and other arms. In 1883 Anglican Bishop John Selwyn claimed that 
every returnee carried one or more guns and several hundred rounds of 
ammunition, and many more weapons were given as beach payments for 
new recruits. An 1884 act prohibited British firearm (and liquor) sales, 
despite raucous opposition from whites in Queensland and the “sullen 
indignation” of Melanesians, but guns kept coming via French recruiters, 
and illegally from Australian recruiters and rampant smuggling by return-
ees. In 1902 the Protectorate’s first resident commissioner, Charles Wood-
ford, guessed that Malaitans held 4,000–5,000 Winchester repeating rifles, 
and his deputy, Arthur Mahaffy, claimed that 80 percent of men owned 
guns. As late as 1927, men of one north Malaita district surrendered 1,077 
guns in fear of government reprisal for the killing of a district officer far-
ther south, though by then there was little ammunition on the island.5
It is usually assumed that guns triggered increased violence on Malaita 
and elsewhere in Melanesia, but this is hard to gauge and difficult to detach 
from changing modes of conflict and destabilizing impacts of other rapid 
Figure 1.1. “Men of Central Malaita, Armed Bushmen at home,” ca 1911, near 
the west Kwaio-Kwara‘ae border. (Photo by Northcote Deck, courtesy of the SSEM 
Archive, 5MENFR~1.)
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changes taking place. It is notable that later, as ammunition grew very scarce, 
violence continued at high levels. Patterns of fighting varied through time 
with shifting supplies, distribution, and models of guns and ammunition, as 
well as with changing social conditions. Guns extinguished certain modes 
of violence. For example, one style of Malaitan warfare resembled that in 
the New Guinea Highlands: groups formally faced off at established fight-
ing grounds to duel with bows and spears, layered tapa cloth body armor, 
and painted shields of wood and bark coated with flint shards or canarium 
almond shells, while women repaired arrows behind the lines. But guns put 
an end to all that.6
Soon, new sorts of leaders emerged. Most Malaitan harbors had one 
or more “passage masters” (referring to passages through reefs or into 
harbors), who acted as middlemen between communities and recruiters. 
Called “interpreter men” (Pijin: tobetamani), most were former laborers 
familiar with Europeans and Pijin. Men like Kwaisulia of ‘Adagege in north-
ern Lau and Fo‘alanga of Walade in the south expanded their spheres and 
degrees of influence far beyond what had been possible before on Malaita 
by redistributing guns and other goods they received for recruits.7 Such 
men were sophisticated negotiators and though recruiters and missionar-
ies denigrated many as manipulators or cheats they could not avoid them.8
At some passages, several men might assert rights to negotiate with Euro-
peans and claim the title of sifi (chief). When the Helena called at Uru in 
east Malaita in 1892, “At least five men claimed to be ‘masters’ of local 
villages,” and a few years later, after Anglican Bishop Cecil Wilson visited 
‘Ataa farther north, he reported, “Every man I met said he was a chief, 
and wanted presents of hooks, etc.” A government officer in 1909 wrote 
of Malaita, “The district appears to be inhabited solely by chiefs.” Some 
leaders marshaled goods brought home by returned laborers and deployed 
them in feasting and other competitive exchanges. In places young men 
converted their trade goods into local wealth and entered economic realms 
formerly dominated by older men. Others found new power through their 
guns, which some used to kill to collect blood bounties. In these and other 
ways, the political-economic scene was remade.9
The labor trade brought many other new things. Initial disquiet that 
whites smoked from fires within was soon laughed off, and many Solomon 
Islanders became addicted to tobacco. Getting it soon became an impor-
tant motivation for leaving to labor on plantations. For decades Virginia 
tobacco sticks served as a currency, and naturalist Henry Guppy wrote, 
“A white man without tobacco in these islands is worse off than a man 
without money in his purse in London.” Food crops that were introduced 
included pineapple and papaya, and new varieties of taro, yams, bananas, 
and sugarcane. Sweet potato, later a Malaitan staple, first came to most 
places during the labor trade, though for most inland people it did not 
become an important food crop right away, and in some places not until 
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blights devastated taro in the mid-1920s. Imported ornamental plants and 
trees were also popular.10
Taro and yam gardens were a source of prestige and men worked hard 
in them, but the potato was considered a mundane “women’s crop,” so the 
more it was planted, the more garden work fell to women. As potatoes grew 
in importance, once-vital taro rituals conducted by priests in special shrines 
were abridged or faded away. Yam ritual complexes built on shrine hierar-
chies integrated different regions of Malaita, but these disappeared by the 
early twentieth century. Bigger and more aggressive pig breeds arrived also, 
and soon Malaitans demanded them as payment for recruits. Because of 
them, gardens needed stronger fences, which were hard work to build, and 
roving swine destroying gardens became a major cause of disputes. Unwel-
come arrivals included the aggressive weeds that returning laborers used 
to pack their boxes of trade goods, which greatly increased garden work, 
and also rats. Imported cats helped control the latter but wiped out ground-
nesting birds. The terrible new diseases that came are discussed in chapter 3.
Real and perceived excesses of the labor trade raised an outcry in some 
European circles, especially among missionaries, and this was one factor 
that pressured Britain to expand its realm into the Solomons. Important 
here too was the violence the trade spawned, especially that directed against 
Europeans. Over the first 30 years, Malaita acquired a sanguinary reputa-
tion among whites, who wryly referred to killings there as “death by natural 
cause.” Early on, Malaitans assaulted recruiting vessels for plunder, prestige, 
and revenge for past abuses and attacks, particularly along the east coast. 
Open bounties placed on unspecified Europeans or ships became com-
mon and motivated many attacks, and some of these stood into the later 
1920s. This reflected the Malaitan view that a person’s relatives or allies 
could be held liable for their misdeeds. Europeans pointed to such boun-
ties as indicative of the brutal nature of Malaitan societies, but they were 
a crucial leveling mechanism since via them militarily weak groups could 
use wealth gained through production and exchange to defend themselves 
against communities with more fighters and, later, those with more guns. 
Bounties assured a rough balance between martial and economic power, 
and integrated them. They also led (especially when bounty hunting inten-
sified during the labor period) to murders of hundreds of innocent people, 
including many women and children. As with bounties placed on Malai-
tans, groups pooled resources to sponsor bounties on Europeans.11
Europeans had few options for avenging attacks. In the phrase of 
Anglican missionary Arthur Hopkins, based in northeast Malaita starting 
in 1902, coastal people and those on tiny offshore islands in the Lau and 
Langalanga lagoons were “get-at-able,” though it was often impossible to 
know exactly who to punish. Inland people were mostly unget-at-able, and 
at that time many parts of Malaita had no coastal settlements. Warships 
occasionally lobbed shells into the hills but rarely did serious damage. The 
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European quandary resembled that faced by Malaitans wronged by Europe-
ans unknown or out of reach, and they responded in much the same way: 
whites were quick to ascribe sweeping group responsibility for attacks by 
individuals or small groups. As local informants became available—often 
returned laborers or passage masters—it was easier to learn who was cul-
pable, and Europeans sometimes posted bounties of their own. But often 
such knowledge was brushed aside and innocents were punished “to teach 
the natives a lesson.”12
Figure 1.2. “Malaitans on the beach just after returned laborers have been landed 
with their boxes of trade goods, northwest Malaita,” 1907. (Photo by George Rose, 
Rose Stereographs 12257, Thomas Edge-Partington collection, courtesy of the 
Edge-Partington family.)
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Military attacks would later prove effective in bringing under European 
control some parts of the Protectorate, such as coastal areas and the West-
ern Solomons. But submission in those places was partly due to Islanders’ 
recognition that warfare was hindering their participation in an economic 
scene increasingly dominated by European trade and cash cropping. Like-
wise on Malaita, by the mid-1890s European-Malaitan clashes were on the 
decline. Recruiters got better at avoiding attacks, but more important, as 
relations became more routinized, Malaitans in power, particularly along 
the coast, came to see that violence against whites hampered doing business 
with them. However, Malaitans continued to kill Malaitans into the 1920s, 
and due to Malaita’s place in the colonial economic system—as a labor 
pool rather than a site of plantations—Europeans saw little need to pursue 
internal pacification there. For them, and for those Malaitans who most 
benefited from labor recruitment, the pressing need was for peace between 
Malaitans and Europeans. Internal fighting could even be profitable since 
two important motivations for signing on as labor were flight from violence 
and a need for guns.13
Life Abroad
I cannot detail here the lives of Melanesians in Queensland and Fiji. His-
torians have distilled and published voluminous archival materials on the 
topic, and what follows draws much from their work. My primary interest is 
in the impacts of labor experiences abroad on Malaitan societies. Islanders’ 
plantation experiences varied greatly. As Peter Corris described, the degree 
to which laborers were exposed to foreign ways, and thus often the extent 
to which they returned home changed persons, depended on many factors, 
most basic being their location and period of employment and the length 
of time they spent abroad. Rural Fiji was more like the Solomons than was 
Queensland, and within Australia men who worked on isolated farms led 
different lives from those on large plantations near Bundaberg or Mackay. 
The work and social conditions in both Queensland and Fiji also changed 
over time; recruits in 1900 had experiences quite unlike those in 1871. For 
instance, as the Queensland sugar industry blossomed in the early 1880s, 
men increasingly found themselves working larger estates, but when planta-
tions were subdivided in the 1890s, more Islanders again worked on smaller 
farms.14
At first Melanesians taken abroad filled many roles such as servants, fish-
ermen, cotton pickers, and shepherds. An 1884 Queensland bill barred the 
men from all but unskilled agricultural work, though noncontract work-
ers continued to do other jobs. By the time more Malaitans were arriving, 
sugarcane was moving to the fore. As a Kwaio friend explained to me, most 
“worked on the sugar for the white people to put in their tea.”15 Treatment 
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of laborers varied; severe physical brutality was not the norm but did occur, 
and working conditions were often deficient or demeaning. Over time 
improvements were made and mortality rates fell, though Ralph Shlomo-
witz has argued that the drop owed more to increased resistance to diseases 
than to better treatment.16
The experience was hardest for first-time recruits adjusting to new social 
scenes, climates, housing, diets, and infections.17 But as time passed, ever 
more Melanesians in both Queensland and Fiji were so-called “old chums”—
those who lived there for longer periods or reenlisted one or more times. 
Newcomers learned from them, and in later years many arrived abroad 
already knowing the English, Pijin, or Fijian being spoken and taught in 
the Solomons and on ships. Some decided where to sign on for based on 
detailed information from previous recruits.18
Melanesians differed widely in how and to what extent they adopted for-
eign practices abroad (including those of other Melanesians), put aside 
their own, or combined them with innovations distinct to plantation identi-
ties and cultures. Some, particularly those who stayed longer, took up hous-
ing and lifestyles that looked more European. A few acquired land and 
hired workers, or owned businesses in the “Kanakatown” districts Melane-
sians frequented, where stores catered to Islanders and became sites for 
socializing. During the 1890s, one-third had bank accounts holding an aver-
age of £8 (new indentured workers earned £6 a year; white plowmen up 
to £66).19
Christian missionaries pressed Melanesian laborers to repudiate indige-
nous practices and take up European ones, but as in most colonial situations 
they did not want them to fully adopt white ways. They could, in Mahmood 
Mamdani’s words, be “almost the same but not quite,” though here the 
distance of separation was to remain great, and whites often belittled those 
who transgressed boundaries as absurd mimics. Many whites were preoc-
cupied with the clothing Islanders wore—oblivious to their rich senses of 
style and fashion, Europeans saw their attire as a façade that concealed 
and falsely denied the savage beneath. To missionaries, dapper Melanesians 
lacked the humility proper to Christians, as one explained: “Many Mela-
nesians waste an enormous amount of money in dress. It is pleasant to see 
them clean and tidy; but when a ‘boy’ comes to Church in a faultless suit, 
with a white starched shirt and collar, an expensive orange and red tie, and, 
to crown all, with his mustache waxed to an extreme point, it is sad to see 
his vanity and what a fool he has made of himself. He is not going to spoil 
his trousers by kneeling down.”20 These views betrayed not just contempt 
but fear, for such men threatened the black-white distinctions and segrega-
tion so vital to those Europeans who wanted Melanesians to aspire to sta-
tus no higher than servants. These white fears later became more palpable 
back in the Solomons with rules that forbid Melanesians to wear shirts, usu-
ally citing health concerns.21
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We have limited data on how Melanesians maintained or discarded cul-
tural and religious practices abroad. Here again, individuals varied, much 
as Malaitans still do when traveling. It is important to know that these men 
were not so cut off from their home communities and social networks as 
we might suppose. Many recruited together with relatives, and men who 
went on the same ship often stayed together and even refused to be sep-
arated. From Langalanga, Deryck Scarr found, “Scores of people would 
engage together, so that there was a constant flow of young men, espe-
cially, between their villages and the plantations.” Also, many Melanesians 
became literate and were, Hopkins later recalled, “great letter writers,” and 
thereby exchanged news of deaths, births, and other events both at home 
and abroad. It is said that bounties were posted on Malaita for killings in 
Queensland.22 Then again, one can exaggerate links to home. At least into 
the 1890s, deaths abroad often went unreported or misreported on Malaita. 
For example, in 1886 the ship Young Dick was attacked at Sinalagu Harbour 
to avenge a death falsely reported from Queensland. The ship kidnapped 
Sinalagu passage master Geni‘eloa, who spent years in Fiji and Queensland 
before returning home in the 1890s to find his family thinking him dead 
and his mortuary rites long concluded. People at times turned to divination 
for news of faraway kin.23
Malaitans quickly developed new strategies for managing religious rules 
in places where they had little control. The chief difficulty was interactions 
with foreigners, both European and Melanesian, who did not know, let 
Figure 1.3. Three Melanesian men in Queensland, nd. (Courtesy of the State 
Library of Queensland, negative 18044, photographer unknown.)
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alone observe, the behavioral rules or taboos that ancestral spirits enforced 
among descendants. At home, even Malaitans from the same language 
group followed different taboos enforced by their specific ancestors, and 
rules that a person observed at home and abroad were key identity markers. 
In recruiting, taboos could become problematic as soon as a man entered 
a ship’s hold if women were known to have trodden the deck above, since 
men could not be underneath women or places they had walked. All ances-
tors also forbade male descendants being exposed to menstruation, and 
so women aboard the same ship could present difficulties.24 Fewer women 
were recruited from Malaita, but they might in any case be aboard ships 
that called there, and innovative solutions had to be devised if men were 
to travel with them. This did not mean that taboos were fully waived. For 
example, the most profound taboo violation for Malaitan men was to have 
contact with childbirth, and Corris found that resulting problems led to 
government agents being told in the early 1880s to bar pregnant women 
from the ships.25
People negotiated with their ancestors new ground rules for proper 
behavior abroad, to follow taboos when possible but waive them when nec-
essary. Like so many other things, taboo observation, and taboos themselves, 
changed over time and varied from person to person, and those who stayed 
in Queensland or Fiji longer were less likely to observe taboos, among other 
reasons because more of them became Christians. Models developed for 
religious practice abroad extended older principles for adjusting, mitigat-
ing, or waiving ancestral taboos at home, in ways that allowed men to live a 
normal life while away. Many of these models are still applied by non-Chris-
tian Malaitans on plantations or in towns. Later, when “foreign” things, ways, 
and institutions proliferated in the Solomons and then on Malaita itself, the 
rules and procedures for adapting them abroad were extended once again, 
but now in reverse, applied back to spaces defined as “foreign” in the home-
land. These eventually included plantations and district stations, and, most 
important, the Christian villages that began to appear around Malaita. As 
the twentieth century progressed, an increasing proportion of the world 
Malaitans moved in came to be defined as, to varying degrees, outside of 
the ancestral domain, and thus as places and spaces where ancestral taboos 
might be selectively relaxed or put aside. In areas where they were still fol-
lowed, taboos at times became stricter, as they became both for ancestors 
and their descendants symbols of rivalries with Christian communities and 
markers to hold the line against further decadence. What emerged over 
time was a highly contested politics of space and taboos.26 This all interests 
us in part because we will see that Europeans often portrayed Malaitans as 
innately conservative, as servile to “rigid custom,” and as most conspicu-
ously so in their religious behavior. But the labor period as a whole, and 
particularly how quickly people adapted religious beliefs and practices to 
change, gives lie to that perspective. Christians applied similar principles of 
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taboo interpretation to their new religious rules, often to the consternation 
of missionaries.27
Some Christian Malaitans abroad believed it sinful to accommodate 
ancestral taboos, a precept that later caused endless conflicts back on 
Malaita. Once back home, most returned to their ancestors, but over time 
a growing number maintained their new religion there, often in the face 
of great danger and social hardship. People could not fully rejoin their 
home communities as practicing Christians, and instead they formed small, 
mostly coastal communities. Some Malaitans opposed their fellows adopt-
ing Christianity even while abroad, perceiving in it threats to their ancestral 
religions, morality, and power; after returning home they disparaged the 
churches and warned others against tolerating them. This set the scene for 
future hostilities.
The Fiji labor scene has been studied much less than Queensland’s, but 
a different situation unfolded there—laborers in Fiji more often lived on 
smaller, isolated plantations, especially after the mid-1880s, sometimes on 
islands far away from any town. Another crucial difference with Queensland 
arose from similarities among Fijian and Solomons cultures. Relatively few 
Fijians worked on plantations, but Malaitans interacted with them and 
some married or otherwise integrated into Fijian society. Corris wrote that 
laborers found it easier to maintain their cultural practices in Fiji than in 
Queensland. Anglican missionary Walter Ivens, based in south Malaita, 
wrote that many laborers in Fiji “merely changed one set of native con-
Figure 1.4. Malaitans performing a sango dance in Fiji for a mostly Melanesian audi-
ence, ca 1904. One dancer wears a beaded Christian cross. Sango was performed 
throughout north Malaita into southern Kwaio for mortuary feasts and after kill-
ings. (Postcard in author’s collection, photographer unknown.)
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ditions for another—living on a plantation and learning Fijian or mixing 
almost entirely with natives and learning but little English. Practically they 
still were natives instead of being bad copies of a certain class of whites.” 
Later, so many Solomon Islanders knew Fijian (some learning it in the Solo-
mons) that there was talk of making it the Protectorate’s official language.28
Malaitan returnees brought home aspects of Fijian religion and other cul-
ture borrowings, but few details are known about the extent to which Solo-
mon Islanders and Fijians felt a common identity, and there were rivalries 
and fights among them.
What is certain is that in both Queensland and Fiji, Islanders forged 
new, broader ethnic identities as Malaitans, Solomon Islanders, and Mel-
anesians. In 1971 Aduru Kuva interviewed surviving Kwara‘ae and Kwaio 
recruits still in Fiji, who recounted how ethnic barriers weakened as soon as 
they boarded recruiting ships:
Mutual animosity of people from different tribes would normally have been too 
great even for them to consider a long voyage together, yet on the ship these 
people become almost a closed community, very much isolated from shore com-
munities and their influences. Any desire to harm former enemies was super-
seded by the overriding need to live peacefully and safely on the ship. Recruits 
were also under the explicit instructions of the recruiters, the captains, and the 
“old hands” aboard not to quarrel or fight. . . . The recruits found that on the two 
to three month voyage tribal feelings tended to dissolve because they had to inte-
grate in their daily activities. All became Solomon Islanders with a common pur-
pose and a common identity which they would not have recognized on shore.29
Such bonds were sometimes maintained back home, and Kwaio and ‘Are‘are 
people today trace their long alliance on plantations to the early labor 
period. Some enmities remained and new ones emerged, most famously 
in Queensland between Malaitans and men from Tanna in the New Heb-
rides.30 What endured, and resurfaced in later political movements, were 
new, shared identities grounded in the common political lessons gained 
from like dealings with Europeans.31
In Queensland and Fiji there emerged a third culture, neither strictly 
European nor Melanesian, but rather what Ted Schwartz referred to as 
“contact culture” and Keesing later called “plantation culture.” This was 
the culture of Melanesians, predominantly men, living together aboard 
ships, on plantations, and in towns. To some extent it encompassed Euro-
peans within these settings. At the same time, it was not fully separated 
from life back home—labor migration and plantation culture became 
integral aspects of Melanesian societies, not merely a break with or escape 
from them, and this remains true today. Within plantation culture, codes 
of social relations evolved between Islanders and Europeans and between 
different Islander groups, along with new structures of commerce, politics, 
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marriage, conflict, and religious practice. Malaitans devised individual and 
group guidelines as to how social and religious rules were to be adapted to 
foreign settings, and how to reestablish social relations with living kin and 
ancestral spirits on one’s return home. At the same time, various politi-
cal, philosophical, and religious ideas and practices diffused throughout 
Melanesia, facilitated by new crosscutting identities and relationships, and 
shared languages like Fijian, English, Hiri Motu, and other pidgins.32
Christian Missions and the Labor Scene
A key connector of many Melanesians abroad was their shared adoption of 
Christianities, and Christians were among the Malaitans who came home 
most outwardly changed. They varied considerably, as they still do, in the 
degree to which they embraced the new faiths, and in their understand-
ings and interpretations of different denominational teachings. Malaitan 
Christianities from the start embodied Melanesian ideas that distinguished 
them from European versions. Although in this book I sometimes refer to 
“Christians” as a group and “Christianity” in the singular (as Malaitans, both 
Christian and not, often do), this diversity must be kept always in mind.
The established Christian missions maintained odd relationships with 
the labor trade as both its staunchest critics and some of its most obvious 
beneficiaries. Many missionaries were relentless and important public 
advocates for Islander rights and were influential in bringing about better 
recruiting and labor practices. At times they exaggerated in sweeping terms 
the trade’s brutality, for example by emphasizing blatant kidnapping even 
after it had largely stopped, and they also inflated its negative impacts on 
Melanesian societies. Some saw the trade as undermining Church control 
over Islanders. In many places, missionaries had been the first and the only 
Europeans to deal with local communities on a regular basis and their influ-
ence could be enormous. But the labor trade gave Melanesians alterna-
tive means of obtaining European knowledge and goods. It exposed them 
to being “stained by contact with Chinese and low white folk” in whom 
missionaries saw a corrupting influence and spiritual danger, exemplified 
by “the man who went home from Queensland and told his friends that 
Christianity could not be so very important after all, for white people didn’t 
think much of it.”33 In essence, many missionaries wished to be European 
“passage masters” and thereby mediate all Islanders’ contacts with outsid-
ers, and they felt this was imperative if they were to be protected and prop-
erly civilized. It was hoped that under missionary guidance, rather than 
signing on as labor, they would “sign on for Jesus.”34 These ambitions and 
anxieties fed ongoing missionary tensions with each other, as well as with 
colonial officials, traders, and the laborers who came home more sophisti-
cated in and critical of European ways.
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Yet the labor trade also gave missions opportunities to infiltrate societies 
previously inaccessible, indifferent, or hostile. The Anglican Church had 
enjoyed some success in removing individual Melanesians from their homes 
for religious training on distant Norfolk Island, after which they were sent 
out to proselytize. But that process was slow, expensive, and piecemeal, and 
once back home, “native teachers” often gave in to family and other pres-
sures to return to ancestral ways.35 Queensland and Fiji offered attractive 
settings for pursuing a similar strategy more cheaply and on a much larger 
scale. Away from their homes, Melanesians were easier to access and con-
trol, and many were eager to experiment with new ideas.
Missionaries, like many Europeans, nonetheless found Melanesian social 
freedoms abroad problematic. One author in the Anglican journal Southern 
Cross Log wrote, “There is in Queensland an almost entire absence of con-
trol. A Melanesian . . . soon finds out that when his work is done he is a free 
man in a free land; so long as he does not offend against the civil law he may 
go where he pleases and do as he pleases. He has left public opinion behind 
in his island. He is like an undergraduate at the university.” Without proper 
guidance and control, a man abroad might be open to new religious ideas 
but also to new vices. The same writer observed men dodging missionar-
ies who pursued them: “When the plantation where he works is visited, he 
knows of the visit and can keep well out of the way. There is no opportunity 
of seeing him unless it be a chance meeting, and then he might run for it.” 
Some time-expired workers, he claimed, relocated to other plantations to 
escape the missionary’s persistent “warning or advice.”36
Established mission societies were slow to grasp the opportunities 
Queensland offered them. Due to logistics, Anglicans made no concerted 
official effort to provide teachers for Melanesians on Queensland planta-
tions until 1896 (though individual Anglicans taught before then); the Lon-
don Missionary Society did not want to compromise its vehement opposi-
tion to the labor trade; and the Catholics in Fiji would not baptize Solomon 
Islanders for fear that, as Bishop Francis Redwood put it, “on returning 
to their pagan lands, and deprived of [Catholic] missionaries, they would 
revert to paganism.”37 But they soon noticed the success of independent 
missionaries working on plantations, some of whom they correctly foresaw 
as future competitors. Anglican Bishop Henry Montgomery of Tasmania 
encountered women teaching laborers in Fiji in 1892: “I was more and 
more interested as the hours passed at Suva, to learn about the hundred 
and fifty Melanesians attending their school night after night, of the ear-
nest-minded ladies who assisted, and of the communicants among these 
Mala men. It was then borne in upon me with force that the labour traf-
fic could be made a mighty engine for the conversion of the South Seas, 
and that what was once a curse might prove a blessing in Christian hands.” 
Three years later Bishop Wilson wrote, “I cannot see how we are to get at 
Malanta [sic] except through Queensland and Fiji; yet as a rule returned 
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labourers in these places are of no use to us.” The bishops were late to the 
game, for by this time in Queensland it was said that roughly 75 percent 
of Melanesians were having some contact with Presbyterian, Anglican, or, 
especially, nondenominational teachings, mostly via small European evan-
gelical groups or individuals, particularly women. Fewer Malaitans were 
proselytized in Fiji, most of them by Anglicans.38
Most important was the Queensland Kanaka Mission, a nondenomi-
national evangelical mission founded in 1886 by Florence Young on 
her brothers’ Fairymead sugar plantation in Bundaberg, where she had 
preached to laborers since 1882. The mission enjoyed phenomenal success 
and soon spread through the plantation districts; by 1904, 19 missionaries 
and 118 unpaid “native teachers” were at work. By its 1907 closing, 2,484 
Islanders had been baptized in the area’s rivers, 589 of them Malaitans. 
Up to 7,000 had attended Bible classes taught in Pijin at night or on Sun-
days, with more of them from Malaita than any other island. Teachers and 
students who had returned to Malaita besieged Young with requests for 
assistance, and in 1904 she took her mission there, where it became the 
South Sea Evangelical Mission (SSEM), later Malaita’s largest and most 
politically active church.39
Relations in Queensland between missionaries and plantation owners 
could be symbiotic, and missions received money from businessmen who 
found Christian laborers more manageable. One donor, when told Young’s 
mission did not ask for money, told her, “But it is worth money to me. My boys 
do better work, and I think we planters should contribute to the cost of the 
Mission.” Other planters were less sympathetic, and Anglican Archdeacon 
Lonsdale Pritt said that some opposed missionary work “just for the rea-
son that it makes the ‘boys’ ‘know too much,’ and sets them against their 
masters. . . . Boys have been known who were forward as leaders of others in 
school who were also leaders of sedition. The doctrine of all men’s equality 
in the sight of Heaven may be so presented to untutored minds as to practi-
cally obliterate those relations of order and subordination without which 
no human society can exist. Care is needed.”40
Florence Young’s Bible schools became a centerpiece of her mission’s 
structure. Other white Christians of various denominations set up similar 
ones, many taught by women. They offered Melanesians a sense of com-
munity abroad that bridged ethnic groups, a new or added source of spiri-
tual protection, avenues for gaining prestige as church teachers, and inter-
actions with Europeans who were friendly and sympathetic.41 A promise 
of education remained the missions’ most potent draw for decades, and 
Malaitan attendees acquired varying degrees of knowledge. The Kanaka 
Mission curriculum consisted of simple Bible classes with a modicum of 
elementary literacy taught by the Youngs and their colleagues—salvation, 
not education, was the overriding goal. Still, many Melanesians did learn 
to read; in 1892 it was claimed 45 percent of the men on one plantation 
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were literate.42 The most successful students were selected as teachers and 
many began holding small classes of their own. To this day Malaitans call 
church leaders tisa (teachers) and Christianity and Christian villages sukulu 
(school). Decades later, the missions’ failure to fulfill Malaitan desires for 
serious education would lead many to reject white missionaries, but not 
their Christian faiths or the Malaita-wide organizational structures that 
Christians built.
Return from the White Man’s Land
A good house to live in, clothes of European cut, shops to spend 
money in, and alas! grog only too easily, albeit illegally acquired. 
This is the heritage of the kanaka, and he is happy in his new life, 
and, in some cases, all the better for it; for, possibly, a night-school 
is on or near his plantation and he goes there when the work of the 
day is done, and he learns to read and write, and to believe in God 
and his Savior. . . . Death carries off many and white men’s vices are 
acquired, and all the misery that these vices bring: and it is a ragged 
regiment that returns after the three years’ service in the white man’s 
land. . . . All who are thus taken away, are, whether we like it or no, 
educated for evil if not for good by their contact with a white superior 
race; and the labour-vessel, in returning labourers, is really returning 
so many school-masters to teach their fellows the evil or the good that 
they themselves have learned in the distant, civilized land from which 
they have come. Thus it is that no ships have left their mark upon the 
islands, like these labour-vessels who deal in “souls of men.”
—Southern Cross Log (August 1895, 12)
Beware of the non-Christian returned labourer; as a rule they are plau-
sible, good-for-nothing fellows.
—Walter Ivens, Hints to Missionaries to Melanesia (1907, 26)
Writers have often portrayed Malaitans who returned from abroad as hav-
ing quickly blended back into their “closed,” traditional societies, separated 
once again from Europeans and their influences, their lives little altered by 
the experience. Sometimes this expressed the notion that Melanesians were 
so deeply conservative that they could not truly change; changes that they 
seemed to undergo abroad were cast as superficial and ephemeral. This 
complements another image sometimes presented of Melanesians abroad 
as having fully shed their home cultures; likewise, on return they put aside 
the new and simply reverted to former ways and thinking.43
Part of the confusion stems from the assumption, deeply ingrained in the 
West, that change in the modern world inevitably means becoming more 
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like the West. Malaitan innovations that develop Malaitan cultural themes, 
because they still appear exotic to Europeans, have often been misread as 
exemplifying unchanging “traditional” or “customary” ways. Few historians 
or anthropologists have conveyed the degree to which Malaitan societies—
the local communities that returned laborers rejoined—were altered dur-
ing these decades. Even before the labor trade ended, pre-1870 Malaitan life 
was a distant memory held by ever-fewer people, and long before Europe-
ans gained any significant presence on Malaita, new tools, weapons, crops, 
and wealth changed every realm of life there. Just as important as material 
changes were the new ideas returned laborers shared out, including their 
familiarity with Europeans and recognition of dangers they presented. As 
the European presence on Malaita increased, so too did a defiant Malaitan 
insistence on autonomy that still infuses much Malaitan political thought 
today as an elemental basis of kastom ideologies. In these and other ways 
the labor period changed Malaitan worldviews and their conceptions of 
themselves and their societies, profoundly shaping the island’s subsequent 
history. What follows will sketch out the close of the overseas labor trade, 
its impacts on Malaitans at home (particularly in terms of their political 
consciousness), and finally the imposition of British military control over 
the island.
As the new century began, the number of Melanesians in Queensland 
was still rising. Then, in December 1901, the Australian government 
passed the Pacific Islands Labourers Act to end the labor trade for good. 
No new Melanesian arrivals would be allowed after 1903, and those 
remaining would be deported en masse in 1906 and 1907. After Islanders, 
Christian missions, and others protested the bill’s harshness, exemptions 
were granted to a few. Melanesians formed lobbying groups and thousands 
signed petitions, but to little avail. Some who had fled trouble on their 
islands and feared what might await them there pleaded to stay.44 The Fiji 
trade carried on at one vessel per year until it too ended in 1911 under 
pressure from the Solomons, where a corporate plantation scene was 
developing. Resident Commissioner Woodford had attracted companies 
like Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd and Burns Philp to set up operations 
there so the fledgling Protectorate could support itself economically. Even 
were the Queensland trade to resume, he wrote, Australia would have to 
look elsewhere for laborers.45
The mass deportation from Queensland of so many Melanesians, includ-
ing 3,000 Malaitans, was neither easy nor humane. About half had been 
there for long periods, and many had settled in Australia and adopted ways 
of life impossible on Malaita. Some of their offspring had never been to the 
islands and were ignorant of their people’s languages and cultures. In some 
cases particular family members were expelled while others were eligible to 
stay. People who had run away from trouble at home begged to take their 
firearms back with them but were not allowed to, though many back on 
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Malaita were heavily armed, and the government had no presence there 
to protect deportees. In the Solomons, all had the option of being landed 
at the government center of Tulagi in the Gela group to seek work there 
or, from there, elsewhere in the Protectorate. About 250 Malaitans went 
straight to Fiji, and another 400 went there from Malaita. Others signed 
on for new Solomon Islands plantations, most on three-year indenture 
contracts.46
Some deportees did not know how different life would be on Malaita, 
and this ignorance of destination is further caution against overstating links 
Figure 1.5. “On board a recruiting labour schooner, Malaita, Solomon Islands. A 
fortified island is visible in the distance,” 1907. (Photo by George Rose, Thomas 
Edge-Partington collection, courtesy of the Edge-Partington family.)
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Malaitans abroad maintained with home. Jack McClaren, captain of a boat 
carrying returnees, overheard Malaitans aboard happily anticipating their 
arrival: “I heard them talking of buying pieces of garden land and wives to 
work them, and of building houses with doors and windows and verandas all 
round, like white men’s houses, and living down the years in ease and com-
fort. Wherefore they spent their wages-savings in trade-goods they thought 
would be acceptable to the people of their respective villages, who, dazzled 
by the number and utility of the things, would be ready to do anything 
for the wealthy home-comers.” Ivens wrote of one ship’s arrival: “Sewing-
machines and gramophones might have been bought up cheaply a week or 
two after [the returnees] had landed. In some cases sewing machines were 
actually abandoned on the beach, for no one cared to carry them slung on 
a pole into the interior. . . . Brown boots and bowler hats and starched shirts 
and collars and ties were seen adorning the persons of all and sundry in 
the neighborhood when the trade boxes of the returns had been opened. 
Babies that were brought ashore in all the glory of woolen socks and bon-
nets and white clothes were rolling about naked by nightfall.”47
There was scattered violence on Malaita, including killings, particularly 
during an initial wave of returnees before the deportation deadline arrived, 
but overall the main return took place without the bloodshed and upheaval 
many had predicted.48 The event provided a splendid opening for missions, 
especially the SSEM. Everyone knew that many deportees were longtime 
Christians who had become alienated from mountain lifestyles and had 
badly wanted to stay in Australia. Missionaries made extensive preparations 
for their arrival, including establishing communities for them, and many 
Christians were landed at Malu‘u in To‘abaita and other coastal mission 
settlements around the island. As some settled in areas not their own (most 
temporarily), churches cultivated social and political networks across lin-
guistic and cultural boundaries.49
Some Malaitans saw larger church communities as dangerous, particu-
larly if their members ignored ancestral taboos. In early years, many Chris-
tians followed some taboos, took part in bridewealth and other exchanges, 
and lived in relative harmony with neighbors. Many Christian returnees had 
faced intense pressure from relatives to come back to their ancestors and 
communities, and to the dismay of missionaries most did so. But as Chris-
tian settlements grew and church policies forbid following taboos or engag-
ing in formal exchanges with the larger community, more people came to 
see the settlements as a threat. For protection, Christians formed larger 
villages and consolidated into united fronts, and while these provided some 
safety they also presented a more obvious challenge to the dominant social 
order.50
During the century’s first decade, Christian life on Malaita became more 
perilous still. The growing enclaves that dotted the shore, and a few inland 
areas, were increasingly harried by neighbors. Some built forts, like one 
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Hopkins described at Malu‘u: “They took us to their retreat. It was an amaz-
ing place. Built round the large men’s hut, none too clean, dark and low, 
was a massive stockade. There was a first barrier of upright tree trunks some 
eight to ten feet high; then about two feet apart was a second barrier of 
tree trunks and the space in between was filled in with earth and soft stuff 
fastening the two together [with] the whole structure making an immensely 
strong stockade. In the hut at night forty people gathered, by day they gar-
dened en masse.”51 Though Christians were often portrayed by Europeans 
as helpless victims of attacks, some fought back with their own deadly vio-
lence. Nonetheless, many continued to be killed right into the 1910s. They 
were further imperiled since they were attractive targets for blood bounties; 
they were less likely to retaliate, and government laws against guns more 
effectively disarmed coastal Christian communities.52 These conflicts estab-
lished religious divisions and rivalries that persisted until Maasina Rule and 
resumed after it.
Some returnees saw local leaders to be backward, and Hopkins observed 
them to “defy all authority tribal, governmental and Christian.” A decade 
later, Malaita’s District Officer William Bell commented that many of the 
men he chased as murderers had been to Fiji or Queensland. Still other 
returning laborers had simply lost all connection to their home communi-
ties or embraced Western notions of individualism and private property 
that clashed with local ethics. Hopkins pointed to new arrivals having to 
share out their goods to kin as motivating some to seek shelter in Christi-
anity: “His raiment was divided waistcoat to one, coat to another, hat to a 
third, his tobacco distributed and soon smoked. No wonder that the picked 
ones among them who had led years of civilized life and become Christians, 
wanted a refuge.”53
During and after the labor trade, Europeans debated its effects on Mela-
nesians. Those with vested interest in the trade often painted it as a civilizing 
influence toward social and moral elevation. A former high commissioner, 
Everard im Thurn, wrote, “It is quite certain that the greater proportion 
of the natives who . . . were the subjects of this trade, benefited by it, in that 
they for the most part escaped from the ‘rot’ which is overwhelming most 
of such of their kindred owing to the hopelessly backward conditions in 
which they were born.” Trade opponents took pains to counter this argu-
ment, particularly missionaries who also objected to aspects of the labor 
system being erected within the Protectorate. This is one reason why Ivens, 
Hopkins, and others accentuated returnees’ rapid abandonment of West-
ern clothing and other accoutrements—their seeming enlightenment was 
skin-deep. In Ivens’s words: “The thousands of men who, throughout the 
years the trade was in existence, returned from civilization did nothing to 
better the conditions of life among their neighbors; they disseminated no 
knowledge, they started no spiritual movement for the uplifting of their 
people, they stirred up no divine discontent with the old-time conditions. 
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They brought back in a measure the outer trappings of civilization, but 
were ignorant of its power. While their axes lasted they made it easier for 
someone else to work; their purchases gave them for the time being a cer-
tain amount of importance; but once their stock was finished their influ-
ence was at an end.”54 This perspective coexisted with a common missionary 
narrative that savagery, too, was a veneer that could be removed by, and 
only by, Christianity, liberating a humanity that lay just beneath.
When white Protectorate residents did note shifts in Islander attitudes 
that they disliked, they often blamed the labor trade’s corrupting influ-
ences and portrayed returned laborers as a menace to European and Mela-
nesian alike.55 European reactions to returnees provide some of our best 
historical evidence of how the labor experience molded Melanesians’ atti-
tudes toward the waetman who now began to occupy their region in greater 
numbers. Many whites had long despised returned laborers and feared 
their influence on their countrymen, though there were exceptions, most 
obviously the steadfast Christians beloved by missionaries. Many returned 
laborers did in fact threaten European agendas, and some, especially 
Queensland veterans, were thorns in the side of missionaries. For example, 
during 1882, one mission school on Makira lost pupils after a labor veteran 
told people they did not need to attend church since Australians did not, 
and others conveyed similar messages.56
More generally, Europeans were dismayed by their loss of prestige in 
the eyes of returned Islanders and those they influenced. As Ivens wrote: 
“There is no question that the Queensland return, except those who had 
been at some mission school, was as a rule a person to be avoided; he had 
learned something of the white man’s ways and had a certain amount of 
the externals of civilization, but the old-time respect for authority had all 
vanished and its place was taken by a bold, rough style of address which did 
not differentiate between a high commissioner or a bishop and a recruiter 
of a labor vessel. All alike were hailed by him as mate and all would be asked 
for tobacco. In effect he had lost the charm of the natural state.”57
Hopkins wrote of the non-Christian returnee, “He is self-important, 
vicious, a despiser of white man and of the old native rule too, and keen to 
stir up strife and to ‘pooh pooh’ the fears of his bushy friends of the white 
man’s power. He landed yesterday in polished boots, starched shirt and 
collar, tie, etc.; to-morrow he is running about naked, or very nearly so, 
shell in hair, gun in hand on some bush feud which his return has perhaps 
restarted.” Hopkins said leaders had no control over such men, who were 
involved in many disputes. The Southern Cross Log bewailed “these semi-
Europeanised natives with their little knowledge, and, I am very sorry to say, 
their very poor opinion in most cases of the white people. You can plainly 
see, then, that one of the great difficulties at the present time that we have 
to face is the returned Kanaka. It is true, however, as Mr. Hopkins has told 
you, that many of them are splendid Christians, they start schools in differ-
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ent places—many of the schools that have been lately opened are entirely 
due to these Kanakas from Queensland. Yet, taking the Kanaka return alto-
gether it has introduced things which are all against our work.”58
Returnees also placed a higher value on their own labor, and on Gela 
some influenced Anglican teachers to stage a strike in 1908. Indentured 
Melanesians and whites could not legally strike in Queensland and the 
Solomons, but time-expired workers organized union-like groups that bar-
gained for wages, and some would have known of 1906 strikes by Australia’s 
unionized white sugar workers. Decades later, Malaita’s Officer Michael 
Forster reported that many Australian-born Melanesians were “keenly inter-
ested in Labour activities and particularly strikes.”59 Thomas Edge-Parting-
ton, who in September 1909 became Malaita’s first resident government 
officer, could at first find no Malaitans willing to work on his station for the 
10 shillings a month he proffered, and he had to use convicts and men from 
the Western Solomons. He blamed Queensland veterans for the high prices 
that neighboring people asked for local foods, though he could sometimes 
“buy the food very cheap from bushmen who cannot talk any English and 
who are willing to take just what you can give them.” Ivens expressed the 
indignation of many Europeans: “The returns expected to buy goods in 
traders’ stores at Queensland prices; they demanded Queensland rates 
of pay, and both traders and missionaries were faced with labor troubles, 
and crude socialistic ideas circulated freely everywhere.” Elsewhere he was 
more specific: his mission had difficulty finding ships crews on demand and 
people wanted to bargain for wages. William Bell, while working as a labor 
inspector, said many Malaitans refused to work for Solomon Islands planta-
tions since the wage was lower than men had earned in Australia.60
Malaitans were already famous for their boldness toward Europeans, 
due not only to their independent behavior abroad but also to violent 
attacks and their tight control over recruiting on their island. Both were 
often organized by returned laborers and continued after the overseas 
trade ended. In Queensland there had been widespread resistance among 
indentured laborers, ranging from “everyday forms”—feigned ignorance, 
shirking, malingering—to desertion and violent retaliation for overseer vio-
lence, and these all carried on in the Protectorate.61 The overall Malaitan 
approach to Europeans was more opportunistic than malevolent, but many 
of those forcibly repatriated, more sophisticated in European ways after 
longer residence abroad, worked out and disseminated political ideas as to 
how best to deal with whites, ideas that would develop and spread over the 
coming decades.
Returnees accentuated one particular worry about whites: that they 
would steal Malaitan land. This fear originated in part from observations of 
the plight of Aboriginal Australians whom Europeans had stripped of their 
lands, and also of alienated land in Fiji. Malaitans perceived in these cases 
a warning of what could happen if whites gained control of Malaita.62 Fears 
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intensified when men began to work in the Protectorate on land that white-
owned companies had, with government help, taken from other Solomon 
Islanders.63
The forced eviction from Australia in itself contributed to resentment and 
more open postures of defiance. The Royal Commission on Sugar Industry 
Labour warned, “The persons to be affected are a race relatively helpless; 
but they include isolated individuals predisposed to foment amongst their 
fellows active hostility to action which, in their ignorance, they may deem 
oppressive. In case the hostility so aroused may have far reaching effects 
in some of the less civilized of the Pacific Islands, we deem it our duty to 
point out that the existence of this feeling has come under our notice.” The 
anger reflected not just loss of livelihoods, properties, and communities in 
Australia, but also a hard-learned recognition that whites had a proclivity for 
exploiting and denigrating Islanders, whom they saw as inferior. Malaitans 
now saw their relations with whites more clearly and critically, and many 
called for a defense of Malaitan autonomy. Whites in the Solomons often 
heard the phrases “white man no good” and “country belong us.”64
The Imposition of Pax Britannica
As I have said, little attempt was made to control Malaitan internal violence 
during the labor trade. Early retaliatory actions in the Solomons by war-
ships were taken under the Pacific Islanders’ Protection Acts of 1872 and 
1875. The second of these contributed to establishment of the High Com-
mission for the Western Pacific, “with instructions and authority, within 
such of the islands as were not subject to any Foreign Power, to protect the 
Islanders against aggression by British subjects, and, incidentally, to protect 
Europeans from attack by the Islanders, but without power to intervene in 
disputes in which natives alone were concerned.”65 With the Western Pacific 
Order in Council of 1877, the high commissioner was granted authority 
over British subjects in the Solomons but not over Islanders or other Euro-
peans, and some attacks by warships were technically illegal. Various factors 
now forced Britain to try to assert more control. There was public outcry 
for more supervision of the labor trade and punishment of attacks on Euro-
peans, and pressure came also from the international political arena since 
Britain feared falling behind Germany and France in a region being rapidly 
carved up.66
The Solomons were declared a protectorate in 1893 (expanded to 
included Santa Cruz, Rennell, Santa Isabel, and Choiseul in 1898–1899). 
Its people were “British protected persons” but not entitled to the rights of 
British subjects. This signaled the colonial approach that would typify com-
ing decades. In the scramble for colonies, Great Britain shuffled into the 
Solomons; by proclaiming a protectorate, they “could lay effective claim to 
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a territory without obligation to govern or develop it.” When HMS Curaçoa 
sailed about the group declaring the new status, opposition was met only at 
Laulasi in Malaita’s Langalanga Lagoon, where people declined to fly the 
Union Jack for fear their Kwaio and Kwara‘ae neighbors would read it as a 
sign of war.67
The first government officer stationed in the Solomons was Charles 
Woodford, who as a naturalist had studied the area and published a book 
and articles about it, and had served in the Fiji Department of Immigration. 
He convinced High Commissioner John Thurston and the Colonial Office 
that the Solomons could be profitably administered and that his position 
should be made permanent and full time. He arrived in 1896 and with mea-
ger resources soon established his headquarters at Tulagi. As resident com-
missioner he remained answerable to the high commissioner in Fiji. This 
remained the command structure system until 1953, and we will see that it 
often hampered administration and placed key decisions in the hands of 
faraway men who knew next to nothing about the Solomons.
Woodford stressed opportunities for European-managed plantations: 
“As a locality for the growth of the coconut palm, I believe the British Pro-
tectorate of the Solomons presents advantages unequaled by any place that 
I have hitherto visited in the Western Pacific.” He was convinced the Solo-
mons could support a successful plantation economy, especially the prime 
coconut-growing areas of Guadalcanal and New Georgia.68 This required 
the suppression of warfare and raiding there, which trade with Europeans 
had exacerbated, and Woodford set out to do this with a handful of Fijian 
policemen. He stationed a deputy, Arthur Mahaffy, in New Georgia to carry 
out punitive actions, and by the start of the century Woodford could report 
that raiding was “scotched for the present.” Important trading areas of Gua-
dalcanal were brought under control soon afterward.69
On Malaita different economic forces were at work, and punishments 
there were reserved mostly for violence against Europeans, though there 
were exceptions. Early government attempts to discipline Malaitans failed 
to impress inland dwellers, though some coastal areas were effectively sub-
dued. Mahaffy knew the small coastal island communities were “completely 
at the mercy of a Man of War,” and in 1902, to punish local killings, he 
orchestrated HMS Sparrow’s looting and destruction of offshore island set-
tlements at Oru Island in Sio Bay in To‘abaita, and at Kwai and Ngongosila 
off of east Kwara‘ae.70
The government became a permanent presence on Malaita in 1909 with 
the establishment of a station at Rarasu on the central-west coast, which 
they named for the nearby island of ‘Aoke (also known as Auki, Kwaibala). 
The station land, bought for £20, was surrounded by Kwara‘ae speakers 
inland and Langalanga artificial-island dwellers seaward. The first Euro-
pean posted there was District Magistrate Thomas W Edge-Partington, a 
25-year-old who had served in the Royal Navy and was the son of a famous 
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scholar of Pacific artifacts. Since 1904 he had spent nearly three years 
posted at Gizo in the Western Solomons and he arrived on Malaita in com-
mand of twenty-some Western Solomons police.71
By December 1909, Edge-Partington began to realize the enormity of his 
task: “One whole village of about 60 or 100 fighting men came over from 
Quai [Kwai] and attacked a bush village at Langalanga. They expect me to 
have a lot of police here and have absolutely no fear of the Government. 
Figure 1.6. Two men of ‘Aoke Island visiting aboard a cutter, 1907. (Photo by 
George Rose, Rose Stereographs 12263, Thomas Edge-Partington collection, cour-
tesy of the Edge-Partington family.)
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They laughed at me the other day when I went down to Fiu about a murder 
and took 17 with me all I could spare, leaving 6 to guard the station. . . . This 
is going to be a very difficult island to tackle, and until the whitemen stop 
selling cartridges one cannot do much.” The following May, Joe Maekali, 
son of the big man of Laulasi island in Langalanga, asked Edge-Parting-
ton for permission to kill a man from inland to avenge a killing, but when 
refused told him, “It did not matter whether I gave him permission or not 
he intended to kill a bushman.” His reception was not wholly negative—that 
same month, while touring the mountains along the west Kwaio-Kwara‘ae 
border, he was told that “they had done with fighting now that I had come 
here and they were very glad as now they could live in peace and attend to 
their gardens which they had not been able to do with safety in the past.” 
Perhaps recalling his experience in the Western Solomons, he recorded, 
“Most of them want to be quiet but they want some one to tell them to be 
quiet first.”72
I will not delve into Edge-Partington’s frustrated tenure on Malaita. 
In the end he, and later his police officer, Frederick Campbell, had little 
impact except perhaps to embolden Malaitans for future resistance. In late 
1911, Commander E C Carver of the warship Torch estimated what would 
be required to control Malaita: imposition of martial law with swift tribunals 
and punishment of men who killed, to circumvent the slow and ineffectual 
system of sending them to Fiji for trial; a prolonged presence by 150 sol-
diers and two naval vessels; and replacement of private labor recruiters with 
government ones to stop the inflow of cartridges.73
In December 1914, Edge-Partington resigned. History has unkindly por-
trayed him as a timid failure. Reading his reports, correspondence, and 
diaries, I find him no worse than his fellow officers and keener than many. 
He was assigned an impossible task, given his pitiful resources, and was held 
back from pursuing it by men in Tulagi and Suva who had no inkling of 
Malaitan realities and found him insolent because he was acutely aware of 
flaws in policy and unafraid to upbraid superiors.74 Negative verdicts against 
him have come from those marking his accomplishments against the man 
who soon followed him on Malaita, a comparison that would tarnish most 
any district officer. Australian and Boer War veteran William Robert Bell 
arrived in ‘Aoke in October 1915 after six years as a government agent 
on Fiji labor ships that mostly worked Malaita (1905–1911), and then four 
years more as a BSIP inspector of laborers.75 Over the next 12 years Bell 
transformed Malaita to a degree few would have thought possible. How 
he brought nearly all of Malaita under his control, and his assassination at 
Sinalagu in October 1927, were explored in a 1980 book by Roger Keesing 
and Peter Corris. The following summary draws on that work as well as on 
archival and oral historical sources.
Bell faced the same daunting task as had Edge-Partington, made still 
harder by Malaitans’ experiences to date of an impotent government. Bell 
Figure 1.7. District Magistrate Thomas Edge-Partington and servant at ‘Aoke, 
nd. (Thomas Edge-Partington collection, photographer unknown, courtesy of the 
Edge-Partington family.)
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said his predecessors, hamstrung by superiors, had accomplished noth-
ing: “The natives within a few miles of the Government Station are as little 
under control as they were before the Station was established. If the Officer 
goes a few hundred yards inland from the Government Station he has to 
go prepared against an attack.” Perusal of Bell’s early reports reveals that 
killing due to vendettas or to collect bounties was rife. He cited for Act-
ing Resident Commissioner Frederick Barnett the example of Rohinari in 
southwest ‘Are‘are, where the Marist priest Jean Coicaud told him that over 
a three-year period there had been at least 60 to 70 murders, mostly of 
women and children. Bell then listed for Barnett still unpunished killings 
for bounties in the neighborhood of ‘Aoke.76
Bell pushed his superiors even harder than had Edge-Partington for 
aggressive pursuit of those who killed and was likewise held back by igno-
rant bosses, particularly Barnett, who had also stymied Edge-Partington 
and did not think officers should punish Malaitans who killed Malaitans.77
When Bell protested directly and bluntly to High Commissioner Ernest 
Sweet-Escott in Fiji, Barnett removed Bell as insubordinate. But he was 
soon reinstated, and starting in 1917 a new acting resident commissioner, 
Charles Workman, backed Bell on his proactive approach and many other 
matters. The Protectorate’s police headquarters had recently been shifted 
from ‘Aoke to Tulagi and Bell began with half the police force Edge-Parting-
ton had and no European police officer. By 1918, he said he had enough 
police and lobbied to command them on his own. Unlike Edge-Partington, 
he favored Malaitan police and formed a trusted force of 30, mostly men 
from To‘abaita and other parts of the north where he had made the most 
progress.78
The new toughness Bell brought to the job is clear in the tone of his 
early reports. After a patrol inland behind Kwai Harbour in 1917, he wrote: 
“I told them that the Government knew that they had money and pigs on 
offer for the killing of a white man, and advised them to eat the pigs and 
make some other use of the money, to which they made no reply.” Malai-
tans already knew Bell, and even in 1913, while he was still a labor inspec-
tor, Edge-Partington complained to Woodford, “There is too much ‘Mr. 
Bell’ over here,” and said Malaitans spoke of Bell as if he were the resident 
commissioner.79
During his first year Bell conducted extensive inland tours. He knew that 
patrolling merely to display his presence would be counterproductive if he 
took no action, since that would imply the government did “not mind the 
killings.” He was noteworthy for his ability to analyze patterns of violence 
and what was needed to stop it. He knew most Malaitans would not resist his 
efforts to check killing—the key was to intimidate and subjugate assassins, 
who drew wealth, prestige, and authority from bounties and feuding. Boun-
ties of pigs and shell currencies were integral to the economic system, and 
those who killed for them redistributed most of their rewards and invested 
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what remained in mortuary feasting, bridewealth, and other exchanges that 
augmented their strength. Bell was taking on men at the center of power.80
Bell recognized the unfairness of harshly prosecuting people in areas 
still outside government influence, of expecting people to lay down arms 
when enemies still held theirs, and of punishing only those who accepted 
his authority by turning themselves in. In the beginning he went so far as 
to give people permission to avenge killings of their relatives, for example 
when he met with a crowd of 400 people near Malu‘u: “I told them that if 
the Government was not prepared to protect them that they were justified 
in taking any necessary steps for the preservation of their own lives. . . . If 
any man killed the murderer of his relative I would take no action, but they 
must only retaliate on the actual murderer.” Four years later, Bell reported 
that, while he was touring east ‘Are‘are, “Three men came down from the 
bush to see me who had taken part in the very recent killing of a man and 
a woman. [They] had committed adultery and the man’s people killed him 
and the woman’s people killed her. Under the circumstances as there are 
much worse men in the Takataka district whom I have not yet been able to 
deal with, I did not think it would be justice to charge these three men with 
murder. I explained to them the course they should have taken which, I am 
afraid, did not appear very satisfactory to them, and warned them against 
further killing under the same circumstances.”81
Bell rejected as “repulsive” punitive expeditions aimed at “punishing 
natives as a community.” The real problem was the men who killed for pay-
ment, most of whom lived in the rugged mountains, and he systematically 
applied several effective strategies aimed squarely at them. He did not need 
to overwhelm them all, but merely to force the strongest and most resistant 
to capitulate—weaker men would follow. Despite the relatively small fight-
ing force at his disposal, the atomistic nature of Malaitan society made it 
possible to confront specific assassins from a position of strong advantage, 
forcing them one by one to submit. Actual fighting was rarely necessary. 
Bell demanded that such men “enter into recognizances for future good 
behavior” with shell money or cash. This strategy had been used in lim-
ited fashion by the missionary Hopkins, and by Officer Ralph Hill when 
he briefly served at ‘Aoke in 1915, and Bell made it a regular practice after 
receiving such a deposit from Suina‘o of Bita‘ama in To‘abaita, who had 
killed many people. Bell learned Suina‘o and other strongmen had formed 
what they called a “company” to resist his police. But in 1916, after the 
police raided an associate’s hamlet and killed four men, Suina‘o came to 
‘Aoke in an enormous canoe and formally presented Bell with ten gold 
coins and shell money as a pledge that he would kill no more: “Me, Suina‘o, 
me good fellow now.” In April 1918, Bell extracted 178 strings of red money 
and 749 porpoise teeth from Irokwato, a Baegu man who many years before 
had shot a man on Hopkins’s verandah and had frustrated Edge-Parting-
ton. Bell also offered cash bounties for specific fugitives. Another effective 
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tactic was to appoint former warriors or assassins to be government con-
stables and make them responsible for peace in their areas. Key to Bell’s 
strategy was gun confiscation; arms and especially ammunition were still 
being smuggled in.82
Bell unleashed his police on the uncooperative, as in a 1919 raid on 
Na‘oasi in east Kwara‘ae that killed four. Though militarily disciplined, 
thievery and gratuitous violence were standard practice among the police. 
Their looting and shrine desecration continued previous government puni-
tive tactics, and both had long been a part of Malaitan warfare.83 I think 
Keesing and Corris understate Bell’s own ruthlessness and occasional bru-
tality, at least as he acted through his police and some headmen, particularly 
late in his tenure. Could someone so smart and informed remain unaware 
of his underlings’ cruelty? Yet Bell’s empathy for law-abiding Malaitans was 
extraordinary for his day. He agitated on their behalf on issues ranging 
from taxes and fair returns for them in government services, to land alien-
ation, their “unreasonable exploitation” as indentured labor, and their 
need for medical care and education.84
In 1923, Bell began to develop a system of headmen and constables to 
serve as his interlocutors with local populations, and another of “lines,” 
groups said to share common descent, on which to base tax payments. 
“Lines” often had little political cohesiveness outside the government sys-
tem. It was hard to find suitable candidates for headmen since few men 
wanted to be government representatives, and many were chosen not 
because they were recognized leaders but only for their willingness and 
sometimes for their knowledge of white ways (most had labored abroad). 
Some headmen took advantage of their positions, a few wielding tyrannical 
power, and this and bullying by Bell’s police fed antigovernment bitterness 
that grew among many inland people during the 1920s. Headmen wanted 
guns for their own safety, and Bell agreed, writing, “I would not send an 
unarmed Constable off the beach in a very great portion of Malaita, in 
fact I would not send only one Constable.” But High Commissioner Cecil 
Rodwell (1918–1925) refused Bell’s request because, his secretary said, “It 
would be a most dangerous action to arm savages with rifles and invest 
them a little brief authority so armed.”85
Bell’s early efforts concentrated on north Malaita, though as early as 
1917 he began to extend his influence into the east Kwara‘ae mountains 
across the island from ‘Aoke, and by 1920 Kwara‘ae was fairly under his 
sway. In that year Bell reported having gained sufficient control over the 
northern third of the island, Small Malaita (also known as Maramasike) in 
the far south, and in coastal areas to allow a census. His subsequent reports 
were less optimistic, however, and four years later Bell acknowledged that 
government constables still could not safely travel alone in most places.86
In 1921, the BSIP government had started to impose a “head tax” on 
males from ages 16 to 60. The administration suffered ongoing revenue 
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problems, and Workman hoped taxation would “infuse new energy into 
the Solomon Islands and act incidentally as an incentive to recruiting.” 
The latter was hardly incidental; the nascent copra industry faced a chronic 
labor shortage. As in other colonies, the administration used taxation, 
with jail time for defaulters, to coerce labor, particularly on Malaita. Other 
Europeans supposed that taxes would force needed “development” on the 
Islanders.87
Solomon Islander reaction to the new tax was often bewilderment. Angli-
can Bishop John Steward complained in 1921 that some were “inclined to 
regard the tax more as a fine inflicted on them for no ascertainable reason 
than as a contribution to imperial revenue.” Adventist missionaries who wit-
nessed the 1925 Kwaio collection recalled, “Many of the old men, finding 
they could not buy anything with their receipt, were disgusted. ‘What name 
this government?’ they muttered. ‘He steal im money belong we fella. We 
fella no give more money along im-nothing!’ ” That year an old man in the 
north, fearing punishment because he could not pay, hanged himself, and 
Ivens wrote, “A terror of imprisonment for non-payment of the tax is very 
real.” Though Malaitans came to understand the taxation concept, resent-
ment would continue, as expressed by a man Hogbin overheard in the early 
1930s: “I have to work for one week to earn five shillings. To the white man 
it is nothing. He gives it away for a drink of beer.”88 Taxation without return 
or representation was to be a key issue in Malaitan political resistance for 
decades.
Under Bell’s influence the Malaitan tax was postponed until 1923 (as was 
Choiseul’s), and then set at 5 shillings per annum, a quarter of the rate for 
some islands. Bell expressed strong reservations about the tax, question-
ing both Malaitans’ ability to pay and his to collect it. Shortly before his 
death he complained, “I am unable to see what benefits the natives of Mala 
have already received from payment of the Native Tax,” and, “It appears to 
me that the natives of Mala received less service after the Native Tax was 
imposed.” He meant that due to his heavy tax-collection duties he could not 
properly tour or perform other work. Anglican missionary Albert Mason 
observed in 1925, “The two government officials are so busy most of the 
year collecting this money that little time is left for attending to court busi-
ness, and the medical assistance rendered to the natives is practically nil.” 
That year Bell told Resident Commissioner Richard Kane that extracting 
taxes without providing more services was a “despotic act.”89
Bell taxed over 10,000 Malaitans in 1923–1924 and over 12,000 in 1925. 
Resentful, many refused orders to work on new communal tasks like main-
taining tax houses and trails, and Bell came to believe the tax and the exces-
sive time he spent collecting it were undermining his and the government’s 
status. Yet government prestige was at stake: Bell and others worried that to 
exempt Malaitans from a tax demanded of other Islanders might be seen as 
an admission of government weakness. Indeed, Bell applied the tax as a way 
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to demand and obtain submission, particularly from fighting men. For years 
to come, tax payment would represent for the British a vital acknowledg-
ment of Crown authority, especially after World War II when many refused 
to pay. Bell also used the tax resourcefully as grounds to demand more 
logistical support from Tulagi.90 He toured mostly in whaleboats or canoes, 
though at first he refused to travel in these, feeling they cost him not just 
time but also respect since traders and missionaries had larger boats. He 
did eventually use sailboats but for years superiors denied his requests for 
a better craft (except for a few months in 1918) and for an assistant “whose 
nerves are in good condition.” In 1921 he was given a power-launch, and 
he began to get assistants at times, the last being Kenneth Lillies in 1925.91
Beginning in 1924, Bell determined to use the tax for the first time to 
force men of the east central mountains to submit to him. As early as 1921 
he had visited the east Kwaio coast at Uru, Sinalagu, and ‘Oloburi to confis-
cate guns, investigate crimes, and make arrests, but by the mid-1920s Kwaio 
was the last major area he did not control. During the first tax collections 
there in 1924 and 1925, he had been forced to back down from arresting 
defaulters at Sinalagu. But in 1926 Bell sent his police on a surprise raid 
inland behind Sinalagu to arrest a dozen defaulters on the 1925 tax, and 
they badly beat several men. This time, the Kwaio strongmen were forced 
to back down and pay fines for those arrested. During the 1926 collec-
Figure 1.8. A 1927 event on Tulagi’s golf course for a visit by High Commissioner 
Eyre Hutson. William Bell is last on right in foreground. (Photo collected by Com-
missioner of Lands Alexander “Spearline” Wilson, seen here walking two ahead of 
Bell. Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum, Oc,A56.1.)
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tion, Kwaio offered no resistance to Bell and his police (though Kwara‘ae 
men attacked them), but Bell had a personal encounter with Basiana, a 
renowned fighter, bounty hunter, and leader of the people of ‘Ai‘eda, and 
Bell cursed him as a “bastard.” It was Basiana who in 1924 had forced Bell 
to withdraw from arresting tax defaulters by threatening to kill him and 
his men.92
By the 1927 tax collection, a personal animosity had developed between 
a group of Kwaio strongmen and Bell and his police. Several Kwaio whom 
Bell had arrested were hanged for murder, some of them relatives of these 
men, and he now demanded they hand over their guns, which were to them 
more than mere weapons; since the labor trade, guns had been symbols 
of power. To submit to further taxation and turn over their rifles would 
have publicly acknowledged capitulation, which was what Bell intended. 
Kwaio oral historians are fond of recalling how coastal Christians and head-
men ridiculed the fighting leaders for having paid the 1926 tax, joking that 
they were “people of the bisi” (the menstrual area) instead of “people of 
the busi” (Pijin for “bush”). In the mountains, two ramo, Maenaafo‘oa and 
Tagailamo, made curses with their ancestors’ names, stating that Bell and 
his police were “shitting on their heads,” which required them to seek puri-
fication. The Kwaio warriors were backed into a corner with two choices: 
succumb to Bell’s rule or confront him head-on.93 Bell’s options were simi-
larly limited; by 1927 only Kwaio men had refused to submit to his control, 
and with the 1926 tax collected it appeared they would now yield as well. By 
forcing them to hand over their rifles and another tax, he could complete 
his domination of Malaita, to which he had dedicated 12 difficult years. On 
the other hand, if he failed to do so it would be widely noted and under-
mine his hard-earned gains elsewhere.94
Kwaio men killed Bell and most of his party at the 4 October 1927 tax 
collection at Gwee‘abe in Sinalagu. Details of this have been well docu-
mented by Keesing and Corris and will not be recounted here. The attack 
was set in motion at the initiative of Basiana. Some Kwaio who had lived 
abroad warned that, if they killed Bell, government forces would come 
and crush them. But Basiana, who like many renowned Kwaio warriors had 
never left the area, belittled those who wavered, and he prevailed. By the 
time Bell and his party arrived at Sinalagu, detailed plans were in place and 
ancestors had received sacrificial pigs to clear the way for the attack. Even 
so, many Kwaio did not believe it would occur. Ri‘ika of ‘Ubuni, in his late 
twenties at the time, told me that on the way down to the coast many in the 
war party were in a jovial mood, thinking there would not really be a fight. 
He recalled his relief when they reached the coastal rim and saw three ships 
anchored in Sinalagu Harbour 600 meters below: “Oh, there are too many 
people. The fight is off!” But his father replied, “The fight cannot be off, we 
have sacrificed pigs for it.”95
While collecting the tax at Uru, Bell had been amply warned of plans to 
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attack him, but he believed he could finesse his way through. The action 
was executed primarily by fighting leaders of three kin groups from behind 
Sinalagu, and Basiana initiated it by caving in Bell’s skull with a rifle bar-
rel as Bell sat at the tax table. To defuse the confrontational atmosphere, 
Bell had unwisely ordered his police inside the tax house, where they were 
quickly overwhelmed. Bell, Lillies, and 13 of their party were killed, while 
the Kwaio attackers lost one of their leaders, Maenaafo‘oa, and another 
man, both killed by a single shot from Lillies’s pistol.
Much more bloodletting was to come. When word of the attack reached 
‘Aoke, the government quickly organized a punitive expedition. As detailed 
by Keesing and Corris, some two weeks later there assembled at Sinalagu a 
large government force consisting of the Australian ship HMAS Adelaide with 
a contingent of about 50 marines, 28 white civilians, 50 Malaitan police and 
volunteers, and 211 north Malaitan bearers. Bell had earned the esteem of 
many Malaitans, particularly in the north and on Small Malaita, and no love 
was lost between north Malaitans and the Kwaio. One Kwara‘ae man named 
Dio told me in 1987 of being in an ‘Aoke area church when news arrived of 
Bell’s death, at which the entire congregation burst into tears and wailing. 
Some 3,500 north Malaitans visited the station to proclaim support for the 
government, and many volunteered to help punish the Kwaio.96
It soon became clear that only the Malaitans were capable of fighting 
Figure 1.9. Members of the punitive expedition to Kwaio resting in an inland river, 
October 1927. (Courtesy of Jeff Wilmot, whose father Harvey Rosswell Wilmot was a 
crewmember of HMAS Biloela, a fuel supply ship; photographer unknown.)
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in the mountains. Decades later, coastal Kwaio who had served as porters 
laughed when they recalled how the Europeans stumbled about and gen-
erally made fools of themselves in the jungle terrain. But the Malaitan 
constabulary was skilled in jungle warfare. Leading patrols were Maekali, 
Ba‘etalua, and Timi Kakalu‘ae, all of whom we will meet later as powerful 
government headmen. As described by Keesing and Corris: “[Shrine] des-
ecration, garden destroying, shooting pigs and burning houses were diver-
sions. The order of the day was people hunting. . . . Whatever orders they 
received from above, their mission was to avenge Bell and, most of all, their 
own slain relatives.”97
Women were gang-raped and shot, children were murdered, and prison-
ers routinely executed and their bodies mutilated. Gardens were sprayed 
with an arsenic mixture referred to as “Anti-Ant” donated by Levers. Even 
today, there are few Kwaio who cannot tell of atrocities committed against 
their kin. Most victims had played no part in the plot or the killings, and the 
constabulary attacked not only Sinalagu people but also those inland from 
‘Oloburi and Uru, and even in west Kwaio. Keesing estimated around 60 
people were shot, while many children died of exposure and hunger while 
hiding in the jungle. Kwaio give much higher numbers. About 200 Kwaio 
men, most innocent of crime, were jailed in Tulagi, and 28 men, most of 
Figure 1.10. A member of the punitive expedition with a Kwaio man, October 
1927. (Courtesy of Jeff Wilmot; photographer unknown.)
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them elderly, soon died during a dysentery epidemic there. Basiana and 
five others, who turned themselves in to stop the carnage, were hanged, 
and 17 were sentenced to prison terms.98
Kane determined to permanently deport the entire “Sinalagu tribe” 
to the island of Santa Isabel (he wildly underestimated the area’s popula-
tion at 500). Harry Moorhouse, sent from London to investigate the assas-
sination, advised High Commissioner Eyre Hutson, who had originally 
deferred to Kane, against the deportation. Kane thought it necessary to 
“punish the evildoers” and that deportation would lead Kwaio to interbreed 
with the Isabel natives “and so bring to the natives of that island some of 
their undoubted and much-needed virility.” His plan called for setting the 
deportees at forced labor to help pay for their own relocation. Finally, in 
mid-1928, the innocent “detainees” were taken back to Kwaio. The gov-
ernment had to provide rice rations for months until new gardens were 
established.99
The Bell assassination and its aftermath marked a key historical shift 
in the Solomons (coinciding with Charles Woodford’s death in Sussex on 
the same day Bell was killed). Most obviously, it ended violent resistance 
to colonial rule. The punitive expedition dashed any Malaitan ideas that 
their mountains were impregnable or that they could challenge the govern-
ment militarily. Many hoped opportunity, development, and other benefits 
to cooperation would now be forthcoming. Others continued to resist the 
government in subtler, nonviolent ways. Nearly six decades of dealing with 
Europeans as independent peoples had left Malaitans reluctant to fully sur-
render their political autonomy, and in the years that followed, reluctance 
turned to refusal as the government disregarded the island’s development, 
failed to provide social services, and continued to treat its people as second-
class citizens in their own land.
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Chapter 2
Early Native Administration:  
Coping with Custom
The 1930s on Malaita are often perceived as a political lull between trans-
formative events. As the decade began, the last violent resistance to British 
control had been put down, and 12 years would pass before World War II 
engulfed the Protectorate. The Great Depression brought economic mal-
aise and hardship, and, for the few hundred Europeans in the group, Malai-
tans seemed hopelessly fragmented and resigned to, if not always content 
with, life and labor under their control. This was an illusion. Beneath the 
surface anger smoldered and deepened through the decade as Malaitans 
assessed the new colonial order and their status in it. While many have 
credited the war with arousing Melanesian desires for change, in the south-
eastern Solomons it was rather a catalyst for an eruption of resentments and 
aspirations already grown rife.
The decade is also crucial to this study because this was when officers on 
Malaita and elsewhere began to formulate and initiate native administra-
tion and social engineering projects inspired by models of “indirect rule” 
imported from African colonies and grounded importantly in the concept 
of “custom.” After the war, Maasina Rule and kindred resistance move-
ments built on Malaitans’ critical appraisals of these projects, and kastom 
emerged when Malaitans appropriated the “custom” concept and took it in 
directions officers could never have foreseen.
The Idea of Indirect Rule
Conquered states that have been accustomed to liberty and govern-
ment of their own laws can be held by the conqueror in three ways. 
The first is to ruin them; the second, for the conqueror to go and 
reside there in person; and the third is to allow them to continue to 
live under their own laws, subject to a regular tribute, and to create 
in them a government of a few, who will keep the country friendly to 
the conqueror. Such a government, having been established by such 
a new prince, knows that it cannot maintain itself without the support 
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of his power and friendship, and it becomes its interest therefore to 
sustain him.
—Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
Repercussions from Bell’s assassination were felt far beyond Kwaio, since 
it compelled London to reassess standing “native policy” throughout the 
Protectorate. In 1928 the Colonial Office under a special king’s regula-
tion dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Harry C Moorhouse, lately a high 
official in southern Nigeria, to investigate the attack on Bell’s party and 
the killing a few months earlier of three policemen on Guadalcanal. The 
scope of Moorhouse’s recommendations exceeded those two events, and 
his final report critiqued past administrative methods, especially how the 
first Native Administration Regulation of 1922 (to be discussed presently) 
had been applied. The government made little pretense of ruling by other 
than direct means, and Moorhouse alleged that this had contributed to 
not only the recent violence but also many other problems. He prescribed 
gradual development of an indirect rule scheme such as he and others had 
administered in Africa, starting with appointment of native headmen who 
enjoyed genuine community followings. He acknowledged that the Solo-
mons differed from Africa in important ways and that the approach would 
face difficulties.1
It is significant that Moorhouse spent his career in Nigeria, where he had 
been a key player in attempts to revitalize a moribund system of indirect 
rule. In southern Nigeria he had enjoined new doctrines for “the resuscita-
tion of indigenous forms of government, the consolidation of tribal units, 
the selection of the rightful chief, his installation with appropriate ceremo-
nial, the re-establishment of the clan council together with the definition of 
the jurisdiction and powers of the clan council and chief.” The Protector-
ate’s resident commissioners over the next 23 years all arrived having cut 
their administrative teeth in colonial Africa. Like Moorhouse, they brought 
with them African models of native administration, particularly indirect 
rule, and so we must have a basic understanding of these.2
“Indirect rule” is a notoriously murky concept that has been used to label 
diverse systems of rule applied by various colonial powers. For the British 
Empire, it is most famously attributed to Lord Frederick Lugard, high com-
missioner of northern Nigeria from 1900 to 1906 and later Nigeria’s first 
governor-general, for whom indirect rule was “the cardinal principle upon 
which the administration of northern Nigeria was based.” Donald Cam-
eron subsequently carried Lugard’s approach to Tanganyika, and varia-
tions were extended to other colonies. The core idea was that Britain would 
rule through indigenous political structures already in place, making “a 
systematic use of the customary institutions of the people as agencies of 
local rule.”3
Indirect forms of rule were in part a response to stark necessity: Lon-
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don’s colonial policy of the day strictly limited administrative spending, 
and the labor and resources of colonized peoples were expected to finance 
their own subjugation.4 For example, as of 1906, Lugard had been receiving 
only £100,000 to £500,000 annually to administer 75 colonial officers and 
about 7,000,000 people belonging to diverse groups.5 Manpower presented 
a special problem because there were not enough white officers to rule 
Africans directly. Use had to be made of “existing machinery.” Mamdani 
pointed out that staff shortfalls in African colonies resulted largely from a 
refusal to fully employ talents of the many educated Africans. In the Solo-
mons, too, manpower shortfalls were self-inflicted, but at a more basic level: 
the government failed to provide Solomon Islanders with any serious edu-
cation at all.6
Colonizing powers throughout history have marshaled local political sys-
tems to their own purposes, as had the British in Nigeria before Lugard. 
His contribution was to systematize, formalize, and promote indirect rule 
as an ostensibly scientific administrative system with high moral goals. As 
Adiele Afigbo observed, historical study of indirect rule was long hindered 
by a preoccupation with the distinctive model Lugard devised for northern 
Nigeria and a tendency to define the approach in its terms.7 I nonetheless 
highlight selected ideas from Lugard here, first because his basic model 
was an important influence on what the British tried to do in the Solo-
mons, and second because Lugard laid out fundamental requirements for 
the success of indirect rule that clearly applied also to Malaita but that the 
administration there long neglected, contributing to many of its failures.
Lugard presented indirect rule as serving a “dual mandate” to facilitate 
both economic exploitation and the gradual moral and social advancement 
of African peoples. He asserted that indirect rule was in fact necessary to 
prevent a collapse of Nigerian societies in the face of European incursion. 
The alternative for Africans, he declared in a 1927 White Paper, was “disin-
tegration into an undisciplined rabble of leaderless and ignorant individu-
als.” Indirect rule would allow different African groups to develop along 
paths and at paces best suited to them, and at times it was claimed that 
its primary objective was didactic: “helping the African to become a bet-
ter African.” At the same time, administrators hoped that by sponsoring 
chiefly authority they could, in Cameron’s words, build “a bulwark against 
future political agitation” by “Europeanised natives seeking to obtain politi-
cal control.”8
Lugard went far beyond merely maintaining indigenous Nigerian insti-
tutions. He shored up or broadened the power of local chiefs as required, 
and where no recognizable chiefs existed they were created.9 Sometimes 
he found it necessary to “restore” to chiefs a real or supposed “prestige and 
authority which they had lost by the British conquest.” Political institutions 
were similarly simplified, elaborated, standardized, or invented as needed, 
most notably “native courts” and “judicial councils of elders and chiefs,” 
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which were granted limited powers under close supervision. One should not 
assume that Africans were always passive recipients of these new models; in 
some cases they were active in their construction. John Iliffe was one of the 
first to argue this when he described how Tanganyikans met British expecta-
tions that they had tribes by creating them for their own strategic purposes 
within the colonial system. Many later historians have followed a similar 
approach by investigating the dynamic, dialogic, and emergent natures of 
political structures and identities in colonial settings, as I do here.10
Champions of indirect rule often downplayed British authority within 
it, as in Sir Anton Bertram’s suggestion that, in northern Nigeria, British 
officers were “really only residing in a native jurisdiction” and “the District 
Officer is not dealing with a subject race, but with recognized communi-
ties under British Protection.” Some Europeans complained that indirect 
rule gave too much autonomy to native populations or power to oppressive 
chiefs.11
Many students of African colonial history have questioned the claims for 
and political motives behind indirect rule there. Helen Lackner asserted 
that in practice Lugard presided over a government through chiefs rather 
than by them. John Bodley wrote, “Indirect rule was designed to preserve 
native political institutions only to the extent necessary to maintain order 
and to assure the availability of native labor.” To colonial administrators, 
Lucy Mair said, “A ‘progressive’ chief or ‘energetic headman’ is one who is 
tireless in exhorting his people to obey [government laws] and not unwill-
ing to prosecute them for failing to do so.” As late as the 1960s, George 
Foster likewise observed in Northern Rhodesia, “The Native Authority sys-
tem in no real sense of the word represents self-government. To a consider-
able extent it is a device to try to make a chief do some of the unpopular 
things Government feels must be done.” Indirect rule, when it worked, 
typically did not so much give power to local leaders as it first limited their 
power and then drew on and channeled what was left. Immanuel Waller-
stein traced the idea to “the responsive note it touched in British hearts,” 
having emerged when the “romantics among the soldiers teamed up with 
the romantics among the anthropologists.” Mamdani saw indirect rule’s 
political aim as having been “to fracture the native population into eth-
nic groups” and said that it “signified a retreat from colonization’s original 
project of civilization: the natives would remain natives, forever proscribed 
from the realm of civil law.” Fulani bin Fulani similarly charged that indi-
rect rule acted to “fasten down upon the African his own past,” a way of life 
now dead or dying. Many of these same critiques could also be made of the 
indirect rule schemes later implemented in the Solomons.12
Indirect rule policies were applied with a good deal of variation and 
mixed success throughout the British Empire. Even within Nigeria, popula-
tions were graded according to their political systems, and those viewed as 
less advanced—mostly southern groups without powerful leaders or cen-
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tralized institutions—were ruled more directly. Policies also shifted over 
time. Lord William Hailey, former governor of the Punjab and the United 
Provinces and himself once an enthusiast of indirect rule, later disparaged 
a gradual shift in attitude among its adherents: what had started as “a useful 
administrative device” became “a political doctrine,” and finally “a religious 
dogma.”13
Steven Pierce has employed data from Hausaland to argue that the 
indirect rule system in northern Nigeria never really worked as advertised, 
that it not only concealed and facilitated inequalities and injustices on the 
ground but also disguised the degree to which the colonial state failed in 
its modernist projects of classification, categorization, and organization of 
the sort James Scott has famously explored. Instead, the indirect rule model 
granted the system a façade of legitimacy to outsiders and let the colonial 
administration, in Pierce’s phrase, “look like a state.”14 One could similarly 
criticize Solomon Islands native administration systems, but it is important 
to note that officers there did not see indirect rule as a façade or sham, 
and many trusted in and worked to promote its ideals and workability even 
when frustrated by its defects.
My interest here is not in scrutinizing the efficacy, sincerity, or morality of 
indirect rule in Africa or in general, but rather in understanding attempts 
to deploy it on Malaita. The basic social and economic pressures to institute 
it in the Solomons resembled those in Africa and, also as in Africa, indirect 
rule schemes were most problematic when imposed on societies that, like 
Malaitan ones, lacked the kinds of political leaders and institutions that 
colonial officials were prepared to recognize and work with. The British 
conceived “tribal” political legitimacy as based significantly on tradition and 
birthright, and they were stymied where leadership was not so ascribed, or 
where they encountered indigenous political structures that were fluid or 
unstable or appeared to have collapsed altogether. Roy Davies later wrote, 
“District officers transferred to the Solomons from African colonies usu-
ally smiled pityingly at the prospect of administering a mere 40,000 people 
[Malaita’s official population], used as they were to having to look after a 
quarter of a million. The smile did not last long.” BSIP administrators right 
into the 1950s exhibited what now seems a persistent inability to grasp and 
adapt to unfamiliar or dynamic systems, as well as a dogged denial of cul-
tural realities. Nowhere was this truer than on Malaita, where their attempts 
to apply indirect rule often appear in retrospect half-hearted and confused. 
Their efforts to apply indirect rule in the Protectorate came at a time—in 
the later 1930s and just after World War II—when the approach was being 
widely questioned and criticized in Africa and elsewhere in the empire, 
partly as a result of its failures during the Depression.15
Understanding how indirect rule unfolded and faltered on Malaita 
requires consideration of several key requirements that Lugard laid out 
for the approach to succeed. One was that district officers had to learn at 
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least one native language, with their promotion dependent on it. Another, 
which Lugard deemed “paramount and essential,” was continuity of admin-
istration—officers should be transferred as seldom as possible, since only 
through long residence in one area could they acquire knowledge of “native 
laws and customs” necessary to carry out their duties effectively, and since 
Africans would give full confidence to an officer “only after many years of 
personal contact.” He also instructed officers to spend the least time pos-
sible in their offices and concentrate instead on “travel and work among 
the people.” Lugard said that cultural knowledge was absolutely essential: 
“In order to develop a system suited to [the needs of the natives], the Dis-
trict Officer must study their customs and social organizations; for without 
a knowledge of their institutions the result must be failure.” Regardless of 
one’s view of indirect rule as idea or practice, it is hard to disagree with 
Lugard regarding these basic prerequisites for its workability. Malaita was to 
prove him correct when efforts to deploy indirect rule there were crippled 
by a failure to meet two of these provisos: no officers learned any Malaitan 
language, and most remained woefully ignorant of fundamental aspects of 
Malaitan societies.16
These failures made it difficult for an officer to gain effective authority, 
and they help explain why missionaries who stayed in one area for years and 
learned languages sometimes had more influence. Furthermore, with only 
two officers, and sometimes a cadet, working out of and maintaining ‘Aoke 
station and overseeing thousands of hamlets scattered over rugged terrain, 
most Malaitan communities before the war received few or no government 
visits.17 Relative to other islands, Malaita did enjoy an unusual continuity of 
senior officers from the 1930s into the later 1940s, but through the prewar 
years these officers rarely engaged socially with most Malaitans and this 
diluted the advantages Lugard believed long-term residence would bring. 
Lower-ranking officers were transferred often into and out of Malaita.
During the Depression, attempts to apply a formal system of indirect rule 
on Malaita remained piecemeal and desultory, until they intensified just 
prior to and immediately after the war. Yet even before that shift, officers 
had little choice but to employ elements of the indirect rule approach on 
a de facto basis due to shortages of funding and personnel and because 
they lacked the requisite knowledge to carry out core aspects of their duties 
without help from local people. I will return to how this system worked in 
practice.
Antecedents and Beginnings of Native Administration
Early endeavors at native administration in the Solomons can help us 
understand subsequent efforts to apply indirect rule as official policy. Prior 
to Moorhouse’s 1929 report, a handful of colonial officials and other Euro-
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peans had recognized the pressing need for more Islander participation 
in administration, and there were attempts to effect this. The first was the 
Anglican Melanesian Mission’s establishment of a local “Parliament” on 
Gela called the Vaukolu (“meeting”). Rev John Holford Plant and Bishop 
John R Selwyn initiated Vaukolu gatherings in 1887 and 1888 to rebuild a 
Gela leadership system badly undermined by labor recruitment and the 
mission’s own activities. The assembly devised a loose administrative struc-
ture dividing Gela into five districts, each headed by a “chief.” At the early 
Vaukolu, missionaries and local leaders fashioned laws relating to adultery, 
pig trespass, and marriage (all said to be based on preexisting “native legis-
lation”) and instituted rules demarcating the powers of Melanesian church 
teachers. Persons found to have broken the laws were to work on commu-
nity and church projects and pay fines to the chiefs, despite problems deter-
mining who were “chiefs” and some displeasure with those selected. The 
Vaukolu became an annual Gela event, sometimes attended by people from 
other islands including Malaita.18
When Resident Commissioner Charles Woodford established the first 
government station at nearby Tulagi in 1896, he disapproved of the church 
having taken on secular powers and he soon began a campaign to transfer 
those powers to his administration: “During January [1898] I invited the 
chiefs and people of Gela to a meeting at Tulagi for the consideration of 
a code of laws for the better government of the island. About a thousand 
natives attended. . . . District and village chiefs were appointed who were 
to send offenders to Tulagi for punishment.” The new code, modeled at 
Woodford’s suggestion on one from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protec-
torate, met with a positive response, and not only on Gela; his initiative 
brought inquiries and some cooperation from nearby islands and even a 
friendly Malaitan visit (probably Langalanga people calling on Gela trade 
partners). He thought a broader formal code was “urgently wanted” and 
hoped one could be quickly extended to Savo and to Guadalcanal’s north-
ern coast. Woodford supported enforcement of the 1898 laws until he left 
the Solomons in 1915.19
Woodford attended subsequent Vaukolu “in full uniform—white duck, 
fine helmet with enameled coat of arms, and dress sword—very impos-
ing,” but he remained concerned that the Anglicans stay out of what he 
saw as government’s exclusive domain. Worried that church teachers might 
effectively become “chiefs,” he excluded them and the clergy from his new 
administration. Relations between the colonial government and the Chris-
tian missions remained generally amicable and cooperative, but tension 
over their respective political authority and rivalries between government- 
and church-appointed officials were to permeate BSIP politics for many 
decades. In his 1929 report Moorhouse noted this continuing friction and 
suggested that some synthesis of government and mission authority might 
be wise and inevitable.20
Early Native Administration: Coping with Custom 57
Through the following decades, many church leaders saw government 
appointees as threats to their power, and they impeded selection or recog-
nition of some indigenous leaders and lobbied for installment of men of 
their own denominations. Anglican Bishop Steward instructed fellow mis-
sionaries to ignore local leaders: “Native Chiefs, may generally be divided 
into two categories, the Knave and the Fool. BUT THERE ARE CERTAIN 
OUTSTANDING EXCEPTIONS. Generally speaking, treat the Native Chief 
with outward courtesy but do not pay much attention to what he says. The 
exceptions are so rare that you are not likely to make a mistake. Since the 
arrival of the Government, the ‘worth’ of the Chief has decreased in the 
same degree as has his power.” Steward likewise dismissed the native police-
man as “nearly always a knave and an unmitigated nuisance. Lose no oppor-
tunity of putting him ‘in his place.’ ”21
The annual Vaukolu outlasted the nineteenth century but became more 
social than administrative in nature and its political import declined. None-
theless, in 1901 and 1903, despite strong opposition from local women, the 
Vaukolu chiefs set a limit on rising brideprices, with Woodford’s promise to 
help them enforce it.22 Subsequent Vaukolu addressed such issues as Chris-
Figure 2.1. Anglican Bishop Cecil Wilson speaking to the Vaukolu of 22 October 
1906, at Honggo, on Gela. Resident Commissioner Charles Woodford is seated in 
helmet. (John Beattie photo 618, courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum, 
Oc,B115.77.)
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tian converts “backsliding” to their ancestral religion, marriages without 
Christian rites, tattooing, and village cleanliness and maintenance of paths 
to link them—all concerns of Anglican missionaries.23
Despite these early initiatives, it would be decades before Islanders were 
allowed any real, formal role in government, due to a number of obstacles. 
Foremost was the common European conviction that Melanesians were 
far too “primitive,” “savage,” and “backward” to play any part. Officials 
argued further that rule had to be direct because local societies offered no 
political structures or mechanisms on which to build. They bemoaned the 
absence of discrete units by which to partition the landscape, particularly 
on Malaita. There, language zones contained innumerable (for officers) 
small groups with layered, nested identities, which often stressed their dif-
ferences. Officers who had learned something of anthropological models 
of groups defined by unilineal kinship were confused by Malaita’s cog-
natic systems, and in any case kinship there was only one of many bases for 
social relationships and identities. As in so many other colonies, officers 
demarcated and named groups arbitrarily across what were often ambigu-
ous ethnic or linguistic borders. These hardened into “Kwaio,” “To‘abaita,” 
“ ‘Are‘are,” and so forth—ten language areas in all—divided for administra-
tive purposes into 32 sub-districts based on the island’s key anchorages (see 
map of Malaita, back endpaper). Despite their artificiality, over the years 
these units did acquire real political meanings for their residents, especially 
after World War II.24
The obstacle to Malaitans’ participating in government most often cited 
by administrators was their leadership systems. Officers could not operate 
through political units that were small, atomistic, and fluid, and though 
they worked to consolidate them into larger, stable polities, they searched 
in vain for “customary” leaders to head such groups. As in many parts of 
Melanesia, few men fit European conceptions of a “chief.” Most leaders 
in the southeastern Solomons had small followings that expanded or con-
tracted contextually, and the basis of their authority was in most places only 
minimally inherited, if at all. Ritual organization linking clans through 
descent from common ancestors had some limited political coherence, but 
to colonial officers it was obscure and in many places it was disintegrat-
ing prior to Christian expansion, as were the more hierarchical leadership 
systems in the far south. Many men who did wield more power gained it, 
like past “passage masters,” as brokers of European trade and labor recruit-
ment, and some of them Europeans saw as scoundrels. Others were church 
teachers whom government officers and many Malaitans were unwilling to 
formally elevate as political leaders.
Sometimes it was supposed, by Malaitans as well as colonials, that “chiefs” 
(or even “chieftesses”) had once existed but had disappeared due to the 
European impact or because of a progressive decadence of island cultures 
predating European presence. For example, Resident Commissioner Fran-
Early Native Administration: Coping with Custom 59
cis Ashley, soon after his arrival in the Solomons in 1929, insisted that there 
had been such leaders and proffered a list of powerful precolonial “chiefs,” 
lifted (uncited) from an 1887 book by naturalist Henry Guppy. Most of 
these men were from the Western Solomons and, as Guppy described, 
had gained their stature by marshaling trade or labor networks involving 
Europeans. Nonetheless, Ashley lamented the absence of suitable leaders 
in 1929 and pressed for their resurrection: “It must be accepted, generally 
speaking, that any executive power the chief had, is lost, disintegration has 
taken place. As time goes on this complete emancipation from any kind of 
control will lead to trouble. . . . No education will instill the advantages of 
British rule, and advantages will be less and less realized by the increased 
security in which the people live. . . . With this in view, it may be advisable, 
if for no other reason, to reconstruct, as far as we are able, a native orga-
nization, upon which to build a native administration. A native authority 
responsible for law and order.”25
Martha Kaplan has nicely analyzed the situation in colonial Fiji in which 
chiefly status was shored up and ordered according to British sensibilities 
of hierarchy, as an “aristocracy,” all in the name of preserving Fijian ways. 
But in most of the Solomons this approach was too distant from reality to be 
feasible. Early drafts of the first Native Administration Regulation, like the 
Southern Rhodesia legislation on which it was modeled, made provision for 
appointing functionary “chiefs,” but in the final version they had become 
“headmen,” and, unlike its African precursor, the regulation made no ref-
erence to leaders with indigenous legitimacy. As one principal headman, 
Timi Kakalu‘ae, testified approvingly even in the late 1940s, “The Govern-
ment gave power only to the headmen. Not to anyone else.”26
Prior to 1920, except for land law, the government directed no spe-
cific legislation at Solomon Islanders, and in 1918 Acting Resident Com-
missioner Charles Workman wrote candidly to High Commissioner Cecil 
Rodwell that Solomon Islanders were “in a backward state as a result of 
neglect of native administration in [the] past.” Soon a native tax regula-
tion and a labor regulation were introduced, and in 1922, almost 30 years 
after declaration of the Protectorate, the aforementioned Native Admin-
istration Regulation became law. It defined authority of different officers 
concerning native affairs; provided for creation of administrative divisions; 
authorized appointment and defined duties of “district headmen,” “village 
headmen,” and “village constables”; and “imposed upon natives generally 
the duty of respecting authority and complying with government orders.” 
Rodwell, based in Fiji, and for many years before that (and again later) in 
southern Africa, personally prepared the final regulation. It was very dif-
ferent from a version proposed by Resident Commissioner Richard Kane, 
who had worked in Fiji and whom Rodwell plainly despised. Kane’s ver-
sion followed more closely the declared ideals of indirect rule, but Rodwell 
rejected it as “a hopeless jumble,” and he was particularly critical of Kane 
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for having tried to devise a system of administration in which Solomon 
Islanders would participate: “He has included provisions establishing native 
courts and conferring jurisdiction on natives which I consider altogether 
premature, the majority of Solomon Islanders being little better than raw 
savages.” He rejected even Kane’s suggestion that headmen organize and 
preside over local meetings.27
Kane defended his rejected proposal (modeled partly on Fijian regula-
tions that Rodwell disdained), arguing, “The main idea is to inculcate in 
the native mind that he is having a share in the Government and that some 
at least of the Regulations governing his life emanate from him.” Kane cited 
requests by people of Gela and the Western Solomons to participate in gov-
ernment as evidence that parts of the Protectorate were ready.28 Nonethe-
less, under Rodwell’s direction, the final 1922 regulation was designed to 
firmly maintain direct rule.
The only Islanders included in the resulting administrative structure 
were headmen, and their primary functions, especially early on, were to 
enforce government rules, help collect taxes, and act as the primary means 
through which officers communicated with the populations they stood 
over.29 Kane issued them preposterous instructions to, among other duties, 
radically reorganize and police residence patterns, the division of labor, 
sanitation and burial practices, house building, gardening, pig raising, vil-
lage interconnectivity, and treatment of the sick, and to report their success 
in these tasks to district officers on a quarterly basis.30 Village headmen who 
failed to report a birth faced a fine of up to 5 shillings and up to seven days 
in jail. It is significant here that Kane came to the Solomons from Fiji; Nich-
olas Thomas has analyzed similar intrusive sanitary and other regulations 
imposed there, concluding their primary basis was not their substance, but 
rather, “the regulations were . . . ends in themselves, which constituted the 
ambit of state control.” Few BSIP headmen were literate, and Acting Resi-
dent Commissioner Ralph Hill said they did not understand the regulation 
or the powers it did and did not grant them. Malaita’s 1944 Annual Report 
recounted the duties of these early headmen as “little more than those of a 
common informer,” though this was unfair to the better ones.31
Remarkably, given their critical importance to administration, headmen, 
of whom there were 47 on Malaita by late 1929, were paid the base wage 
of plantation laborers. Still, their position as middlemen gave them sub-
stantial power, which some abused. Most were appointed not due to their 
community status or in order to represent local views but instead for their 
ability to communicate with officers and their familiarity with European 
ways. They were meant to fully serve government policy and control, which 
officers saw to be synonymous with the peoples’ interests. Some headmen 
effectively isolated officers from the populace.32
Implementation of Rodwell’s watered-down version of the regulation 
proceeded fairly smoothly in some places, most notably on Santa Isabel 
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(which was by then fully Anglican) and farther west, but Malaita was more 
problematic. We saw earlier that much of the island in the early 1920s 
remained outside government control and Bell found few men both suit-
able and willing to be headmen. As of 1924, he had appointed only a hand-
ful of village headmen and constables and just three sub-district headmen, 
but he predicted, “The application of the provisions of the Regulation will 
continue to increase and it will undoubtedly be of the greatest assistance 
in obtaining complete control of the native population.” By 1926 Bell was 
recommending appointment of 22 sub-district headmen.33
The Moorhouse Report and Malaita Policy after Bell
Moorhouse’s report on the Malaita and Guadalcanal murders was in part 
a critique of how the Native Administration Regulation of 1922 had been 
implemented. Many of his proposals echoed Workman’s of a decade before. 
After initial dismay at the poor fit of African models with the Solomons, 
Moorhouse came to believe that a less direct method of rule was called 
for anyway, one that gave villagers some choice of their representatives in 
government. This could not be rushed, he stressed, and officers had to 
take into account difficulties specific to their areas and move at appropriate 
speed. Pulling a page from Lugard, he stressed that district officers had to 
tour more: “It is only by constantly visiting the natives in their villages and by 
taking an interest in their affairs that their confidence can be gained. I am 
afraid that at the present moment the majority of natives look on the Dis-
trict Officer merely as a tax gatherer or one who metes out punishment.”34
The timing of Moorhouse’s advice proved unfortunate, since the Protec-
torate was just heading into years of economic stagnation brought on by the 
global Depression and a precipitous plunge in copra prices. Many Europe-
ans later blamed the failure to implement his ideas on the Depression, and 
certainly Moorhouse did specify that they could only succeed with a sizable 
increase in European staffing, particularly on Malaita, but matters other 
than financial woes contributed to the inaction that followed there. As will 
become evident, the policies, practices, and attitudes of colonial officials 
were fundamental obstacles to reform.35
Moorhouse’s report did bring about certain changes. Some administra-
tors tried harder to pick headmen who enjoyed popular support, though 
less so on Malaita. Kane’s replacement Ashley supported Moorhouse on 
this matter, in procedure if not spirit: “With every confidence I believe that 
a native authority, under our guidance, can be formed from the existing 
chiefs of the native communities. . . . In ruling an illiterate community and 
a very scattered people, especially when for financial reasons, the Euro-
pean administrative staff has to be curtailed, we should rule through the 
natural leaders of the people. Even if the natural or elected head is not the 
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best possible selection, the people will obey more readily one of their own 
choosing, than some person thrust upon them by an extraneous power; 
moreover their imaginary grievances will be more lightly tolerated.” Ash-
ley’s tone here only hints at his demeaning views of Islander intellects 
and cultures. The next year he told High Commissioner Arthur Fletcher, 
“The Solomon Islands natives generally are of a low mentality and have 
the minds and understanding of children,” and soon afterward he wrote 
regarding Malaitan land tenure that he saw “little object in sustaining, even 
in a protectorate, customs which are strange to our ideas.”36
Ashley warned that government-appointed leaders might undermine the 
remaining power of traditional “chiefs.” He issued instructions that where 
the leaders’ customary and genealogical “credentials” were established, “We 
should support, by every means in our power, the building up of the author-
ity of these natural rulers of the people,” but he warned of chaos if more 
than one chief per village were appointed. As with the search for headmen, 
many indigenous leaders avoided government recognition; among other 
things, duties of a colonial appointee such as enforcing British laws and 
taxation could undercut their local standing.37
Officers on Malaita at the time received the new approach without enthu-
siasm. In charge of the district during the early 1930s was Jack C Barley (see 
figure 2.3), who staunchly opposed giving significant authority to local lead-
ers. His response to his superior Ashley’s vision of ruling through “chiefs” 
was lukewarm at best, and in Malaita’s 1930 Annual Report he pointed out 
the Machiavellian advantage of maintaining headmen who lacked local 
standing and therefore had little choice but to be government loyalists:
The great majority of the Headmen whom I found in office had been appointed 
on the principles of direct rather than indirect rule . . . and but few of them 
wielded any natural authority amongst their people as chiefs by hereditary right 
or personal prowess. Having, therefore, no individual “locus standi” outside their 
official status as Headmen, the appointees have naturally had to rely solely upon 
the prestige and power of Government to support and maintain them in the 
execution of their duties, and this factor has no doubt contributed toward keep-
ing them loyal and also conscientious in the exercise of the authority entrusted 
to them. I am, however, strongly of the opinion that some effort should be made 
officially to recognize the position of the few surviving chiefs and natural lead-
ers of the people by entrusting them with minor posts in the general scheme of 
Native Administration.
Not only had Malaitans not selected their own headmen, but also in Bar-
ley’s day most headmen had minimal contact with most people since they 
rarely or never visited heavily populated mountain areas of their sub-dis-
tricts. Barley said they did not know or even recognize most inland people 
under them. Moorhouse’s recommendations notwithstanding, the system 
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of headmen as instruments of direct rule was entrenched. Ten years after 
Bell’s death, 70 percent of Malaita’s district headmen were men he had 
appointed. Most of those stayed on at least until World War II and some of 
the most important ones were kept on into the early 1950s, including sev-
eral who were hated by a large proportion of people in their sub-districts.38
Ashley drew from his experience administering native courts in Nigeria 
to raise the possibility of starting experimental ones in the Solomons. He 
soon proposed two on Malaita, presided over by “chiefs” and by district offi-
cers as vice presidents, with chiefs allowed to decide cases involving “native 
custom.” High Commissioner Fletcher rejected this on the grounds that 
courts could not be adequately supervised and that customary laws had to 
be codified before such courts could properly function. But Ashley opposed 
codification; citing the diversity of rules on Malaita, he warned that it might 
“freeze” custom and leave it unable to adapt. Besides, he wrote, “No doubt 
in time the natives will adapt themselves to our laws.”39
The issue of codification of custom and its real and potential impacts 
reappears later in this book, so let me digress to raise some basic consider-
ations. Ashley was neither the first nor last to worry that codes of “custom-
ary” rules could rob colonized societies of flexibility; administrators and 
anthropologists in Melanesia, Africa, and India long voiced concerns that 
codes could “impose the grid of law on custom.”40 This issue is more com-
plex than it appears. Efforts to codify unwritten rules can have two very 
different effects. One indeed would be to congeal once fluid and dynamic 
systems. Committing rules to formal codes can more tightly define offenses 
and clarify fuzzy categorical boundaries or other ambiguities, leaving rules 
less malleable. Administrators found this prospect troublesome in places 
like 1930s Malaita where rapid change was ongoing and inevitable, and, 
given European beliefs that Malaitans were inherently inflexible, they wor-
ried that codification would further hamper their ability to adjust.
Codes might also simplify or narrow disputes in terms of penalties or 
procedure, as Malaitan practices of dispute resolution illustrate. Outside 
of colonial and state law, disputes were and are profoundly embedded in 
broader social processes. Though disputes are vitally grounded in strong 
indigenous concepts of morality and justice as well as a Malaitan penchant 
for abstract rules and principles, their management is also intensely politi-
cal. Compensation payments are typically subject to negotiations that incor-
porate a myriad of aggravating and mitigating factors—the personal status 
and reputations of disputants; their relative power and wealth (eg, people 
with lesser means to raise shell money and pigs can ideally pay smaller com-
pensations); and their present and past social relations, including previ-
ous disputes or compensations and political rivalries between them or their 
groups that may reach across generations. Disputes commonly expand and 
escalate when parties raise other issues. These can at first appear tangen-
tial to the original complaint but then emerge as the true issues at stake, 
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the complaint having been a pretext to broach them. Moreover, important 
men, and sometimes women, use disputes as occasions for political com-
petition, either as disputants themselves or as explicit or tacit sponsors of 
those directly involved. As with all public presentations on Malaita, in com-
pensation payments individuals and groups alike seek to earn prestige or 
at least to preserve face. Thus these payments transcend mere legal or eco-
nomic calculation. If a code sets specific fines or compensations for particu-
lar offenses and procedurally demarcates and narrows admissible issues, 
then these dynamic aspects of dispute management can be constrained or 
eliminated, fundamentally altering the system. British officials desired this 
result, not only because these features of Malaitan disputes disturbed their 
conceptions of justice, but also because only if disputes were greatly sim-
plified and extracted from the intricacies of social and political relations 
could officers ever hope to understand, regulate, and manage them.41
But this issue has another side. It is crucial to make an analytical dis-
tinction usually absent from discussions of codification’s consequences, 
particularly of whether it freezes rules once fluid and dynamic. We must 
differentiate the deployment and enforcement of legal codes from the pro-
cess of codification. This is especially important for colonial and postcolo-
nial Malaita, where groups have invested tremendous energies in discuss-
ing, debating, and drafting kastom laws or similar codes, often over years 
or decades, with their efforts rarely or never culminating in working laws 
except during Maasina Rule. The codification process, far from hardening 
rules, can thrust what were once routine, mundane, or comfortably ambig-
uous rules into a volatile political realm where they take on new, extrale-
gal meanings—objective, subjective, and metaphorical—and are thereby 
fundamentally transformed. Competing readings of particular rules can 
become political platforms for rival factions and, paradoxically, the codi-
fication process can thereby make rules more difficult to codify. Finally, 
especially in colonial situations, certain rules or bodies of rules may within 
this process become symbols of resistance to the state. This began to occur 
on Malaita during the 1930s, and Malaitans would later undertake inten-
sive codification efforts in opposition to the government legal system. In a 
similar way, codification became a weapon in Malaitan religious conflicts.42
Administrators like Ashley, focused on codification as product rather 
than process, saw it as dangerous because it might lock down social change. 
If they had understood the more dynamic processual aspect of codifica-
tion they likely would have opposed it still more, particularly as the 1930s 
progressed and officers began to fear that Malaitans were changing too 
fast, with, they believed, disastrous destabilizing and anomic consequences, 
including rapid depopulation (see chapter 3). This fear led them to try 
to stabilize local societies by restoring, preserving, and protecting selected 
customs, and custom codification became central to this effort. For exam-
ple, Malaita’s Officer George Sandars in his quarterly report for June 1937 
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called for speedy codification: “For much knowledge of things as they used 
to be is gradually being lost as the elders of the people die off.” Later chap-
ters explain how in the 1940s Malaitans themselves took up codification 
within their own social engineering projects aimed at radical change, which 
propelled to the fore the dynamic force of codification as process.
As noted earlier, Barley, who was Ashley’s assistant during periods of 
the 1930s, opposed serious recognition of local leaders, and he counseled 
High Commissioner Fletcher against Ashley’s native court ideas. He argued 
that codification was impossible, that Islanders were unqualified to serve 
on courts, and that Melanesians were inherently incapable of rendering 
fair and impartial decisions. In any case, he said, people wanted officers to 
handle their disputes for them. Ashley himself at times felt that there was 
little foundation on which to build a serious native court system; in 1933 he 
told Fletcher, “Owing to very rapid change of conditions I fear that the time 
has now unfortunately passed to attempt to revive any clan feeling or native 
customs. So damaged is it all in this short span of years. . . . Later, when the 
laws of these people have completely gone, as they must in time, and they 
have adapted the ideas of Western Europe, it will be possible and perhaps 
beneficial to have courts of Native Magistrates supervised by Europeans to 
administer laws we have made or adapted and codified for the benefit of 
the natives.” Fletcher’s successor, Arthur Richards, opined in 1937 that little 
was left of Solomon Islands cultures to preserve and that most of what did 
survive was obsolete and unsuitable as a basis for native administration.43
On the other side of the debate, anthropologist H Ian Hogbin became 
an advocate for building a native administration. In publications, popular 
articles, and reports to the government, written following his 1933 fieldwork 
in Guadalcanal and north Malaita, Hogbin lobbied heavily for indirect rule 
in the form of native courts and councils and custom codes, as well as for 
resuscitation of feasting to revive leaders’ prestige. Later he helped com-
pose an instruction booklet for councils and courts (eventually published 
in Oceania) that the government distributed to officers and these native 
bodies. Hogbin cautioned in Pacific Islands Monthly, “The scheme naturally 
presupposes that the district officers are trained in anthropology and are 
familiar with the customs of the area which they have to administer.”44
Even in the early 1930s some BSIP officers saw a clear need for greater 
Islander participation in administration. As unofficial headmen had existed 
before the Native Administration Regulation allowed them, so too in places 
unofficial native councils and courts developed with officers’ knowledge 
and even support. By 1934, for instance, native tribunals were hearing cases 
involving “native custom” on Guadalcanal. Fletcher did not challenge their 
existence but still insisted on codification as a precondition for official 
courts.45
Most officers involved in such projects seem to have been driven less 
by a desire to give Solomon Islanders a voice for its own sake than by a 
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dire need for their help in administration, although these motives were not 
mutually exclusive. Throughout the 1930s, government, mission, and eco-
nomic forces steadily eroded indigenous systems of dispute management, 
and the authority of local leaders further declined. Serious violence was no 
longer a viable response to offenses, and a growing number of cases were 
being brought before already overworked district officers. Legal work was 
just one of their many duties, as described by Martin Clemens, who worked 
for two years (1938–1940) as a cadet on Malaita: “The DO was responsible 
for practically everything. I learned what it meant to sit as a local magis-
trate; train police; keep prisoners’ warrants; act as coroner; inspect labor 
on plantations, do accounts, and collect taxes; supervise medical work; 
captain the district schooner; and even, on occasion, serve as collector of 
customs. . . . The district officer was also, it seemed, the settler of disputes, 
not only between different groups within the native population but also 
between Solomon Islanders and Europeans.” But though Malaita’s officers 
bore pressures similar to or greater than those of other officers, they did 
little to encourage formal, unofficial courts in most places there until just 
before the war.46 The rest of this chapter examines officers’ relations with 
Malaitans during the 1930s as they grappled with expanding duties and 
court dockets, and as Malaitans sized up their new lives under British con-
trol. From these interactions, especially in courts, emerged aspects of later 
kastom ideologies that urged Malaitan control over the legal system.
District Officers, Law, and Custom Knowledge
Many Malaitans interacted with colonial officers most directly when officers 
presided over courts. Beginning in the early 1930s, new cadets received 
basic training in civil and criminal law during a year of Colonial Adminis-
trative Service Courses at Cambridge or Oxford.47 To receive a commission 
they had to pass exams in criminal law, evidence, contracts, torts, indict-
able offenses, summary jurisdiction, and king’s regulations and the Pacific 
Order in Council. Sandars described the Pacific Order in Council as “our 
real Bible” and said his 1932 law exams were his “great bugbear”; other 
officers who initially failed them would doubtless have agreed. Those who 
passed became “deputy commissioners of the Western Pacific” with mag-
isterial powers to mandate prison sentences up to seven years and to hear 
criminal cases except for murder and rape.48
Officers handled all facets of a case, which, as former cadet Cyril Belshaw 
recalled, made legal work awkward: “The administrative officer has to act as 
judge, prosecutor, defense council and jury all at once, besides having con-
ducted an enquiry as policeman a few moments before.” Further, remem-
bered Ronald Garvey, who served on Malaita in 1928 and 1930–1931, “You 
were also the Superintendent of Prisons to see that the accused were looked 
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after, if you sentenced them.” After the early 1920s, except for just after 
Bell’s death, no police inspector lived on Malaita until the early 1950s. But 
even then Officer Jim Tedder followed “the convention that the District 
Officer or Commissioner always wore a tie” when hearing cases “to show he 
was not the officer from the district office but a magistrate.”49
To manage most cases effectively an officer had to have, or have access 
to, local knowledge. His legal training was often of little use in disputes not 
justiciable under British law, the main source of government law except 
for specific BSIP regulations made under the Pacific Order in Council. 
Bell had quickly realized he had to adjudicate such cases if he was to claim 
authority. In one late-1919 report he detailed his criminal investigations, 
mostly of murders, on a Malaita tour, but then he told of other grievances: 
“Besides the above there were the usual number of complaints to try and 
settle which could not very well be brought under the category of crime, but 
which often cause considerable unrest among the natives of this island.”50
Disputes over ancestral oaths, sorcery accusations, and violations of local 
rules and taboos had to be dealt with to keep the peace, and to do so effec-
tively required cultural sophistication.
Soon after arriving, Resident Commissioner Ashley, drawing on his 
Nigerian training, instructed, “An administrative officer’s duty is to study 
the native customs of the people with whom he has to do.” This was eas-
ier said than done since most districts had many language groups—ten 
on Malaita—with significant cultural variation between and within them. 
Gaining cultural and language fluency was made still more difficult when, 
against Lugard’s prescription of continuity, officers were transferred fre-
quently. For example, Cadet Clemens, posted to Wairokai in ‘Are‘are in the 
late 1930s, differed from most officers in compiling serious notes on local 
culture and a language word list, but he was soon transferred to Makira. He 
told me of being “furious” at having his work wasted: “One was just never 
left anywhere long enough to really get down to understanding the Solo-
mon Islanders.” His superior, Charles Bengough, had instructed, “Native 
custom should be carefully and exhaustively studied by the officer at Wairo-
kai.” Had Clemens been allowed to follow through, it would have been the 
first such study by a Malaitan officer.51
George Steinmetz has noted a common pattern in colonial settings of 
officials competing for “the cultural capital of ethnographic acuity or eth-
nographic discernment,” and in the literature and archives of Malaita one 
occasionally finds claims to, or glowing attributions of, such expertise, some-
times presented as an essential tool of control. But in truth officers there 
before the war remained ignorant of crucial realms of local cultures, owing 
to the sheer complexity and variation, their segregation from Malaitan life, 
and prejudices of the day. Malaitans knew more about the daily lives of local 
whites, via servants for example, than whites did about Malaitans’.52
Though colonial policies would come to privilege and grant political 
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power to local knowledge and practices—that is, to “custom”—officers 
lacked the resources and in many cases the serious desire to learn enough 
to adequately manage such policies. Some were conscious of what they did 
not know but confident that in the final tally it was not critical—local cul-
tures were simply not worth the trouble for an already overworked officer 
to study in depth. The resulting misconceptions of local societies paved a 
treacherous road for colonial policy makers, from young cadets in the field 
to distant high commissioners in Fiji. There was also a pattern of more 
astute officers finding the local knowledge they did have and their deci-
sions based on it overruled by resident or high commissioners who knew 
little and made decisions based on gross stereotypes or on their personal 
experiences in Africa or Fiji.
Raymond Firth, who was first in the Solomons in the late 1920s, remem-
bered, “Only two officers in the Solomons administration at that time 
seemed to me to have any inkling of how the local societies operated.” 
A major barrier on Malaita was that no officers there learned any local 
tongues, and Anglican missionary Albert Mason found them “rather afraid 
of the native languages and names.” Into the 1910s, officers were told that 
to earn a salary increase they had to learn “at least one dialect spoken in the 
Solomons,” or “the principal dialect of their district,” but in the end they 
were required only to learn Pijin. By the mid-1920s, Officer Hector Mac-
Quarrie found that, in the Protectorate generally, “The language problem, 
being beyond any workable solution, is ignored.” Hogbin and his To‘abaita 
informants alleged that Malaita’s officers spoke even Pijin badly. As a medi-
ocre linguist who managed to learn Pijin quickly I find this hard to believe, 
though Malaita’s District Commissioner Sandars, whom we shall soon meet, 
did later recall it as “a queer sounding garbled business and not in any way 
satisfactory,” and even after many years on Malaita he was not above using 
an interpreter to convey his words in Pijin. A common idea that Pijin was 
only a kind of broken English discouraged some English speakers from 
learning it as a language in its own right. The high commissioner and some 
others agreed with Acting Resident Commissioner F E Johnson’s late-1930s 
call for rejection of “this bastard language,” but officers used Pijin to inter-
act with most Islanders until independence in 1978.53
Though the frequent transfer of officers was a problem across the Pro-
tectorate, prewar Malaita enjoyed unusual continuity of senior personnel. 
Bell had been so effective partly because he dealt closely with Malaitans for 
22 years—as labor inspector from 1905 to 1911 on Fiji ships and from 1912 
to 1915 in the Solomons, then for over ten years as a district officer—and 
thus understood many aspects of local life. He told Acting Resident Com-
missioner Frederick Barnett that during his three years as BSIP inspector, 
“I was probably more in touch with the doings of the greater portion of the 
island than were the District and Police Officers.”54
Bell was followed by a succession of officers, including several on special 
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short-term duty just after his death. For over a year in 1928–1929, Malaita 
was placed under Francis Filose, who had people flogged and was removed 
from his next posting on Santa Isabel for ordering Malaitans and others 
beaten and for pulling one behind his horse with a rope round his neck.55
Filose was preceded and followed by Colin E J Wilson, who had been in 
the Solomons for many years. Three members of the Whitney South Sea 
Expedition, ornithologists traveling to the Kwaio interior in 1930, recorded 
in diaries their predeparture interview with Wilson, on 26 January. Walter 
Eyerdam wrote, “He told us a lot of awful stories about hostile and treacher-
ous mountain bushmen but as he had never been farther than a day’s march 
inland, he could not speak from personal experience”; William Coultas 
recorded, “He became so eloquent in his pessimism that he offered us one 
chance in a hundred of coming out of the mountains alive”; and Hanni-
bal Hamlin noted, “He was almost alarmingly pessimistic about the Ari-Ari 
[‘Are‘are] natives in the vicinity of the big range in South Malaita. . . . These 
people live only for suspicious hatred and treachery which keeps them in 
constant fear of anything foreign. ‘Why would they miss such an opportu-
nity to destroy a few white men?’ These sentiments do not jibe with what I 
have heard from more reliable sources.” Lord Lugard would not have been 
pleased.56
Wilson’s fears doubtless stemmed from Bell’s assassination, and the fact 
that just before that Wilson had sent a police patrol to their deaths at the 
hands of people of Talise on Guadalcanal. He had been partly blamed for 
their deaths, having convicted one of the murderers of adultery with a 
woman who was in fact his wife, and he was reprimanded for dereliction of 
duty. Wilson had also been the officer in charge of the punitive expedition 
into Kwaio and, with Kane, had covered up its brutality in reports to High 
Commissioner Eyre Hutson. (Kane was also chastised behind the scenes 
for the Guadalcanal incident.) An American doctor, Sylvester Lambert, was 
told that it was Wilson who had decided to send the Malaitan constabulary 
into the Kwaio bush without escort. Now constant rumors circulated, all 
baseless, of Kwaio plots to again attack officers, and into the 1940s reports 
were regularly submitted to the resident commissioner about prospects of 
Kwaio unrest.57 At this same time, Officer Garvey deployed constabulary in 
elaborate defensive positions at tax collections: “In order to protect myself I 
had the police in a V coming down towards my table, with the natives com-
ing in single file down the center. And then at the back I had another V of 
police to prevent anybody coming from behind to obliterate me like they 
had poor Bell and Lillies.”58
Soon after meeting the Whitney bird hunters, Wilson left Malaita, and 
the island came under the aforementioned Jack Barley, who had from 1912 
served under Woodford as one of the Protectorate’s first cadets and was now 
an experienced administrator. Barley was on Malaita for nearly two years 
from 1930 to 1932 and again briefly in 1933. Dr Lambert lauded Barley’s 
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“passion for ethnology and affectionate responsibility for the natives,” and 
wrote admiringly of him as “Barley, who knew more about the customs, lan-
guage and social traditions of the people than any white man who had ever 
lived in the Solomons. Barley, whose affection for the natives was fatherly, 
and who had devoted his splendid life to them.” Lambert described him at 
his earlier “God-forsaken post at Kirakira” on Makira as “like something out 
of Kipling, dressing for the evening, having his spot of gin and bitters before 
dinner, and a sound cigar afterward.” Barley held a bachelor’s degree from 
St John’s College at Oxford, and his reports from Malaita and Makira reveal 
him as in certain respects more sympathetic toward and knowledgeable of 
Melanesians than were his colleagues. He undertook some ethnographic 
study (which he later gave up), and before his posting to Malaita he had 
also gained, in his words, “a passing acquaintance with some six distinctive 
dialects.” These included languages of Roviana, Ontong Java, Makira, and 
Fiji, although there is no record of his learning any on Malaita. But sympa-
thy did not translate into confidence in Malaitan abilities or an apprecia-
tion of the moral moorings of their communities. Earlier in this chapter 
I noted Barley’s opposition to the serious application of indirect rule in 
Malaita, and he held highly negative views of relevant aspects of Malaitan 
societies. In 1932, for example, he wrote that the authority and prestige of 
Figure 2.2. District Officer Ronald Garvey collecting the head tax at Uru, north-
east Kwaio, in early October 1928, with soldiers in defensive formation. (Photo by 
Guinevere Anderson, courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum, Oc,A61.42.)
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the island’s leaders was based mostly on “exercise of traditional rights and 
privileges, totally repugnant to modern ideas of justice and humanity or 
calculated to retard social progress or vi et armis.”59
Two officers who followed Barley—George Eustace Sandars (see fig-
ure 2.4) and Charles Bengough—were to have an enormous influence on 
Malaita and dominate its administration for years to come. Sandars, from 
Lincolnshire, spent over seven years on the island between 1928 and 1947 
and is a key figure in this book. Londoner Bengough was in Malaita nearly 
as long, serving many terms between 1934 and 1943, when he died.60 To 
understand how Malaitans developed their ideas about the colonial govern-
ment before the war, it is important to know something of these two men 
and their dealings with local people. Sandars first arrived on Malaita in 
1928 as a sub-inspector of the constabulary, a job he did not like but took 
in order to escape a weak Australian economy. He became a district officer 
on the island in November 1933 at the relatively late age of 38, serving 
under his close friend Barley and then replacing him when Barley left to 
become resident commissioner of the Gilbert and Ellis Islands. Bengough 
was first posted to Malaita in February 1934, while in his mid-twenties, to 
serve under Sandars, and for much of the next 13 years, one or the other 
presided there. Their reports show they saw eye-to-eye on most issues and 
Figure 2.3. Jack C Barley (seated with dog) picnicking with Stanley Annandale, on 
Gela, ca early 1910s. (Edge-Partington collection, courtesy of the Edge-Partington 
family.)
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closely coordinated policy, and Sandars later said they were “very firm 
friends.” Dick Horton, on Malaita for eight months in 1938, thought that 
the two were much alike and that Bengough “had clearly modeled him-
self” on Sandars. SSEM missionary Norman Deck wrote of Bengough that 
Sandars had “taught him sound administration.” Kwaio told me Bengough 
was quieter and physically smaller, and they and other Malaitans said that 
Sandars was the better-liked man.61
Junior officers who served under Sandars later described him as a stern 
taskmaster. One, Martin Clemens, recalled to me, “Bengough was very much 
under the eye of Sandars, his mentor and all that. It was always ‘yes sir, three 
bags full’ from Bengough to Sandars, you know.” They were, Clemens said, 
“a most secretive mutual admiration society. . . . Neither ever encouraged us 
cadets to read up what they had written about Malaita.” “They kept what 
they had written to themselves and never gave anyone else any credit.” San-
dars later expressed regret for not having spent more time in training his 
cadets but said he had been too busy.62
Sandars took pride in his knowledge of Malaitan cultures and in what 
he felt to be his resultant ability to minimize the need for official courts: 
“According to our Pacific Order in Council the native custom ran except 
Figure 2.4. G E D Sandars with his staff at ‘Aoke, ca 1934. L to R: (top) Sergeant 
Major Sale Vuza; Malakai Ravai (Fijian Medical Practitioner); Sandars; Gegi (domes-
tic); Aliki Maena (clerk); unknown; seated is Vuza’s wife Salome, from Kafusiisigi 
in east Kwaio. (Roger Keesing Papers, Tuzin Archive for Melanesian Anthropology, 
Mandeville Special Collections Library, University of California at San Diego, box 
41, file 5, photographer unknown.)
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where repugnant to British justice,” he later wrote. “It was therefore most 
essential that any District Officer should thoroughly understand all native 
customs within his District. I suppose that of all the matters which came up 
before me I was able to deal with at least 75 percent of them according to 
native custom and if the people refused to accept the native custom then I 
had to deal with them in Court, but generally speaking if one knew one’s 
job there was never any question of them not accepting the native custom 
as their true law.” Sandars said he had started a “book of Native Custom” 
that he believed would be vitally important to administration, but that he 
never had time to compile it properly. “Native Custom,” he wrote, “varies 
from zone to zone and it takes years before one can collect a good working 
knowledge of the whole. New customs, old to the people concerned, but 
new to me, keep coming to the fore entailing much lengthy discussion in 
order to get a grasp of the essentials.”63
And yet, for a man so long on Malaita who claimed such ethnographic 
expertise, Sandars’s apparent ignorance of many basic aspects of Malai-
tan life is startling. Take a trivial but revealing comment: describing the 
complex plaiting of Malaitan ornamental combs, he wrote, “How people 
who were quite incapable of counting could make up these very intricate 
designs always worried me but I could never find out how they managed 
it.” In reality, many Malaitans display remarkable numerical abilities; their 
detailed memories and calculations of decades of marriage and feast 
exchanges, compensation payments, and commodity transactions often 
humbled me as their children’s math teacher.64 More consequential were 
Sandars’s crude and sometimes ridiculous misreadings of Malaitan religion 
(“a thing of awful fear for everyone”; “of such terror that almost anything 
was preferable to it”); leadership systems (“They live in small family groups 
all thoroughly mistrustful of one and other and it was only through the abil-
ity of some family to slay more people than anybody else that they gradu-
ally gained an ascendancy over some family groups”); and social structures, 
exchanges, and concepts of liability. To Sandars, large swaths of Malaitan 
life were remote and morally indecipherable, and he therefore, like many 
other whites, judged them amoral or immoral.65
Some of Sandars’s distorting statements just cited appear in a later auto-
biographical manuscript, which also contains surprising errors concerning 
Malaita’s colonial history before his arrival. This calls for caution: colo-
nial servant memoirs are peculiar in that some men who were erudite and 
impressive officers, as evinced by their reports, wrote memoirs mired in 
frivolity. They tended to curb discussion of serious topics in favor of humor, 
anecdote, and the chatty dinner-party tone characteristic of the genre (and 
often included mundane accounts of actual dinner parties). Sandars’s pre-
sentation, which he dictated when he was old and unwell, falls squarely 
within this type. That aside, we will see that, although vital aspects of Malai-
tan societies obviously remained an enigma to him, his views of Malaitans 
74 Chapter 2
did become more nuanced by the end of his tenure in the mid-1940s. This 
change arose not so much from a grasp of more ethnographic knowledge 
as from a deeper and more empathetic understanding of Malaitans’ char-
acter and their grievances and aspirations.
That Sandars knew little about many basic aspects of Malaitan life was in 
part a result of the fact that he, like most prewar officers, remained socially 
distant from most Malaitans, due largely to an inability or unwillingness to 
see or reach beyond the colonial conventions and stereotypes of the day. 
This was exacerbated by the difficulty of learning about people so physi-
cally remote—at this time the majority lived in the mountains, and even 
many coastal communities could be visited only rarely. Sandars told Dr Ross 
Innes in 1938 that on Malaita “anything up to 8,000 people are beyond the 
ken of anyone, and not likely to be seen in the meantime by anyone.” As 
Belshaw noted for the Solomons generally, inland villages “were seldom 
visited except by the most enthusiastic officials, and . . . none have ever been 
visited by the most senior officials of Government or Church.” Sandars later 
said that he spent half of his time under Barley touring, but he did so mostly 
by boat and held his courts on the coast. Though notorious for breaking in 
new cadets by sending them on arduous mountain patrols—Cadet Alexan-
der Waddell called him “the worst slave driver he ever knew”—Sandars him-
self strongly disliked bush walking. In his fifties by the time he left Malaita, 
he said he was bad at it, and anyway, “one saw very few people” and “it 
wasted too much time.” Dr Innes, who from 1937–1938 conducted a lep-
rosy survey with Sandars and other officers, recorded, probably advised by 
Sandars, that Malaitan officers had to tour by ship since there were so few 
trails in the mountains, but in fact there were countless footpaths. Davies, 
a cadet under Sandars in the mid-1940s, later acknowledged charges that 
Malaita had “a sea-borne administration, [which] had no roots on land and 
hence never got to know the people properly,” resulting “in a less personal 
form of administration than if we had used Shanks’ pony more often.” But, 
he noted, “It was . . . a question of walking along the coast at three miles an 
hour (if one was very lucky) and being too exhausted to do much effective 
work, or traveling by sea at six miles an hour and being fresh enough do 
some work.” Officers touring on ships usually slept on their boats rather 
than ashore. The upshot was that they spent little time in the milieus in 
which most Malaitans lived.66
To be sure, touring Malaita’s mountains is no simple walkabout and it is 
no wonder so many of the thousands of hamlets before the war never saw 
an officer. Clemens described the logistics:
We used to pad along in a long, silent column. A policeman, who knew the route, 
led the way, and I followed. Behind me came another constable, strong and sure-
footed, who assisted me if the way was too slippery. We were followed by the carri-
ers with our bedding and rations; they were supervised by the remaining police, 
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who also kept an eye on any felons who had been sentenced to a term of impris-
onment at any court held during the tour. These had the privilege of carrying 
the heaviest loads. The biggest burden was a heavy ironbound, padlocked box, 
which contained court and Treasury forms, registers, and silver money collected 
in payment of tax. We also had to carry tinned rations, to which were added 
whatever fresh fruit and vegetables we could find in route. The farther away we 
were from the coast, the less likely this was. . . . The work done was varied, and 
very interesting, but the walking got monotonous—the shady jungle was always 
the same, mile after mile—and I used to plan magnificent meals as I went along.
Mountain trails are not cut to European sensibilities. Routes often travel 
as the crow flies, contours be damned, and a novice walker might guess 
they had been blazed by someone traveling like an ant, climbing a blade 
of grass to its tip and descending the other side rather than going around. 
As Innes wrote, “One does not need to be very long here before one has 
struggled through mangrove swamps, slipped and slithered over atrocious 
bush paths, been sweated and reduced to exhaustion in crawling over the 
surface of this roadless part of the earth.” Touring was made still more dif-
ficult in that most mountain hamlets moved on a regular basis.67
Even when touring inland, officers could stay insulated from the people. 
Ma‘aanamae of Kwainaa‘isi (a hamlet 900 meters above sea level), with 
whom I lived in the 1990s, told me in 1987 how they at times played reluc-
tant hosts to armed patrols that occasionally passed through Kwaio in the 
1930s: “They would arrive on patrol and we would put them in a house: 
‘Here is the house for you to sleep in.’ And we people who lived there, only 
when it was time for them to give us orders would we gather together . . . and 
then they would be on their way. [District officers could be kind] but their 
kindness was selective, in that they only liked certain people. They liked 
people like the headmen. But common people, they were not friendly to 
us. . . . When they were eating we could not go in to talk to them. If we did 
they would say, ‘Go on! Outside!’ The white people on the plantations were 
like that, and so were gafamanu [government officers].”68
The social distance enforced varied with the place and the officer, how-
ever, especially later in the decade. Some Kwaio told me that Sandars liked 
to joke with elders and children when he came, and Dick Horton wrote 
of a looser protocol he followed in 1938 when at age 23 he patrolled the 
mountains of Kwara‘ae and Kwaio: “The night would be enlivened with gos-
sip as all and sundry crowded into the huts to see the visitors, smoking and 
spitting until I felt that I was floating on a miasma of the tuberculosis which 
is prevalent in the islands. Then the police would drive out the crowd and 
‘Guberment’ would go to sleep surrounded by his henchmen.”69
Key for Malaitans was a European’s willingness or refusal to eat with 
them. Molaina‘o of Nu‘u accompanied officers Bengough and Brownlees 
on a Kwaio tour in 1940 and 40 years later recalled to me vividly the people 
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at stops watching the two eat rice alone. I have heard other such stories and 
the important point is not that officers were selfish for not sharing out their 
rations to gatherings, but rather that those who pointedly did not eat with 
local people erected a high social barrier in the eyes of Malaitans, for whom 
food sharing is fundamental to human relationships. We will see that during 
the war Malaitan friendships with some American soldiers were cemented by 
the soldiers’ readiness to share food and meals, and I have been given many 
heartfelt explanations of the symbolic import this had for Malaitans.70
In 1940, Officer Michael Forster, age 24, began impressing ‘Are‘are and 
Kwaio people by taking part in bridewealth exchanges and especially by eat-
ing with them. Decades later Malaitans still remembered him as a different 
sort of officer, who even invited Malaitans into his house to eat at his table. 
We will follow him through much of this book. Sandars wrote that Forster 
was “very fond” of the people of the southern half of Malaita and “was of 
very great assistance to me because these people were particularly hard to 
get on with but he managed particularly well.” Forster gave lie to the maxim 
that firmness and distance, not kindness and familiarity, were the only safe 
and effective modes for dealing with Malaitans. He also toured more than 
other officers and not surprisingly his reports display more knowledge. 
Davies said Forster was “deeply in love with Malaita.” When he was posted 
to the Western Solomons in early 1945, Forster wrote to Sandars pleading 
to return: “I find it extremely hard to contemplate settling down any where 
else.” By June he was back in ‘Aoke as assistant district commissioner.71
Headmen served as a filter between officers and most Malaitans, since 
legal or other problems were usually taken first to them and they might 
choose to settle things themselves. Jonathan Fifi‘i told me, “The officers 
always worked through the headmen, and would not just talk to people. . . . If 
a man or woman had a problem or something bad happened to them, they 
couldn’t go straight to the district officer; they would have to go through 
the headmen.” Before the war, Sandars at ‘Aoke used Sergeant Major Sale 
Vuza (see figure 2.4), an extraordinary Guadalcanal man who had joined 
the police in 1916, to screen even headmen who came to see him. Vuza 
later said Sandars disapproved of people casually visiting ‘Aoke “because 
the station belonged to the government.” The use of select individuals as a 
bulwark against general contact with other Melanesians was standard pre-
war practice. Hogbin and Camilla Wedgwood described this as part of “the 
prevailing attitude” and quoted a 1926 article in the Rabaul Times titled 
“How to Succeed as a Coconut Planter in New Guinea”: “Never talk to the 
boys themselves under any circumstances; always do it through the boss 
boys. Apart from your house boys and boss boys never allow any native in 
your employ to approach you in the field or on the bungalow verandah.” 
Most officers were not as exclusive as this, but many Malaitans, at times 
encouraged by headmen, perceived it to be the usual practice. When Dr 
Gideon Zoleveke of Choiseul was posted to Malaita in 1951, he found the 
Early Native Administration: Coping with Custom 77
officer living in “an enormous construction on top of the hill,” and thought, 
“No wonder expatriate officers developed a colonial mentality, living alone 
in such huge structures, protected by policemen and served by prisoners.” 
In this land of buffers, officers served as cushions between Melanesians and 
other Europeans, “standing,” wrote Arthur Hopkins, “between the white 
men and the native, regulating their relations and intercourse in its every 
phase and complication.” They also stood between Europeans in conflict, 
such as rival missionaries, who also sometimes clashed with planters.72
Encircled by selected underlings and intermediaries, Malaitan officers 
in the 1930s could fashion an enclave, shielded from the seeming chaos 
beyond, and this removed the need to learn more about the local scene 
in order to conduct one’s daily life. On his 1929 arrival in the Solomons, 
Resident Commissioner Ashley had explained that, to succeed, the admin-
istration had to be accessible to the people, and he quoted Sir John Mal-
colm to instruct his officers “to live with four doors open, be of perfectly 
easy access to every native; for to listen to a man is sometimes as good as 
granting what he prays for.” Perhaps Ashley had been thinking here of the 
people’s “imaginary grievances,” but in any case throughout his ten-year 
tenure this directive was trumped by black-white boundaries. Although 
individual officers on Malaita during this period exhibited varying attitudes 
and behaviors, older people I have known over the years have consistently 
maintained that there were few differences among them, excepting always 
Forster and sometimes also Sandars, and they remember prewar officers as 
aloof and unfriendly. I have heard more positive memories of some officers 
from elders who lived around ‘Aoke, however.73
It was not only whites who cultivated separation. While headmen acted as 
gatekeepers to officers, they were also useful to Malaitans as buffers against 
unwanted contact with these same officers, blocking them out of local 
affairs—most Malaitans were not eager for extended interaction. Davies 
later said that officers touring by boat just after the war would have slept 
ashore more often but for a lack of rest houses, which government would 
not pay for, and “although it became fashionable in later years to criticize 
[officers] for living on board their ships, the people at the time certainly did 
not feel so strongly about it that they were prepared to build rest houses.”74
One might wonder at this, in light of the idea some scholars have put 
forth that prewar officers were accepted as big men, filling roles once held 
by indigenous leaders. In the same vein, Forster portrayed the prewar head 
tax—sanctioned though it was by fines, jails, and at times bullying police-
men—as analogous to a tribute to such leaders and thus not resented 
(though elsewhere he roundly contradicted this). This view of officers as 
substitute leaders receiving tax tribute may have had validity in parts of the 
Solomons, but one could scarcely be further off the mark insofar as how 
most Malaitan communities in the 1930s saw officers and the tax, or how 
officers performed their duties. J D A Germond, a senior officer who arrived 
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from Africa in the late 1940s, summed up the historical position of an offi-
cer on Malaita: “He has become, in the eyes of the people, a collector of 
taxes, an investigator of crime and a judge and executioner who however 
well disposed, cannot be regarded as impartial. He is in fact a man to be 
feared and avoided as much as possible, whereas he should be a friend, 
advisor and a protector.” He added that tax houses were a prime symbol of 
the people’s resentment.75 Some Malaitans did try to harness the power of 
officers through real or feigned cooperation, but the social and logistical 
distance separating officers from most communities by itself precluded their 
approaching anything like the intensely social roles of local leaders. Viewing 
particular government headmen in this light might be more fruitful, though 
their close association with the government was as often a political handicap 
for them (and with the worst headmen, for the government as well).
For many Malaitans, taxation without tangible returns, let alone repre-
sentation, was a root of the problem. Shortly before his death, Bell warned 
that the tax “appears to have caused a very pronounced decrease in the 
faith of the natives in the good-will of the Government toward them and 
consequently the confidence of the natives in the advice of the District Offi-
cer does not appear to be quite the same as in former times. Owing to the 
amount of work and the time [spent collecting taxes] there is danger that 
the natives have come to the conclusion that the principal duty of the Dis-
trict Officer is that of extracting money from them.”76 Five years later Barley 
reported that taxation consumed more of his time than any other feature 
of administration—in 1930 he traveled 3,800 kilometers in 167 days during 
ten trips to 31 leaf “tax houses” around the island, up from 25 tax houses 
in 1927. Most Malaitans came to see the tax with indignation as an onerous 
levy bringing no return except incarceration for defaulters. Many before 
the war perceived it much like Baegu people of the north did—in Officer 
Tom Russell’s words, as “an honorarium to government for the privilege of 
being left alone.” Colin Allan reported, “Fataleka like Eastern Kwara‘ae and 
parts of Kwaio before the war paid their taxes on the understanding that 
the Govt. would leave them in peace.”77
Malaitans commonly value leaders for their abilities to settle disputes 
with erudition and to the satisfaction of all parties, but here especially, car-
rying out one of their primary duties, officers were often on shaky ground. 
When trying to adjudicate “custom” matters, they could be made pain-
fully aware that they lacked requisite cultural knowledge. In 1934, Officer 
Leonard Wright of Guadalcanal gave this as a reason he allowed unofficial 
native tribunals there based on unwritten native custom. And Wright was 
no greenhorn; he had already spent some three years in charge of that 
island, and before long published studies in Oceania and in Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, for which he was a fellow and corresponding 
secretary.78
Much more was at issue than an officer’s familiarity with abstract rules. 
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When Malaitans assess disputes they often draw on deep local knowledge of 
long-term, complex relationships of the disputants and their groups. Such 
sophistication comes only from enduring social engagement. I have often 
heard Kwaio declare their inability to properly evaluate particular disputes 
between Kwaio who live far away and whom they do not know well, citing 
their lack of social and historical knowledge about the case and its princi-
Figure 2.5. Men queued up to pay the head tax at Maro‘umasike, southeastern 
‘Are‘are, ca 1936. (Photo by Robert A Lever, courtesy of the Trustees of the British 
Museum, Oc,B98.95.)
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pals. In any Malaitan community certain individuals are known for their 
superior knowledge of social networks and legal and other histories and 
for having the brains, talent, and integrity to effectively apply it to skillfully 
managing disputes; they are called on when trouble cases arise. This is one 
realm in which “big men” earn that name—the same skills and some of the 
same information that allow one to navigate mazes of formal exchange net-
works can be brought to bear on disputes. The depth and breadth of knowl-
edge of such men is formidable. I have studied a part of one Malaitan area, 
east central Kwaio, intensely over 30 years, at times with a specific focus on 
rules and disputes, and I have toiled to learn local networks and their histo-
ries, but many disputes there I would be loath to adjudicate. Officers were 
charged with doing so not in one area but across all of Malaita, sometimes 
after only brief residence on the island.79
Many Malaitans disdained the government preference for treating dis-
putes as circumscribed and dyadic rather than as conflicts immersed in 
relations between groups or as episodes within complex histories. While 
Malaitans typically absorbed disputes within social networks, officers tried 
to isolate disputes from them. Malaitans commonly resented the govern-
ment’s emphasis on punishment over redress and on rights and liabilities 
of individuals over those of groups. For officers, settling disputes via com-
pensations was a special challenge: lacking the knowledge to direct pay-
ments to multiple, appropriate parties, they often awarded them instead 
to individuals; they balked at ordering compensation paid by a party that 
seemed by their European sensibilities to bear no responsibility for a wrong 
or misfortune at issue; and they commonly disallowed demands for puni-
tive compensations. British and Malaitan approaches to misdeeds and dis-
putes were separated by more than different rules and procedures; at con-
flict, too, were basic moral principles regarding relationships between the 
individual and society, and between intent, responsibility, and liability. It 
is no surprise that law, or loa, and especially compensation, soon became 
key symbols of Malaitans’ resistance to outsiders imposing foreign ways on 
them and of their demands that they be left to conduct their own affairs.
Other problems arose when officers presided over more formal courts. 
Strict rules of evidence could prove a handicap, and a common complaint 
was that officers ignored evidence Malaitans judged to be damning, such 
as sacred oaths made in ancestors’ names (or refusal to utter them), while 
they granted weight to testimony Malaitans found implausible or irrelevant. 
Sandars had this in mind when he wrote regretfully concerning Kwaio 
thievery, “What they consider proof, and in many cases they are probably 
right, cannot be accepted as evidence in court.” Observed Bishop Steward, 
“It must be a terribly difficult business for the Government official who is 
hampered by British Law and legal procedure and it is no wonder that his 
efforts are so little appreciated and that he is so often used as the unwitting 
instrument of revenge.”80
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Both Sandars and Bengough made extensive use of knowledgeable 
Malaitans when hearing disputes over “purely native affairs.” Sandars felt 
that this both allowed him to make informed decisions and boosted com-
munity respect for “elders.” At times the officers skirted British legal rules 
and procedure altogether. In adjudicating Kwara‘ae land cases, Bengough 
sometimes admitted evidence in the form of ‘aenimae, stylized historical 
chants about ancestral deeds sung in the Kwara‘ae language that he did not 
know. In ‘Are‘are, Sandars went so far as to allow trial by ordeal, involving 
the handling of hot stones and swimming crocodile-infested waters, and 
he admitted evidence found through divination in cases there, in north 
Malaita, and probably elsewhere. He once tried the hot-stone test himself 
and, to the delight of spectators, burned his hands. Officers commonly 
employed ritual oaths of denial. After the war, Officer Wilfred Marquand 
explained how he let the local courts he presided over carry on in local lan-
guage and afterward received a Pijin summary and the verdict to approve, 
modify, or reject.81
Sometimes officers hearing cases assessed local knowledge less for-
mally. Officer John Brownlees—a barrister and eventually a chief justice in 
Tonga (1941–1947) and a judge in the New Hebrides (1956–1958)—later 
recounted his judicious assessment of catcalls in his Solomons courts, prob-
ably while he was on Malaita in the mid-1930s, or 1940: “I was always influ-
enced to a certain extent, wrongly or rightly, by the audience. Their reac-
tions to the proceedings were not put into so many words, but they were 
highly expressive: ‘Waaahhh!’ would mean ‘You dirty liar!’ This was often 
very helpful, and certainly did influence you. Above all, you had a strong 
sense of trying to get to the root of the matter, and seeing fair play. There 
was no finesse or nonsense about admissible evidence. That kind of thing 
never crossed my mind.” Missionary Hopkins commented that officers were 
placed in a position where “a short, sharp settlement by guess work is very 
tempting.” Sandars’s rule for making difficult court decisions, which he 
taught to his cadets, was to “do something, even if it’s wrong.”82
Efforts to manage local disputes through indigenous mechanisms were 
admirable, but in the end officers had little choice, given that in many 
cases British law was unsuitable or irrelevant, or unacceptable to Malaitans 
involved. The predicament was, again, that properly applying such mecha-
nisms required complex knowledge that officers often lacked. They could 
be left serving simply as referees, “seeing fair play” but basically ignorant of 
the rules of the game and sometimes even of what was really at stake in a 
dispute they were hearing.
The expertise required to properly apply indigenous mechanisms of dis-
pute management could be daunting. Take as an example ancestral oaths 
of denial, just one of the types of oaths and curses routinely employed to 
settle Malaitan disputes. These generally take a conditional form: “I did X, 
and I also do Y,” where X is the act the speaker is accused of, and Y some 
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act of ancestral or personal defilement involving a polluting substance such 
as feces or afterbirth. If a man—let us call him Jimmy—is charged with 
stealing a pig belonging to Tom, Jimmy might utter the following oath of 
denial: “I stole Tom’s pig, and I also defecate on the sacred shrine of my 
ancestor, Bighead.” If Jimmy did in fact steal that pig, then his omniscient 
ancestor Bighead, knowing his guilt, becomes enraged since he has made 
the performative statement that by stealing said pig he has also defecated 
on the shrine. Bighead is certain to kill Jimmy or a relative in retribution. 
But if Jimmy did not steal the pig, then the second part of the oath is 
inconsequential.83 While such oaths of denial may seem straightforward, 
they are often much more complicated than this example, and negotia-
tions surrounding the precise wording an oath will take can be one of the 
most complex aspects of Malaitan disputing. They can drag on for hours 
or sometimes through recurring meetings over weeks. Accusers want the 
oath to be as deadly as possible and will try to eliminate potential loop-
holes. The accused—in our example Jimmy and his kin, collectively liable 
for any ancestral punishment that might result—will want to avoid the most 
dangerous oaths. They also want to tailor the oath’s wording to eliminate 
ambiguity that might leave them open to ancestral wrath, or if Jimmy is 
guilty, perhaps finesse the wording to dodge an effective oath. For a simple 
illustration, Jimmy’s oath will likely denote this specific pig rather than simply 
“Tom’s pig,” in case he has stolen another of Tom’s pigs in the past, or has 
eaten pork, perhaps unknowingly, from a pig someone else stole from Tom.
To complicate matters further, secret counter-magics allow certain oaths 
to be made with impunity, and Tom’s people will be suspicious these might 
be in play. Or someone in Jimmy’s group—as variably defined—may have 
once made a prohibitive curse against anyone making certain types of oaths, 
or perhaps against any oath invoking a particular ancestor’s name. Here, in 
negotiating oaths and their phrasing, Malaitans enter perhaps their most 
legalistic mode—each word may be weighed, worried over, and debated, 
with great attention to the subtlest shades of meaning. Oaths are deadly 
serious and their composition is not to be hurried. Sometimes the guilty 
will try to prolong negotiations as a stalling tactic. Keep in mind that all 
of this addresses only formal aspects of cursing. The proceedings are made 
much more complex when one superimposes on them the labyrinthine 
social relations and histories of the participants and their various ances-
tral spirits. Several Kwaio people complained to me that when Sandars and 
other officers allowed oaths there in the past they were often improperly 
worded, careless or even reckless, or invoked inappropriate spirits.84
Despite these complexities, there were several reasons why officers try-
ing to settle trouble cases might find an oath an attractive solution. First, 
if the accused, in the end, refuses to utter an oath, and there are reason-
able grounds for suspicion, their refusal is generally taken as an admission 
of guilt, they pay compensation, and the case is resolved. Further, once a 
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person has made an oath of denial, henceforth no one can again publicly 
accuse that person of the same offense (at least in southern Malaita), and 
anyone who does so risks having to compensate the accused (in effect, they 
accuse them of “Y”). Oaths thus provide a singularly effective form of public 
closure. In reality the case is not over but has simply shifted to another tri-
bunal, placed now in the hands of ancestors. People will note any death or 
other profound misfortune that befalls the accused or their kin as indicat-
ing a false oath that the spirits are now punishing. But even so, the original 
aggrieved party will usually make no further public claims on the accused 
for the offense (though they may stay alert for a reason to confront him or 
his people again).
Other aspects of Malaitan disputing can be just as bewildering to outsid-
ers, one being how people manage compensations, especially who will con-
tribute to and collect from them, how much, and why. I have already noted 
this as especially difficult for officers to manage. In some cases two sides 
may exchange compensations, perhaps even equal amounts, which indi-
cates either that both concede to having committed an offense against the 
other (eg, one striking the other for an offense), or more basically that the 
dispute is less important than social relationships it might damage. This can 
occur under pressure to reconcile from the wider community that the con-
flict is disrupting. In cases involving taboo violations, such an equal transfer 
can mollify angry ancestors as well, as one or both sides use the money to 
buy sacrificial pigs. As one would expect, such mutual compensations are 
more common when disputants or their groups share significant, positive 
social ties in need of repair.
Government officers sometimes ordered matching compensations in an 
attempt to make peace, but because they and their courts were outside the 
community such directives had minimal moral force. For instance, in the 
mid-1930s in Kwaio, Sandars heard the case of Gwaruafane having during 
a land dispute mildly cursed Ma‘aanamae, who then punched him in the 
face. Sandars ordered them to exchange equal compensations, but after 
Sandars left, the two men casually agreed it was pointless to do so. However, 
this same lack of moral force accorded to government officers and courts 
could make them more useful for certain purposes, most notably as circuit 
breakers to resolve deadlocked disputes that might otherwise spiral into 
violence. There was little shame in losing in government court, and parties 
ruled against by an officer could settle or withdraw from the case without 
public loss of face, having been “forced” to settle by the government. In 
this way the courts served as an expedient form of binding arbitration. This 
resembles in microcosm early twentieth century strategies when the govern-
ment’s having outlawed violence became for some a welcome pretext to 
end conflict that was interfering with new economic pursuits.85
Further complexity came from intricate notions of group and absolute 
liability, which can seem illogical or profoundly unfair to outsiders.86 Lit-
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igants might also draw into disputes concerns that ancestral spirits have 
about a case as revealed through divination or possession. Land disputes 
demand still further erudition—they often involve multiple versions of 
boundaries, land histories, and deep genealogies. Woodford found early 
on in Gela land disputes, “Rules are subject to so many exceptions that it 
becomes difficult to formulate them with any certainty.”87
One can only sympathize with district officers for the handicaps they 
faced, even beyond the language obstacle, in trying to deal competently 
with local disputes, let alone in managing formal courts simultaneously as 
investigator, judge, prosecutor, and defense council, in cases across hun-
dreds of communities spread over multiple language and cultural zones. 
Despite Sandars’s boasts, we must doubt that even a man who served as 
long as he “thoroughly understood all native customs” on Malaita, even 
those most pertinent to settling disputes and court cases, and indeed the 
evidence speaks loudly otherwise. The result was that officers were left heav-
ily dependent on Malaitans, particularly on their headmen, to explain to 
them in simplified form what was happening around them. Their lack of 
knowledge and cultural sophistication was regularly and publicly on display 
to Malaitans.
Malaitans Consider Government Law
Despite ambivalence about government law, at the start of the 1930s some 
Malaitans were bringing disputes before touring officers. In 1930, Barley 
heard many cases from Kwai and points north along the coast to Fo‘odo 
but reported a “deadness” of administration from Uru southeast. As the 
decade progressed, burgeoning caseloads made it impractical for officers 
to hear any but serious disputes. They did not respond by initiating native 
courts, but instead, in keeping with the inclination toward direct rule, 
they instructed government headmen to adjudicate more cases on their 
own, especially those involving “tabu and custom.” Officer William Fowler 
observed that this was “a task for which they are infinitely better qualified 
than any District Officer.” Headmen were already indispensable as infor-
mants and in taxation, censusing, and making arrests, but it was perhaps in 
settling disputes that they became most valuable and powerful.88
Hogbin detailed how this system worked in 1933 in and around Malu‘u, 
in To‘abaita. This area was distinctive due to the presence of the island’s 
most powerful headman, Maekali. He had been a leader of Bell’s constabu-
lary and of the 1927 punitive expedition, and in 1928 he took over the sub-
district headman position from his uncle Stephen Gori‘i, a former consta-
ble whom Bell credited for Malu‘u’s being the first Malaitan area brought 
under government control. On a 1929 visit, Ashley was so impressed with 
the Malu‘u area’s leaders that he advised they be given more responsibili-
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ties. Due largely to Maekali’s presence, Malu‘u would years later be allowed 
to convene Malaita’s first native council. In the early 1930s, Maekali often 
judged even serious and problematic disputes, and Hogbin said officers 
heard few cases there. To‘abaita nonetheless shared an important feature 
with other parts of Malaita in that most disputes among non-Christians con-
tinued to be handled independently of the headman by communities and 
their leaders, and in Christian communities by mission teachers, particu-
larly among SSEM people.89
Many in To‘abaita strongly disliked Maekali and his administration, 
and in 1949 people there recalled why to District Officer Colin Allan, 
then stationed at Malu‘u: “A small faction of more or less insignificant 
men . . . enforced oppressive communal duties, dealt unskillfully in native 
custom matters, and misrepresented the true feelings of the people to suc-
cessive Government officers. In this Council the men who carried with them 
the affection and esteem of their people had no place, and gradually the 
few who possessed that confidence, became disinterested and withdrew.” 
In later years officers referred to the practice of domineering government 
headmen as “Maekalism.”90
By 1936, Malaita’s headmen were handling most conflicts brought to the 
government overall. Many had been resolving deadlocked disputes before 
officers began telling them to, and people sometimes welcomed adjudica-
tion by the better ones. They commonly ordered compensation payments 
and generally paid little heed to British legal formalities, something that 
troubled officers at times. Barley, for example, had this to say about Sinalagu 
Headman Sirifa, appointed by Bell in 1924: “The continued reports of ‘All’s 
well’ in such a wide, thickly populated, and aggressive Sub-district are apt to 
arouse suspicion that either the [headman] is not carrying out inspectional 
visits and keeping in proper touch with his people, either through timidity 
or laziness, or that, on the other hand, he is fixing up rather too much, in 
the way of trouble and law-breaking, ‘at his own bat,’ with possible personal 
advantage to himself.” Oral historical accounts portray Sirifa as guilty of 
both, depending on who was involved from which part of his sub-district. 
Wilfred Marquand, who became a cadet in north Malaita in mid-1947, was 
told that a typical prewar Malaitan headman had been “a stooge, who did 
what the people told him to do and told the District Officer what he wanted 
to tell him and what he knew the District Officer liked to hear. The cry of 
‘no any trouble, sir’ became rather monotonous.”91
Nevertheless, as the decade progressed government courts did hear 
more cases, for several reasons. First, officers rejected certain indigenous 
legal practices such as imposing absolute liability irrespective of intent, and 
sanctions such as compensations for theft far exceeding values of property 
stolen. Once Malaitans realized that colonial law had different ground 
rules, those who had lost their cases in indigenous proceedings, or who 
anticipated they would, might appeal their lost or weak cases to government 
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courts in hopes of exploiting the different rules. This of course angered 
people who had already won their cases or thought they would have, with-
out government interference.92 In this and other ways, headmen’s and offi-
cers’ courts contributed to an ongoing erosion of the authority of local 
leaders, which left them less effective adjudicators, which in turn led people 
to take more troubles to the courts; leaders’ clout decreased in a downward 
spiral. Hopkins wrote that as early as the 1910s in the north, “The common 
retort to a quarrel, to a disputed claim, was ‘You no pay along me? Very 
well, me summons you along Governor.’ ‘Summons’ became quite a cur-
rent word with a hazy legal connection.”93
In the early 1930s, Hogbin observed a related change in north Malaita 
that occurred to varying degrees in other areas—a decline in the impor-
tance of kinship and other social ties as factors within disputes. At Malu‘u, 
with powerful Maekali settling cases single-handedly, one’s kin were no 
longer as effective a support group. I noted earlier that many Malaitans 
resented officers in court ignoring group relations and liabilities, but Hog-
bin reported that some young people around Malu‘u welcomed Maekali’s 
doing so, as one explained: “In olden days each man helped his kinsmen 
and group quarreled with group. They used insults first. Then they remem-
bered honour and fought. Honour caused the fight. Now Maekali listens to 
the talk of the two men only. It is settled by Maekali, and there is no fight.” 
This must be read cautiously: Hogbin was a close friend and confidant of 
Maekali and all in To‘abaita knew this; we do not know how deep or wide-
spread such sentiments were in that area, and it is clear that many did not 
share them.94
Overall, most Malaitans developed mixed attitudes toward expanding 
government law during the 1930s, though, for many, ambivalence shifted 
toward resentment as the decade progressed. Most appreciated the end 
of fighting, and I have often heard elderly people express this with a worn 
cliché: “We sleep better at night.” Others disliked government intrusion 
and wished to settle their disputes as they saw fit. There was also anger that 
when Europeans committed crimes such as murder, severe assault, or rape 
they were most always deported rather than punished in the Solomons (if 
at all) in order to avoid embarrassing the white community by a local trial 
and imprisonment. And when an Islander fought a European, it was always 
the Islander who went to jail. Such inequities made gafamanu loa a potent 
symbol of colonial injustice.95
Malaitans found irksome specific laws first imposed in the early 1920s: 
For instance, they were not to allow their pigs to forage but instead confine 
them in pens 50 yards from houses, or the pigs would be shot and the own-
ers fined (and police charged them for the cartridges). To follow this law 
left both sacred and other pigs easy prey for thieves, which angered ances-
tors, and it hugely increased the labor and resources needed to feed them. 
Walter Ivens said that this regulation was one of three reasons Bell’s party 
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had been attacked, “as much a cause of the recent murders as the Poll Tax.” 
This was untrue, but it does indicate the level of anger at pig laws that Ivens 
encountered during 11 months on Malaita in 1924. A 1929 king’s regula-
tion brought more onerous laws: villages were to be sanitized or structurally 
reorganized according to European sensibilities, births and deaths had to 
be reported, and even dogs would be registered and taxed. (Few moun-
tain communities submitted to these.) Unauthorized, extended absence 
from one’s village was forbidden.96 Clumsy attempts at social engineering, 
imposed without regard to their impacts on people’s lives, further stoked 
resentment of the government and its laws.
Many took special exception to a law that stipulated they labor, unpaid 
or to work off taxes, to clear and maintain government “roads”—bridle-
path-width trails—through their territories. Each “line” was assigned the 
“communal service” of clearing and upkeep of a section, and men had to 
work on them one day each week. Noncompliance brought fines and jail. 
Russell later aptly conveyed Malaitan assessments of these roads as “a very 
labour-intensive way of preventing Europeans getting their feet wet,” and 
said that northern people preferred to walk their own trails, which ran par-
allel to the roads. Roadwork at times during the 1930s was ordered partly to 
enhance authority of headmen, who oversaw compulsory labor.97
Farther south in Kwaio and parts of ‘Are‘are, some resented the govern-
ment’s prohibition of killing to punish serious moral transgressions, which 
people blamed for a rise in adultery. Others were bitter at officers’ lack 
of consideration of and sometimes barring of compensation payments to 
aggrieved parties in certain disputes. Bita Saetana (Peter Satan) from Sina-
lagu, who served for a time under Sandars as a government “chief” (see 
chapter 3), recounted to me in 1981 how Kwaio had observed Sandars’s 
courts with dismay: “Under the government before, if you discovered who 
had stolen your pig you wouldn’t get any compensation: ‘Take him to jail 
for two months.’ Somebody committed adultery with your wife and it was 
found out? ‘You go to jail for just a year, or six months. You can’t compen-
sate with shell money. No compensation for sexual offenses.’ That was mak-
ing our people very angry in those days.”98
Yet we have seen that Malaita’s officers, including Sandars, did recog-
nize compensation payments as legitimate in some cases and, furthermore, 
employed them in their work. Officers from Bell onward realized that com-
pensation was absolutely necessary to maintaining peace. But there were 
special difficulties: How should officers treat compensation demands for 
acts not criminal under British law? Should they let Malaitans address seri-
ous crimes with compensation alone? What was to be done when individu-
als bypassed the indigenous system by taking their cases to the government 
courts, where injured persons (or, via them, offended ancestral spirits) 
might receive no compensation? Was double jeopardy inflicted if a person 
was both sent to jail and ordered to pay compensation? Malaitans thought 
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so, as did some officers who forbade compensation on top of jail terms they 
imposed. And, again, how could officers assure proper distribution of com-
pensations awarded in their courts when they did not know the complex 
social networks, histories, or subtle principles involved?99
When government officers did allow or even order compensation 
payments in courts, they sometimes did so in ways that angered people. 
First, they commonly limited compensation in cases of theft or property 
destruction to restitution of the property’s value. Compensations paid for 
thefts, particularly of pigs, are usually far more than the property’s worth 
and address more the disrespect shown than the material loss. Malaitans 
are strongly motivated to negate any public humiliation they experience, 
something officers failed to fully appreciate—which, as we shall see, was to 
cause the government grave problems in realms far beyond native courts. 
Officers generally disallowed such punitive payments. At the matter’s heart 
was unease with Solomon Islanders punishing each other for offenses; the 
right to punish was to be reserved for the state and its legal system. The 
state also of course reserved the right to employ force, and officers ordered 
return of compensations collected under a perceived threat of violence and 
even imprisoned those who threatened it. Like many Europeans today who 
understand and advocate compensation as a purely reconciliatory practice, 
the officers missed the point that such a threat is at least implicit in most 
major compensation demands. Officers almost always prosecuted serious 
offenses, especially murder and assault, via British criminal law, and in such 
cases courts often ignored or even disallowed compensation. As noted ear-
lier, officers sometimes quashed compensations collected on the basis of 
indigenous principles of collective, strict, or absolute liability. Marquand 
later said that officers angered people by ordering compensations to be 
paid in state instead of local currencies, but this was not done on prewar 
Malaita, and indeed Sandars thought that only compensations in native 
currencies were legitimate custom.100
Many Malaitans resented British law more basically as an alien impo-
sition. One of Hogbin’s To‘abaita informants, Aningari, who was once a 
fighting man but by 1933 a “pillar of the Evangelical Mission,” explained, 
“You are familiar with the Law. It belongs to you: it comes from the place 
where you were born. For us the Law is different. In olden times we behaved 
as our fathers did before us. When you have asked me in our conversations 
together, why did I do that, have I not replied ‘It is the custom; my fathers 
did it of old?’ To-day that is changed. The white man has come and tells us 
we must behave like his father. Our own fathers, we must forget them. But 
we cannot forget them so soon.” Another man complained, “In olden days 
we did this thing, we did that thing. We did not stop and say to ourselves 
first, ‘This thing I want to do, is it right?’ We always knew. Now we have 
to say, ‘This thing I want to do, will the white man tell me it is wrong and 
punish me?’ ” Anthropologist Douglas Oliver summed a view of the prewar 
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government as “that awesome institution whose agents collected taxes and 
put you in the calaboose if you acted like a Solomonese when you should 
have acted like a European.”101
Hogbin said that he only heard To‘abaita express resentment at specific 
issues like taxes or weak adultery laws, and that he rarely heard them con-
demn government as a whole; Hogbin also reported that everyone knew 
“rebellion was impossible.” But this tells us only that dissident views were 
rarely voiced to Hogbin, with his close link to Headman Maekali. That peo-
ple might conceal their views from Hogbin became clear a decade later 
when he returned to To‘abaita on the eve of Maasina Rule to advise govern-
ment on “native rehabilitation,” and he, like other whites, was apparently 
kept in the dark as to the level of dissatisfaction then rife in that most rebel-
lious of areas.102
People in Malu‘u, Kwara‘ae, Kwaio, and, it seems, Malaitans generally 
attached little stigma to conviction by government courts.103 Older Kwaio 
friends have gleefully told me stories of “winning” in prewar government 
courts although they were guilty of the crimes charged, at times by their hav-
ing employed magics that grant the ability to lie convincingly. Even today 
Malaitans sometimes see themselves as possessing a better understanding 
of what goes on in state courts than do the judges. That is, because they 
better comprehend human nature, they can see through the fallacies—or, 
as they see it, the naïveté—underlying European legal principles and rules 
of evidence. They believe their superior insights allow them to manipulate 
court proceedings and verdicts in the face of European social and cultural 
blindness.
Custom as a Basis for Colonial Law
As more Malaitans and other Islanders turned to the colonial courts, it 
became more incumbent on those courts to recognize “native custom” as 
a basis for settling cases. One reason some people liked Maekali’s court 
in To‘abaita was that he applied indigenous principles to cases and usu-
ally ordered disputes settled with shell money compensations, and other 
headmen pursued similar approaches to varying degrees.104 We have seen 
that Malaita’s district officers, too, often tried to adjudicate out-of-court 
proceedings according to local ways and to take those ways into account 
in formal courts. But as “custom” gained judicial importance, officers’ lack 
of pertinent expertise became ever more problematic. More awkward still 
was the vague and problematic “custom” concept itself, which through the 
1930s became more vital to policy.
Government had been obliged to design a few regulations directed at 
Islanders and their concerns, most notably the Native Adultery Punishment 
Regulation of 1924. Adultery was a grave offense on Malaita and had often 
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led to killings (though not inevitably, as is often claimed), but it was not 
a crime under British law, leaving Malaitans no adequate way to punish 
offenders. Magistrate Edge-Partington in 1913 begged Resident Commis-
sioner Woodford to let him punish adulterers, citing “local custom,” and 
warned that otherwise he and the government would be “the laughing 
stock of Malaita,” but he was refused. Bell said adultery was as disruptive to 
peace as murder, and that Malaitans’ desire for tough penalties was nearly 
unanimous. Soon after arriving on Malaita, Bell began jailing male adulter-
ers under a Pacific Order in Council rule (with Resident Commissioner 
Workman’s approval) and urged criminalization, though he remarked, 
“The punishment most of them desire is, of course, greater than that which 
I am prepared to advocate.”105
Anger over adultery and also mounting fornication became an early focal 
point of Malaitan resentments of government law, and many officers and 
missionaries shared their concern that enforced peace was undermining 
morality. Sexual promiscuity had become most problematic in Christian 
communities, and missionaries thrust themselves deeply into the adultery 
debate. SSEM leaders blamed the increase on “the disproportionate gov-
ernment penalty [dulling] their consciences as to the shame of sin.” Nor-
man Deck, now leading the SSEM in the Solomons, and other missionaries 
as well as anthropologist Hogbin called for floggings and other harsher 
punishments. But some colonial officers attributed adultery’s rise to the 
missions themselves and blamed a perceived moral decline on church life-
styles and policies that removed severe sanctions. Particularly problematic 
were church policies that prohibited compensation and instead prescribed 
prayer and forgiveness. This was but one facet of a more general pattern: 
while missionaries typically presented Christians as having been saved from 
a degraded, dystopian indigenous condition, some officers saw Christians 
as more decadent, and increasingly as more politically dangerous, for hav-
ing been freed from the social controls of “custom.”106
The greatest pressures for adultery legislation came from angry Malai-
tans, who forced enactment of the 1924 law, which punished male or 
female adulterers with a £5 fine or up to three months imprisonment, and 
six months on second conviction. Malaitans’ continuing complaints com-
pelled a 1929 amendment that increased penalties, with an off-the-books 
understanding that its severity would be applied only on Malaita. (Where 
adultery was a lesser crime, as on Guadalcanal, people complained that 
penalties were too high.)107 Even this failed to satisfy many Malaitans and 
missionaries, who, supported by Barley, demanded still heavier punish-
ment.108 In a partial tally of 225 cases heard by Malaita officers from 1931–
1935, fully 20 percent were adultery cases (assault and theft trailed at 15 
percent each).109 Ashley seized on the growing problem to castigate High 
Commissioner Fletcher for barring official native courts that could punish 
adulterers by more effective means such as compensation.110 The continu-
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ing ambiguous legal status of most indigenous rules and punishments, and 
of local bodies to apply them, was an ongoing problem for officers and 
Malaitans trying to keep the peace.
Malaitans also pressed the government to criminalize sorcery, and Edge-
Partington had jailed men who were so charged. By the early 1930s, people 
were complaining sorcery was epidemic because the government would 
not punish it and had shut down alternative means of striking at enemies 
(though new magical counterattacks were invented). Ashley and Fletcher 
heard such grievances during a mid-1931 Malaita visit and, encouraged by 
Malaita officers Barley and John White, Ashley grudgingly tinkered with a 
sorcery regulation, targeted once again solely at Malaita, before declaring 
it unenforceable and unfeasible, writing, “I am not at all convinced that any 
measures for its repression are necessary, but if they are we must realize that 
natives are unbalanced in their beliefs in spirits [and] would be excessive in 
their punishments of anyone guilty or innocent whom they believed to be 
able to communicate with dwellers of the Styx.”111
Such attempts to devise laws targeted at Islander sensibilities were few, 
and we have seen that through most of the 1930s local rules were not codi-
fied to augment the British laws in force. And yet, at the same time that 
Malaitans were pushing government to take more notice of indigenous 
concerns, pressures were emanating from Tulagi and farther abroad to pre-
serve island “customs” and cultures. The next chapter details how as the 
decade progressed it became government policy, particularly on Malaita, 
to bestow a higher order of legitimacy on “good customs.” These were con-
trasted with “bad customs” such as fighting or sorcery, which were deemed 
“repugnant to accepted principles of humanity” and required suppres-
sion.112 Interference with good customs was to be avoided as far as possible, 
it was said, because their loss would contribute to “cultural fatigue,” social 
degeneration, and depopulation; without “good customs” a society could 
become “a ship without a rudder drifting helplessly to destruction.”113 “True 
customs” were conceived in legal and other contexts as pre-European cul-
tural features, and many newer practices were branded as spurious corrup-
tions of custom, unnatural and even dangerous to natives.
These models of Melanesian cultures presented difficulties even if one 
assumed specific ideas and practices could be understood piecemeal, iso-
lated from the wholes with which their meanings were intertwined. The 
approach expressed a widespread European belief that before European 
arrival local societies had been static, that the lives of their peoples were 
ruled by rigid customs, and that innovation and change were anathema 
to them. Like so many other societies classified as “traditional” in colonial 
settings, Malaitan ones were seen to be nonhistorical.114 Those holding this 
view were ignorant of the fact that as the 1930s began Malaitan cultures had 
already undergone 60 years of radical social change, most of it before Euro-
peans had even penetrated the island’s interior. It was difficult if not impos-
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sible to know the antiquity of particular ideas, rules, or practices, especially 
for Europeans with their deeply flawed understandings of the societies in 
question. And of course one must ask: if Malaitans were so inherently con-
servative, then where had the plethora of new “spurious customs” come 
from? The implication was that the sweeping Malaitan innovations and 
adaptations of preceding decades had been illegitimate. The great irony 
was that colonial officials (like some much later anthropologists and histo-
rians) seemed oblivious to these realities, and while Malaitans were busily 
adapting and inventing, Europeans themselves were crippled by a remark-
able inability to revise their own cultural models of timeless, custom-bound 
Malaitan societies capable only of prolongation or disintegration, not 
speedy change. Muddled as these ideas seem now, they generated or justi-
fied key colonial policies on Malaita.
Directives to bolster “good customs” pushed officers into a conflicted 
position: they were to be more attentive to valuing and preserving local cul-
tures and their older ways, but at the same time they were assigned the task 
of bringing about great changes within them. As one would expect, the arti-
ficiality and vagueness of the “custom” concept led to its being selectively 
applied. When officers found an innovation acceptable, they either ignored 
its lack of pedigree or tried to show that it was actually a return to a prac-
tice once lost but now revived, as described earlier regarding the idea of 
“chiefs.” On the other hand, government officers and sometimes mission-
aries (especially Norman Deck) deployed the same model to reject aspects 
of Malaitan life of which they disapproved—labeling something a modern 
corruption could strip it of the legitimacy it would enjoy as “custom.” The 
custom concept’s contrived nature, combined with the ignorance of those 
who applied it, made it what Kwara‘ae call “a spear pointed at both ends,” 
a two-edged sword that could be wielded to sustain or condemn as needed. 
Later, during Maasina Rule, officers came to label resistance leaders illegiti-
mate because they lacked the “hereditary status” that officers considered 
the proper “custom” credentials of “true and traditional native authorities.” 
Nicholas Thomas has described a similar situation in nineteenth-century 
Fiji, where “custom” was also “protected” to address depopulation, both 
disapproved practices and problematic leaders “were distanced from ‘Cus-
tom’ in order to be legitimately proscribed,” and a “constant slippage” was 
evident “between interests in reducing mortality and other agendas.”115
The contradictions involved in these selective applications of custom 
appear to have remained unconscious in the Solomons, with officials fully 
believing they were protecting, rehabilitating, and applying custom in a 
consistent manner. In thousands of pages of reports, correspondence, and 
classified documents across several decades I found no officer questioning 
the essential validity of the “custom” concept as Europeans were applying 
it. Instead, one often encounters a sympathetic, philanthropic belief that 
Malaitans had fallen out of touch with their own past, but that, through the 
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help of white people, they could be reunited with it, albeit in more civilized 
forms. That most officers knew little of Malaita’s pre-European past beyond 
crude stereotypes appears to have given no one discomfort or pause (and 
many knew shockingly little about even the more recent colonial past). In 
the final analysis, the custom concept as applied to Solomon Islanders was 
a legal fiction and a fantasy.
In the short run, the model of inherently static and endangered tribal 
cultures could serve colonial policy well, for it suggested that it was futile or 
even dangerous to educate such peoples or to try to develop their islands 
too quickly. The idea that Melanesians had to be protected from rapid 
change, again, denied decades of transformation that Malaitans had them-
selves brought about, recognition of which would have thrown into disarray 
not just the “custom” concept but also many justifications for the colonial 
project writ large. So far as the changes that could not be denied, particu-
larly unwelcome ones, we will see that Europeans had a palatable reading: 
though it might appear Malaitans were changing and adapting like other 
human beings, these changes were so unnatural to them that they were kill-
ing them, as witnessed by a rapid depopulation that had occurred in many 
places. More European control and direction were absolutely essential, to 
help the Malaitans become better Malaitans and a viable population in the 
changing world.
In hindsight, this facet of colonial governance in the Solomons was dread-
fully naive and became a wellspring of confusions and administrative woes. 
Government officers failed to grasp the fallacy in their approach and its 
basic conceptual underpinnings despite the glaring evidence before them. 
It did, however, become increasingly apparent to Malaitans, until eventu-
ally only the administration itself remained blind to it. As we will see, when 
opportunity presented itself, Malaitans would move to seize the political 
opening, and exploit the logical weaknesses of the “custom” concept itself.
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Chapter 3
Colonial Experiments and Mounting 
Resentments
Limping through the Great Depression
The 1930s economic crisis, particularly the collapse of copra prices, cut 
deeply into government resources and hamstrung any plans for develop-
ment or better administration. G Lennox Barrow called copra “the very 
stuff of life” in the Solomons, and the 1933 Annual Report lamented that 
copra comprised “the sole industry of the Group upon which the Admin-
istration relies . . . for its revenue; the European planters and the natives 
for their income; the commercial firms for their sales; and the shipping 
firms for cargo.” Statistics are telling: in 1926–1927, 22,316 tons were pro-
duced annually, valued at £411,597; by 1934–1935 this fell to 18,093 tons 
worth £54,013. Total BSIP revenue that year was £55,687, against £61,319 
in expenditures.1
Grim conditions through most of the decade constrained government 
spending and staffing, and as the Depression deepened, jobs available to 
Islanders fell by half. The number of Malaitan laborers recruited from 1931 
through 1940 was 43 percent lower than the decade ending in 1922. Since 
the Queensland and Fiji days, most Malaitans had depended on indentured 
plantation work for money and trade goods; in 1930, Jack Barley guessed 
that 90 percent of the cash circulating the island came from wages earned 
by some 5,000 men, about 10 percent of the population, working on other 
islands.2 The economic crash brought home to Malaitans their vulnerability 
within the colonial and capitalist order, and resentments grew.
During the 1920s plantation work conditions had become less severe, 
but to Islanders they remained demeaning, and Judith Bennett has 
described how, as the Depression set in, plantation interests cut corners 
in ways that made the labor scene again more harsh and exploitive. Many 
whites had always taken Melanesians’ second-class status for granted as the 
good and proper order of things, and they wrote off workers’ complaints 
as due to their ignorance of the economic process or the fruits of govern-
ment mollycoddling (for examples, see any issue of the Planters’ Gazette). 
For years there had been calls for laws to suppress the “cunning” organizer 
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of resistance on plantations, the so-called “bush-lawyer,” who “posed as a 
leader among his friends, . . . a confirmed instigator of discontent and trou-
ble and an inflamer of the passions of his fellow labourers.” Dismissals of 
Islanders’ frustrations often displayed a peculiar blindness to social reality, 
expressed by Hector MacQuarrie, a relatively sympathetic district officer 
of the mid-1920s, when he wrote that his boat engineer was “the only Solo-
mon Islander I ever met acutely aware of his colour and its disadvantages.” 
Others, too, voiced this odd belief that Islanders were oblivious to or even 
happy with the discrimination and exploitation they suffered. This delusion 
was to cause Europeans no end of troubles. The discontents of workers and 
their communities, particularly as they grew during the Depression, are key 
to this book’s project because, as Ian Frazer has observed but most studies 
have failed to stress, Maasina Rule was in important respects a labor move-
ment, which voiced a shared “industrial consciousness” developed out of 
the plantation experience and indenture’s negative impacts on workers’ 
home communities. In what follows, I do not delve into 1930s plantation 
life but concentrate instead on impacts the labor scene and the Depression 
had on Malaita itself, particularly regarding Malaitans’ growing unhappi-
ness with the European establishment.3
The Malaitan labor picture dramatically worsened in mid-decade when, 
under pressure from planters, the Solomon Islands Labour (Amendment) 
Regulation halved the adult wage for indentured labor from 20 shillings a 
month back to the 1923 rate of 10, and also cut the wage advance—which 
had partly replaced the beach payments of old—from £6 to £3. Beach pay-
ments had ended with King’s Regulation 7 of 1923, which outlawed them 
but hiked the minimum monthly wage to £1. District Officer William Bell 
at the time said that plantation interests wanted beach payments ended 
since they would recoup any wage increase by selling laborers goods in their 
stores at high profits.4
Now, many Malaitans refused to work for the halved wage, particularly 
from Kwaio southward through ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita. In places there 
was open hostility: in July 1935 a recruiter named Hill encountered com-
plaints about taxes at ‘Oloburi Harbour in southern Kwaio, and elders 
there blocked young men from signing on. Farther south at Maanawai, Hill 
was confronted by Headman Lilimae and a group of SSEM men who threat-
ened him that “If [I] remained there they would bring down about 200 boys 
and clear us out as no natives would be allowed to sign out of Mana Kwoi.” 
Adding to tensions was a surge in new recruits absconding with advance 
pay and trade goods. As during the Fiji-Queensland labor period, many 
Malaitans wanted to keep more men home because the absence of so many 
undermined their communities. In mid-1936, recruiting across the island’s 
southern half remained “more or less at a standstill.”5
The Depression brought a drastic reduction in jobs, even under the new 
terms. The 1934 Annual Report tallied only 3,578 indentured laborers, 
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down from over 6,000 six years before. After mid-1936 more southern men 
again sought work, but that October District Officer Charles Bengough 
reported, “A very large proportion of the taxpaying population of Malaita 
is both able and willing to work, but there is no work,” and men were having 
difficulty finding tax money.6
Malaitans’ financial woes were exacerbated by the government’s deter-
mination to keep collecting head taxes from men aged 16 to 60. When the 
tax was first introduced, High Commissioner Cecil Rodwell had bristled at 
charges that it was meant to compel indentured plantation work, but that 
intent was clear to all. Bishop John Steward had criticized the new tax for 
this reason and because money collected would not be spent on Island-
ers. Recruiter Ernie Palmer described to Roger Keesing how tax collections 
were the best times to get men: “This was very handy for us, the recruiters, 
because it meant that the boys came down and stayed until market. . . . You 
heard the D.C. was going round to collect taxes at Auki or . . . Kwai. It was a 
race between us to see who got there first. Whoever got there first dropped 
his anchor, and he waited for the D.O. to come on the ship. And then after 
the boys came down to pay their taxes, you recruited them. So half the poor 
blokes hadn’t got any money at all. . . . We didn’t pay in cash, of course, we 
paid in tobacco and parcels and axes and knives . . . and they got money for 
it from relatives ashore, and they paid their tax.”7
Anglican missionary Albert Mason wrote from north Malaita, “In May 
[1924] some seventy people, or twenty per cent of the village of Bio, 
recruited on the Mendana on one day, the explanation being that they had 
no money for the tax. The village seemed quite depressed after such a gen-
eral exodus.” Some villages sent groups of men abroad expressly to earn tax 
money for the entire community.
Inland people, especially, had no saleable products, opportunities for 
casual work, or other means to earn cash, and so many faced a choice of 
indenture or jail. In 1933 Barley told Sylvester Lambert that he believed 75 
percent of Malaitan workers left home for this reason and that the Protec-
torate was violating the international Forced Labour Convention enacted 
the year before. Colin Allan, writing as Malaita’s district commissioner in 
1951, largely blamed this prewar system for the great discontent during his 
time on Malaita, and he quoted a high commissioner’s chief secretary who, 
just after the war, said the BSIP economy was based on, “in fact if not in 
theory, forced labour at very low rates of wages—forced by the imposition 
of a poll tax, by the desire for trade goods, and the total lack of other means 
of earning money, and organized on a system of two years indenture based 
on severe penal sanctions . . . the system is a vicious circle leading only to 
progressive impoverishment and discontent.”8
The labor regulation aggravated the problem. By halving wages it 
reduced cash entering Malaita by more than half, for two reasons: Before, 
departing recruits had generally left their £6 wage advance with relatives. 
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But they now began taking all or most of the new £3 advance with them, for 
with the lower wage they now needed that money abroad. Second, because 
laborers now earned less, they spent a greater proportion of their wage on 
trade goods (prices of which did not fall) rather than bringing it home as 
cash. With less money coming in to families, inland people in particular had 
to pay taxes with savings that by 1936 were nearly exhausted. As in the past, 
some in desperation turned to opportunistic policemen who exchanged 
cash for shell money at dismal rates during tax collections, though officers 
at times tried to stop this.9
In the growing Christian communities, this situation was worsened by 
missions’ reduction or elimination of brideprice, which left young men less 
dependent on seniors and thus less willing to distribute wages to their fami-
lies or patrons for them to pay tax with. In some areas, too, control of bride-
price and other exchanges was shifting as the shell currencies dominated 
by older men lost ground to the cash held by younger men.10 Even in inland 
groups some young men were less attentive to seniors’ directives as practi-
cal benefits of putting aside personal interests for community ones dimin-
ished. Similar processes were at work across Melanesia; Ian Hogbin and 
Camilla Wedgwood wrote that in places “the young men can—and do—
snap their fingers at their seniors,” and that on Malaita specifically, “The 
word ara‘i, which originally meant ‘old man’ or ‘person of importance,’ 
has been degraded from a term of respect to a mild form of abuse.”11 How-
ever, today, one hears similar complaints from both old and young that 
many young men and women disrespect their elders, and these recall com-
plaints made about rebellious nineteenth-century returned laborers. While 
big changes were certainly underway in the 1930s and 1940s, many indig-
nant elders of that time had in their youth been impudent rebels, as many 
elderly complainers of later years were during the 1930s, and one must be 
cautious against perceiving intergenerational tensions as always marking a 
sea change; they have typified Malaita since the late nineteenth century and 
perhaps much longer.
Years later George Sandars recalled his sympathy for poverty-stricken 
Malaitans and claimed he had never penalized anyone for nonpayment of 
tax, and Barley gave extensions and accepted partial payments. Hogbin, 
though, said tax default was the second most common legal offense (after 
adultery) in 1933, during Barley’s and, toward the end, Sandars’s watch. At 
any rate, as the decade progressed, economic realities forced modifications 
of tax policy. First, Sandars on his own reduced or remitted some taxes. 
Resident Commissioner Francis Ashley, who before the 1934 wage cut had 
himself advised High Commissioner Arthur Fletcher that south Malaitan 
taxes should be cut by half, initially protested Sandars’s move but after a 
visit to Malaita decided not to interfere. He rejected the idea that his having 
allowed a halving of the wage added to the tax difficulties; rather, he said, 
Malaitans should look within: “The real cause is the uneven distribution of 
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wealth, that is due to the fact that cash does not circulate on Malaita and 
barter is still the form of exchange.”12
Soon after, in March 1936, Ashley and Bengough visited Sinalagu to dis-
cuss taxation with a “large and comprehensive gathering” rounded up by a 
police patrol to meet them at Gwee‘abe, where Bell was killed. Spokesmen 
from all three eastern Kwaio harbors explained that people were willing to 
pay if only they had money. Ashley told them, “The amount of wages paid 
a labourer under contract, had nothing whatever to do with the Govern-
ment.” But, as Bennett wrote, “In the eyes of the Solomon Islanders, the 
fact that the government set a wage meant it was a fixed, not merely a mini-
mum, wage, a misconception planters fostered.” Ashley then “proceeded 
to explain the objects of taxation and how every country was taxed and 
all free men had to pay as their contribution to government for the secu-
rity of life and property that was provided.” He gave as illustration “how a 
labourer under contract was protected from the time of his recruitment 
until his return home.” Those who had been misused on plantations must 
have raised their eyebrows, and Charles Fox recounted one reaction to such 
“protection” justifications for the tax: After an officer had explained to peo-
ple that without the government, “the Germans or the Japanese . . . would 
come in and treat you far worse than we do,” one man said, “It’s like this, 
a big boy is sitting on you and beating you, and you howl.—‘What are you 
howling for?’ he says. ‘If I wasn’t sitting on you, a bigger boy than I would be 
doing it, where’s your gratitude?’ ” Ashley’s civics lecture omitted something 
Malaita’s Officer John Brownlees saw as fundamentally unfair: “Whereas we 
Europeans were not taxed, be we government or planters or commercial 
people in stores and so on, the natives were.”13
Despite Ashley’s distorted perception or at least presentation of the 
economic situation, he departed Sinalagu convinced that Kwaio could not 
pay 5 shillings and therefore lowered their tax to just 2 for 1936/1937. He 
“emphasized that it was not reduced for anyone else on Malaita and it was 
for one year only,” though in truth ‘Are‘are taxes were also cut. But by 
year’s end, Bengough reported that so little money was coming into Malaita 
that people could not pay even reduced rates.14
Temporary cash relief came in 1937 when numbers of men returned 
home from plantations, but by midyear, visiting High Commissioner Arthur 
Richards had to waive the tax entirely for mountain people with no known 
incomes. Sandars recommended that only bachelors be taxed because 
when married men left to labor for two years this caused hardships and 
conflicts at home as well as administrative problems. The next year Ashley 
reluctantly agreed to tax inland people only 1 shilling (with an option to 
work this off by laboring on government “roads”), a rate that stayed in place 
until the war, with the wealthier saltwater people still paying from 2 to 5 
shillings.15
Disgruntled, Ashley asserted that Malaitans did not pay their fair share: 
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“It should be realized that there is no native in the Protectorate who pays 
less and gains more from the administration than the Malaitaman.” To 
him, Malaitan poverty was a fallacy: “I am personally of the opinion that the 
native labourer is satisfied with 10/- per month. . . . It cannot be too often 
stressed that wages paid to the natives in the Protectorate are nothing more 
or less than so much pocket money. Apart from their tax obligation, no 
natives of the Protectorate have any financial responsibility in respect of 
either themselves or their families and very few natives have any idea of the 
value of money.” Earlier in the decade, Ashley had been similarly pitiless 
toward Officer Ronald Garvey’s pleas that Makirans had no money to pay 
taxes. Declaring Makira “quite the most fertile island in the protectorate,” 
he directed that people should simply double their work.16 Later, during 
Maasina Rule, Malaitans recalled these years to explain their refusal to pay 
taxes. In 1950 Officer Michael Forster reported why Naomani (who was 
from Waisisi in ‘Are‘are but a Maasina Rule leader at Guadalcanal’s Marau 
Sound) said he “had no use for Government”:
In his opinion the Malaita people previously paid a great deal of money in taxes 
for which they received nothing. This allegation contains a large measure of 
truth. When the tax was first collected it appears that certain promises were 
made to the people. One was that they should receive medical services; the other 
was that they should receive pay for doing Government work. In the period dur-
ing which tax was paid some £30,000 was contributed by Mala. During the same 
period the amount paid to headmen and their assistants never exceeded £318 
per annum. Government medical services were not started until 1930 and by 
1940 consisted of one [native medical practitioner] and four dressers and an 
extra [practitioner] and dresser seconded to ‘Are‘are to investigate an alarming 
decrease in the population. This question has been dealt with at some length 
because it forms a main plank in the MR [Maasina Rule] argument against pay-
ing taxes.17
Foreign commodities grew increasingly scarce on Malaita, particularly 
in the mountains. Besides the fact that returned workers were bringing 
back fewer goods, people in the south lost their other main source of sup-
ply: Australian and especially Chinese trading boats from Tulagi had long 
cruised the Malaita coast selling matches, tobacco, cloth, tinned meat, and 
clay pipes, with £1,400 in sales in 1930. As cash supplies dried up during the 
Depression, these boats declined in number and rarely visited the poorer 
south. In late 1936, Bengough reported an “unprecedented lack of new 
calicos and tobacco among bush natives during the past year.”18
The injury was compounded when European trade stores charged Island-
ers higher prices for merchandise than whites paid, while paying them less 
than whites for identical produce. This practice was long-standing; Bell told 
Walter Ivens that Islanders often paid double what whites did in stores. In 
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1939 High Commissioner Harry Luke drew up legislation to criminalize 
this practice but withdrew it in deference to plantation interests. When eco-
nomic conditions improved a bit in the late 1930s, planters resisted raising 
wages and warned that doing so would cause them great hardship. Ben-
gough, knowing how difficult times were on Malaita, suspected planters 
were exaggerating but could not prove it.19
The economy would not soon return to pre-Depression levels, and 
laborers’ prospects remained grim. Just when recovery seemed imminent, 
the looming war contributed to a June 1940 collapse of copra prices and 
further hiring slumps, and the trochus market was shattered as well. Most 
smaller European plantations never recovered after the war.20
Throughout the 1930s, as before, plantations were sites of not just eco-
nomic frustration but also the development and spread of political ideas 
among Islanders who shared anger at the colonial system. New political 
identities were forming that transcended old boundaries and enmities. 
Lambert wrote: “Barley speaks of the nationalism of Malaita which Malaita 
men show even from different parts of the island when opposing a common 
enemy away from home. The island is divided into many tribes unrelated in 
language or custom, but who are all proud of being Malaita men.” Whites 
had always dreaded the possibility Malaitans might unite against them, as 
Caroline Mytinger described: “Malaitans were scattered all through the 
islands; the houseboys were Malaitans, the boat boys were Malaitans, and 
the labour lines on the plantations were made up almost entirely of these 
sharp ‘black fellows.’ There were anywhere from fifty to eighty boys on each 
tract under a single overseer, never more than two white men. And the 
plantations were widely distant from one another, sometimes a matter of 
two or three hours by launch—and that launch, paradoxically, in the hands 
of a Malaitan boat boy, was the only means of escape from unexpected trou-
ble.” But Barley’s observation was a counter to a comforting and widely 
shared assumption that Solomon Islanders, and particularly Malaitans, 
would never unite politically because of primordial intertribal hatreds.21
When this supposition was contradicted, whites were baffled and con-
fused. Take an account given in 1980 by Bita Saetana of Kwaio of a 1930s 
plantation fight: “Mister Birifi gave me a job with a young man from Gua-
dalcanal named Rodo. He gave us eight hundred coconuts to plant in one 
day. We started at 4:30 am and worked until 6:00 pm but we’d planted 
just seven hundred. The white man cursed me for not finishing the job, 
so I spun around and cursed him, and then he took a swing at me but 
missed. He came at me with a shovel . . . and that man, Rodo, from Tatuve 
[a mountain area of central Guadalcanal], jumped up and broke Birifi’s 
nose. . . . The white man asked him [painfully shocked tone], ‘Why did you 
hit me? You’re not related to that man!’ And Rodo answered, ‘My color. 
My skin. If you strike him, I strike you!’ ” We will see that when the Fal-
lowes movement, and especially Maasina Rule, united diverse groups and 
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exploded the myth of Islanders helplessly divided by xenophobia, many 
whites were similarly astounded, disoriented, and dismayed.22
At this point in time, the broader of these plantation alliances were con-
textual and oppositional, and they faded from day-to-day relevance when 
men returned home and their active affiliations contracted to smaller com-
munities (with the important exception of mission networks). But old divi-
sions were also being countered by new, more inclusive identities emerging 
at home among groups loosely defined and structured by the administra-
tive zones to which the government had assigned people. In many parts of 
Malaita, old factionalisms began to weaken and a broader community con-
sciousness began to develop at political and judicial events organized by the 
government: tax collections, court hearings, and meetings with district offi-
cers. These proceedings drew together formerly atomized groups to inter-
act as a body with the colonial state. In Malaita’s Annual Report for 1931, 
Barley described a tax collection at Uru Harbour in Kwaio: “An altogether 
different spirit to that of previous years pervaded the atmosphere. Instead of 
the dour, suspicious crowd of bushmen, that one was in the habit of seeing 
at a tax-collection (and only then, for they kept well away at all other times), 
who sat around in small groups of their own particular kinsmen, only wait-
ing for their tax-money to be taken before hastening back to their moun-
tain fastness, the place was filled with sightseers.” Four years later, Wilfrid 
Fowler reported from Kwaio tax collections and courts, “There have been 
large congregations of spectators which have remained until the last item of 
business has been transacted.” In some places such government events were 
the first time people from across a language zone had interacted as a group 
with any regularity. Officers welcomed this change, feeling it would make 
their work easier, but such gatherings also planted seeds for the integrative 
networks and meetings of postwar Malaitan political actions.23
The Fallowes Movement
Two political movements in 1939 displayed growing discontent in the Pro-
tectorate with not just economic conditions but also peoples’ general lot 
under colonial rule. Although both were quickly suppressed, they brought 
forward themes that resurfaced in more potent forms after the war. They 
were very different: the first was a thoroughly political movement initiated 
by an Anglican priest named Fallowes, and its impact was felt throughout 
the Solomons; the second was a politico-religious movement incited by an 
ancestress in central Malaita.
At the same time as Islanders were coming together as never before at 
government-staged events, other crosscutting political connections were 
developing via the churches. An expression of this was the Fallowes move-
ment—sometimes called in the literature “Chair and Rule.” It interests us 
102 Chapter 3
for what it reveals about the growing politicization of church networks, as 
an articulation of and attempt to act to address Islander dissatisfactions and 
aspirations, and because Malaitan men who later helped start the Maasina 
Rule movement attended its final meeting.
A driving force was Richard Fallowes, who had arrived on the island 
of Santa Isabel—also known as Bugotu—in 1929 as a Melanesian Mission 
priest. Isabel’s population was by then entirely Anglican, and church offi-
cials competed for power, quite successfully, with government officials. Fal-
lowes feared that an ongoing decline of indigenous leadership and com-
munity cohesiveness would weaken the church, and he disapproved of the 
government’s methods. Working with Lonsdale Gado, who later became 
Isabel’s “paramount chief,” Fallowes organized large meetings on Isabel to 
discuss a range of issues and grievances, and in 1931 they began to institute 
an island-wide system of church officials; “church chiefs” (or “mission head-
men”) were selected in each village and, in addition to their other duties, 
reported violations of church rules to Fallowes or his representatives. Fal-
lowes offered some offenders, especially violators of sexual rules, a choice 
between excommunication and a severe cane thrashing. A weak govern-
ment presence and Anglican dominance gave him considerable authority, 
and local people found it difficult to tell whether church or government 
was in charge. By early 1933, Sandars, sent to investigate, reported that the 
government had “almost handed over the administration of the island to 
the Mission.” This state of affairs had been facilitated by the acquiescence 
of Isabel’s District Officer Francis Filose. Filose was eventually removed for 
brutality, and Fallowes was probably the organizer of a petition to restore 
him to his position. Officers also investigated Fallowes for his thrashings, 
and in mid-1933 he was convicted on 3 of 13 charges of common assault 
and fined. In 1935 he suffered a mental collapse and returned to England.24
Fallowes returned to Isabel in October 1938, against Ashley’s wishes and 
now unaffiliated, since Bishop Walter Baddeley had withdrawn his license 
to officiate. He talked to Islanders about government and the church hav-
ing neglected their interests, and the dearth of economic, educational, 
and political avenues open to them. This came as no news to Islanders but 
struck a responsive chord. Fallowes later described this process in a letter 
to historian David Hilliard: “The Soga [Paramount Chief Gado] and other 
Bugotu chiefs would discuss their grievances with me rather than the dis-
trict commissioner. In those days discussion with ‘nigger’ chiefs was not the 
policy of the colonial officials. At these informal discussions I pointed out 
that the grievances were not those of Bugotu alone but all the Solomons 
and that brought up the possibility or otherwise of meetings of chiefs from 
the other islands.” With Fallowes’s support, leaders from Isabel and other 
islands planned an interisland “Parliament” or “Assembly,” reminiscent in 
some ways of the Vaukolu of decades before. A first meeting was convened 
in southern Isabel in early 1939, followed by a larger one from 28–29 April 
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at Savo, and, largest of all, the Parliament itself from 12–13 June at Halavo 
on Gela, east of Tulagi.25
Hearing of the first meeting from Isabel’s Officer John Brownlees, an 
unruffled Ashley wrote that Fallowes could do little harm: “The natives will 
soon get tired of attending meetings and getting nothing for it and it will do 
them good by teaching them a lesson.” The crux of the meeting, he said, was 
“mythical grievances” of “an abnormal state of mind.” But he sent Sergeant 
Major Steven Sipolo of east Malaita to attend the Savo meeting “in plain 
clothes.”26 As the movement grew, so did government concern. Soon after 
the June meeting, High Commissioner Luke visited Tulagi and received a 
list of the Parliament’s proposals that Fallowes had helped prepare, along 
with two papers written by Gela headman John Pidoke, translated by Fal-
lowes. Pidoke succinctly expressed the frustrations that energized the meet-
ings: “In 1921 the Governor said that we shall pay taxes to help the King’s 
realm of England here in Solomon Islands, and we have paid taxes for 18 
years. We have only been taught the Gospel, but nothing yet about trade 
and commerce. We have been Christianized for 78 years now. The Church 
people are anxious for collections, and the Govt. for taxes, but where is the 
money? Here in the Islands wages and prices are very small, not enough 
for taxes and church collections. . . . In the year 1939 the Revd. Richard Fal-
lowes explained the desires of the leading people in England. But we have 
been ready for many years. . . . I am writing down the words of all the people 
in the Solomon Islands.”27
Pidoke said the group wanted a lawyer appointed to represent native 
interests, and movement proposals included the establishment of a techni-
cal school, improvements in medical care, better prices for copra and shell, 
changes in plantation labor regulations, and an increase in the standard 
wage for “those who work for white men and Chinamen” to £12 a month. 
Anthropologist Geoffrey White was told that the call for a £12 wage origi-
nated with Malaita representatives.28 Both government and the missions 
were being challenged here, at a time when many Solomon Islanders were 
expressing similar disillusionment with church policies. In a subsequent 
letter attributed to Pidoke, the threat of a strike was clear: “Don’t worry too 
much about the Europeans. If they can’t take us to do any work they can’t 
find any money either for tax or collections.” Fallowes disavowed responsi-
bility for the substance of the demands but acknowledged his role in orga-
nizing the meetings and promoting the idea of a more permanent native 
political body.29
Some of the changes being sought were also avowed aims of the colo-
nial establishment, and Fallowes maintained that the participants did not 
expect government disapproval of their actions, or even believed officers 
would view them favorably. But the European response was predictable, 
as Fallowes later described: “The Govt. policy at that time was to divide 
and rule. A meeting of chiefs to express a common voice was viewed with 
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indignation and alarm both by Govt. and missions. Hitherto Bugotu [had] 
thought of Malaita as foreigners if not enemies and consciously or uncon-
sciously the colonial power fostered this. And then along comes a pestilen-
tial priest putting forth subversive ideas of a pan Solomon if not a pan Mela-
nesian nationalism. It came as a shock to the ‘whites’ to discover that chiefs 
and others would travel hundreds of kilometers of open sea in their canoes 
to attend meetings to discuss matters of common concern.” Shaken, the 
government and Bishop Baddeley united to condemn Fallowes and his fol-
lowers as subversive. Fallowes said that Luke sent for him and “dressed me 
down for encouraging insubordination among the natives and putting pan-
Melanesian ideas into their heads,” and told him that his efforts were “mis-
chievous, irresponsible and ignorant.” Earlier, at a March meeting between 
Fallowes, Ashley, and Sandars, the latter recorded that Fallowes “appeared 
to me to be labouring under considerable mental excitement,” and after 
the Parliament meeting, word was spread that he was crazy, to discredit 
him. With Baddeley’s encouragement, Fallowes was deported in late July, 
defiant to the end. He vowed to return and to consult “influential people in 
England” and, “for conscience sake,” disavowed the Melanesian Mission.30
In early 1940, a worried William Marchant, the new resident commis-
sioner, sent officers a confidential circular asking them to ascertain the 
movement’s influence on the people, whom he described as “particularly 
backward politically and are distinctly ingenuous.” The upshot of the offi-
cers’ responses was that the organization had dissolved after Fallowes’s 
departure, although its ideas remained widely discussed.31 Makira’s Officer 
Alexander Waddell reported that Fallowes “had caused profound discon-
tent throughout the Eastern Solomons for some months, and had aroused 
even in District Headmen an enthusiasm for a distorted Utopia that was 
incompatible with their loyalty to the Government.” Makirans put forward 
men for the Parliament, though they apparently remained unsure about 
how to proceed. Waddell saw in all of this a need for more education, social 
services, and future “political advancement”—changes he continued to 
advocate after the war.32
Academic writers later portrayed the movement as mystical and cultic, 
and then as having been violent. “Chair and Rule” referred to a carved 
chair that speakers are said to have used. Cyril Belshaw wrote, “About 
1939 a European missionary encouraged the Melanesians of Santa Ysabel, 
Gela, and Savo to agitate for a seat on the nominated Advisory Council. He 
emphasized the need for a chairman and rules of procedure. The move-
ment got out of hand and was misinterpreted. The Melanesians elevated 
a flag, a wooden chair, and a wooden rule into positions of ritual impor-
tance.” Vittorio Lanternari said the result was “an anti-European uprising,” 
and A de Waal Malefijt wrote that it sparked “anti-European revolts.”33
What these events revealed most profoundly were the growing political 
frustrations and ambitions of Solomon Islanders, and even Fallowes was sur-
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prised by the level and scale of their response. Several long-standing themes 
of resentment publicly crystallized, and although the Parliament itself soon 
faded, its grounding vision did not. Many Solomon Islanders were no lon-
ger willing to remain silent about their own governance, to tolerate the edu-
cational and economic limits imposed on them, or to quietly pay taxes for 
minimal returns. The Fallowes movement was not the first instance of Solo-
mon Islanders questioning and protesting white dominance. For example, 
people of Gizo in the west had staged a nonviolent tax protest in 1934 over 
the lack of health and education services. This led the writer of a letter 
to the Pacific Islands Monthly, citing Malaitan discontent, to propose that 
hospitals and schools would be a more effective remedy than “a regiment 
of soldiers.” Also in the mid-1930s, parishioners for several years boycotted 
the Catholic mission at Tangarare, on the west coast of Guadalcanal, after 
the departure of a priest, Rinaldo Pavese, who had pressured the bishop to 
give catechists better pay. Yet the Fallowes movement signaled something 
new: for the first time large numbers from across the Protectorate gath-
ered formally to express shared grievances and ideas for change, and, most 
important, to attempt interisland organization.34
There is little evidence the movement had any great impact on Malaita, 
although many of its basic themes later reemerged during Maasina Rule. In 
1939 a large proportion of Malaitans still worshipped their ancestors, and 
among them a missionary’s message aroused less enthusiasm. For example, 
Tome Waleanisia in 1987 told me Fallowes had little effect in Langalanga, 
since “that one belonged to the Anglicans, not to the people.” Allan later 
said the movement had caused excitement mostly at Lau and ‘Ataa, while 
Brownlees, now transferred to Malaita, said it was having some impact at 
Malu‘u and Su‘u, and on Small Malaita generally. The next year Brownlees 
reported that even in those areas Fallowes was rarely discussed.35 But officers 
were privy to only glimpses of local thoughts on such matters, and Malai-
tans did hear and talk about the Fallowes meetings. Several men who were 
to play key roles in Maasina Rule attended the Gela one—Nono‘oohimae, 
Harisimae, and Hoasihau of ‘Are‘are; Anifelo of Kwaio; and Steven Sipolo 
from Kwai (none of whom were Anglican). The last three were at Tulagi 
with 12 other Malaitan policemen for preparation for possible war, and the 
police held their own meeting to discuss what had been said. Many postwar 
Malaitan resistance leaders were former policemen, and others of them 
were probably there.36 The many Kwaio I asked about the Fallowes move-
ment denied, some indignantly, that it inspired or shaped Maasina Rule. 
Some granted that both voiced common concerns but pointed out that 
these were widely shared well before 1939.
The Fallowes movement flustered the government and motivated 
attempts to finally start rudimentary native courts and councils, which some 
officers later credited with having pushed Fallowes’s ideas into the back-
ground.37 I will return to the courts and councils after examining a very 
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different sort of movement that emerged in central Malaita at about this 
same time.
La‘aka Speaks
One Malaitan area where the Fallowes events made the least impression 
was east Kwaio. The only politically important Kwaio man to attend the 
Gela meeting was ‘Abaeata Anifelo, whom we will meet again as a headman 
and then a Maasina Rule leader. He carried word of the meeting back to 
Kwaio as instructed but sparked little interest. A dedicated SSEM man with 
missionary leanings, Anifelo was an ineffective messenger in the mountains 
where most Kwaio lived with their ancestors.38 Also, people were still angry 
with Anifelo over the punitive expedition that his father Basiana had trig-
gered by killing Bell.39
Shortly after Fallowes was deported, another vision for radical change did 
make a great impression in Kwaio. News spread that a powerful ancestress 
named La‘aka was speaking through the medium of a priest of ‘Atobala, 
within the Uogwari area in the central mountains, just on the west side of 
today’s boundary between east and west Kwaio. As described by Bengough, 
La‘aka alerted people to an upcoming invasion: “American warships and 
troops would shortly arrive and would kill all Government officials. The 
spirit entered into a detailed description of how he [she] had visited Amer-
ica, and arranged this with the King of the United States. Further instruc-
tions were given by the spirit to the effect that houses should be built to 
accommodate the soldiers and their stores.”40
The priest, named Noto‘i, was said to have met on Guadalcanal two 
American bird hunters traveling the islands on a sailing ship, who gave him 
La‘aka’s instructions to build special villages and palisades.41 Later, back in 
Kwaio, word of La‘aka’s message spread, and small groups from across the 
area traveled to ‘Atobala to hear Noto‘i speak her words. In 1981, Tagii‘au 
of Saua recalled his 1939 visit there with a delegation: “We said, ‘Let’s go 
and hear the words of our ancestress.’ ” They asked Noto‘i to let them hear 
from La‘aka:
Just after dusk Noto‘i bespelled a betelnut for La‘aka, and prayed to La‘aka. 
Then a firefly entered the house and alighted on Noto‘i’s head.42 The spirit 
asked, “Who wants to hear me?” and Feolate [Tagii‘au’s companion] replied, “I 
do. I’ve come to hear my ancestress speak, to hear what you have to say.” Then 
La‘aka spoke: “I am angry because I have been sitting at Tulagi for so many years 
with my descendants. And the government is killing my descendants at Tulagi. 
All I do is mourn. They hang my people at Tulagi and they persecute my people 
at Tulagi. . . . I came back from Tulagi and I said, ‘I have been grieving at Tulagi. 
Now I have come to you, Noto‘i.’ Tulagi, though life goes on there, Tulagi is 
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mine. . . . The wireless at Tulagi, it is my wireless, La‘aka. The flag there is my flag, 
La‘aka. I am going to destroy it. One day you will all see!”
La‘aka spoke to Tagii‘au and his friends at length, venting her rage that 
her descendants had died on plantations and at government hands and 
that the Christian missions had desecrated “her land.” The missions would 
be destroyed as well. Noto‘i spoke in tongues, which he then translated for 
listeners. Men from the ‘Ai‘eda area returned home from a visit reporting 
that Noto‘i spoke in American English.43
Noto‘i was visited early on by a delegation of La‘aka descendants related 
to him, from ‘Airumu, several miles to the northeast toward Uru harbor. 
On their return home, La‘aka began speaking through one of their num-
ber as well, a man named Nagwaafi (or ‘Uia). By mid-August, La‘aka had 
demarcated ‘Atobala and ‘Airumu as “safe areas” and warned that all who 
did not take up residence within them would be killed by the American 
invasion force. Palisaded villages were constructed at both places, enclos-
ing men’s houses and sacred pigs dedicated to La‘aka, and some men there 
practiced military drilling and hand-to-hand combat techniques. The two, 
gated villages each hung a different calico flag in the trees in shrines above 
their men’s houses. La‘aka soon announced through Nagwaafi the day 
Americans would arrive at Uru and said they would also bring money and 
goods. Those who did not enter the safe areas by a given date would have to 
pay La‘aka a shell money entry fee.44
Bengough estimated that by late August some 2,000 people—a large por-
tion of the Kwaio inland population—had joined the movement, but this 
was based on faulty intelligence; in fact, primarily people from around ‘Ato-
bala and the ‘Airumu people were fully involved. Various others visited to 
help build the villages or simply hear the two mediums speak La‘aka’s words, 
and many were merely curious.45 Bengough later reported that many people 
who had not moved into the two areas carried out “wholesale killing of pigs 
and destruction of tabu gardens . . . so as to be able to enjoy them before 
dying,” and that many houses were also destroyed. But most of this “destruc-
tion” was actually an upsurge in consumption through intensified feasting 
and pig sacrifices to La‘aka.46 Although this was not nearly so widespread as 
Bengough believed, it did occur in some places and, combined with neglect 
of gardening, resulted later in food shortages in the core areas.47 This was 
neither the first nor the last episode of Malaitan destruction or unbridled 
consumption of property in expectation of calamitous events.48
In mid-September, Bengough dispatched Cadet Martin Clemens with 
several constables, headed by Diake Maenagwa and newly appointed Kwaio 
Assistant Headman Anifelo, to arrest Noto‘i and six followers. As Noto‘i was 
being led away, he vowed that La‘aka would raze Tulagi. Clemens warned 
people that they would receive no help if they destroyed their property, 
though the government did later supply food to some. Following the arrests, 
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the failure of Americans to appear, and several police patrols (the most 
important led by Sale Vuza, whose wife Irene was Kwaio), the movement’s 
open manifestations ceased. According to Bengough, some people who 
had destroyed pigs and property expressed anger at having been misled.49
Bengough blamed enthusiasm for Noto‘i’s message on a crisis of confi-
dence in government caused by rumors of impending war (England and 
France declared war on Germany in early September, and the news spread 
quickly) and a transfer of nearly half of Malaita’s 25 police to Tulagi to 
prepare for it. He said the demonstration of government force and the 
failure of Americans to show up had restored people’s faith in the establish-
ment. But clearly more complex issues lay behind these activities, including 
a deep anger at the government and the Christian churches, as expressed 
so bluntly by La‘aka. Contrary to Bengough’s belief, there had been and 
remained little faith in the government. It is noteworthy that Noto‘i’s mes-
sage was not a general rejection of foreign things or outsider involvement 
in Kwaio affairs—American liberators would replace the ousted British, 
and, some said, bring material wealth. The latter “cargo” aspect seems to 
have been of marginal if any interest to most Kwaio, and people recounting 
these events to me in the early 1980s—some who took part in and still cel-
ebrated the movement, and others who belittled it—did not mention the 
“cargo” element at all unless I asked about it.50
The story of Noto‘i having received his instructions from two Americans 
on Guadalcanal will sound familiar to students of Maasina Rule. In a story 
still told throughout Malaita, one of Maasina Rule’s ‘Are‘are founders, Nori, 
is said to have received his instructions on Guadalcanal from an American 
general who smoked a golden pipe, or, in many versions, from two Ameri-
can officers. The centrality of Americans to Noto‘i’s message, years before 
World War II introduced Solomon Islanders to thousands of US soldiers, 
is of obvious interest. Keesing and Bennett summarized several possible 
sources of the prewar American mystique on Malaita, and by at least the 
early 1900s Queensland returnees had brought word to their countrymen 
that Americans would someday come to the Solomons.51
Key to understanding the American inspiration for Noto‘i’s movement is 
a visit to Kwaio by three ornithologists of the Whitney South Sea Expedition 
from New York’s Museum of Natural History, which collected specimens in 
the Solomons for several years beginning in the 1920s. In 1930, after six 
weeks working around Malaita’s coasts, they arrived on the west coast at 
Su‘u in the sailing ship France and ascended the Kwari‘ekwa river valley to 
seek birds deep in the Kwaio interior. With no government escort, two of 
them, Walter Eyerdam and William Coultas, lived some six weeks in central 
Kwaio under the sponsorship of one Sale Babaamae, provisioned by his kin 
living in and around the village of ‘Aulola, on the slopes of Mt Tolobusu, 
Malaita’s highest peak at just over 4,000 feet above sea level. During the 
recent punitive expedition the government had designated ‘Aulola a “safe 
Colonial Experiments and Mounting Resentments 109
area” where people could take refuge. The ornithologists first camped in 
west Kwaio along the Kwari‘ekwa before Babaamae and his people guided 
them for two days up to Tolobusu’s summit area, then a week later to 
Bobo‘efuufuu at 300 meters lower elevation, and finally to ‘Aulola itself. 
These camps, particularly Bobo‘efuufuu, were near what would later be the 
Noto‘i movement’s initial focal area of Uogwari.52 It is obviously significant 
that the men later said to have given La‘aka’s message to Noto‘i on Guadal-
canal were likewise two American bird hunters traveling the islands in a sail-
ing ship. Moreover, both of La‘aka’s mediums—Noto‘i and Nagwaafi—and 
at least three of the other five men arrested were Babaamae’s close relatives; 
Nagwaafi and another, Wadoka, were his first cousins. Almost certainly, all 
had spent time with the Whitney Americans.53
When I first lived in Kwaio nearly 50 years later, people who knew Eyer-
dam and Coultas still recalled their kindness with great enthusiasm. What 
was it about these American naturalists that so impressed the Kwaio who 
interacted with them, and how might memories of them have helped 
inspire, nine years later, an apocalyptic yet utopian vision of a Kwaio-Amer-
ican future?
Fortunately, Eyerdam and Coultas left diaries of those weeks in Kwaio, as 
did Hannibal Hamlin, a third expedition member who was there with them 
for a shorter period. These diaries tell of behaviors and relations with local 
people that set these men fully apart from Europeans Kwaio had encoun-
tered before, and it is no surprise that they “were a source of great wonder” 
to local people. Without realizing it, Eyerdam and Coultas managed to lay 
waste to some of the most basic rules of colonial white-black relations: “The 
natives are not used to the cold,” wrote Eyerdam, “but come here in dozens 
and sleep on the ground and shiver all night. We never bother them and 
let them eat our potatoes and [skinned] bird bodies. They think this is a 
picnic and suffer exposure on the cold mountaintop because of the novelty 
of hunting and living with 2 white men in the bush. These boys like to work 
for us at small tasks, such as gathering wood, cooking, etc. We let them use 
all of our spare blankets and clothes at night and even let some of them 
occupy our bed with us so they won’t freeze.” The 90 kilograms of rice they 
had brought lasted just two weeks, after which they ate only local foods.54
These white men were friendly and curious, invited people to help 
themselves to their food, and ate with them. They enjoyed ancestral chants 
performed nights around the fires, one being the story of Bell’s assassin 
Basiana, narrated by a second ‘Aulola leader named Sale Suuburigeni, and 
Ofomauri of Tofu.55 They did not order people about, and they negotiated 
payments that they thought fair for services rendered. They showed remark-
able trust and routinely gave men rifles and 10–20 cartridges to hunt birds 
for them in the bush. This was soon after a government punitive expedi-
tion had brutalized the area after Bell was killed, and Eyerdam noted dryly, 
“When government officers travel in the bush on Malaita nowadays, they 
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have an armed guard of 25 police with modern rifles and plenty of ammu-
nition.” Decades later my friend Basiberi, who spent three nights with the 
birders at Tolobusu, told me how their sharing of food and clothing, and 
their trusting men with guns, greatly surprised and impressed everyone.56
Neither man’s diary indicates whether or not they voiced any antigovern-
ment or anti-mission sentiments to the Kwaio men and women who filled 
their camp each night—which would have violated the colonial prime 
directive to not criticize other whites in front of Islanders. They seem to 
have been focused on their collecting and on coping with the unfamiliar 
physical and social conditions. But Eyerdam did write critically of Christian 
missionaries, and both men expressed to Kwaio a respect for their religious 
beliefs. For example, though they badly wanted specimens of certain taboo 
birds, they did not pursue them, and they agreed, with deep regret, not 
to enter the bush by themselves to hunt, grasping without being told that 
Kwaio feared they might stumble into sacred shrines. Eyerdam and a senior 
local ancestral priest, in Coultas’s words, “took to one another like ducks to 
water.” This priest carried out rituals to protect their camp from dangerous 
spirits, and when he dramatically and successfully performed spells to keep 
away rain, “We repeatedly flattered and praised him before his countrymen 
as a powerful devil devil man that savvys too much along altogether some-
thing blong rain he no come.”57
On their arrival in Kwaio, having talked to District Officer Colin Wil-
son and other Europeans, both men had already taken up some negative 
caricatures of mountain Malaitans. Eyerdam wrote, “There are many bad 
eggs amongst them” and “they are not to be trusted.” At the start, Coultas 
referred to the people as “these imbeciles,” and described “hordes of weird, 
naked savages who offer us as much interesting speculation as we give them 
in turn.” But as time went on their tone changed, and their diaries com-
ment repeatedly and—given warnings they had received about the dread-
ful “Malaitaman”—with no little surprise on their hosts’ integrity and good 
natures: “These people are heathens and have not yet been contaminated 
by the efforts of missionaries to Christianize them. They do not wish to 
have their customs interfered with by missionaries and they are right.” And 
on the eve of their departure: “Altho very shrewd and hard to deal with 
in business transactions, they need to take few lessons from missionaries 
in the 10 commandments.” Eyerdam later wrote, “Although we had heard 
much of the treachery and cruelty of the mountain bushman, we learned 
to like them in many ways. They are a simple and industrious people, whose 
mode of living has not progressed much beyond the days before the white 
man’s advent. Their wants are few and their code of morals strict. In driv-
ing a sharp bargain they are unexcelled, but like most warlike primitive 
people they possess a higher standard of honor than many civilized people. 
When once confidence and friendly relations are established there is not 
much danger as long as they are maintained. We never lost a penny’s worth 
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of anything by theft while with these people, and could leave an article 
unguarded no matter how valuable it might be in the eyes of the natives.” 
At their trip’s end, Eyerdam told the biological journal Murrelet that Babaa-
mae “and the devil-devil man . . . were very sensible and quite decent chaps,” 
and in contrast to the common European travelers’ derision of Malaitan 
women, said that some were “real beauties.”58
Kwaio nicknamed Coultas “Master Dio,” the same moniker (“Joe”) later 
given to American soldiers in the Solomons and elsewhere. At the end 
Coultas observed, “Although we have heard any number of stories regard-
ing the maliciousness of these Malaita men, we found them quiet, peaceful 
and quite willing to cooperate with us throughout all of our stay.” Contrary 
to the stereotype of the “always serious and sullen” bushman, the two bird-
ers found people’s constant humor contagious, with Eyerdam writing, “We 
have won much favor by telling a few very simple jokes or bantering and 
playing tricks on some of the small boys or old men.”59
Before long, the Americans became true guests of the ‘Aulola people, 
Coultas recording: “[Babaamae] very kindly offered to supply all foodstuffs 
gratis [they had been buying yams and taro] and give us the house rent free 
[they stayed in his house]. Why I don’t know; I have never experienced an 
act of gratitude of this kind.” A few days later, after an earthquake, people 
came running to them, “for moral support I suppose,” guessed Coultas, but 
they were likely concerned with the hunters’ safety, since earthquakes are 
very dangerous in this area due to landslides.60
Sadly, Coultas, at least, left the mountains feeling that they had been a 
burden on the community. Shortly before their departure a feast was held 
in the area, which diverted their usual steady stream of visitors. Coultas, 
unaware that an important Kwaio feast must monopolize all of an area’s 
socializing, perceived in their empty camp that people had wearied of them. 
Then, when their descent to the coast was imminent, he misread the joyous 
sendoff they were given as people celebrating because they were leaving: 
“The hotel Arola Reed [panpipe] orchestra entertained us with a number 
of selections to-night. The whole spirit of the place has changed since it has 
become known that we are leaving. Apparently we have been unwelcome 
guests all of these days.” Two days later, they embarked on the France at 
‘Oloburi Harbour, but not before bringing their carriers out to visit the 
ship. Babaamae and Suuburigeni, and perhaps others, were rewarded with 
a trip to Tulagi in the ship.61
One scholar seemed to attribute Kwaio friendliness toward the Whitney 
Expedition to their paying high wages, but as above quotes suggest and 
numerous diary entries make clear, pay was the one continuous source of 
friction during their visit. Some men were unhappy when, despite “much 
haggling,” the Americans followed to the end Sandars’s directive to pay car-
riers (men or women) no more than government’s daily wage of 1 shilling, 
although men demanded 3 shillings. A few walked off the job over wages. 
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Hunters they hired protested to no avail at being paid for most birds in 
tobacco instead of money (despite a tobacco shortage), and carriers refused 
to pack loads over 25 pounds (the later standard government weight was 
40). These labor squabbles tell us that although Kwaio were fascinated by 
the Americans they were not awed, and that what impressed them was not a 
perceived largesse but rather how they interacted and socialized with peo-
ple. (Eyerdam pointed out that a simple porter strike would have given the 
people all of their goods, since they could not carry them out themselves.)62
Perhaps as an American writer I should stress that my point here is not 
that these naturalists’ behaviors can be attributed to some inherent fairness 
or open-mindedness of Americans relative to the British or Australians. To 
discard this notion, one need only peruse the many bigoted American writ-
ings about the Solomons, by Jack and Charmian London, Hermann Nor-
den, Osa Johnson, and their ilk. Or a cursory glance through American 
history will suffice. Even the Whitney men wrote things that most would 
deplore today.63 But how enlightened they were is beside my point, which 
is Kwaio perceptions of their behavior and also how those might have fed 
into people’s later political aspirations. To be sure, being Americans gave 
them an initial opening. When Babaamae and an armed party challenged 
the third ornithologist, Hamlin, on his initial, separate arrival in their ter-
ritory, he explained their purpose and Babaamae told him, “Because none 
of our expedition belonged to the government and were not missionaries 
and also because we belonged to another country he could see no reason 
why we should not be welcome to his people”; Babaamae also said they were 
anxious to trade. Eyerdam wrote, “Several have informed us that we have 
nothing to fear from their country men, because we are Americans and do 
not belong to the government.” One old coastal man known as Queensland 
Charlie told him, “Me savvy man blong this big fella country Merika. He 
good fella. Me like um too much. Bushman he savvy him too. Bushman he 
no like um England, no like um government.”64
The key difference between these men and other whites Kwaio had met 
was, in a nutshell, their unprecedented and disarming familiarity and their 
treatment of Melanesians as fellow human beings. The power of this discov-
ery for Malaitans, perhaps difficult for readers to grasp today, can be appre-
ciated from an anecdote told by American tourist John Vandercook about 
his conversation with a coastal Kwaio man about two years after the Whitney 
visit. While the two were chatting, the Kwaio man began to cry, and when 
Vandercook asked him why, he shook his head and replied, “You first white 
man, master, ever talk soft along boy.”65 Or take Xavier Herbert’s account 
of black-white relations while he worked as a hospital clerk and pharmacist 
in Tulagi two years before the Whitney visit, in 1928:
I did argue a bit at first about the treatment of natives; that is, they were treated 
like dirt. One man argued with me and said you’ve got no idea of how the Ger-
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mans used to treat them in Bougainville. . . . They had sulkies, and no horses, 
and they used to put natives in the sulkies and then they used to whip them, and 
make them gallop and things like that. I remember my comment being that that 
was probably better treatment than the utter contempt that you people treat 
them with, as if they don’t exist. I recall a situation where there was a Major [J  C] 
Barley I think he was, the Government Secretary. There was a woman, a Mary 
as they called them, brought in. She had pneumonia, she was dying—probably 
had tuberculosis—but they brought her in and laid her on the floor, the steps 
outside the dispensary, a bit of an office and a surgery. . . . The doctor and I went 
to see her, she appeared to be dying, she was breathing very badly. And Major 
Barley turned up with his dog—he’d been on the golf course and his dog had 
fallen down or something and broken one of its front paws—and immediately 
the doctor drops the woman and went in to attend to the dog and put it on the 
operating table. So I became very angry about that. This woman was lying there 
dying, and her people were standing down respectfully and quietly. And I went 
in to the doctor and said ‘Doctor, what are you going to do with the woman out 
there?’ He said ‘What woman?’ And I said ‘The woman out here, the Mary.’ And 
they sort of looked at me, and I said, ‘Surely a dog can wait.’ And they just turned 
round and went on with it. . . . That would be the only protest I ever made. My 
sister shut me up and said you can’t talk like that here.66
What most favored the ornithologists was what they did not know and fol-
low: the strict prewar codes of black-white relations, particularly the impera-
tives of avoiding “familiarity” and preserving white separateness, prestige, 
and superiority—what BSIP geologist John Grover 20 years later referred to 
as “the supercilious isolationism which some Europeans call dignity,” and 
Ralph Furse portrayed as a vital “attitude of aloofness” for colonial officers. 
We have seen and will again see the importance this had for so many Euro-
peans. A cliché in accounts of the prewar Solomons is the “old hand” taking 
a new white arrival under his wing to instruct him on the “proper handling 
of the natives,” particularly “Malaita boys.” Walter Ivens early on included 
such directives in his Hints to Missionaries to Melanesia (in chapter 5, “Man-
agement of Natives,” part 4, “Never Be Familiar”), and colonial officers in 
Melanesia later wrote guides on dealing with “the native” for distribution 
to incoming US troops.67 The latter guides failed dismally in their purpose, 
and many soldiers made the same sorts of “mistakes” as the bird hunters, 
with predictable results. For some Kwaio men, working and socializing with 
Eyerdam and Coultas was a rehearsal of sorts for their future interactions 
with American soldiers.
As much as Malaitans resented the way Europeans treated them, by 
the 1930s most took it for granted. They had long come to believe, and 
taught their children, that most whites were hard-hearted and incapable 
of normal social relations, kindness, or proper modes of exchange, at least 
concerning Melanesians. This accurately captured how many Europeans 
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viewed and interacted with Malaitans, not as fellows but as lesser beings, 
perhaps improvable, but only within sharp limits. A white axiom was that 
kindness toward Malaitans was counterproductive and dangerous. Thus a 
1929 Labor Commission chaired by Barley pointed to “lawless and violent” 
Malaitans and warned, “Humaneness and consideration are apt to be mis-
construed as signs of weakness or fear and the labourers consequently to 
grow increasingly arrogant and disobedient until a crisis occurs, resulting 
in a fracas and possibly loss of life.” Former Burns Philp manager F Ash-
ton “Snowy” Rhoades wrote, “The average Solomon Islander has no sense 
of gratefulness whatever and kindness is wasted on him.” When medical 
worker Charles Gordon White was in 1929 presented with a generous gift 
by a community he had treated, he credited the act to a local missionary, 
since, he wrote, “The Malaitaman generally wants as much as he can get for 
anything he has to dispose of and giving things away he looks on as sheer 
madness.”68
These social defects were all the more unfortunate in that whites seemed 
to possess immense riches. To Melanesians, a person of great wealth who 
refuses social engagement and exchange is grotesque, distressing, or even 
evil. Nevertheless, as abnormal as the colonial racial codes seemed to Malai-
tans, they had come to accept them as fixed. It should be noted that this 
was not only a Melanesian problem—some whites in the colonies also felt 
trapped by these codes, sanctioned as they were by severe social pressure 
and potential ostracism, not only from fellow colonials but at times from 
colonial subjects. In the words of one of novelist E M Forster’s Indian char-
acters, “They have no chance here. . . . They come out intending to be gen-
tlemen, and are told it will not do.”69
Eyerdam and Coultas did not know or follow the rules, and Kwaio found 
their behaviors surprising and refreshing. The experience must have sug-
gested to them previously unimagined possibilities for productive social 
relations with a different kind of white person. It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that a few years later, near the end of a long economic Depres-
sion and amidst dreadful rumors of a great war about to engulf the islands, 
Noto‘i’s utopian vision tied future hopes to a message of two American 
bird hunters under sail promising liberation from colonial subjugation and 
humiliation.
The Project to Counter ‘Are‘are Depopulation
When asked for their opinion upon the probable causes of the 
diminution of the race, most Fijians attribute it to infectious diseases 
introduced among them by foreign ships.
—Colony of Fiji, Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire 
into Decrease of the Native Population (1896, 30)
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In these islands there are not enough people. There are 100,000 
people in the Solomon Islands. There should be 10,000,000.
—Officer Len Barrow, “The Work of Native Councils” (1946)
The Fallowes movement, and to a lesser extent the Noto‘i affair, startled 
government officers and awoke them to the changing mood of Solomon 
Islanders. Many concluded that a more serious attempt at native admin-
istration was imperative and overdue. Soon after the new resident com-
missioner, William Marchant, arrived in 1940, he decided to launch a con-
certed effort to establish native courts and councils based on those he had 
helped administer in Kenya. They were initiated explicitly to help counter 
Islanders’ growing discontent with their situation under colonial rule.70
Councils and courts became part of a more general shift in administra-
tive policy, especially on Malaita. The government had always depended 
on Christian missions to carry out much of the social welfare work on the 
island while its officers focused on law and order and taxation, but the 
late 1930s saw a government rush to adopt a more active social agenda. 
On Malaita, they had two core goals: to counter people’s alienation from 
government and to offset what they perceived to be a cultural decadence 
haunting the island and depleting the population. The rest of this chapter 
summarizes, first, a government project intended to halt inanition, anomie, 
and depopulation through social engineering, and second, the early devel-
opment of Malaita’s native courts and councils. These overlapped consider-
ably and both were seminal to the postwar Maasina Rule movement and its 
kastom ideology.
Depopulation became a central concern of Malaita’s officers during the 
1930s. The idea that Melanesians were dying out was by no means a new 
one. Anglican Bishop Cecil Wilson lamented of Solomon Islanders in 1905, 
“They have but a short time to live, and all that can be done is done for 
them, that their short lives may be brightened. . . . We are placed then by 
GOD in His infirmary, to work amongst a dying race; but a race which will 
certainly die a Christian death.” Resident Commissioner Charles Woodford 
predicted Solomon Islanders’ extinction, whatever Europeans might do, 
and in 1910 expressed a common view that their demise was “as certain 
as the rising and setting of the sun.” Colin Allan later observed that this 
justified early government land policies that “virtually disregarded native 
interests.”71
In the Protectorate’s early years, some Europeans saw benefits to Mel-
anesian extinction. Royal Navy Lieutenant Boyle Somerville wrote in an 
anthropology journal that Solomon Islanders were doomed because of 
their extreme violence and “the advancing oblivion of civilization,” but he 
was keen on the benefits this would have for whites: “Except from a scien-
tific point of view, I think one might be almost reconciled to this dispen-
sation. The natives have their good points, certainly, but their bad are so 
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much more conspicuous that the elimination of the race would be no great 
loss to the world. Worst of all their bad points almost, is their incredible and 
incurable laziness—the heritage of all Pacific races.” He went on to describe 
the economic potential the Solomons would have for Europeans once the 
Islanders died away. Burns Philp’s 1899 Handbook of Information encouraged 
potential settlers: “It is, indeed surprising that such a magnificent country 
as this has been so long neglected. True, the natives have been, and still are, 
a troublesome factor to be reckoned with; but their claws are rapidly being 
cut, and every fresh settler furthers the work of civilization and reclama-
tion.” Upbeat anticipation of Islander-free islands usually did not include 
Malaita, for its people, the core of the Protectorate’s labor force, were the 
island’s great resource for Europeans. Hence the SSEM’s Northcote Deck’s 
warning in 1919: “If something radical is not done to check the excessive 
sums demanded for wives there can be no future for the race upon which 
the Protectorate depends for its development.”72
The extent of depopulation in the Solomons and specifically on Malaita 
is hard to know because statistics from early decades of European contact 
are scarce and highly speculative, and even later figures are dubious. As 
late as 1916, Malaita population estimates ranged from 35,000 to 150,000 
people. In 1924, Bell guessed Malaitans numbered 60,000 to 70,000, but 
a 1931 census estimated just over 40,000, and Barley reckoned there were 
45,000. The latter numbers were likely undercounts. We do know that intro-
duced diseases like influenza-pneumonia, whooping cough, and bacillary 
dysentery took awful tolls well into the twentieth century. The global influ-
enza pandemic of the late 1910s and early 1920s wreaked havoc among 
Solomon Islanders, even though the Protectorate was sheltered from its 
most virulent early stages by an Australian maritime quarantine. Some 17 
percent of Malu‘u’s population died then, but for other Malaitan areas data 
is slender or nonexistent. A medical officer guessed 3 percent of the Protec-
torate’s people died overall, compared to 10 percent in bacillary dysentery 
outbreaks of 1913–1915. Ivens in 1924 estimated that numbers at Sa‘a in 
the south had dropped by half since his arrival in the late 1890s, and he 
noted a dearth of children.73
Barley’s 1930 Annual Report said nearly all new babies around Su‘u in 
southern ‘Are‘are died in a whooping-cough outbreak that ravaged the island 
throughout the year, but how many people were stricken overall was impos-
sible to ascertain because officers and most headmen had minimal contact 
with the inland communities where most people lived. The next year, Barley 
estimated, 2.8 percent of Malaitans died in a spate of influenza brought by 
the Anglican ship Southern Cross, which hit people of the north and elders 
hardest. These are just a few examples of appalling epidemics that continued 
into the 1930s. Even today, flu outbreaks kill Malaitans of all ages, and I write 
this having just learned that two close Kwaio friends have died in one, both of 
them young and strong when I last saw them a few months ago.74
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For decades Europeans blamed depopulation on what they saw as the 
inherently decadent, unsanitary, or violent natures of Melanesian cultures, 
and it was often supposed that degeneration predated white arrival. Nicho-
las Thomas has detailed the application of this idea in neighboring Fiji, 
where extensive residence and sanitation rules were imposed in the inter-
est of improving the health of Fijians and checking population decline. He 
observed that many of the regulations instituted—for house construction, 
village locations and layouts, pig penning—had no demonstrable link to 
improved health; rather, they reflected European values and privileged “an 
orderly and accessible village rather than because their consequences were 
known to be beneficial.” The colonial projects for Fijian relocation and 
amalgamation that Thomas analyzed were in some ways similar to schemes 
in parts of the Solomons. Surprisingly, I have found no explicit references 
from Malaitan officers in the 1930s to Fiji’s earlier reports about or efforts 
to address depopulation, though of course similar worries about subject 
populations being endangered by culture loss and too-rapid change were 
also found in other colonies, including in Africa.75
Missionaries at times asserted that Islanders were responsible for their 
own demise, which both downplayed their own destabilizing role—which 
officers and anthropologists sometimes stressed—and justified their pur-
suit of radical Christian transformation as Melanesians’ only hope. Meth-
odist Rev John Goldie wrote: “The advent of the white man, though a con-
tributing cause, is not the principal cause of this decline, which has been 
going on for years. Going into a heathen village for the first time, seeing 
the filthy condition of the people, the wonder is not that they decrease, but 
that they are not extinct.”76 Bishop Wilson blamed declining numbers in 
south Malaita on a “refusal of women to bear the burdens of motherhood,” 
something missionaries and others highlighted throughout Melanesia and 
elsewhere, often greatly exaggerating infanticide. Others portrayed moth-
ers and infants as helpless victims of cruel ancestral birth taboos. Wilson 
further blamed decline of the Melanesian “child race” on antisocial impacts 
of native curses and high marriage payments, as well as on the labor trade. 
But he claimed that diseases brought by ships (like his church’s Southern 
Cross) had minimal impact on the “hardy” Melanesian. When missionaries 
did link depopulation to Europeans, atop their list of culprits were usually 
the labor trade and the “unsuitable” things it brought, such as firearms, 
“excessive clothing,” and “civilization’s vices” more generally. Other Euro-
peans blamed these also.77
On Malaita, mission activities could intensify the impact of diseases. Most 
Christians lived in relatively crowded coastal villages where they cast off 
many sanitary rules enforced in mountain hamlets because they were also 
ancestral taboos. For example, a myriad of taboos regulated food and water 
sharing, while others isolated feces from pigs and people. Scattered, tiny 
mountain hamlets and the lengthy segregation of groups observing mortu-
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ary taboos could impede the spread of illnesses. On the coast, people were 
more susceptible to malaria and tropical sores and had more contact with 
outsiders. For example, the SSEM reported this problem in 1921 as moun-
tain Christians descended to the Langalanga Lagoon area: “Too often the 
site chosen is on the low-lying delta of a river, or even among mangrove 
swamps. We have tried to get the people to settle on the first line of hills 
for their own sakes, but they like being near the sea, and have often, in 
consequence, suffered much in health.” The Southern Cross regularly col-
lected and disembarked people throughout the islands and was notorious 
for spreading sickness; Norman Deck of the SSEM wrote with apparent 
satisfaction that it was known as “the death ship.” In some places Chris-
tians’ greater access to European medicines mitigated these factors. Still, 
statistics gathered in north Malaita from 1920 to 1922, and Bell’s impres-
sion through his time, indicated higher mortality rates in Christian than in 
mountain villages. Bell correctly surmised that many who became Christian 
were less healthy to begin with—the chronically ill sometimes converted to 
escape ancestors believed to be causing their sickness, and invalids had an 
easier life in level coastal villages—and he also credited childbirth taboos 
that freed new mothers in the mountains from work. Later the imbalance in 
death rates disappeared.78 While missionaries often blamed depopulation 
on perceived manifestations of moral decadence such as escalating bride-
prices or adultery, government officers more often highlighted secular and 
logistical factors like the isolation of hamlets, poor sanitation, “excessive 
feasting,” and a breakdown of “custom law”—all said to be both symptoms 
and causes of malaise and societal decay.
Malaitans, too, worried about drops in their population. They typically, 
and correctly, cited introduced diseases as the main overt mechanism, 
though they often blamed alien spirits or angry ancestors for inflicting or 
failing to protect from them. Some north Malaitans, in particular, in the 
1920 and 1930s attributed high disease mortality to sorcerers exploiting the 
government’s forbidding execution of sorcerers while refusing to criminal-
ize their predations.79
Here I am most interested in one European theory of depopulation: that 
it could be explained by “the psychological factor,” that is, that Islanders 
were dying because they had lost interest in life or were otherwise emo-
tionally exhausted because of cultural breakdown following the arrival of 
Europeans—that they were suffering from “premature civilization.”80 Mela-
nesians, Stephen Roberts wrote in a widely read book, were bewildered with-
out the “rule of custom” that had formerly “regulated every detail of exis-
tence” and had lost the will to live. Even after disease came to be recognized 
as the great cause of Melanesian depopulation, the psychological impact 
of change, of “modifications and interferences with native custom,” was 
granted causal weight in influential quarters.81 The mechanisms through 
which alleged confusion or depression led to higher mortality were gener-
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ally left vague. Even so, for those following this line, a secret to combating 
depopulation was cultural stabilization, preservation, and revitalization. 
“The native, to be saved, must save himself,” wrote Roberts. If Europeans 
charged with natives’ welfare were to help them, said former High Commis-
sioner Everard im Thurn, they were duty-bound to familiarize themselves 
with and protect “the habits, customs, and ideas natural to the Melanesian.” 
We saw earlier in this book that many whites thought Melanesians innately 
incapable of adaptation and innovation, and this provided a basic premise 
for the belief that, for the natives, rapid social change could only mean 
social, psychological, and physical disintegration.82
When customs seemed already dead, many whites believed they might 
still be exhumed from beneath “the veneer of doubtfully genuine Euro-
pean culture which has been imposed.” Some key aspects of Melanesian 
life, such as warfare, were abhorrent and intolerable to any civilized Euro-
pean, but they could be modified, or suitable, innocuous substitutes could 
be found. For example, competitive games might replace fighting. Some 
believed the best substitute of all was integration into the capitalist econ-
omy. Thus an 1893 commission on Fiji recommended several remedies for 
native depopulation that included “more steady work,” “subversion of the 
communal system,” and “creation of incentives to industry, stimulus to exer-
tion, and motives for thrift.” For decades to come, many whites would attri-
bute Melanesian problems and discontents to idle hands.83
The Protectorate’s resident commissioner, Ashley, was of the school that 
attributed population decline “not directly to the introduction of disease, 
but to the destruction of old native culture.” When pressing High Com-
missioner Fletcher in 1930 to allow native courts, Ashley quoted a report 
by New Guinea Medical Officer Raphael Cilento: “Perhaps psychological 
causes, due to a consciousness that all that the primitive native held dear is 
being ignored and swamped by new ideas and customs, which at times leads 
to a species of melancholia, diminishing the activity of the seminal glands, 
may have an appreciable effect on population decline.”84 As the 1930s pro-
gressed, Malaita’s officers, especially Bengough, based projects importantly 
on such theories, though by then most serious researchers dismissed them 
as, in Meyer Fortes’s words, “mystical,” and “pseudo-psychological.”85 Offi-
cers by then received some training in the anthropology of the day that 
analyzed different aspects of cultures as functionally interrelated, and 
functionalist models were at least implicit in many psychological depopula-
tion theories. On Malaita, the remedies such theories suggested dovetailed 
nicely with indirect rule strategies and interventions and lent them a scien-
tific and humanitarian cast as being necessary to save Malaitans.86
Much government activity on Malaita in the 1930s went forward against 
this background, and officers defended policies by citing a need to bolster 
cultures suffering “cultural fatigue.” Take Bengough’s argument against 
registration of native marriages: “It is maintained by authorities on popula-
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tion problems that the degree of social integration exhibited by a people 
is an index of their increase, or conversely of their decrease. A system of 
exchange of goods, such as that under the marriage customs, is a chief fac-
tor of social integration. I feel strongly that in administering a race whose 
tendency to decline has been so amply demonstrated, we should refrain 
from interference with any factor which helps to maintain social organiza-
tion and structure.”87
Worries about depopulation and the need to revitalize Malaitan cultures 
did not merely lead to policies of noninterference, but also provided both 
officers and missionaries with arguments for intervening in people’s lives in 
ways each believed necessary. Ashley used them to advocate native courts, 
and in 1937, when urging importation of Chinese workers, he hypothesized 
that the indentured labor system might also be contributing to depopula-
tion. The next year Sandars cited population problems in requesting legal 
powers to deal with marriage rules of Christian missions that he thought 
were too strict and an obstruction to matrimony.88
Population concerns combined with tenets of indirect rule motivated 
and justified native administration policies that had a great influence on 
subsequent Malaitan political ideas. It became government policy and a 
priority for several officers to approve and bolster “old native custom,” as 
conceptualized by Europeans. Malaitans were told that officers would avoid 
interference with and shore up custom, “so long as it did not run counter 
to the dictates of humanity,” and would accord them some power to admin-
ister it themselves.89 Especially important in this respect was an ambitious 
government scheme to counteract depopulation in ‘Are‘are. It was pursued 
in the same area from which Maasina Rule emerged, and that movement 
later carried forward and expanded on most of its projects, in some cases 
under leaders who took part in the government endeavor.90
Malaitan officers had first discussed how to counter depopulation in the 
south of the island, in Kwaio and especially ‘Are‘are, in 1930. They believed 
north Malaitans had, in Barley’s words, “the survival spark,” and it was even 
predicted that population there would increase to the point where land 
shortages might emerge. Based on his 1933 fieldwork in To‘abaita, Hogbin 
too wrote, “I feel the day of Melanesian depopulation is at last drawing 
to a close,” and that the north, at least, was “showing signs of increase.” 
But Barley in the early 1930s calculated that southern populations, who 
lacked the same “vitality,” were in rapid decline and “already well on the 
road to extinction,” and he felt that measures had to be taken to counter 
this.91 Readers can better appreciate Barley’s concerns if they consider that 
from 1919–1922 he was in charge of neighboring Makira during a drastic, 
disease-driven plunge in the population there.
While people across Malaita had clearly suffered greatly from intro-
duced diseases, Barley used questionable methods, both subjective and 
objective, to determine the extent of population declines in specific areas 
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and then set in motion targeted government interventions. First, he saw 
radical ‘Are‘are depopulation in “pathetic evidences in the shape of old 
gardens and deserted clearings of a one time thriving race.” Though this 
may have indicated population loss or departure in places, he seems not 
to have realized that abandoned garden and hamlet sites were (and are) 
ubiquitous in mountain areas, where Malaitans maintained rapidly shifting 
horticulture and residence patterns. Barley further read declining tax rolls 
at face value as revealing a 30 percent population drop during the ten years 
prior to 1933, though he himself complained the tax rolls leading up to 
1930 had “degenerated annually into an increasing welter of unconnected 
names and places, deletions, substitutions, and double entries.” The gov-
ernment used its (male only) tax lists to estimate various populations into 
the 1950s.92
Barley in 1931 had gathered statistics through a census that he read to 
give a population of 45,000 (in 1930 he guessed 70,000, probably using 
Bell’s gross estimate). What most concerned Barley was that the census 
indicated a stark imbalance in the southern area’s sex ratio, which he said 
revealed a weak population. Ashley—who two years before had reported, 
based on information from Officer Wilson, that Malaitan men outnum-
bered women three to one—decided headmen would conduct censuses. 
Barley reported to Ashley that headmen were given “long rectangular tally 
sticks, painted at the four top corners to represent the two age-divisions 
of the male and female population,” and that the method was serviceable 
and accurate. But in this same period Barley was telling Ashley that most 
headmen rarely or never visited the heavily populated inland areas of their 
districts, could not even recognize many of the people there, and indeed 
feared to venture into many places.93
Moreover, census zone boundaries were undetermined beyond the coast, 
and headmen argued over who should count whom. Eight years later, when 
Sandars sent Cadet Dick Horton into the mountains to collect census data, 
he told him, “It won’t be accurate by a long chalk. . . . Most of it you’ll have to 
do by adding up tallies on a stick—the headmen have to notch sticks in their 
villages for everyone in the village on a certain day—still, I suppose we’ll 
have to do the bloody thing.” Such crude methods yielded distorted data, 
as did many colonial Melanesian censuses of the day, particularly where, as 
on Malaita, many men (over 5,000 in 1931, with higher percentages from 
the south) labored abroad, and where many women avoided contact with 
Europeans.94 Vital statistics were far less accurate for Malaita than for most 
islands, and Lambert was told their collection required “incredible toil.” 
Sandars told Dr Ross Innes in 1937, “No complete register of births, mar-
riages, and deaths is kept on Malaita; certain literate headmen keep regis-
ters of births and deaths, and in certain places do it well.” But few headmen 
were literate, most of them in the north. Nonetheless, Ashley maintained 
an interest and required updates.95
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In 1934, Bengough, working under Sandars, reported that ethnographic 
study and a detailed census in west ‘Are‘are revealed three primary causes 
of depopulation: courtship practices (haruna) through which unmarried 
men gained local money, a system of prohibitively expensive marriage pay-
ments (toraana), and an excessive number of houraa mortuary feasts that 
burdened married men while rewarding single men. He suggested these 
acted together to raise the average marriage age and thereby lower the 
birthrate. He also thought too many houraa feasts diverted people from gar-
dening and left them more susceptible to disease: “People are continually 
going from Houra to Houra, at which they are inadequately housed in all 
weathers, which ill assists them to combat disease, and were it not for the 
fact that they ordinarily wear no clothes they would probably be even more 
unable to resist. The custom is not a true one, but has been grossly exag-
gerated by the increased freedom and greater safety of life in Ariari at the 
present time.” Bengough also believed feasting led to “serious starvation” 
during taro and yam harvests from September to April, which increased the 
death rate and “induced an apathy into the people.” He later imposed rules 
limiting feasting to certain periods.96
I know of no corroborative evidence of starvation in this period, but Ben-
gough was correct that feasting on Malaita had expanded over the decades. 
As in many parts of Melanesia, the end of fighting and waning of aspects of 
religious leadership left feast giving as a more important avenue for earn-
ing prestige and status. Increases in garden production and the quantities 
of local and foreign currencies and pigs in circulation were democratizing 
exchange activities once dominated by senior men, and some enterprising 
young men converted cash they earned as laborers into local wealth used 
in feast exchanges, increasing their economic prowess. Over time, feast 
exchanges even began to open, more slowly, to women.97
It is significant that Bengough felt it important to assert that the “cus-
tom” of houraa feasting he described “was not a true one.” He reported 
that “a number of the young men and a few old men” wanted to revise 
the houraa system, or as he put it, to “rationalize” it.98 These points were 
later emphasized, and proposed limitations on both feasting and marriage 
exchanges were couched in terms of restoring “ancient custom” as opposed 
to meddling with it. Bengough also advocated codifying limits on compen-
sation payments in similar terms.
Government concerns about population and cultural integrity aside, 
when Resident Commissioner Marchant toured ‘Are‘are in 1939, local 
debates over limitations were clearly about political and economic issues, 
with each side seeking government support for its position: “A certain num-
ber asked that the present limitation of period during which these feasts 
may be held should be lifted, while others, notably the headmen and richer 
old men considered that the present restriction should remain, in fact they 
sought to restrict the incidence of houra still further by limiting them to 
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those held on the death of old men and women only.” Marchant did not say 
who the “richer old men” were who favored restrictions, or what younger 
men thought, or what was at stake for whom, and he probably did not know. 
In any case, he favored letting ‘Are‘are find their own solutions.99
Though young men of Malaita were gaining more access to wealth and 
formal exchanges, many sought more independence. This goal clashed 
with the long-term debt and other relationships entailed in bridewealth 
finance, and feasting was a part of the same integrated exchange–social 
debt system. In the past, participation in exchange and other social proj-
ects had earned protection and support from one’s group and its leaders, 
and the dependencies and networks of exchange helped keep young men 
in line—in community. But after more than a decade with no fighting and 
with growing opportunities for solo economic and other pursuits, commu-
nity support seemed less vital. To some young men, large marriage debts no 
longer seemed worth the cost and sacrifice, and they looked more kindly 
on limiting brideprice and feasting. There were also older men and some 
headmen who were doing well for themselves and did not want a return 
to stronger social constraints. Justus Jimmy Ganifiri in the 1940s recalled 
a conversation with Kwara‘ae Headman Tome Siru about Maasina Rule: 
“He said that he did not like collective but individual effort. I replied that 
we had been working individually for a long time with the result that we 
had not enough food or money and there were plenty of people who were 
sick and starving and had no one to care for them.” Ganifiri remarked, 
“Those outside of the Marching Rule [ie, Maasina Rule] only think about 
themselves.”100 Though feasts can analytically can be seen as both individual 
and group endeavors, to Malaitans they are most importantly about com-
munity, as Jonathan Fifi‘i explained to me in 1988, in criticizing a modern 
day effort to limit feasts: “Mortuary feasts are what tie us all together. If we 
gave them up then there would be no kinship. Mortuary feasts are what 
unites kin. They are what bring together reciprocity. They are what join 
together the people who look after each other. If there were not mortuary 
feasts, we would cease to be. If people are not kept together by mortuary 
feasting, then it will be every man for himself. Who will help us when there 
are problems?” Malaitan societies had always maintained a fundamental 
tension between individual and group interests, but mechanisms to balance 
these had eroded, resulting in a shift toward the former. Even many young 
people, however, saw this as problematic and, as we shall see, just after the 
war the balance was to swing radically in the other direction.
Missionaries had for years campaigned against brideprice, sometimes 
against government wishes; now government and the missions were allied 
in seeking limitations. However, though the SSEM’s Norman Deck tried 
to pressure officers to enforce his mission’s policies, when these incited 
disputes officers continued to overrule them.101 Hogbin, noting claims by 
Deck (Hogbin’s rival) that Kwara‘ae men could not marry due to brideprice 
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inflation, said he found no evidence of this in To‘abaita in 1933. However, 
elderly Kwaio bachelors have told me that fear of brideprice indebtedness 
was a primary reason they did not marry before the war. As noted earlier, 
Sandars thought strict mission rules, too, blocked some marriages.102
Bengough’s early reports stressed a need for detailed study, and in 1934 
he advised against imposing restrictions on formal exchanges until more 
people’s opinions could be ascertained. He cautioned that there might 
be significant variation in relevant practices even within ‘Are‘are, and that 
forced limits would probably fail. As the decade progressed, this advice was 
forgotten; officers increased the pressure to institute “reforms” and tried 
to restrict both ‘Are‘are and Kwaio feasting, with little understanding of 
relevant practices. In ‘Are‘are, feasts were limited to September–Novem-
ber, apparently with some local support. In the end, this restriction failed 
owing to noncompliance, feast congestion during the permitted season, 
and, ironically, a flu epidemic that killed hundreds of ‘Are‘are, which some 
people blamed on ancestral displeasure at the limitations. As for Kwaio, 
Bengough reported, “There was considerable agreement in principle for 
placing native custom in this area on a more stable footing, and for reduc-
ing the financial liabilities of marriage, but there is a hard core of diehard 
conservatism in this area, which sees in every variation suggested by either 
Government or their own headmen an attempt to break down what they 
consider to be their ancient rights. In actual fact, many of these so-called 
rights do not exist in ancient custom, but the Kwaio bushman is just as 
unable to follow a logical argument as are some people in an island much 
nearer to Great Britain.”103
A 1938 ‘Are‘are census indicated further decline, and in 1939, partly 
spurred by this, Bengough initiated a more formal repopulation project 
there. Its goals far exceeded mere limits on feasting and marriage pay-
ments; the stated ambition “was to check the depopulation of Ariari by 
improving the conditions, social, hygienic, medical and economic, under 
which the people live, and to attempt to give them a greater interest in life 
itself.” In February 1940, the government opened an “administrative camp” 
at Haumatana, just inland from Wairokai on the west coast. It was staffed 
by cadet officers and a native medical practitioner to oversee multiple proj-
ects: “Roads were to be made, and the natives encouraged to live in larger, 
better sited villages. A permanent census record was to be started, and bride 
prices and the houra feast were to be stabilized if possible. The medical ser-
vice was to be established in a dispensary at Wairokai, with a traveling Native 
Medical Practitioner in charge.”104
Bengough stressed the need to inculcate ‘Are‘are with a spirit of “com-
munal service” and “cooperative effort.” He thought these had always been 
“conspicuously lacking” there, and by mid-1941 he reported progress in 
cultivating them.105 In fact, ‘Are‘are always had undertaken enormous 
cooperative projects on their own in the massive group efforts necessary to 
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carry off the very brideprice presentations and feasts that the government 
now wished to constrain. (A Pijin term for such teamwork is kambani—“to 
combine” or “to company.”) The problem for the government had always 
been ‘Are‘are disinterest in cooperating on government projects, anchored 
in European conceptions of what a “community” ought to be and do.
The initial Haumatana efforts included construction of an extensive 
“road” system to integrate east and west ‘Are‘are. Locally made paths 
already crisscrossed the region, and most people showed little enthusiasm 
for making the new ones, but officers hoped the make-work of clearing 
the trails would itself foster greater community cooperation. More revolu-
tionary was a project to persuade the ‘Are‘are to drastically change their 
residential patterns, as described by Bengough: “The old method of life 
of Ariari people was based upon small family settlements of one or two 
houses widely scattered through the bush. Such a distribution is obviously 
not conducive either to successful communal effort or to adequate public 
health control: nor does it assist the maintenance of public order. It was 
decided, therefore, that the Ariari people should be encouraged to build 
villages based on the patrilineal family groups (‘lines’) into which they are 
divided. . . . Concentrated in small villages, the Ariari people will find that 
companionship comes from living with others, and the old spirit of hostility 
will begin to disappear.”106
This idea was not novel; Europeans before had instituted schemes to 
nucleate villages on Guadalcanal, Choiseul, Santa Isabel, and Makira, as 
well as in other places in Melanesia, usually justified as improving sanitation 
and community life but also making populations more visible and acces-
sible to Europeans. As elsewhere, some Solomon Islanders inhabited these 
government-enjoined villages, with their houses arranged in neat rows, 
only when officers toured their areas, after which they returned home. On 
Malaita the strongest impetus to form larger villages had come not from 
government but from Christian leaders, both black and white. Like previ-
ous nucleation schemes, a key motivation behind the ‘Are‘are project was 
that people were easier to track and control when grouped into set villages. 
James Scott has observed that consolidated, permanent settlements allow 
rulers to “see” subjects better, but he found in a comparative study that the 
effort to impose settlement on mobile populations “seemed to be a peren-
nial state project—perennial, in part, because it so seldom succeeded.”107
Many Malaitan Christian relocations had proved longer lasting because the 
people themselves desired them, or, earlier, because hostile mountain peo-
ple forced them to congregate for protection. However, beyond managerial 
or defense motives, a growing number of Malaitans, like whites, shared a 
sensibility that stable villages, replacing scattered and shifting hamlets, were 
a prerequisite for forming proper Melanesian communities and identities 
for the future.
The speed with which ‘Are‘are took up the resettlement plan was remark-
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able; by mid-1941, close to half of them in the targeted sub-districts (Waisisi, 
Wairokai, Komunihaka, Tawana‘oro, Takataka, and Maro‘u) were said to 
be living in new villages, with most others in the process of building them, 
and Maanawai and Onepusu expected to follow suit. Officers hoped also 
to persuade people to abandon shifting horticulture and adopt large fixed 
farms near the new villages with the help of a “native agricultural instruc-
tor,” and the staff worked to introduce terracing and new cash crops. Ben-
gough wanted to convince ‘Are‘are their land would not be exhausted by 
several years of cropping in the same place. His conceit that he knew much 
more about gardening on Malaita than did Malaitan gardeners was indica-
tive of the project’s overall approach—that district officers could, with 
patience, educate Malaitans about complex aspects of their own lives in 
which ‘Are‘are were already experts but about which officers knew little.108
Another facet of the project was that a Malaitan clerk was to conduct a 
census and record all deaths, births, and marriages. Such data were needed 
since otherwise the population could not be efficiently monitored, con-
trolled, and taxed, and as we have seen, previous census methods were 
highly unsatisfactory. Bell had anticipated that a crucial benefit of taxation 
would be that it would compel all men to register their names with the gov-
ernment (he often had to detain numbers of people until he could deter-
mine which one he had come to arrest), and Sandars, though he thought 
the tax “iniquitous” since most people had no money, said he found col-
lections useful since they brought men to the coast annually for him to see 
them. But officers were unable to keep good track of identities in this way. 
For example, beyond the ongoing difficulty in hearing and properly record-
ing native names, many names that men used, particularly with whites, were 
European nicknames—Tom, Biri, Dio—shared by hundreds of men, and 
most changed even their indigenous names at least once in their lifetimes; 
many used more than one. Men with four or more children under age 15 
did not have to pay the head tax, so men would borrow others’ children 
to take to tax collections as their own, and officers had no way to check 
familial authenticity. Ronald Garvey remembered similar problems with 
men claiming exemption for being over age 60: “A chap would get all his 
friends round saying they remembered old Jimmy, he was born eighty years 
ago, this sort of thing. Well, how could we know? If we were in a good mood 
we’d accept it, if we were in a bad mood, we wouldn’t. So when it came to 
the [tax on] dogs, they’d try the same thing. But there was no exception 
for dogs of any age.” A full census accurate for men, women, and children 
would be useful indeed.109
A loose-leaf record book of “native customs” was started at Haumatana, 
and Bengough envisioned a full reappraisal and restructuring of ‘Are‘are 
culture: “Native custom should be carefully and exhaustively studied by the 
officer at Wairokai with a view to the eventual elimination of all such fea-
tures as have an adverse effect on the population, while upholding those 
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which are beneficial.” Efforts to limit brideprice and houraa feasts—as 
modern corruptions of custom—remained a key to the undertaking for 
its duration.110 Throughout the project the two-edged colonial sword of 
“custom”—good and bad, genuine and fraudulent—was a tool of choice, 
always at hand to legitimize and promote, condemn and suppress practices 
according to whether they suited or hindered government ambitions and 
sensibilities. Again, it seems from most officers’ writings that they applied 
“custom” sincerely, were blind to the concept’s inconsistencies and contra-
dictions, and did not try to manipulate it in any disingenuous way.
For us, the most important aspect of this ‘Are‘are scheme is the strik-
ing similarity between its projects and those of the Maasina Rule move-
ment that emerged later. The scheme’s main objectives all became central 
to the movement: large, permanent, and accessible villages; adoption of 
new gardening methods and cash cropping; censusing; and the creation 
of stronger, broader group identities. Further, a paramount Maasina Rule 
activity was the recording of kastom by Malaitan scribes with the goal of 
selectively adapting or discarding old societal rules and creating new ones, 
which would help the movement’s leaders better guide the populace toward 
shared goals.
Moreover, Maasina Rule emerged from the same area in ‘Are‘are where 
the government repopulation project was centered, and three men cen-
tral to the project—Harisimae, Hoasihau, and Nono‘oohimae—were the 
key founders of Maasina Rule (and again, all three attended the Fallowes’s 
meeting on Gela). Both Sandars and Roy Davies later credited Hoasihau, 
the Wairokai district headman, with having started Maasina Rule, while 
others said Harisimae had. Hoasihau was a key participant in Bengough’s 
‘Are‘are efforts from the start, and Officer Michael Forster said he had “dis-
played great interest and keenness” in them. Martin Clemens—the cadet 
assigned to oversee Haumatana’s initiation and begin a “road” connecting 
Wairokai to Takataka—told me that it was Hoasihau who first explained to 
him the destructive effects of excessive brideprice in ‘Are‘are.111
When war came and officers left, the Haumatana camp continued for a 
time under a government clerk, Timeas Teioli from Abu village near ‘Aoke, 
who Davies said was an able organizer despite his minimal education. But 
the camp was abandoned early in 1943, officers believed because Teioli and 
Hoasihau tracked and killed a local murderer and prison escapee. ‘Are‘are 
historian John Naitoro was told that the people were unhappy about being 
pressured to labor without pay on the roads, which as we have seen most 
Malaitans considered pointless. Everyone returned to their homes, and 
later in the year Sandars on his first postwar tour found Haumatana in “rack 
and ruin,” with houraa again flourishing. He quickly imposed a seasonal ban 
on feasts—none while yams were in the ground—but the project was put 
on hold, partly due to lack of resources but also because Sandars thought 
its design needed serious modification. Also, heated disputes had emerged 
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over who owned the Haumatana land, and the venture’s original architect, 
Bengough, had perished in the war.112 Thus died the ‘Are‘are repopulation 
project, its activities set aside until Sandars might give them his attentions. 
Or so thought Sandars.
Further Experiments: Councils and Courts
Partly in response to the Fallowes movement, before the war district officers 
on several islands began to initiate new, unofficial or “experimental” native 
councils and arbitration courts.113 Like the repopulation project, Maasina 
Rule later absorbed these within its own social engineering schemes, and 
it is important to understand their development and how Malaitans per-
ceived, employed, and at times rejected them. During the 1930s, a few areas 
had set up unofficial courts, but now there was a shift in government policy. 
In 1939, Bengough, with an eye to wider changes, initiated two “councils of 
elders” at Fo‘odo and Malu‘u, chaired by headmen and staffed where pos-
sible by “heads of lines.” These councils were to “meet monthly, to discuss 
local affairs, and wherever possible, to settle disputes in native custom—
a matter in which I consider they have far more authority than the Dis-
trict Officer.” In 1940, Ashley’s replacement Marchant strongly supported 
experiments in this direction, though he still had no authority from above 
to establish courts and those that started consequently lacked any legal sta-
tus. But there were indications from London that their development would 
be supported.114
By 1941, new councils were operating in Lau (at Te), Baelelea, Baegu, 
and Langalanga, and a single one was charged to “co-ordinate custom etc. 
for all Kwara‘ae” under Headman Tome Siru, whom Bell had appointed 
from the constabulary in 1925. Council boundaries did not in practice 
match those of sub-districts but instead followed more linguistic and cul-
tural lines. The plan was that soon these bodies would arbitrate legal cases. 
Responses to councils in the north were almost wholly positive, and offi-
cers thought them popular and successful, though before long council 
members were reportedly “uneasy at having no legal sanction to back their 
authority.” Bengough met with leaders in other areas to discuss local prob-
lems and lay groundwork for similar bodies. Within a year, four convened 
on Small Malaita, though with limited success due to problems “getting 
elders to take Councils seriously” and leaders’ “indifference.” At year’s end 
there were still no official councils in Fataleka, Kwaio, or most of ‘Are‘are.115
Native courts proved more difficult to organize than councils. In 1941 
they were still not legal, but most of the councils were arbitrating native 
custom cases and “proved of great assistance in administration.” Most active 
in this respect was the north Malaita council operating a court under Head-
man Maekali, which was allowed to hear minor criminal cases and impose 
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penalties up to a £5 fine or a month in jail, and civil disputes of values 
to £10, with its decisions appealable to district officers. However, “custom 
law” enjoyed a special, protected status, and no appeals were allowed in the 
“native customary cases,” which predominated. Coupled with these courts 
was a push to codify and “regularize” custom law, linked to Bengough’s 
ongoing concern to limit brideprices and compensations. The courts were 
mandated to maintain local language records of disputes that they heard 
and “rulings in native custom” they made.116
Unlike in some African colonies, and especially India, Malaita’s officers 
did little to involve themselves in the nitty-gritty of custom codification and 
left it to Malaitans. They expected the codes to have minor legal importance, 
and in any case they lacked the requisite knowledge, time, and resources 
for such intensive work. Furthermore, there was a reluctance to officially 
interfere with “native custom,” and, unlike India and parts of Africa, there 
were no classic texts of religious or other rules on which to build new codes.
With no legal sanctions to enforce their “custom” judgments, courts 
faced a growing problem that some men simply ignored a summons to 
appear. When such cases were referred to government courts, no means 
existed there for ordering compensations, and so offended parties were left 
unhappy. Clearly, if courts were to evolve as hoped they would require offi-
cial powers, and in early 1941 Marchant instructed all officers to prepare 
outlines of planned native court procedures for their districts. On 30 April 
Sandars, acting as resident commissioner, submitted these to High Com-
missioner Luke, stating in his cover letter: “Establishment of native courts is 
fundamental to any system of native administration founded on principles 
generally accepted within the Empire. Moreover, the native peoples of the 
Protectorate have, for the most part, now reached a state of development 
where they are seeking some outlet for their political aspirations and there 
is little doubt that the best means of satisfying such a demand is to permit 
them to have a greater voice in the settlement of their own affairs.”117
Bengough did not envision native courts as significantly empowering 
Malaitans. He made this clear in an outline proposal for their operation that 
specified government headmen would be in charge, with “elders” acting 
only in an advisory capacity. He noted, though, that the courts lacked quali-
fied, literate headmen to lead them, and since officers only saw headmen 
a few times a year there was no way to train them. He therefore proposed 
starting a school for headmen at ‘Aoke, but Marchant rejected the idea.118
Bengough regretted he could not allow Malaitans to select their own 
headmen or magistrates but fell back on an old justification: “I could wish 
that some form of native leadership existed which we could adapt for our 
purpose, but unfortunately on Malaita there is nothing of the kind. We 
cannot rule through chiefs, so we should, I consider, aim at ruling through 
Councils of Elders and Native Magistrates.” He wanted to empower coun-
cils in each area to enforce settlement of “offenses against native custom 
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which carry a penalty of monetary compensation,” without any reference to 
the native courts. Thus, the only real authority Bengough intended to grant 
Malaitans who were not government servants was over matters of “native 
custom,” which in practice they had already been allowed in the past. A 
key point here is that these and subsequent court and council policies 
generated “custom” as a category of practices—the only such category—
over which Malaitans would be allowed full legal control, at least in the 
abstract.119
In early December 1942, with the war ongoing, Marchant sent officers 
copies of the Native Courts Regulation, approved by the secretary of state 
to the colonies, and modeled largely on past ordinances of the Gilbert and 
Ellice Colony, Fiji, and especially Tanganyika. This regulation finally legal-
ized native courts and made headmen their presidents. Marchant ordered 
an end to all codification, however, citing the fear that it “stifled evolution.” 
He emphasized that, unlike councils, the courts were not empowered to 
make new rules but only to administer the law and established native cus-
tom. Courts were to be “constituted in accordance with the native law or 
customs of the area,” and their powers were limited to administration of 
“the native law and custom prevailing in the area of the jurisdiction.” The 
regulation contained elements important for understanding later events: 
First, it said, “Nothing in this section contained shall be deemed to pro-
hibit any person from adjudication as an arbitrator upon any civil matter 
in dispute when the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to his deci-
sion.” This preserved community leaders’ right to hear and judge civil dis-
putes outside government-sanctioned courts. Further, “For offenses against 
native law or custom a native court may, subject to the provisions of this 
Ordinance, impose a fine or may order imprisonment or both . . . or may 
inflict any punishment authorized by native law or custom, provided that 
such punishment is not repugnant to natural justice and humanity.” Courts 
were specifically allowed to order compensation settlements. When the war 
moved off to the Western Solomons, officers Bengough, Sandars, and For-
ster would work in south Malaita to draw ‘Are‘are araha, or chiefly leaders, 
into this system on a more organized basis.120
Also about this time Hogbin visited To‘abaita. While in 1933 there had 
been dissatisfaction with the courts, he wrote: “Signs of a change were 
apparent on my return a decade later . . . although local government had 
then been in operation for only three and a half years. The councils and 
courts were still regarded as somewhat strange—these natives had had no 
corresponding organization which the Administration could adapt—but 
there was a growing realization that the rules of law are the natural out-
come of social life.”121 Hogbin’s optimistic assessment missed the essence 
of what was happening on Malaita. For many Malaitans, the government’s 
stuttering attempts to erect a semblance of a native administration through 
the 1930s to the beginning of the war had been inadequate and too slow. 
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Colonial law and courts had become key symbols of discontent throughout 
the island, sometimes evoked to stand for all grievances against the colonial 
system. These grievances would soon come to the fore in organized fashion 
with the rise of Maasina Rule. A paramount purpose of this movement was 
to take up what the government had so tentatively started, and to transform 
the councils and courts into serious political and legal institutions run by 
and for Malaitans. The key event that energized Malaitans to act on their 
dissatisfactions with the government system and their aspirations for more 
self-rule was World War II, to which we now turn.
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Chapter 4
The Wartime Opening
The Malaitan War Experience
World War II brought little actual fighting to Malaita but had profound 
social repercussions there.1 As in the past, Malaitans were summoned to 
work on other islands, this time in the Solomon Islands Labour Corps 
(SILC) assisting US and allied forces on Guadalcanal and Gela, and later 
in the Western Solomons, under the command of district officers and plan-
tation managers. Malaitans dominated the corps early on—in October 
1943 over 2,000 Malaitans made up 85 percent of recruits—and for the war 
overall they made up more than half its members. Most were young, some 
under 16 years old. About 800 more Islanders, including many Malaitans, 
were with the Solomon Islands Defence Force. The wartime experiences 
of these men were to change Malaitans’ worldviews and political aspira-
tions forever. From among them arose leaders of political actions in years to 
come, men like Nono‘oohimae, Nori, Ga‘a, Sau, Fifi‘i, and Irofiala. As else-
where across the southwest Pacific, the war proved a demoralizing setback 
for those Europeans dedicated to tightly controlling Melanesians, and their 
attempts at war’s end to reinstate the old social order were destined to fail.2
My focus in this chapter is the war’s impact on the political ideas and 
actions of Malaitans and other Solomon Islanders rather than its military 
aspects.3 In brief, the Japanese bombed the Tulagi area beginning in Janu-
ary 1942, took the town in early May, and in June began occupying Gua-
dalcanal. By early February 1942, most white residents had been evacuated 
from the Solomons, although a handful of government officers and a few 
others bravely stayed to coordinate the Defence Force. Some worked with 
Islanders, many of them policemen, as guerilla fighters and “coastwatch-
ers,” using tele-radios to report on Japanese movements while on the run. 
Resident Commissioner William Marchant, with a radio operator and some 
constabulary, shifted his headquarters to Fulisango inland from ‘Aoke 
until December, collecting and transmitting coded coastwatcher reports to 
Port Vila in the New Hebrides. Defence Force Captain Charles Bengough 
remained at ‘Aoke with a police squad. Some missionaries also stayed on 
Malaita and other islands.4
The Wartime Opening 133
Islanders closely noted the last panicked departure in February, as the 
final steamer slipped away from Tulagi jammed with frightened Europe-
ans, their luggage abandoned on the wharves. Bishop Walter Baddeley 
lamented, “Many white men, I’m afraid, did not maintain ‘the white man’s 
prestige.’ ” Martin Clemens recalled the “appalling display of cowardice 
and irresponsibility” among Europeans: “Hundreds of laborers were left 
on the plantations to fend for themselves, unpaid, with only a few weeks 
rations. Most were Malaita men; they were confused and angry and had no 
means of returning home.” A flotilla of government, missionary, and native-
owned ships later collected some 3,000 workers and took them back to their 
islands.5 In early August 1942, a US force invaded Guadalcanal, and serious 
combat continued for about six months before moving off to the west. Only 
dimly if at all aware of British campaigns on European and other fronts, 
most Malaitans perceived in these events British weakness and American 
strength: the former fled while the latter brought the fight to the Japanese.
During the evacuation and early fighting, widespread pillaging broke 
out, particularly among workers deserted by their employers. Cadet Cle-
mens told of “over 1,000 smashing and looting,” and wrote in his Guadal-
canal diary, “There is much lawlessness afoot, and headmen finding it dif-
ficult to assert their influence”; he also reported “quite a lot of anarchy 
on the Weather Coast.” Cyril Belshaw later said there was looting “on a 
grand scale” and hinted at political overtones to the mayhem in “the glee 
with which law books were burned” at Tulagi. Officer Donald Kennedy 
reported what Marchant called “wanton destruction” and ransacking of 
residences and the government store, and he advised Marchant of houses 
being built on Gela for storing stolen goods. Kennedy gave headmen and 
native courts powers to “deal drastically with defaulters” and offered special 
“tribal police” a reward of 5 percent of any loot produced in native court. 
Norman Deck, too, bemoaned a “wave of stealing that has spread through 
the group,” but he was one of the few to mention that Europeans initiated 
the looting.6
Several hundred Guadalcanal people were employed by US forces early 
on, but in November 1942 they were dismissed after presenting written 
demands for work conditions and pay that were considered “most extrava-
gant.” It was decided to ship in Malaitans to replace them, on one-year 
stints. On 3 December, at the request of US Marine Corps Colonel Hunt, 
Bengough recruited the first 175 Malaitans, and by the following Novem-
ber, 2,740 Islanders had signed on. In 1942, the Americans pressed for 
5,000 workers, but the government declined their request that labor be 
made compulsory. They did so because, first, they had insufficient records 
on which to base a conscription law, and second, if people resisted—
and Ian Hogbin, now a government adviser, assured Marchant that they 
would—enforcement would expend more manpower than it gained. Fur-
ther, resulting anger might lead to dissolution of the Labour Corps, and the 
134 Chapter 4
government might lose face and perhaps control. So enlistment remained 
voluntary, although some headmen were heavily pressured to meet quotas.7
Various passages around Malaita initially supplied one or more “sec-
tions” of 25 men each, headed by a local sergeant, for example, 4 sections 
from east Kwaio, 2 from ‘Are‘are, and 6 from Kwara‘ae. As during the nine-
teenth-century labor trade, subsequent SILC recruits enlisted after hearing 
returnees’ stories of their experiences and seeing them distribute goods 
they had gotten. Ansene Wa‘ii‘a of Maka in west ‘Are‘are recalled his deci-
sion to join the Labour Corps in 1943: “After a year some of the men who 
went in the first group came home. Waopu and Houma‘i, Sihiu, brought 
boxes of goods. I was watching them as they divided tobacco, tinned meat, 
clothes, matches, axes, and knives. Not one of them offered me a thing. 
This made me think and I had a strong desire to go on the next ship that 
came to take labor.” Wa‘ii‘a had wanted to go in the first group, but found, 
“When they reached the number of men they wanted, they stopped calling. 
I was far behind in the line so I did not go.”8
Most of the initial recruits, now recalled as the fasimoorin (first marines), 
had only vague ideas about what they were volunteering for, and many 
were apprehensive; rumors and anxieties about a coming war had been 
building for years, even before the Defence Force began to be organized in 
1939.9 Throughout non-Christian areas, pigs were now sacrificed in ances-
tral shrines to ask protection for the recruits and for Malaita itself (some 
feared Japanese would take their land). Such calls for ancestral help upset 
some Christians, and Wa‘ii‘a recounted Malaitan Sergeant Ilala lecturing 
their ‘Are‘are SILC section on arrival at Guadalcanal: “You people will not 
invoke your ancestors or worship them. Those who came here before did 
that and were killed by the bombs and their hands or legs were blown off. 
These [fox]holes they were hiding in had been blessed by the Bishop [Bad-
deley].” But many, including some Christians, prayed in foxholes to their 
ancestors nonetheless or asked non-Christian comrades to do so on their 
behalf, reasoning that ancestors knew more about warfare than God did. 
Some Melanesians later claimed that Americans bought local fighting mag-
ics for protection.10
Nothing could have prepared Islanders for what they found when they 
arrived on Gela and especially on Guadalcanal. They were set to construct-
ing camps, unloading masses of cargo, building roads and an airfield, car-
rying supplies and ammunition, planting gardens, and burying the dead. 
Working from an inland camp on Guadalcanal’s Tenaru river, just east of 
present-day Honiara, some were shelled by the Japanese, after which they 
asked to be returned to beach areas. In mid-December a Japanese plane 
bombed the same camp, and some sergeants requested that their sections 
be taken back to Malaita. Officers were sure this would blow over when 
they came “to see for themselves what little real danger exists,” but on 26 
January fears became reality when another bombing killed 11 laborers and 
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wounded 9. This temporarily halted SILC recruiting, which by then had 
engaged 1,450 men—1,100 to Guadalcanal, 350 to Tulagi.11
This bombing catalyzed unhappiness among the corps and sparked a 
two-week mass walkout.12 District Officer and Defence Force Lieutenant 
Lennox Barrow described the SILC “stampede” the next morning: “We met 
them on our way back from the range walking in an endless stream down 
the coast to the east piled high with junk of every description picked up 
from the Americans.” Bishop Baddeley was brought in to ask men to pray 
together and return to work, and Norman Deck arrived to tell them to work 
on Sundays. Marchant sent over some senior Malaitan men, writing in his 
diary, “They want to tell the young men what they think of them.”13
Eventually the men were convinced to return to work, but the bombing 
was only one source of their discontent, and resentments grew and more 
strikes followed. Among early demands were that they be given a raise to 3 
shillings per day, that late wages be paid (a cash shipment had been delayed), 
that they receive better rations, that they be issued clothing, and that Sun-
days be holidays. According to Fifi‘i, they also insisted they be allowed more 
freedom to fraternize with Americans. Jason Alaikona of Bokolo, To‘abaita, 
a former policeman, in the defence force, and later a Maasina Rule and 
then Federal Council movement leader, recalled: “Two British men, named 
Mr. Clemens and Mr. Bengough, . . . wanted to pay us £1, or $2.00 a month. 
But some in my section, they didn’t want £1, or $3.00, or $2.00, and asked to 
be taken back home. They did not want to fight for $2.00 a month because 
they thought their lives were worth more than that, [and they said], ‘We 
don’t think this fight has come here for we natives to fight; it belongs to 
you white people.’ ” Adequacy of food and tobacco rations had always been 
for laborers a crucial measure of a plantation employer’s competence, and 
early SILC provisions were very poor. Men lived in dilapidated tents, and 
one camp was built on a Japanese burial site. Some Malaitans complained 
loudly when ordered to dig or clean latrines or to handle corpses uncer-
emoniously, both religiously forbidden for many.14
Fifi‘i told me in 1988 that he and other Kwaio, including sergeants Iria-
mae, John Te‘efu, and ‘Ui‘aniaria (all three former policemen from Uru), 
were strike leaders. Government officers (and Fifi‘i to a lesser extent) iden-
tified SILC Sergeant Major Jared Ramo‘ifaka of Langalanga as a behind-
the-scenes instigator, followed by sergeants Ata, Gwanoi, and Arnon 
Ngwadili. Ramo‘ifaka was for years a trusted “boss boy” for Burns Philp, and 
Bengough had handpicked him to be in charge of Labour Corps workers. 
These men were organizers and were arrested, but the actions overall were 
loosely organized wildcat strikes with many leaders in the different sections, 
making them all the more difficult to repress. In response, “American over-
seers” were attached to the SILC in order, Marchant telegrammed the high 
commissioner, to “bring pressure on labourers.” Fifi‘i told of US officers 
gently pressing them to resume work, but he and others believed they were 
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placed in the SILC camps because the Malaitans had demanded it as a con-
dition for returning to their jobs—they wanted to work under American, 
not colonial officers. In the end, the fact that officers turned to Americans 
to help them control the Labour Corps amounted to an admission that they 
had lost authority. Charles Widdy, the SILC commander, complained to 
Marchant that US officers did not bother to even consult him when deploy-
ing laborers.15
Concerns to enforce strict discipline had dominated composition of the 
“Military Unit Regulation” of 1942 that established the corps—the govern-
ment from the start had foreseen and feared losing its hold over Islanders 
in a volatile wartime setting. By the following February, Widdy reported to 
Marchant, “There is trouble throughout the Labour Corps,” but now he rec-
ommended against strict enforcement of discipline, which might provoke 
“further trouble and defiance.” Marchant recognized that more than wages 
was at issue and wrote enigmatically to Widdy, “They may have some other 
grouse at the back of their minds which they are reluctant to mention.” But 
he clearly did not comprehend the degree to which government control 
was fading. While the formal launching of Maasina Rule as a movement 
remained more than a year away, it started here with the loosely organized 
but open defiance in the SILC strikes, and with the emerging Malaitan idea 
that Americans might act as their allies against the colonial government.16
Government officers quickly attributed discontents to American influ-
ences and thereby avoided confronting problems of or complaints about 
the colonial system of black-white relations. Still, there was a degree of valid-
ity to their suspicions, in that some Americans openly counseled Islanders 
to rebel and shared their own anti-British sentiments. (“You should throw 
them out like we Americans did.”) Many soldiers would have been union 
veterans of the ongoing labor battles back home, and in some of them the 
Melanesian strikers stirred unexpected feelings of camaraderie. Arnon 
Ngwadili of west Kwara‘ae remembered Americans asking them, “Why is it 
that you all came and joined the war and are doing the same kind of work 
that we are doing, but your government is not paying you well?” I have 
heard many similar stories. But beyond American instigation, what Island-
ers were seeing on their own was enough to raise their expectations and 
encourage them to demand change.17
Decades later, SILC veterans vividly described their shock on arrival at 
Guadalcanal. The ships, thousands of troops, airplanes, and weaponry ini-
tially frightened many, while the sheer scale of organization amazed all. 
Most accounts note the abundance of material goods and Islanders’ easy 
access to them. US soldiers casually gave men what seemed extravagant 
gifts—military clothing, tools, and sometimes even guns. Ma‘aanamae of 
Kwaio, a former plantation carpenter, and his friend Gwauni were kept 
busy building false-bottom boxes in which men smuggled their guns back 
to Malaita, a trick passed down from nineteenth-century laborers. Belshaw 
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later wrote, “Every one of the 6,000 people of Gela . . . acquired a stretcher 
bed and mosquito net in this period. In the Russell Islands . . . so I am told, 
the villagers acquired their own telephones and electric lighting system, and 
rebuilt their houses entirely of timber.”18 The end of significant fighting on 
Guadalcanal in early 1943 brought a surge of wealth still more impressive. 
On Guadalcanal, between 1942 and early 1944 US construction battalions 
erected a huge transit camp to push soldiers and supplies north. They laid 
217 kilometers of roads to connect camps and built airfields, fuel depots, 
and cemeteries. Islanders contributed their labor and their skills in work-
ing with local building materials. Farms of over 800 hectares were planted 
to supply troops with vegetables, which Islanders, supervised by US Army 
officers, weeded, transplanted, and harvested.19
Many Malaitans now took stock of their prewar poverty and blamed it 
on British selfishness. Americans amplified resentment by paying higher 
wages. While most SILC recruits received £1 per month, this was greatly 
supplemented by salvaging and American gifts. Men working for Americans 
as casual labor could earn £15 or more per month doing cooking, laundry, 
and odd jobs and selling art and curios. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel 
Figure 4.1. Islanders bartering local products with American Seabees off Gela, Sep-
tember 1943. (US Government unnumbered photo, Naval Construction Battalion 
Center, Port Hueneme, California, photographer unknown.)
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Alex Sharpe was on Guadalcanal in 1944 and told me in a 1988 letter of 
buying carvings: “I got a jeep and drove up in the hills looking for a native 
village and found one. The price of the clubs was US$5.00 each and he had 
change for a twenty . . . his hut had a sliding door.” Malaitans today believe 
Americans gave the government money to pay higher wages but that it 
diverted the lion’s share for such purposes as buying ships after the war. 
In 1992, I attended a Honiara meeting of SILC veterans, mostly Malaitans, 
on the 50th anniversary of the marines’ landing, and listened to speaker 
after speaker demand the government seek British repayment of American 
wages still owed. The administration did in fact insist on lower wages with 
an eye to checking postwar expectations and American influence.20
Given the high moral, social, and prestige value of food exchange in 
their societies, Solomon Islanders were enormously impressed by Ameri-
can food gifts. More important still was some soldiers’ willingness to share 
meals with them, something taboo among most whites before the war. This 
was the first thing many Malaitan veterans highlighted years later when tell-
ing about the soldiers. Fifi‘i remembered: “They asked us to come inside 
their tents . . . and when we were inside, we could sit on their beds. They 
gave us their glasses so we could drink out of them. They gave us plates and 
we ate with their own spoons. That was the first we had seen of that kind of 
thing. We talked about it like this: ‘Those people like the British and the 
whites before, it was terrible because they were not kind to us! These people 
here are very kind. We can all sit on one bed, and we all eat together.’ ” 
Isaac Gafu of Kwara‘ae described a fatalism among soldiers that diluted 
racial and cultural boundaries: “When the boxes would break open and 
food would fall out all over the place we wouldn’t take any because we were 
afraid as we never stole before. But the Americans said, ‘You all eat these 
things. This is our food. Let’s all eat while we are still alive.’ ” Government 
officers later cited Islanders’ appreciation of the novel American cuisine 
to rebut an old company excuse for poor plantation rations: that laborers 
would reject new foods.21
In these and other ways, some Americans shared with Malaitans a black-
white camaraderie hitherto forbidden. To Malaitans, that there were white 
people not obviously concerned with protecting a superior status was a pro-
found revelation. Said Gafu, “We all stayed together as if we were of one 
race. They were very loving toward us. . . . They did not fight with us. They 
were really good friends. We all ate together.” Ariel Sisili, in a 1949 political 
manifesto formally presented to the government, described the perceived 
contrast with characteristic Malaitan flair (this very bright man’s poor gram-
mar speaks to the lack of education available to Malaitans, addressed later 
in this chapter):
Since the white people and B. P. Govt arrived and settled in the S.I. we’ve the 
native realized and have noticed is a great distinction between them and us: 
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They have never shown any sign of real friendship, Love, nor sympathy, therefore 
it is quite obvious that there will never be any equality between them and our 
coloured race. . . . 
At last a new dawn breaks upon the Sol. Is. The U.S.A. Navy Army Air Force 
arrives and bravely plunges into war against the advancing enemy eventually 
beat, and drives them back from the ground. Which as a result has freed us from 
our fears, our hearts burst forth every day, and gratitude in excess from men 
women and children both young and old great and small to God and to that 
Country who with grace and mercy of God, and their hearts of sympathy, guided 
by them to safety us poor and helpless people of these islands. Ever before they 
came here true love we’ve never known or even had we any dealings one with the 
other. The Americans and us were quite strangers one to another, we even have 
never worked for these in the past but we can about three years American was in 
the Sol Is. during the war. We never know nor ever did we realized before they 
came here the true love and friendship mentioned in the bible and ignorant 
peoples to become better as one should say, that all men were created equal and 
that man is a trinity consisting of both spirit soul and body and that from com-
mon sense man can distinguish without being educated what was true right and 
not right fair and not fair.22
Anthropologist Kenneth Read suggested Melanesians could readily 
accept that there were different sorts of white people because their own 
societies were made up of people who looked alike but were in many ways 
dissimilar. But after the impressive wealth, generosity, and intimacy of these 
white Americans came a more shocking encounter: with black Americans. 
Islanders had heard of them; some had even learned songs about them 
from missionaries, as one veteran later demonstrated with a rendition of 
“Swanee River.” Kwalafanei‘a of Kwaio told Keesing in 1962 that before the 
war they were told that all Americans were black, “olsem yumi” (just like us), 
and this belief existed elsewhere on Malaita. When black troops of the 93rd 
Army Infantry Division began to arrive on Guadalcanal in early 1944, they 
seemed to many in the Labour Corps to have overcome the inequalities 
they themselves suffered. This was far from true, of course—the US military 
was not even fully integrated until the 1950s, and the marines would admit 
no blacks until President Franklin Roosevelt ordered them to in 1942. Most 
black soldiers in the Solomons were given labor or security duties.23
Racism would have been common among US troops of the time, but on 
many Malaitans it made little impression. Racism is fundamentally about 
fear and boundary maintenance, and while the Protectorate’s white resi-
dents saw uncontrolled Islanders as dangerous, for Americans they pre-
sented little threat to their jobs or status in the way black soldiers might. As 
to segregation, some Malaitans thought black Americans were a separate 
nationality with their own country in the southern United States. As SILC 
veteran Sulafanamae explained in 1980: “The British had their own sec-
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tions, as did Australians, Fijians, and white Americans, and so did the black 
Americans.” Misconstrued in this way, segregation could raise the status of 
black troops. Islanders misinterpreted other American expressions of racial 
bigotry, and into the early 1980s some thought niga an acceptable term 
for black Americans. Others did recognize racism among some Americans, 
and some Islanders resented it when Americans made fun of them. Some 
recalled for me confrontations between black and white soldiers. And yet 
most saw American racism to be different from the ordered, colonial racial 
discrimination they knew so well. Tom Titiuru of Ulawa told me in 1987 
that one thing that struck Islanders was how black soldiers were quick to 
stand up for themselves and fought back when insulted: “The MPs had to 
keep the blacks and whites separate because the Negros, even though they 
were black like we Melanesians, they were different—they had a very tough, 
aggressive way of thinking. . . . It was taboo to call them niga because they 
would shoot you very quick. They called them ‘colored boys.’ ” Malaitans 
were impressed that these “Black Joes” appeared to wear the same uniforms 
and have the same rations, equipment, and freedom of movement as white 
soldiers. Fifi‘i recalled working with them: “We saw the black soldiers there, 
and they all wore shirts, and they wore trousers. And their job was to work 
just like the white soldiers. . . . and we saw them and they were better than 
we black people here in the Solomons . . . they were really fine people! Any 
kind of thing that the whites did, they could do it too. They knew how to 
do carpentry, and they knew how to write. And they were the people who 
we worked together with.” Some Malaitans read prestige into the relega-
tion of blacks to labor battalions, or carpentry or cargo work, since, they 
reasoned (or perhaps rationalized), such work required more skill than did 
fighting.24
Some told me of fearing black soldiers and socializing more with 
whites, while others strongly denied this and recalled working with blacks 
as close friends. Edgar Vaea, a scout and carrier from Temotu Province, 
later recounted, “We liked the black Americans, but sometimes we were 
afraid of them, because they were bigger and taller than us from the Solo-
mons. . . . They told us, ‘If you go to school, you can be like us, and do the 
jobs we do.’ ” Titiuru said they told him and others, “You are low down and 
not good, and you have to raise yourselves up. We had to struggle, and 
even though some of us died, you can see that now we are doing well.” 
Fifi‘i, later east Kwaio’s Maasina Rule leader, recounted long talks with 
one black American overseer, a Sergeant Jackson, as inspirational for that 
movement.25
Whether individual Islanders fully recognized or overlooked Ameri-
can racism, or disregarded it as enigmatic, variable, or relatively mild, few 
highlighted it in later war accounts or in stories they took back to Malaita. 
Generic oral histories of the war have often obscured subtleties and ranges 
of interactions with foreigners in service of narrative or political themes. 
The Wartime Opening 141
Thus colonial officers may be presented as uniformly mean in contrast to 
always-magnanimous Americans. Japanese, too, are stereotyped; Islanders 
sometimes tell of deceiving them by exploiting crude images that some 
Japanese held about “primitive natives.”26 Relative to broad-brush depic-
tions of the war, personal accounts of specific events tend to distort less 
and distinguish individuals and their characters, be they colonials or Ameri-
cans. Publicly constructed histories and personal reminiscences influence 
each other in complex ways. For one, there is a “survivor effect” in that, as 
witnesses to an event die away, the accounts of those who remain become 
more influential in their community’s ongoing construction of its historical 
memory. This has occurred in oral histories of the war.
The 15 colonial officers managing the Labour Corps observed Islander-
American amity. Several were former plantation managers selected for their 
experience overseeing native labor, and Malaitans already despised some of 
them, most notably SILC Commander Widdy, infamous as “Mista Wiri” for 
his bullying. These and more benign officers alike recognized in the war-
time scene a dire threat to white authority. The prewar code of white-black 
relations, with its directive “familiarity is disastrous to one’s prestige,” was 
being swept aside before their eyes, and they acted to reassert control.27
In early 1943, US Major General Alexander Patch was influenced to 
write a memorandum on “Native Labour” to put a stop to “certain prac-
tices on the part of military personnel prejudicial to the full utilization of 
native labor and the control of natives by the British authorities.” In addi-
tion to “over-payment for services or commodities” and “employment of 
casual labour without adequate supervision or control,” he ordered soldiers 
to cease “permitting casual natives to wander through camps and military 
areas and encouraging this latter bad practice by feeding or making gifts to 
these casual natives.” The memorandum upended reality and warned, “By 
the native’s own standards, over-payment and the making of gifts is inter-
preted as weakness on the part of the giver.” He attached a “schedule of 
prices for native labour and commodities” including food and curios, and 
daily wages were not to exceed 1 shilling.28
US troops were issued a booklet written by one or more colonial officers 
for New Guinea and titled You and the Native, which advised, “The native is 
nearly, if not quite, as good a man as you are,” but warned, “Always . . . main-
tain your position or pose of superiority, even if you sometimes have doubts 
about it. It is flattering to the vanity and in the circumstances must pay 
us well. As for the native, he will not resent it, because he has brought it 
about himself and he is used to it. . . . Always, without overdoing it, be the 
master.” For another counter-weapon, Ian Hogbin considered it “of pro-
found importance” that British journals such as Illustrated London News be 
imported and circulated to counter Life Magazine and the other American 
periodicals to which Solomon Islanders were being exposed that glorified 
the American war effort.29
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This situation is interesting viewed within a larger context. The US mil-
itary had faced similar threats to its own racial status quo during World 
War I, when General John Pershing issued to the French a 1918 directive 
similar to Patch’s, regarding his black troops: “We must prevent the rise 
of any pronounced degree of intimacy between French officers and black 
officers. . . . Make a point of keeping the native cantonment population 
from ‘spoiling’ the Negroes.” A popular American saying after that war was, 
“How do you keep them down on the farm after they’ve seen Paris?” Now, 
while Protectorate officers fretted over Americans spoiling Solomon Island-
ers, white American officers and many enlisted men stationed in Britain, 
along with the British government, worried over British civilians socializing 
with, and especially British women dating, black American troops, and how 
this would raise the latter’s postwar expectations back in the States and 
influence Britain’s nonwhite populations.30
Just as French and British people widely ignored directives to discrimi-
nate, so too did many Americans in the Solomons. Hogbin said “officers of 
the military Administration were so few and the soldiers so numerous” that 
rules were unenforceable. SILC officers lectured Islanders not to eat or 
fraternize with Americans, and eventually these activities were made illegal, 
but such efforts were futile. Some Islanders went so far as to don uniforms 
to impersonate black soldiers to sneak into the service clubs, movies, or 
PXs, which the US War Department in early 1943 ordered desegregated 
(although the American Red Cross clubs and canteens remained segre-
gated, as did their blood supply). Fifi‘i described the strangeness: “During 
the day we lived in one world [working under Americans], and at night and 
in the morning, in our Labour Corps Camps, we lived in a different world 
where our officers tried to treat us as if we were plantation labourers.”31
There were other indignities. In 1942, SILC men were told not to wear 
shirts, or trousers instead of wrap-around kabilato cloths, and violators were 
threatened with a week in jail. Fifi‘i remembered carrying his sergeant’s 
stripes around in his hand because he had no sleeve to pin them to and 
he found instructions to tie them to his bare arm humiliating. Those who 
earned medals had to hang them from their necks. After the war Titiuru 
visited New Zealand, and he recalled to me the grim irony of seeing dogs 
there wearing “nice coats” while SILC men had been restricted to kabilato: 
“I thought, ‘those dogs have a higher status than I.’ ”32
Colonial officers took more drastic steps to reassert their authority. In 
the SILC camps men amassed items given them by Americans or salvaged 
from camps as troops left for other islands. While they were away at work, 
officers with police repeatedly ransacked their tents and seized clothing 
and equipment or formally burned their goods in a heap in front of them 
when they returned in the evening. Some of this property they had received 
not as gifts but as payment for working for Americans, but officers labeled 
their property “loot,” lumping it with goods stolen during the evacuation. 
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More items were taken when recruits returning home had their boxes 
searched and plundered. Some men began asking Americans to write notes 
with gifts or payments, to produce if they were accused of theft. On Gela in 
August 1945, SILC Lieutenant R Hosie and Captain “Viv” Hodgess (owner 
of a Guadalcanal plantation) carried out heavy-handed property confisca-
tion, in which US officers refused to participate. This led workers to down 
tools, and in an ensuing confrontation Hosie and Hodgess were beaten.33
Such shortsighted bullying inflamed resentments, and even decades 
later Malaitans evoked these events to highlight what they saw as British 
desires to keep them poor and powerless and to selfishly prevent their par-
taking of the wealth Americans seemed so willing to share. Confiscations 
made subsequent SILC recruitment more difficult, and William Daven-
port believed that Santa Cruz people did not take up Maasina Rule partly 
because their Labour Corps men had been allowed to return home with all 
of their collected goods. Judith Bennett suggested that the planter-officers 
were worried that men taking goods home might hamper getting labor-
ers in the future. Gülbün Çoker O’Connor noted that insult was added 
to injury when after the war Solomon Islanders “saw European residents 
making small fortunes on surplus and salvage materials left behind and, 
what is more, employing natives to do the salvaging.” Americans and oth-
ers destroyed much surplus, often in highly irresponsible ways. Even in 
places like the Western Solomons where fighting had wrecked gardens and 
villages, men who had risked their lives fighting the Japanese watched as 
badly needed food, goods, and building materials, forbidden to them, were 
burned or buried.34
American political influence went beyond simple kindness. Again, some 
US soldiers openly incited Malaitans to rebel. This was sometimes sponta-
neous; veterans fondly narrated to me episodes of Americans castigating 
SILC officers with streams of obscenities for ordering Islanders about. They 
particularly remember Bengough’s confrontations with Americans when 
he tried to segregate them from Solomon Islanders, and especially in mid-
1943 when he accused some of giving Malaitans guns: “They were shouting 
at each other,” remembered Molaina‘o, “and the American said we might 
need the guns to fight the Japanese if the war went badly. Later Bengough 
left and said he would be back in two weeks, but he never returned and we 
heard that he died. We figured the Americans had killed him and blamed it 
on the Japanese.” Although Bengough in fact died when the Japanese shot 
down a plane in which he was a passenger, the supposition indicates the 
degree of antagonism that Islanders sensed between some Americans and 
Protectorate officers.35
Other Americans spent long hours talking with Malaitans about their low 
status. In 1987 Fifi‘i told me of weekly Sunday meetings where he and oth-
ers, including future Maasina Rule leaders Nori and Nono‘oohimae, were 
“taught” by American friends, who advised them to stand up for themselves, 
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put forward leaders, strike, collect their own taxes, and make demands on 
the British or even eject them. “The way the government is,” they were told, 
“if you just sit and do nothing, if they see that you are weak, they’ll just look 
at you as if you were one of their knives, or one of their axes.” Dehumanizing 
images of Islanders used as tools or treated like dogs would become a main-
stay of Maasina Rule oratory. Wa‘ii‘a worked with Nori and Nono‘oohimae 
at “Matanikoa No. 3” on Guadalcanal and recalled long hours conversing 
with an American named “Mr. Gemo,” who told them: “Your villages are 
not in good health, you are sleeping with pigs and dogs. . . . We were like you 
people [ie, before US independence]; whatever development we wanted to 
do the government would put us in prison. But we did not give up. . . . If we 
Americans had come here first, your country would be well off these days, 
your towns would be like ours today.” Some soldiers told Islanders that the 
United States might retain its new island bases after the war.36
Most of these Americans were of low rank, and many Europeans attrib-
uted their criticisms of the colonial system to their being bounders, or 
ignorant, illiterate hillbillies; as missionary Charles Fox put it, they “naively 
imagined that if you gave a race of head-hunters immediate independence 
they would at once become a good and democratic people.” Belshaw, how-
ever, concluded “from personal experience” that the American influence 
was part of a conspiracy by officers hoping to “prepare the way” for military 
control after the war. In actual fact, the US Command tried to stop troops 
from fraternizing with locals. This mostly failed on Guadalcanal and Gela, 
but later camps elsewhere were fenced, and several American veterans told 
me these kept them from meeting any Islanders. The US Command also 
supplied BSIP authorities with intelligence on Islanders’ political contacts 
with Americans.37
Previously, few Malaitans had ever been allowed to approach whites casu-
ally, ask them personal questions, or investigate what they were really like. 
Many took advantage of this novel familiarity to become ethnographers, 
interviewing American informants about their beliefs, homes, and lives, 
and many stereotypes about whites were exploded. Non-Christians took 
heart in finding that many Americans made no pretension of religiosity, 
while both Catholics and Protestants were pleased to meet Americans with 
like affiliations—in some churches, US soldiers were the first whites ever to 
participate in services. Garrett notes that soldiers socialized across denomi-
nations in ways uncommon on Malaita.38
The net result of the American presence was a general undermining of 
the prewar racial status quo; the average soldier did not know about it and 
many were unconcerned with maintaining it, and this doomed attempts 
by SILC officers to sustain it. In many ways, then, for Malaitans among the 
troops, and those who heard their stories back home, Americans suggested 
new possibilities, which were widely discussed in meetings held to plan for 
action after the war.
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We Must Be Willing to Die for the Red Cross
After the strikes, the first organized resistance activity to emerge from the 
war formed around collections of funds to present to the American Red 
Cross. This interests us as a nascent form of more effective political actions 
soon to follow. Islanders had already heard of the Red Cross. In 1917, Santa 
Isabel people “donated” over £200 to the war effort, which was given to 
the British Red Cross, and William Bell and other officers were pressured 
to collect Red Cross donations during that war. Whether Isabel donations 
were voluntary I do not know, but Acting Resident Commissioner Frederick 
Barnett the year before commanded Shortland Islanders to contribute. The 
International Red Cross was only established in the Solomons in 1951, but 
in 1939 European women there had formed a branch, which soon received 
nearly 300 donations from a north Malaita collection organized by head-
men Maekali and Ba‘etalua.39
Beginning in early 1943, former headman Oliver Alogobu of Gela and 
George Kabini of Kwarade in Lau separately gathered “Red Cross dona-
tions” from SILC members on Gela and Savo. Kabini, a former constable 
and a survivor of the 1927 attack on Bell’s party, had a Gela wife and lived 
in the east of that island by the Sandfly Passage. Riufaa of Kwaio told me in 
1996 that about this time he and other Malaitans made similar collections 
on Gela, giving each contributor a receipt. The government had tangled 
with Alogobu before: Sandars had dismissed him as Big Gela’s headman, 
for adultery. Hogbin and Malaitan Sergeant Major Steven Sipolo investi-
gated the Red Cross matter for the government, and Hogbin reported that 
Alogobu had been “the popular choice for the office and had an immense 
following,” and that locals told him that but for the dismissal “there would 
have been no thought of approaching the Americans.” Hogbin recom-
mended that Alogobu be either reappointed or banished to another island 
to stifle his activities. Around this time Islanders gave food, money, and 
curios to US officers at Tulagi, and Hogbin told the new resident commis-
sioner, Owen Noel, that these were meant as “evidence of goodwill” or as a 
“bribe,” and were part of a general movement, the thrust of which he said 
was: “We don’t want the government back at Tulagi,” and “The Americans 
must stay.” This was more than crude bribery; people wanted to institute an 
exchange relationship with Americans, one that would indeed entail their 
replacing the British. Hogbin suspected, rightly, that similar activities were 
underway on Savo, and there were also connections to Isabel, Guadalcanal, 
and Malaita. Exactly which Red Cross collections were linked, and how, is 
unknown, but several proceeded independently. Police raids on Gela con-
fiscated documents and American flags, and Sipolo arrested Alogobu, who 
was released with a warning. Officers forced him to redistribute funds and 
apparently asked the US Command to do so as well, which caused unhap-
146 Chapter 4
piness among donors. Sipolo later testified, “The Nggela natives were never 
the same again. The movement had changed them. Henceforward they 
never welcomed Government Officers as before when on tour.” Collection 
efforts continued, and in December 1945 Belshaw discovered on Gela a list 
of 3,318 north Malaitan names “in support of American Red Cross,” and 
the next month Kabini, now back home in Lau, was arrested for “spreading 
false reports and bringing government authority into contempt.”40
It is clear that “Red Cross” labeled political ideas more complex than sim-
ply giving money to Americans. We do not know how people came to link the 
Red Cross with American intentions, and the connection was also obscure 
to the many Malaitan contributors. Malaitan Officer Wilfred Marquand was 
told that the misunderstanding originated when gifts were proffered to an 
American officer, and he, missing their political significance, told contribu-
tors that he would forward them to the Red Cross. Many contributors did 
grasp that the money was to help children of Americans killed or others in 
need, but they also hoped for reciprocity after the war, and even decades 
later some wondered what became of their donations. To Malaitans, sincere 
charity and expectation of reciprocity are not incongruous—that those you 
help will later help you is a basic moral precept of gift exchange. We will 
see in chapter 7 that during Maasina Rule many Malaitans nurtured hopes 
that Americans would help them by replacing or driving out the British and 
becoming their benefactors, sometimes stoked by rumors that they were 
about to arrive. As Lamont Lindstrom wrote of Tannese similarly seeking 
American help in the New Hebrides, Malaitans were “a group of clients in 
search of a patron,” and based on their wartime experiences, Americans 
seemed the obvious choice. Such hopes became an important motivator for 
some and helped to energize movement activities.41
During 1944 and 1945, Maasina Rule activities were being organized in 
‘Are‘are and starting to spread, and though it seems Red Cross activities 
never challenged the movement in the south, in other places they were stron-
ger and sometimes in direct opposition to it.42 For example, Tome Wale anisia 
of ‘Aoke Island in Langalanga recounted to me how John Toliole—later 
arrested for Federal Council movement actions—had collected £1 per man 
and told them that joining the Red Cross “means you can’t join this Maasina 
Rule. Everyone must belong to the Red Cross now. We must be committed to 
it, all around Malaita, we must be willing to die for it.” As late as mid-1946, a 
Red Cross faction rivaled Maasina Rule in Langalanga, but in most places Red 
Cross activities had by late 1945 been absorbed into the larger movement.43
The War Years on Malaita: Government Control Slips Away
Though Malaita was spared most horrors of battle, the war’s impact was 
nonetheless profound across the island. Officers instructed many coastal 
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people to relocate into the mountains, while others went on their own, 
abandoning villages, pigs (or killing and eating the pigs), and often gar-
dens. Many spent miserable months living in makeshift jungle houses with-
out fires at night. Today, people recall acute shortages of store goods, and 
Fifi‘i cited this as a reason SILC men hoarded clothing. While Widdy and 
colleagues were burning confiscated garments on Guadalcanal, Sandars 
worried that Malaitans were “desperately short of clothing.”44
In some areas, SILC over-recruiting caused suffering. The government 
tried to limit recruits to 7 percent of the total population, based on a shaky 
precedent from New Guinea labor rules, but they calculated this by entire 
islands, not individual communities. Overall, the number absent from 
Malaita was said to be less than half of those employed on prewar planta-
tions, but the burden was distributed unequally, especially in the north. 
Hogbin, serving as a “temporary district officer” and Defence Force cap-
tain, spent September and October of 1943 there, assisted by Headman 
Maekali, conducting a government study on reestablishing native courts 
and councils. He reported that recruiting had left only 5 to 10 percent of 
young men at home, and many older men were also gone because prewar 
restrictions on married men departing alone were not now enforced. Local 
men working on a radar base near Malu‘u further depleted that area’s food 
when they received insufficient rations. With few men left to clear new gar-
dens, a dismal sweet potato harvest, and a severe influenza epidemic, peo-
ple went hungry. The government had to issue rations to some families, but 
these were inadequate. Things got so bad that women marched on ‘Aoke to 
demand that their men be returned. Such hardships began to undermine 
SILC recruiting, as Sandars discovered while circumnavigating Malaita in 
mid-1943, reporting, “I have made numerous inquiries as to whether any-
one wishes to sign on for the Labour Corps—and I do not think that I could 
have recruited a section anywhere.”45 On Guadalcanal, too, where Bennett 
told of similar privations, and many people had suffered from the fight-
ing, men refused Viv Hodgess’s attempts to recruit them to the SILC when 
he circled the island that December. They said they were needed at home 
to work family gardens. Reporting to Noel, Hodgess derided their “feeble 
excuses,” an ironic word choice given his own estimates that Guadalcanal’s 
population was “65% emaciated, and 10% sick or maimed.” Headman and 
war hero Sale Vuza forbade people from Tasimboko, east of today’s Honi-
ara, to join the SILC without higher wages.46
Some groups on Malaita enjoyed intermittent economic benefits from 
war-related projects in their areas. On Cape Astrolabe near Malu‘u, a New 
Zealand radar base was built using local labor, and 50 local men guarded 
it. Locals also sold thatch and other items for American use on Guadalca-
nal, as did people in ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita, who sold an estimated 
400,000 thatch slats in all. Government officials, partly in hopes of limiting 
American contact and influence, coordinated on Malaita several schemes 
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in which they acted as middlemen to sell curios, vegetables, or thatch to the 
troops. By the time the war moved north and most Malaitans had returned 
home, many thousands of American dollars were held on the island.47
Officers later told of how the government kept control of Islanders dur-
ing the war, albeit at times only through headmen. In places like Isabel and 
parts of Makira problems were few, but the war seriously damaged the gov-
ernment’s position on Gela, Savo, Santa Cruz, and areas of Guadalcanal, 
and especially on Malaita.48 Throughout the war there was a relatively large 
European presence in parts of Malaita; during the Guadalcanal fighting 
Marchant and his party hid in the Kwara‘ae mountains, Bengough was at 
‘Aoke, Bishop Baddeley toured the north, and other missionaries were in 
west ‘Are‘are, and at Fauaabu, Kwai, and around the Tae Passage in Lau 
Lagoon. Yet for the government all was not well on the island; just as it 
had lost its hold over Malaitans in the Labour Corps, it no longer con-
trolled much of Malaita, most strikingly in parts of ‘Are‘are and Kwaio that 
of necessity had been ignored for well over a year. After his first postwar 
Malaita tour in September 1943, Sandars gave a grim assessment: “In Ari-
ari, where intensive administration was attempted, by means of stationing 
a Cadet officer at the bush camp of Haumatana, things have gone to rack 
and ruin. The ‘Houra’ or burial feast custom has flourished. . . . The whole 
social structure, always flimsy, appears to be even more so than before. I had 
to deal with an astonishing number of cases of men who had cast aside their 
wives and taken others.”49
Sandars saw similar if less severe problems on Small Malaita, but he 
found the greatest changes farther north: “Eastern Kwaio, with the excep-
tion of Uru, is in a bad and dangerous condition. I recently spent a week 
working at Uru, Sinarago and Oloburi. The last two named sub-districts are 
in a very bad way. In fact I was told on two occasions that they want no more 
‘Government Law.’ And on many occasions in the past couple of years they 
have taken the law into their own hands. Murders are the order of the day. 
These disturbances are chiefly due to two causes. Robbery with violence 
ending in death and then the demanding of a native fine (totona) by the 
injured party which, if not paid to great excess leads to further murder or 
fighting. . . . These last two years have put Koio back where it was when I 
knew it in 1929.” Sandars described Sinalagu District Headman Sirifa as 
“useless,” condoning violence, and “afraid of the people,” and urged that 
he be dismissed and replaced with Assistant District Headman Anifelo, but 
this was not done. Of other Malaita headmen, Hogbin wrote, “All are dis-
satisfied and [some are] contemplating resignation.” He attributed this to 
their wage, which was still on par with plantation labor despite tremendous 
demands on their time. Sandars blamed the state of affairs on “contact with 
the more irresponsible elements of the U.S. forces” and pervasive rumors 
that Americans intended to take over the islands.50
Kwaio I have spoken with at length do not remember this period as one 
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of anarchy, though there were several murders there. Kwaio leader ‘Elota in 
his autobiography recalled the lack of options most Malaitans faced in such 
cases, illustrating this with the killing of an old man by a lunatic named 
Meke ‘Ala‘ota: “Headman Sirifa wanted to arrest ‘Ala‘ota for murder. But 
that was the time the Japanese had invaded Guadalcanal and destroyed the 
government capital at Tulagi. If Sirifa had arrested ‘Ala‘ota, what would he 
have been able to do with him? What court would he have taken him to?”51
Charles Fox later recalled the tense atmosphere around the Tae Lagoon 
in Lau: “It was all a time of confusion, with wild rumors flying about, and 
the truth impossible to discover. For the first time for years I saw every Mela-
nesian armed again as in the old days. People went about in companies, as it 
was not safe to go alone; in two weeks there were half a dozen murders near 
where I was, people cut up on the roads just because everyone’s nerves were 
on edge.” There were obviously reasons beyond “edgy nerves” for the four 
killings in the north by mid-1944—three in To‘abaita, one in Langalanga 
(none in Lau)—and Fox may have suffered from nerves more than Malai-
tans, but in all 13 people were killed on Malaita in 1943. Sandars deemed 
the situation serious enough that he asked for and was granted special judi-
cial powers, and he quickly tried and hanged four men, the Protectorate’s 
first executions since 1935.52
Some missionaries reported that their Malaitan work slowed (to a full 
stop in places) and also noted a growing “attitude problem.” The SSEM’s 
K E Griffiths lamented, “It is going to take time and effort to get control of 
the natives and get them back to where they were,” and quoted the Pacific 
Islands Native Welfare Association publication “The Pacific Islander—After 
the War What?”: “Now into their life there has come the soldier who is 
more happy-go-lucky, and in whom the Islanders sense an irresponsibility 
and familiarity such as they have not hitherto known. There is a real danger 
lurking in this newfound semi-equality and irresponsibility. To the Islanders 
it will appear as the birth of a new era and it seems reasonably certain that 
they will not again willingly submit to the same European dominance.”53
To add to government problems, district officers, recently unhappy at 
the dearth of SILC recruits, were soon worried more about the flood of 
SILC returnees—more than 1,000 in the second quarter of 1945 alone—
many of whom were spreading messages of discontent. Almost a year after 
Sandars’s first postwar tour, District Officer David Trench visited Kwaio and 
found there was still “not a good atmosphere” and concluded: “Undoubt-
edly recent lack of control has put the place back a lot and there seems to 
be no authority left in the bush.”54 One should read such reports cautiously, 
especially those depicting leaderless decadence and fighting, since most 
Europeans expected to find chaos after a period without their supervision. 
But the government was indeed losing control and would not regain it for 
many years, and Europeans would never get Malaitans “back to where they 
were.” What would emerge in the postwar environment was not anarchy but 
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a great Malaita-wide political movement determined to bring about radical 
social change.
The Promotion and Refusal of Postwar Native Administration
The war left the Protectorate in shambles. A Western Pacific High Com-
mission press release later summarized the situation: “Administration 
buildings had been wrecked, coconut plantations were derelict; plantation 
owners and the trading community had left the country, and the shipping 
link with Australia had disappeared. The native population was unsettled, 
little evidence of the British administration remained. . . . The problem was 
thus not to start from scratch, but considerably below it.” At the same time, 
important changes were taking place in London, expressed in postwar poli-
cies and objectives emanating from the Colonial Office. A critical notion 
put to the fore was that of trusteeship: “dependent peoples” had a right 
to eventual self-government (though not necessarily independence), and 
colonial administrations were obligated to guide and financially support 
them toward that goal. This shift had begun just before the war reached 
the Solomons with enactment of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act of 1940, which directed that colonized territories no longer had to fully 
support themselves. In the postwar Solomons this meant there would be 
money for reconstruction and development, though the Protectorate stood 
near the end of the line to receive funds.55
Even so, a policy of gradualism envisioned very long periods of tutelage 
as essential in some cases, particularly in Melanesia.56 Julian Huxley and 
Phyllis Deane summarized the model: “The British Colonies have often 
been described as a constitutional procession, each advancing in its own 
way and at its own pace toward the goal of responsible self-government 
to which it is the avowed policy of the United Kingdom Government to 
guide them. The position of each colony in the procession is determined 
by a number of factors in its political framework.” Other factors ran deeper 
than politics, as a former high commissioner, Harry Luke, explained by 
pointing to Gilbertese who could “lead full, communal and happy lives on 
their sunny, open, breeze-swept strips of coral, speaking the same language 
as their neighbors and free from the isolation, the fears and the depressing 
tabus that darken the lot of so many Melanesians.”57
Solomon Islanders were to find their political aspirations stymied by 
such crude stereotypes, remarkably unchanged since the nineteenth cen-
tury. In the chapters that follow, we will examine in detail the Maasina Rule 
movement that began its rise in 1944 and 1945, within which Malaitans set 
out to pursue their own course. But first we need to look at the efforts of 
BSIP officers to initiate these gradualist policies at the same time that the 
movement was forming, and how Malaitan responded to them.
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Government Social Services: Education and Medicine
By the 1940s, the Solomons was an obvious straggler in the great constitu-
tional procession and was becoming an embarrassment to the British. Rec-
ognition that the government had badly neglected social development was 
evident in the circulation of an anecdote later related by Malaita’s District 
Commissioner Stanley Masterman: “Just before the first Munich, Hitler, 
when told that he could not have the Cameroons back because he was not 
fit to govern backward people, retorted ‘What have you done about edu-
cation in the Solomons?’ ” The most glaring failure was indeed in educa-
tion, followed closely by medical services. They are important to this history 
because, for Malaitans, by the 1940s both had become highly politicized. 
Like the Fallowes movement, Maasina Rule would soon be demanding 
schools and doctors, and Malaitans would often cite their absence when 
refusing to cooperate with the government.58 “They wanted their freedom,” 
said Titiuru, “to be equal with the whites, and they wanted schools—the 
government didn’t provide any, only the missions, and that was mostly reli-
gious schools, just the Bible.” As in many colonies, impoverished prewar 
administrations delegated both medical and educational services primar-
ily to the staffs and budgets of the Christian missions. Moorhouse’s 1929 
report had advised against upgrading education, and anyway the Great 
Depression dashed any inclinations to do so.59
The conditions of mission schools varied widely into the 1940s; many on 
Malaita were of poor quality and their curricula excluded whole realms of 
knowledge thought unsuitable or dangerous for Melanesians. Bell thought 
the schools offered little education, and Bengough in 1938 could still write, 
“Enrollment in school cannot be regarded as a criterion for literacy. Many 
natives enrolled in Mission schools are unable to read or write.” Moreover, 
most offered nothing to the majority of Malaitans who were not Chris-
tian. Still, during the 1930s the government, while recognizing that mis-
sion schools were “from an educational point of view . . . quite inadequate,” 
relied on them to “satisfy the craving of the natives to learn.” During Maa-
sina Rule Allan wrote, “Natives have become disillusioned with mission edu-
cation and this has been one of the reasons for the break with the European 
missionaries who are now regarded to have hoodwinked the people and 
withheld the ‘proper’ education or in the pidgin expression ‘skul b’long 
world.’ ” Many Europeans openly opposed serious schooling for Islanders 
because, in Fox’s words: “They think it will make the native more sophisti-
cated, spoil him, as they say.” As Ariel Sisili put it in a 1949 political mani-
festo, “We have never had the Whiteman’s best or ever taught or shown 
anything above the ordinary. These has always been holding back from the 
native in case he may see his position.”60
By the early 1940s, the craving for schooling had only intensified, and 
the postwar period brought “bitter native demands for education,” which 
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Solomon Islanders saw to be “the key to future well-being.” Sandars wrote 
of Malaitans, “The whole population feels the need for [education of the 
young], and the elders feel that if necessary, they must make large sacrifices 
to obtain it.” After touring neighboring Makira in early 1946, one officer 
reported that the people were “Fanatics about education and accuse gov-
ernment of lack of help, since they help the government by paying taxes.” 
Some whites demeaned or brushed aside Islanders’ desire to learn as based 
on a superstition that European knowledge was magical. In the meanwhile, 
the resident commissioner sought permission to bring in Fijians to serve as 
government clerks, typists, and cashiers.61
Beyond infuriating Malaitans, failure to provide education meant the 
government had never cultivated an institutional domain within which to 
instill colonial ideology in young people. Resident Commissioner Francis 
Ashley had explicitly rejected the idea that education could achieve this. 
While there was no medium for fostering effective European hegemony, by 
the 1940s channels for the spread of rebellious ideas were flowing fast, and 
as resistance heated up officers yearned for a way to impart their plans and 
promises to an alienated and mostly illiterate populace.62
Officers knew they lacked the expertise to create a school system. At the 
end of 1945, Sandars worried that if no government educational expert was 
immediately provided, officers might be forced to turn to the missions for 
advice, which he felt “should be avoided at all costs.” Yet not until 1947, 
at the height of Maasina Rule, did the Protectorate employ a director of 
education, and he soon resigned.63 In 1945, Sandars and colleagues busily 
tried to divert frustrations with the government into “reasonable channels” 
by counseling Malaitans to focus on education and erecting hospitals and 
dispensaries. Sandars expected these could and should be paid for not by 
the government but by local taxes, and in December 1945 Sandars told 
Kwara‘ae to use money that Maasina Rule had collected to build a school to 
teach farming, carpentry, and other crafts, and Roy Davies later called their 
failure to do so “a great tragedy.” Two days later Sandars told Malu‘u people 
they should use their Maasina Rule money to build a hospital. There is no 
indication that either man suggested to Malaitans where trained teachers 
or hospital staff, or school supplies, or medicine would come from. In any 
case, Malaitans, who for two decades had complained at receiving noth-
ing for their taxes, balked at this suggestion, as later expressed in a Maa-
sina Rule communication: “They say medicine is something for the work 
of the people but we have paid for it already in the taxes.” No doubt some 
remembered when the head tax was first imposed in the 1920s and offi-
cers followed High Commissioner Cecil Rodwell’s instructions on how to 
explain its necessity: “The resulting benefit to the natives of law and order, 
development and education, should be brought home to them on every 
opportunity. They should be made to feel that by paying this tax they are 
taking a share in a great work for their own ultimate benefit.” Just after 
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Bell was assassinated, missionary Walter Ivens wrote to Secretary of State 
to the Colonies Leopold Amery, “When first imposed it was stated that the 
purpose of the tax was to provide money for the proper medical care of 
the natives,” and he counseled that erection of a hospital on Malaita would 
“go far to remove the grievance felt in the matter of the Poll Tax.” The year 
before, Ivens had urged the secretary to direct that all head tax money 
be spent on health services, to help reverse population declines, and Bell 
himself argued for appointment of a medical officer (and for education). 
Rodwell’s successor, Eyre Hutson, privately blamed Bell’s death on these 
broken promises. He was wrong, but his supposition exposes higher-up 
knowledge of Malaitan aspirations and their betrayal.64
BSIP medical services had always been feeble, and what little Malaitans 
did get came, again, mostly from missions, particularly the Anglicans and 
Adventists. The government at times contributed help with money and 
drugs, though sometimes reluctantly and resentfully due to a fear of being 
outshone. They also worried that missionaries might treat only their own 
flocks or demand donations for care. In 1928, the Anglicans had received a 
£2,000 donation to found the Hospital of the Epiphany at Fauaabu, 24 kilo-
meters north of ‘Aoke, and, soon after, a 50-hectare leper colony nearby, 
which received small government subsidies and donations from New Zea-
land and Australia and was apparently run well until the war and after.65
Adventists had long deployed medical services as an “entering wedge” 
for evangelization: “Missionaries would also be health workers and the con-
nection between health and salvation remained inextricably linked.” They 
maintained this strategy in the Solomons, and on Malaita they opened a 
hospital at Kwailabesi in Lau in 1936, but the mission had only a small pres-
ence on the island before the war. The SSEM’s minimal medical services 
were, in Hilliard’s words, “mere palliative measures.” Medical policy was 
also stymied by church rivalries. Ross Innes, designing an anti-leprosy plan 
for Malaita in 1937, was dismayed when Anglican doctor Clifford James told 
him, “One mission is not likely to co-operate with another, or with the Gov-
ernment, or with the Mission to lepers in any united anti-leprosy work.”66
No government medical system was instituted on Malaita before 1930, 
though doctors at times toured with officers and most officers treated peo-
ple when and as they could. One senior medical officer told Sandars, “You 
can’t make bricks without straw and you can’t run a medical service with-
out funds.” We have seen that the prewar government blamed many health 
problems on local cultures and therefore tried to impose hygienic rules 
for penning pigs, to consolidate hamlets into ordered villages, and to sup-
press cultural practices deemed unhealthy. In 1931, the Protectorate’s first 
native medical practitioner, George Bogese, was posted to ‘Aoke to open a 
leaf-house “hospital” for people of that area. It provided outpatient dress-
ings and injections for yaws and later admitted some inpatients (eg, 268 in 
1938). But this did little for Malaitans elsewhere, and in 1940 the medical 
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staff for well over 40,000 Malaitans consisted of four “dressers” (minimally 
trained medical workers) and a native medical practitioner, with another 
practitioner and a dresser seconded to the ‘Are‘are population project.67
Malaitans had valued European medicines since the labor trade, but 
from 1928 until the war their potential was demonstrated dramatically by 
the stunning success of campaigns against yaws (perhaps 60 percent of 
Malaitans were or had been infected) and hookworm (85 percent of Solo-
mon Islanders infected), which were funded by Levers and then by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. In 1928 alone, some 36,000 people received injec-
tions for yaws, many from medical officer Charles Gordon White. Barley 
called this campaign “one of the greatest returns which the British Admin-
istration has found itself able to give to the native people of the Protec-
torate in justification of its having assumed control of their destiny and 
welfare.” Lambert worked with the project and wrote of Malaitans: “The 
news had spread to them that the white doctors jabbed them with a needle. 
They were all crazy for the treatment.” He also recollected, “Our needles 
wore out and our fingers grew stiff from puncturing the skin of hundreds 
who applied, clamoring for ‘neela.’ ” Elsewhere some feared and fled injec-
tions, but “Malaita men loved the needle—sick or well, they demanded it.” 
Women, too, flocked to touring doctors. Ellen Wilson recounted, “Patients 
with feet half eaten away crawled miles to receive an injection. Mothers 
brought their babies with their little faces disfigured and repulsive, and, lo! 
The sores healed and disappeared, and the tiny children recovered their 
roundness of limb and childish beauty.”68
During Maasina Rule, Norman Deck, ostracized by his flock, advised 
withholding medicine as an excellent way to blackmail movement follow-
ers: “I again suggest that if the Government, and all the Missions, were to 
withhold all medical amenities from members of the Marching Rule, but 
make them available to those outside the movement this would have a deep 
effect, and would probably bring the offenders to heel quicker than any 
other administrative act. I think all missions would agree to this if asked, 
but I am not sure about the Roman Mission. The people would probably 
say ‘no matter,’ but this would only be a pose; they would really feel it very 
much, for they greatly value medicines.” Even at the height of Maasina Rule 
hostility toward government, Malaitans at times welcomed touring native 
medical workers, despite their police escorts, though at other times they 
were rebuffed.69
In 1947 the British government reported to the United Nations that, 
in Linden Mander’s summation, “the Protectorate, with a population of 
94,965 had only two medical officers [one fewer than in the 1920s] and 
eleven Native Medical Practitioners trained in Fiji. The government doc-
tors per thousand of population amounted to .02, hospital beds per thou-
sand 6.31; no staff and no organizations existed to promote social welfare.” 
Many Malaita areas would enjoy no regular health services until the Malaita 
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Council began to take action in the 1950s, and some populous mountain 
regions have none to this day.70
In October 1945, district commissioners Alexander Waddell, David 
Trench, and Frederick Bentley, all Malaita veterans, drafted a relatively pro-
gressive five-year plan to start developing the Protectorate’s infrastructure 
and its educational and medical services, as well as a more advanced and 
participatory native administration. Their assessment of education’s near 
future was bleak: because there were no teachers, people would have to 
remain dependent on mission schools. They suggested that over the five 
years a maximum of 60 Solomon Islanders be sent to Fiji for education. 
They hoped an education department and teacher training might then 
be started, followed later by general education, hopefully “in one genera-
tion.” They also proposed that the government give more money to mission 
schools on the condition that they include “a minimum amount of secular 
teaching.”71
The latter point raised its own problems. Missions and government had 
skirmished for years over the proper balance of worldly and religious con-
tent in curricula, and this conflict now escalated as the postwar government 
began showing more interest in education. Missionaries, Belshaw argued, 
were “well aware that it is through education that they retain such hold on 
the native people as they have.” Deck had warned in the early 1930s that 
nonreligious education would produce “men of the agitator class, disobedi-
ent to authority,” and he explained to Ashley that his evangelical mission’s 
“aim was not to give education with a spiritual appendix as it were, but to 
teach the Word of God, incidentally teaching reading and writing in the 
process.” A decade later, the SSEM was asking its Australian “Prayer Part-
ners” to pray for Solomon Islanders, “That Satan with his devices may not 
be able to create a desire for education instead of the desire for spiritual 
things.” Others worried that government promotion of secular knowledge 
would, in Anglican Bishop Sydney Caulton’s words, create “a race of ‘clever 
devils’ to whom God is fiction or at best unnecessary.” Caulton objected to 
a 1949 education regulation draft on the grounds that “a mature legisla-
tion is being proposed for an immature people.” Reading such pronounce-
ments one senses that, apart from rival missions, many missionaries saw 
education as the greatest menace to God’s work. As Maasina Rule gained 
force, these same missionaries and many government officers, without hint 
of self-reflection, belittled its adherents as appallingly ignorant of the ways 
of the world.72
The Protectorate’s 1946 “Ten Year Plan of Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and Welfare” called for better social services but most important as a 
means to sustain an adequate workforce. The first goal was to improve diets 
with farming development: “The long-term results of this policy, lowering 
of infant mortality, increasing of adult efficiency and working capacity, and 
economy of effort deriving from improved methods and tools, would all 
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tend to increase the quantity and improve the quality of labour available 
for purposes other than subsistence farming. Education and Medical Policy 
will be directed to the same ends.” Four years later Malaita’s Officer Mar-
quand wrote, “The government also intends to carry out a programme of 
education, but here they are thinking of the education of more clerks and 
tradesmen who can keep their machine running.” During Maasina Rule, 
particularly after mass arrests began, education would come to a halt as 
Malaitans rebuffed both missionary and government help and most schools 
ceased to operate.73
Given the years of unfulfilled government promises of education and 
medicine, and the determination of many Europeans to obstruct practical 
schooling, it is little wonder Belshaw observed from his exposure to Maasina 
Rule in its formative stages a widespread belief, particularly among Malai-
tans, that “The European is with-holding advance from the native. . . . This 
means that European ends are conceived as being necessarily incompatible 
with native ends, the basis of mutual confidence is removed, and it is dif-
ficult for policy to be effected.”74
Councils and Courts Revisited
As the war moved off to the north, discussions of the need for social services 
continued, but the government, unsettled by discontent on Malaita and 
elsewhere, was preoccupied with quickly establishing native political struc-
tures and its own presence in the new capital of Honiara. On 17 May 1944, 
Acting High Commissioner Philip Mitchell presided over a conference of 
district commissioners at Tenaru Camp on Guadalcanal, and in what Hog-
bin called “a momentous step” they decided to revive and accelerate Ash-
ley’s and especially Marchant’s prewar plans to develop native councils and 
courts, the beginnings of which had mostly collapsed during the fighting. 
This led to a 1945 Native Courts Regulation and eventually a new Native 
Administration Regulation. Seven nascent councils were already operating 
on Malaita (at Malu‘u, Fo‘odo, Makwanu, Kwarade, Anoano, Lau, and Lan-
galanga), and by year’s end seven more were established or being organized 
(at Fiu, ‘Aoke, Kwaimela, ‘Ataa, Bina, Onepusu, and Su‘u). Areas with no 
councils continued to be administered as before, through headmen.75
A first order of business for these councils was to resolve “what is and 
what is not true native custom, and how much of it should be retained or 
modified or discarded as no longer applicable.” Councils around Malaita 
were instructed to discuss this and record the results in drafted codes. As 
before the war, the plan was that these codes would form a substantive basis 
for native court rulings.76 Just a few months earlier, Sandars had declared 
establishment of courts on Malaita “out of the question” and, according to 
Hogbin, he reduced the powers of even the existing Malu‘u court. But in 
September 1943 Sandars fell ill and left again, and under Trench, Bentley, 
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and then Michael Forster, experimental courts were initiated in areas with 
councils; the plan was to establish them under the new regulations. The 
system was devised so that “[t]he Government, through its administrative 
officers, will be able to keep a strict control, if required, on the activities of 
Native Administration, and at the same time encourage the development of 
the idea of self-government.”77
In practice, both the officers and Malaitans saw courts and councils as 
tightly linked and at times synonymous—both were led by headmen, sub-
ject to overrule by the district commissioner, and usually made up of some 
of the same men. A native clerk was to keep court records, collect fines, 
and record births, deaths, and marriages, though finding suitably educated 
clerks was a persistent problem. Marquand noted that all native court cases 
were subject to review by the officer in charge “when he had time to do so, 
but, in most cases, the records were so badly kept by the nearly illiterate 
clerks that it was difficult for him to criticize.” In an innovation already 
standard practice in parts of Africa, councils were told they would soon 
be allowed small treasuries to hold court fees and fines for local use, to be 
spent under “careful supervision.” Treasuries would also receive as “fines” 
any compensations native courts awarded to Christians whose churches for-
bade their accepting them. In February 1945, the government drafted a 
new policy, modeled partly on the 1934 Tanganyika Native Tax Ordinance, 
that would, in future, allow some councils—starting as ever with Malu‘u—to 
fix a local tax, collect it, and decide how to spend it, subject to the resi-
dent commissioner’s approval. Further, defaulters would no longer be 
imprisoned.78
Native courts were now granted powers not only to decide “native cus-
tomary offenses, and award any native customary punishment [thought rea-
sonable],” but also to hear minor criminal cases and impose fines up to £25 
and sentences up to six-months’ hard labor, and small civil suits with a £50 
award limit. Despite growing resentment of government institutions, Malai-
tans needed no urging to settle their own cases; the 1945 Annual Report 
says their courts dealt with 405 people in civil cases (only six land disputes) 
and more than 600 on criminal charges (with a 95 percent conviction rate), 
against just 207 criminal cases heard by government courts.79
Notwithstanding the new powers being granted to courts and councils, 
district officers now faced men returning from the Labour Corps who 
looked on these bodies with scorn because they were government entities. 
As Forster later lamented, “The Government suffered a very serious loss 
of prestige. Its material resources, which prior to the war appeared to be 
not inconsiderable, by comparison with those of the armed forces, became 
microscopic. The Protectorate capital disappeared from Tulagi and, as far 
as the majority of natives is concerned, has been lost in the jungles of Gua-
dalcanal ever since. . . . The war set new criteria as to what constituted power 
and, by these criteria, the Government appeared to have little or none at 
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all. The loss of prestige suffered by the Government was shared by all white 
people whom they knew before the war.” The poll tax, officially suspended 
in early 1943, had not been reimposed, and Forster believed that Malai-
tans’ disdain could be traced to its absence and to the wartime absence of 
officers. Government remoteness was only accentuated as native courts and 
councils began to take on duties formerly carried out by touring officers.80
Malaitans were reacting to much more than the government’s policies, 
actions, and inaction—the war set new standards of dignity in their rela-
tions with white people and inspired new aspirations. Like other colonial 
subjects after World War II, Solomon Islanders felt that, having suffered and 
sacrificed to defend the empire, they now had an indisputable moral claim 
to higher status within it, and they refused to slip quietly back into their for-
mer demeaning roles. The power of humiliation to motivate political action 
is almost always underappreciated by those who inflict it, and Malaita was to 
prove a case in point. The collective war experience intensified and roiled 
shared resentments of prewar exploitation and degradation, and diverse 
groups who were once divided or even antagonistic now found common 
political ground. The colonists were seen to offer little toward meeting 
people’s raised expectations, and indeed it was presumed they would try to 
frustrate pursuit of them, as already manifest in, for example, government 
attempts to restrict their access to Americans and seizures of their gifts. 
Malaita’s new district commissioner, David Trench, reported a relentless 
theme: “The government does not do enough for us,” and said that even 
“amongst the more responsible natives” he met “some rather nebulous dis-
satisfaction.” At this time a particular metaphor for government became 
popular on the island: the banyan tree, which slowly encases another tree 
as if to care for and nurture it but eventually kills it.81
A further difficulty was that the two pillars of Malaita’s administration, 
Sandars and Bengough, were gone. Their replacements, Trench and For-
ster, had before the war served on Malaita for only four and nine months, 
respectively, and their relative inexperience handicapped their efforts to 
manage new courts and councils and monitor and counter growing dis-
content. In their favor, Trench had started courts on Guadalcanal and the 
Shortlands, and Forster in 1940 and 1941 toured ‘Are‘are to teach court 
procedures—some there later called him “the father of the ‘Are‘are Coun-
cil.” As described in chapter 2, Forster was already popular in the south for 
his kindness and displays of respect for local people and practices.82
The first SILC sections were returned to ‘Ataa in February 1944 under 
Kelebeti (or Gilbert, Giribiti, Fugui), an associate of Kabini of Red Cross 
fame, and the men brought “disturbing ideas” to an already unsettled situ-
ation. In June, European government workers were reportedly threatened 
with violence at Walande on Small Malaita, with an ‘Ataa man among the 
instigators.83 By the end of 1945, only 317 men were still in the Labour Corps, 
but most plantations were still not operating. This meant there were more 
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men living on Malaita than in many decades, and officers found this “over-
dose of young men with too much money and no desire to work . . . decid-
edly troublesome.” Many declared they would only return to plantations 
for £12 per month, a figure voiced in Fallowes’s meetings six years before. 
Returnees berated those who had dutifully maintained government “roads” 
during the war, and that work ceased.84
Officers were still finding little success in starting councils in most of 
southern Malaita, where people remained “somewhat unresponsive.” Of 15 
courts established by 1945, only three were in the south—at Anoano in 
west Kwaio and Su‘u and Onepusu in west ‘Are‘are—though two more were 
soon started, named “Western ‘Are‘are” and “Southern ‘Are‘are.”85 Enthu-
siasm in the south, and elsewhere on Malaita, was in fact declining, partly 
because most headmen were finding their close association with the gov-
ernment and its particular council plans a liability and became supporters 
of Maasina Rule, which by the end of 1945 had already spread throughout 
the island. There were still loyalists. Malaitans most loyal to the govern-
ment tended to be followers of headmen who had been relatively privileged 
under the prewar regime and whom officers allowed more power over their 
communities, such as Maekali at Malu‘u and Timi Kakalu‘ae in Lau (both 
former Bell constables). As Maasina Rule expanded, such men would find 
their power being wrested away by new and often younger leaders beyond 
their control. Fifi‘i later opined that these headmen opposed Maasina Rule 
because “[t]hey wanted only themselves to have power over the people, and 
put their interests above the people’s.” But headmen whom the govern-
ment had so favored were few; the archives are rife with officers’ comments 
about the perceived stupidity, incompetence, or disrepute of various head-
men, and many enjoyed little respect from either officers or the people. 
Thus most headmen had little to lose by working with or in some cases 
becoming leaders in Maasina Rule. Many did not see joining it to be a nec-
essarily antigovernment move. Later, in May 1948, Forster compiled a list 
of Malaita’s 52 headmen that identified all but eight as present or former 
Maasina Rule members, and Germond in February of that year estimated 
75 percent of headmen were still movement leaders or active supporters.86
But as I will explain in chapter 6, through 1944 and most of 1945 district 
officers carried on largely unaware of Maasina Rule’s early emergence and 
spread, and they blamed people’s lack of participation in the government’s 
native administration plans on either apathy or foolish contrariness. We 
have seen how much they depended on headmen for intelligence, and the 
fact that so many headmen joined the movement goes far toward explain-
ing government’s ignorance of it. The degree of officers’ isolation at this 
time is painfully clear in Forster’s reports advising that, with patience, coun-
cils might be gradually developed in the southern areas. These were written 
while that region’s people were busily organizing the very activities councils 
were expected to perform and much more, but within Maasina Rule.87
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Overall, Malaita’s revived native councils were weathering postwar 
changes poorly. Dissatisfaction with them even at the end of 1943 was 
“almost universal” among the “chiefs” that officers had appointed to coun-
cils and later placed on courts, and many headmen, too, were soon express-
ing unhappiness with both. Headmen who genuinely tried to lead obedient 
councils and courts, such as Maekali and Kakalu‘ae, Nat Salaimanu at Tae 
in Lau, and Tome Siru at Kwai, were widely resented, though even Maekali 
and Kakalu‘ae and later Siru dabbled in political activities outside of gov-
ernment auspices for a time, as we will see. Still, officers were determined 
to firmly educate Malaitans in participatory government and proper civic 
life. They instructed councils to report anyone who made trouble for them, 
and in November 1944 Trench asked permission to issue guns to assistant 
headmen to keep order during meetings, arguing, “In their present state 
of development, the courts and councils are liable occasionally to be some-
what turbulent and the presence of a man with a rifle might well have a 
sedative effect.”88
Like Ashley two decades before, officers hoped courts and councils 
would foster a Malaitan idea that they were now part of a government from 
which they had hitherto been excluded. But years of alienation were not 
so easily reversed, and despite their assigned emphasis on “custom” mat-
ters, Malaitans saw the bodies as British made and run. As Marquand later 
wrote, councils “enforced the wants of the Government which were not 
necessarily, and not often, the perceived wants of the people.” Even Maekali 
expressed this to Hogbin about the Malu‘u court he presided over: “The 
Court doesn’t belong to us: we never had Courts before: it’s a Government 
affair.”89
Bita Saetana (also called Falasi) of Kwao, near Sinalagu, in 1981 recalled 
an argument he had with Sandars a few months after Cadet Roy Davies 
appointed him a “chief” in February 1945: “I got to ‘Aoke and I said to 
‘Abaeata [Assistant Headman Anifelo], ‘Let’s the two of us ask the govern-
ment one thing: Why is it that we chiefs are only given tobacco and biscuits? 
When the district officers come that’s what they give us. How about a little 
cash for us, to go along with it?’ [When we asked] Mister Sandars he replied, 
‘But you’re a leader of your community! Who is going to pay you for that?’ 
I answered him like this: ‘If a headman goes to court, or he goes to break 
up a fight, we chiefs go along with him. If they kill him they are going to 
kill us too. Let’s have us some shillings.’ But Sandars said, ‘No. We don’t 
pay wages for you chiefs.’ So my chiefing finished right then and there at 
‘Aoke.” Such complaints highlight a dissonance between government and 
Malaitan views as to what “chiefs” and headmen could be or ought to be. 
Officers envisioned them as the people’s representatives, but as they came 
to understand, Malaitans, for so long barred from governance, considered 
most native officials, especially certain headmen, as at best government 
employees and at worst informants, stooges, or lackeys, and unsuitable lead-
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ers. This was still more palpable where headmen had made enemies by 
abusing their power.90
Among the loudest critics of courts and councils were mission teach-
ers, especially of the SSEM, who had for so long been rivals of the gov-
ernment and its servants. The new “native” institutions threatened to take 
away the administrative and judicial powers they had attained in Christian 
communities, especially after the wartime European exodus. SSEM teach-
ers as a group were among the most powerful Malaitans, often wielding 
more authority than headmen. They objected to many of the “chiefs” and 
“elders,” especially the non-Christian ones, being appointed to the new 
bodies.91
Many white missionaries, too, saw courts and councils as a threat, just as 
before the war they had instructed teachers to avoid taking disputes to the 
government. When Hogbin visited the north just after the war to study the 
state of native administration, he reported that white missionaries unani-
mously opposed native courts because, they argued, Malaitans were too 
ignorant and inexperienced to run them. At Malu‘u, which Bengough had 
called home to “some of the most vigorous and politically argumentative 
people on Malaita,” and where the Christian-government rivalry was oldest 
and most bitter, Headman Maekali, though an SSEM member, had pre-
vented appointment of teachers as council “elders.” In particular, he shut 
out an old enemy, Shem Irofa‘alu, who had succeeded Peter Abu‘ofa, one 
of the first Christian leaders on Malaita, as the area’s SSEM head. We will 
encounter Irofa‘alu again in chapter 7. Forster believed the root of prob-
lems at Malu‘u was SSEM teachers’ jealousy of Maekali’s power and anger 
that “he would not kow tow to their wishes.” While it seems church hostility 
to courts and councils was most fervent at Malu‘u, similar tensions were evi-
dent elsewhere, and some headmen who belonged to the SSEM, especially, 
found their positions awkward.92
Despite sharing Malaitan church teachers’ dislike for courts and coun-
cils, white missionaries returning to postwar Malaita, like colonial officers, 
found their positions much weakened. Partly this was due to teachers’ 
resolve not to surrender their wartime independence to either missionar-
ies or government schemes. But even before 1942, teachers’ resentment of 
their white bosses had been growing. Most important were complaints that 
missionaries—again, particularly those of the SSEM—refused to interact 
with Islanders as equals, provide them opportunity for advancement, or 
pay them enough (or sometimes anything) for their work. These were not 
trivial complaints; decades later Norman Deck, asked to cite a mistake the 
SSEM had made, responded, “Not paying teachers sufficiently. We were a 
faith mission and I thought that principle should be applied throughout. 
But sometimes the teachers hadn’t enough to live on.” This was a reason 
Maasina Rule adherents gave for boycotting SSEM missionaries along the 
east coast in 1948.93
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Through 1945, then, many Malaitans, Christian and not, showed little 
deference to the new councils or courts. Courts had no police (Trench’s 
rifles were not issued) and increasingly their rulings were being flouted. 
Their biggest handicap was that many people saw them as mere govern-
ment fronts. Sandars, who returned to replace Trench as district commis-
sioner in late 1945, misread the problem and vowed to “enhance their pres-
tige and authority by applying full weight of Government authority to back 
up proper decisions,” but he would soon change his tactics.94
Many Malaitans remained unsure as to how much autonomy native 
courts were being granted and, later, of the courts’ relationship to Maasina 
Rule. As the movement spread, people in a few places rejected headmen 
outright, and rival assemblies challenged their councils and courts. Other 
councils appeared to be functioning as instructed but had been absorbed 
into Maasina Rule as forums for Malaitans to plan their own administra-
tion.95 It often was unclear to either officers or Malaitans whether a par-
ticular council or court was the government’s or Maasina Rule’s, especially 
where headmen and members belonged to the movement. We shall see 
that officers gave ambiguous instructions as to how these various bodies 
should proceed.
Some headmen who had been effectively deposed pleaded explicitly or 
in effect for stern government counteraction, but their complaints were not 
acted on until later, when the government needed justification to repress 
the movement. Officers recognized that some unpopular headmen were 
inept, corrupt, or autocratic, but feared their removal might lead people to 
say the government had capitulated to Malaitan demands. So rather than 
lose apparent face they left them in place as the government’s primary rep-
resentatives among the people.96
Elsewhere in the southeast Solomons, efforts to set up councils were find-
ing mixed success. Len Barrow recounted how, at the end of 1945, big men 
of Arosi on Makira greeted councils with suspicion, while on Guadalcanal, 
Gela, and elsewhere on Makira, “The councils continued to develop with 
varying degrees of ambition, enthusiasm, muddle-headedness and down-
right indifference.” These were areas that quickly embraced Maasina Rule 
in 1945 and 1946.97
We will see that later, when officials grew more aware of Maasina Rule 
and its scope, they still hoped courts and councils would facilitate their 
agenda and at the same time diffuse growing discontent: “Not only is the 
immediate initiation of Native Authorities, however rudimentary, a pre-
requisite to social and political progress,” said the Protectorate’s “Ten Year 
Plan” in 1946, “but it is urgently necessary to provide this legitimate outlet 
for the aspirations aroused by the sudden and large scale contact with Euro-
pean and Negro troops of the United States Forces.” In August of that year, 
Resident Commissioner Noel spoke to native council representatives in 
‘Aoke: “Councils have been established by the Government so that you can 
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express your opinions and hear the views of the Government. It is there-
fore through these Councils that the views of the Marching Rule or any 
other movement should be expressed. The opinions of the council are con-
sidered by the District Commissioner, who will give a decision.” Noel also 
vowed, as did other officers, to take legal action against anyone obstructing 
government orders.98
Noel’s speech corroborated Maasina Rule critiques of the councils at 
this time, that they would neither allow communities any real control 
over their own affairs nor change the status quo. Perhaps for some it sup-
ported rumors then circulating that Americans, “hearing of the founding 
of Native Councils had told natives that this was merely a trick on the part 
of the British and that, as soon as the Americans had left, the British would 
destroy these Councils and act as they did before the war.” At all events, 
Noel warned High Commissioner Alexander Grantham, “I do not believe 
and I cannot advise that that which is now occurring is but a passing phase 
inevitable after war and will vanish sooner or later. The demands of the 
people are too genuine. . . . The Solomon Islander is bent on securing more 
benefits from Government than he was granted before the war.” Whatever 
the government now intended to offer, for most Malaitans it was much too 
little and far too late, and the government’s native administration plan was 
soon to become a dead letter.99
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Chapter 5
The Rise of Maasina Rule
Genesis and Spread
By late 1943, much of the southeast Solomons was rumbling with discon-
tent and political groups were forming. Although they shared many griev-
ances, their actions were as yet uncoordinated except as men interacted 
within the crucial setting of the Labour Corps, and in some places rival fac-
tions emerged. The need for a unifying leadership and platform was soon 
met by men from west ‘Are‘are, particularly Aliki Nono‘oohimae and Nori, 
who had been sergeant and corporal, respectively, of a Waisisi SILC sec-
tion. They had formed definite ideas about how Malaitans should proceed. 
Both spent a good deal of time talking with Americans, and Kwalafanai‘a of 
Kwaio later told Roger Keesing how Nori had gone around Camp Guadal-
canal telling people of his plans to organize politically back home, though 
many were skeptical.1
In September 1943 Nono‘oohimae began working to establish a council 
for southwest ‘Are‘are. He allied with Harisimae—who had been a feared 
strongman and passage master, and then, until 1934, a headman—and with 
Harisimae’s nephew Hoasihau (or Houasi‘au). Hoasihau had been a corpo-
ral in the armed constabulary and succeeded Harisimae as headman; he was 
a favorite of Sandars, who called him “a lion hearted fellow.” Older but still 
vigorous, Harisimae proved key in convincing senior men to join the new 
political work, and Nori and others later spoke of him as Maasina Rule’s 
founder. Years afterward, Nono‘oohimae dated Maasina Rule’s beginning 
to a January 1944 meeting at his own village of Arairau. On 25 January, the 
work was also taken up in east ‘Are‘are, at Takataka under big men Wai-
paro and Puahanikeni and Headman Aruhane. The earliest ‘Are‘are activi-
ties bore several names: “Level Meeting” (or “Leveling Meeting”), “Native 
Union Council,” and “Maasina Law,” and to the north people used “Council 
Union” (in Kwaio), or “Congress Union” (Langalanga). The Level Meeting 
name was said to indicate either a desire to establish equality with whites and 
Chinese or that all participants were to be as of a single mind.2
As 1944 progressed, “Maasina Rule” was adopted. Much ink has been 
spent on a marvelous diversity of explanations of the name. Its pronuncia-
tion varies across languages—“Maasing Rul” in Kwara‘ae, “Maasina Ruru” 
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in ‘Are‘are and Kwaio, “Marching Rule” in British—and movement scribes 
fashioned their own variants (eg, “Mercy Rule” or “Marcy Rule”). Among 
Europeans the name was to become a chameleon to various fantasies about 
the movement: “Marxian” or “Marx’s Rule,” or “Marxist Law,” with com-
munist agitators imagined lurking in Malaita’s mountains; eponymously as 
“Marchant’s Rule,” after that resident commissioner’s native administra-
tion scheme on Gela; or even “Basiana Rule” in honor of Bell’s assassin. 
Some said it derived from “martial law.” Most Europeans settled on “March-
ing Rule,” which Roy Davies said was derived from Forster’s mishearing 
of “Maasina.” It nicely conveyed the image of mindless regimentation and 
fanaticism that many attributed to the movement. Malaitans with their pro-
clivity for wordplay have also enjoyed naming games. Some say ruru meant 
“children,” expressing adherents’ newborn social status. Others have told 
me the movement was named after John Martin (at times pronounced 
“Maatina”), who commanded US troops as they prepared to depart the Sol-
omons, but he arrived years after the name was coined. What is clear is that 
Figure 5.1. Harisimae of Rohinari as 
a younger man, ca 1922. (Courtesy 
of the SSEM Archive, photographer 
unknown.)
166 Chapter 5
the name originated in ‘Are‘are, where maasina can be translated as “sib-
ling,” “cousin,” or more broadly “relative” or “close friend” (To‘abaita thaa-
sina, Kwaio waasina, Kwara‘ae and Makwanu saasina, Sa‘a mwaasine), and 
ruru, as in many Malaitan languages, is a word for a gathering or work party. 
Either ruru or the English “rule,” or both, could be the correct etymon—as 
Keesing noted, Malaitans have a penchant for cross-language puns. Many 
‘Are‘are would have known “rule” as a term denoting rules of daily life in 
Catholic and Anglican monastic communities like the Melanesian Broth-
erhood. Many movement documents use the English spelling.3 Nori cred-
ited the name to Harisimae and said that Sandars told them they needed a 
name, though the name predated Sandars’s knowledge of the movement. 
Today, Solomon Islands scholars and political organizers at times use an 
alternative ‘Are‘are spelling, Ma‘asina. For simplicity, in this book I use the 
familiar “Maasina Rule.”4
For many months, into early 1945, organizational activities remained 
within southern ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita, where Nono‘oohimae, his “mes-
senger” Sale Namohani‘ai, Harisimae, a local headman named Ho‘ogisau, 
and others toured to tell out its ideas.5 It is significant that the movement 
began here, because this is where the government’s prewar repopulation 
project, detailed in chapter 3, carried on until 1942, headquartered inland 
from Wairokai. We saw that Hoasihau was a key local participant in that, 
and Nono‘oohimae and Harisimae were also involved.6 The blueprint these 
men eventually drew up for Maasina Rule stressed many of the same goals 
as that project had: to build a broader ethnic unity, construct centralized 
villages, plant communal gardens, codify “native customs” and abandon 
“bad customs,” and reverse perceived population declines. As noted in 
chapter 3, Harisimae, Nono‘oohimae, and Hoasihau had all attended the 
1939 Fallowes meeting on Gela, but how that might have influenced them 
is unclear.7
Surviving documents from the early meetings highlight the importance 
of “custom” as a foundation of the movement but do not elaborate on the 
term’s meaning for ‘Are‘are people at that time.8 Nono‘oohimae later testi-
fied in court that they were motivated to act partly by depopulation fears 
and that he had voiced these concerns during his early proselytizing; other 
testimony supported this claim.9 Kwaio oral histories, too, say depopula-
tion was an early movement concern. To this day, inland Kwaio worry their 
numbers are shrinking, even though, as elsewhere on Malaita, the overall 
population is booming. The tangible source of their worry is a steady fall 
of interior numbers as people move to coastal Christian villages; that is, 
their population is relocating, not shrinking. People nonetheless blame the 
shrinking inland population partly on decreasing longevity and increasing 
mortality, and they nurture a powerful metaphorical linkage between Kwaio 
dying off and what they see as progressive societal decay. I note this here 
because similar ideas likely inflected ‘Are‘are perceptions of their popula-
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tion in the 1940s, particularly given that government officers had gone to 
such lengths to persuade them of a causal link between cultural decadence 
and population decline.10
The early ‘Are‘are activities were seminal to the form the movement 
eventually took across Malaita, yet one should avoid the common mistake 
of seeing ‘Are‘are as the sole source of the Maasina Rule movement and 
its ideology or of its challenge to the government. The image of a wave of 
resistance sweeping out of ‘Are‘are across political waters vaguely troubled 
by World War II is a false one; in fact southern ‘Are‘are emerged from the 
war as one of the politically calmer areas of Malaita. More to the point, as 
‘Are‘are held their leveling meetings, nascent movements were also emerg-
ing in the northern Lau Lagoon and at its southern end around ‘Ataa, 
where the first SILC returnees were landed in February 1944. Many of these 
returnees disparaged the embryonic government councils and courts, and 
soon after they arrived, the district’s senior headman, Salaimanu, was 
openly rejected and the Tae Native Council effectively dissolved. North 
Malaitan antagonism toward the government was from the start more open 
and confrontational than in the south, a difference that, as we will see, con-
tinued through Maasina Rule’s various phases.11
At this same time, grievances were being discussed at central Malaita 
“tract meetings” (talake mitini). Clement O‘ogau, from New Valley along the 
Kwaiba‘ita river in southeastern Kwara‘ae, told Ben Burt of attending these 
across the river, in Kwaio, and the complaints discussed: “We make the pad-
dock for them, then it bears fruit, they make copra, they take the money; 
they don’t give us good money or good wages. So it means the white men 
are robbing us. . . . We are like dogs. They make a dog go into the scrub to 
attack a wild pig; well, they eat the good parts of it and throw the bones away 
for the dog. . . . We get everything to give them a good living but we don’t 
do anything for our own living.” Similar meetings were being held through 
east Kwaio and Kwara‘ae and over to the west coast and Langalanga. Some 
political activities, especially in the north and in Langalanga, were permu-
tations of the “Red Cross” ventures described in chapter 4. The essential 
point here is that in almost every part of Malaita political actions were being 
organized outside of and in opposition to government channels and pur-
view. When Maasina Rule rolled out from ‘Are‘are, it meshed with these 
activities and synchronized them for a time into an island-wide movement 
that rejected the prewar status quo and pursued a new vision of a liberated 
and prosperous future.12
In early 1945 the movement began to extend; at a Takataka meeting in 
January, 40 ‘Are‘are leaders agreed to transmit its ideas across Small Malaita 
and then northward. Also about this time, emissaries from ‘Ataa, north-
ern Lau, and the adjacent mainland began canoeing to southern Lau vil-
lages near Walade and ‘Are‘are, seeking information about the movement. 
Throughout Maasina Rule, this northern-southern Lau social and trade 
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network facilitated linkage between the two ends of the island. Before long, 
men from Kwaio and points north were traveling to consult organizers at 
Takataka, Wairokai, and Kiu in ‘Are‘are, and on Small Malaita. In early 
November, the movement was carried to the ‘Are‘are community at Marau 
in east Guadalcanal from whence it spread westward, and soon men were 
paddling trading canoes from there and other islands to ‘Are‘are for discus-
sion and advice. These contacts paved the way for rapid expansion through 
and outward from Malaita, though for the movement’s duration Malaitan 
leaders remained concerned mostly with their own island and with Malai-
tans working elsewhere.13
Word of mouth and rumors often distorted Malaitan leaders’ ideas and 
words. William Davenport told me that when he spoke to former Makiran 
movement leaders in the mid-1960s he found “great variation in their beliefs 
and goals” from those on Malaita, yet “in every case there was an insistence 
that the ‘word’ they proclaimed had come directly from one or another 
of the movement leaders: Timothy George, Nori, Aliki Nono‘oohimae.” 
Elsewhere, too, there were often differences between what leaders said and 
messages attributed to them, which confused government officers trying 
to fathom the movement. Later, District Commissioner Central Ken Crass 
was told George was refusing to meet with anyone from Makira but leaders, 
because “M.R.M. sections in the latter island are mis-interpreting higher 
policy and bringing the whole movement into disrepute.”14 Tomasi Leo 
of Small Malaita testified during the 1947 trial of the Maasina Rule head 
chiefs: “All the small chiefs in the MR and the people use . . . your name 
[Nori], Aliki Nono‘oohimae’s and Timothy George’s as justification for 
everything.” 
Nori had rejoined the Labour Corps after a short visit home in February 
and March of 1944 and so was away for most of the earliest activity, but in 
March 1945 he returned to ‘Are‘are and quickly joined Nono‘oohimae as a 
leader and organizer. In April some ideas of the movement—now conceived 
explicitly as a Malaita-wide organization—were put forward in a “council” 
document likely written at Nono‘oohimae’s village. It declared the move-
ment’s primary purpose to be to talk about and oversee “custom.” It named 
as leaders Nori, Nono‘oohimae, and Hoasihau and called for appointment 
of a single “chief” to oversee the political organization of Malaita, with 
four other chiefs to serve under him—two each for northern and southern 
Malaita.15 It said that when the main chief was selected the government 
would be informed and that cooperation had already been secured from 
all headmen as far north as Sinalagu. Though this document was not given 
to government officers, like many produced over the months to come it 
forswore opposition to either the government or the Christian missions (in 
this context meaning missionaries and their activities). Soon after, the gov-
ernment appointed Headman Hoasihau president of west ‘Are‘are’s new 
native council and Nori to its court.16
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A turning point came in mid-1945 when Nori led his first extended tour 
or “patrol” (patalolo) north from ‘Are‘are along the east coast as far as south-
ern Kwara‘ae, stopping at passages to speak to large waiting crowds over a 
three-week period. Sale Kaakalade from ‘Oloburi, on the Kwaio-‘Are‘are 
border, in 1982 described to me Nori’s visit there: “When Nori came [in a 
large ‘Are‘are composite canoe], we had an honor guard perform for him 
and prepared a big feast and all sorts of festivities. The men who ran the 
meeting were ‘Unuamae of ‘Oloburi, Balaone Porohiano, who was Nori’s 
older ‘brother,’ and Nori.17 Everywhere they went we duties [movement 
police] escorted them.” In his speeches Nori stressed that Malaitans had 
failed to achieve their goals under European guidance and that instead 
they had to follow Malaitan leaders in pursuit of Malaitan ambitions—suc-
cess would come only in this way. He spoke of the need to plan educational 
and medical programs that Malaitans would administer. Some have told 
me that he talked at this time about Americans helping the movement, but 
others say not.18
I am inclined to believe that Nori did not on these tours tell people that 
Americans would help the movement. But on this point evidence is poor, 
and it is well to caution here that oral historical overviews of Maasina Rule, 
like European accounts, often collapse the movement’s diverse ideas and 
phases into a single historical moment. One manifestation of this is that 
Nori is at times recalled as having laid out the complete Maasina Rule pro-
gram during his early patrols, even aspects that emerged only later, some-
times conceived by others. It is also apparent that aspects of Nori’s message 
were opaque, heard by different people in different ways as filtered through 
their own political views. Finally, many statements were later attributed to 
Nori and other Maasina Rule leaders that they never made. In any case, it is 
clear that many Malaitans were at this time motivated partly by hopes that 
Americans would come to their aid, something I delve into in chapter 7.
In June 1946, at invitation from northern leaders, Nori led a second east 
coast patrol, this time continuing north through Lau and as far as Suu‘aba 
in northern To‘abaita, at one point addressing an audience of several thou-
sand. Meetings about Maasina Rule had been held across the north since 
November 1945, and people were already preparing to plant large coastal 
villages and gardens. SSEM leader Mariko of Malu‘u took diary notes on 
Nori’s visit to Kwai on 10 June 1946, which more than 900 attended. There 
Nori received a fanfare similar to that Kaakalade described from ‘Oloburi, 
with songs performed by a band and several prayers said by Christians pres-
ent. Nori spoke of “staying together in one village either in the bush or 
along the coast. Feeding pigs, making farms of rice or potatoes, collecting 
and putting money in one house.” He told the people, “Those who do not 
believe what Masine Rule says will stay out side of Masine Rule. Don’t listen 
to what they said. But you must listen to what we say.” Mariko’s summary 
says nothing of Americans.19
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Many along these tours met Nori’s request for “pound-head” (£1 per per-
son) contributions to the movement, often proffered in the US currency in 
wide circulation. (Malaitans called US dollars “pounds.”) Some gave less, 
and in places senior men gave on behalf of their extended families, a mode 
of feast presentation of the period. These and later contributions were held 
by local leaders in each district and were intended to fund movement pro-
grams, including hiring foreign specialists such as medical personnel and 
agricultural advisers. Forster heard that by June 1945, £3,000 had already 
been raised.20 People contributed enthusiastically and contrasted this with 
paying government taxes and mission tithes—not only was it voluntary, but 
Malaitans would decide how this money was to be spent, exclusively on proj-
ects for them. Donations, and in places public displays of shell money, har-
nessed indigenous meanings of wealth displays to symbolically raise leaders’ 
status and show allegiance to them. Government officers initially suspected 
fund collectors were grifters but later discarded that idea. As David Trench 
later wrote (within one of the most negative appraisals of Maasina Rule ever 
written), movement funds “were carefully preserved.”21
Nori’s patrols won the movement enthusiastic followers over a wide area. 
Soon after his second such tour, the SSEM’s R J McBride toured Malaita in 
the mission ship Evangel and found that everyone on the east coast belonged 
to it. Malaitans across the island were carrying out patrols of their own, and 
movement ideas also spread by other means. A structure was developed of 
“messenger duties” that manned a relay system reminiscent of the “Pony 
Express” to swiftly carry directives and other communications around the 
island. Kaakalade, one of two messengers for ‘Oloburi Full Chief Geni‘iria, 
described the system: “Suppose there was an announcement for a meeting 
at Kiu [Nono‘oohimae’s home in west ‘Are‘are] and the message was sent 
today. By tomorrow it would have reached north Malaita already. A man 
would carry the message from Kiu south to Maro‘u [Takataka] and then up 
to Maro‘upaina, and another duty there would bring it to Maanawai, and 
then to ‘Oloburi and put it in my hand. Then I would take it to the Sinalagu 
duty Mai‘a, and he would carry it on to Uru and their clerk Jason Frankie.” 
Tome Waleanisia, a Maasina Rule leader and scribe on ‘Aoke Island in Lan-
galanga, told me of his astonishment when he sent a message to a distant 
place early one morning and received a written answer that evening. Mes-
sages also moved north and south on Lau and Langalanga native-owned 
cutters. Teams of scribes wrote multiple copies of documents to facilitate 
their wide and rapid dissemination.22
District officers’ movements were also tracked in this way with help from 
Malaitans working for the government, and word of their impending visits 
reached their destinations ahead of them. Buloli of Laulasi, near ‘Aoke 
in the northern Langalanga Lagoon, described this to anthropologist Guo 
Pei-yi in 1997: “If the D.C. [district commissioner] from ‘Aoke was touring 
from ‘Aoke to Kwaio, on the other side, when the D.C. went into the ship, 
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the message would be passed. The person from ‘Aoke would run to the 
village and tell them that the D.C. was moving to Kwaio. . . . A person from 
here would run to the next village and tell them, ‘the D.C. is coming tomor-
row,’ and then come back. And then a person would run to the next village 
and tell. The news would go around the island just like that.” There were 
precedents for this: in 1919 Bell reported that people across Kwara‘ae were 
closely tracking his movements from ‘Aoke, and he thought intelligence 
was being passed from nearby mission villages: “These people know every-
thing about the police on this Station and I have had proof that when I have 
left here in the Mala they have known right across Malaita within twenty-
four hours.” Regarding the speed at which news of Bell’s death had spread 
through north Malaita, Sandars concluded, “Mental telepathy possibly.”23
Later in the 1940s, officers began composing many messages in code.
Movement Structure and Unity
By 1946 an island-wide structure was coalescing. Malaita was divided into 
nine districts based loosely on languages. These and lower-level divisions 
borrowed elements of the administrative structure Bell designed in the 
1920s, based on vaguely demarcated sub-districts defined around govern-
ment tax houses, and subsequently refined by Jack Barley with coastal but 
only sketchy inland boundaries. (Later the government copied Maasina 
Rule’s model to revise its own administrative divisions.)24 By mid-1946, each 
district had appointed its own “head chief.” They (and their religious affilia-
tions) were as follows: Timothy George Marata (SSEM) of Ro‘one for Small 
Malaita; Aliki Nono‘oohimae (ancestral) of Arairau, Kiu, for ‘Are‘are and 
west Kwaio; Jonathan Fifi‘i (Adventist) of ‘Ilemi, Sinalagu, for east Kwaio; 
Justus Jimmy Ganifiri (SSEM) of Naafinua for east Kwara‘ae; Aliki Basia 
(ancestral) of Makwanu for Baelelea; Hedley Heber (SSEM) of Rerede for 
Fataleka; Arnon ‘Atoomea (SSEM) of Aniuke, near Malu‘u, for To‘abaita; 
and Shadrach Diote‘e (SSEM) of Okwala for west Kwara‘ae. Timi Kakalu‘ae 
(ancestral) of ‘Adagege, a sometimes headman, was head chief for Lau for 
a time, but in July 1946 he withdrew and became a staunch loyalist. His 
replacement was Loea (ancestral) of Funafou, who was jailed at ‘Aoke in 
March 1947 and was replaced in turn by Timoti Bobongi (ancestral) of 
Kwalo‘ai (between Makwanu and Takwa). Nori (ancestral, later nominal 
Catholic) held a pan-Malaita position. Kwara‘ae had two chiefs because it 
was the most populous Malaitan region and because of historical differ-
ences between east and west stemming from ‘Aoke’s location in the latter. 
Nono‘oohimae led both ‘Are‘are and west Kwaio, and the Kwarekwareo 
area between them, because of deep cultural and historical ties between 
these areas and because he already had standing in both.25
Under the head chiefs was a nested hierarchy of lesser chiefs over each 
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passage, territory, and descent group, called “full chiefs,” “leader chiefs,” 
and “line chiefs” (or “headlines”).26 Some places, like Malu‘u, also had 
“ground chiefs,” and below them, “privates.” There was variation in lower 
and, to some degree, higher titles in different times and places, and dis-
tinctions sometimes got messy. Formalized hierarchies existed in tension 
with deeply rooted egalitarian sensibilities, and the leadership structure was 
more horizontal than vertical—most every senior man could be a chief of 
some kind. Some held named offices with specific functions: “kastom chiefs” 
(or simply “kastoms”) oversaw movement rules and regulations and their 
codification, and “farmer chiefs” supervised communal gardens. “Women’s 
chiefs” (usually men) directed women’s labor and other activities, delegat-
ing through female leaders who sometimes held titles as well. For example, 
at Sinalagu in Kwaio, the woman Falaori was chosen alafanigeni (women’s 
chief) for inland people, and another, Sula‘au, stood for Christian women. 
Under these chiefs, women held their own meetings, particularly to incul-
cate rules of sexual behavior, violations of which were presented to the male 
chiefs by the alafanigeni standing with and for the woman involved. A force 
of movement police called “duties” were led by “strife chiefs,” also called 
“stripe chiefs” for their armbands, which bore the letters NCD, for “Native 
Council Duty.” Duties were to become a special worry for district officers, 
who accused them of a plethora of abuses.27
Although Maasina Rule was remarkable for integrating Malaita politi-
cally, its island-wide structural cohesion has often been overstated. Politi-
cal authority was fragmented, and most “head chiefs” had clout only in 
their own districts. All embraced basic tenets of movement ideology, and 
chiefs from across the island met together several times, but in practice 
the different areas never surrendered autonomy to overarching leaders like 
Nori or Timothy George. Under a regime of coordination and guidance, 
even lower-level chiefs could retain significant independence, their author-
ity grounded largely in preexisting personal networks. Few Malaitans envi-
sioned or desired concentrated, centralized control. One source of exag-
gerations of the movement’s unity in academic work has been the writings 
of colonial officers charged with suppressing it. Even after it became obvi-
ous that the movement was a popular one unified more by shared griev-
ances, goals, and ideology than by an integrative leadership structure, many 
senior officers continued to understand and write about it as a centralized 
conspiracy orchestrated by a chiefly cabal, who, in Roy Davies’s words, 
“reduced the people nearly to a state of serfdom.”28
The authority of higher-level chiefs could be fragile even within their 
own areas. This was a common trait of Malaitan political leadership before 
Maasina Rule, but now these men were challenged to lead constituencies 
of unprecedented size and diversity in undertaking extraordinary projects 
at enormous sacrifice, including mass relocations to the coast, with few 
sanctions at their disposal other than social pressure. There is little evi-
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dence of chiefs using outright coercion to control followers, yet as Maasina 
Rule took shape, the vast majority of Malaitans threw themselves wholly 
into the endeavor. To truly understand the movement’s success and accom-
plishments we must look not to chiefly authority but to the solidarity and 
determination of the rank and file—the real power of Maasina Rule flowed 
upward from them. This, as I have said, many officers failed to recognize, 
which led them to make critical tactical blunders in dealing with the move-
ment, as chapters 6–8 detail.
Though Maasina Rule across Malaita shared much in terms of ideology, 
symbols, rhetoric, and practice, it displayed considerable geographical vari-
ation there, and still more on other islands, and it also changed a great deal 
over time. Differences were starkest between southern Malaita, where the 
movement developed more in the mold of its founding social engineering 
projects, and the north, where opposition to government was more bel-
licose from the start. Furthermore, divides remained everywhere between 
ancestral and Christian communities and between different Christian 
denominations, and their relative populations and centrality to the move-
ment varied from place to place. One of Maasina Rule’s great achievements 
was that, for a time, it melded these culturally and religiously diverse groups 
into a cohesive movement pursuing common goals, and much credit for 
bringing about this unexpected unity must go to the leaders the people 
elevated to guide them.
New Leaders
On one occasion that Nori went and asked for his pipe from the big 
man of the USA.
Nori now is the big man for our place. He and Timothy are big men 
for our place.
Malaita this time are nearly getting on well, with good things which 
Nori fight for.
Nori and Timothy, you two look after our place well because you two 
are big men for us this time.
Name of Nori came from USA and it reach England and many other 
places.
—Song of the Maasina Rule29
What may be the first written government political reference to Nori is a 
note that Cadet Roy Davies jotted in his east Kwaio tour book for 13 June 
1945: “[Uru Headman Maenaa‘adi] states that one Lori has been picking 
up money in Sinerago having worked Wairokai, & Areare. He has little idea 
of what it’s for, but thinks L will be coming to Uru soon. Told him to run 
him out if he comes.” To Europeans, with their stereotypes of classic Mela-
nesian elders and big men, the organizers of postwar movements through-
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out the region often seemed unlikely leaders and hard to take seriously, 
and young Nori proved no exception. Sandars later remembered him as “a 
nice lad and very polite” but “of no particular presence” and not “anything 
very out of the ordinary.” He was described by Resident Commissioner 
Noel as “a glib-tongued orator,” and by Davies as “a flabby, unprepossess-
ing little man,” but later as “a born politician and a wonderful orator” who 
could “charm the birds out of the trees for a Melanesian audience,” “but 
no policy-maker.” “To the natives,” Davies wrote, “his name was magic.” To 
Colin Allan he was “short, slight and somewhat timid” but “something of an 
extrovert” and “single-minded, obstinate and determined.” Trench saw in 
him “an insignificant specimen, with the obstinacy of foolishness, a codger 
at heart.” Michael Forster in 1946 gave a more detailed and less disparag-
ing depiction: “Nono‘oohimae appears to have given place to Nori who is 
a more colorful figure. This man has a small stocky well-knit figure with 
a light skin and black wavey hair. He has a pleasant personality and good 
manners. His knowledge of English is limited to pidgin. He comes from a 
part of Malaita where the people are above the average in intelligence and 
general ability. His previous dealings with whites have convinced him that 
they were making large profits out of the natives. There is no doubt that he 
is a clever orator and has been known to address an audience of some thou-
sands of natives for a whole night. Nevertheless it is unlikely that his is the 
brain behind the movement. Generally speaking primitive peoples keep 
their leaders in the background and Nori is more likely to be a scapegoat.” 
In reality, Nori was a creative thinker and renowned as a gifted speaker, no 
small compliment coming from Malaitans. His official position in Maasina 
Rule’s hierarchy was ambiguous at times, but most came to see him as the 
leader, and he is generally remembered as such today.30
Ma‘aanamae of Kwaio was a close friend of young Nori and bunked 
with him on Levers’s Russell Islands plantation until the Japanese inva-
sion. During the evacuation to Malaita their ship ran aground on Nu‘ula‘a 
reef, miles from the coast, and young Nori impressed fellow passengers by 
grabbing a canoe, paddling to ‘Aoke, and bringing the Tulagi to tow them 
off. Ma‘aanamae remembered the 20-year-old as kind and articulate, but, 
like others I talked to who knew Nori before the war, said that at that time 
he was notably apolitical. Nori is often recalled as expert in ‘Are‘are sahu 
divination, in which answers are read in patterns in lime sprinkled on the 
diviner’s arm. Men who had been with Nori on Guadalcanal told me how, 
after the January 1943 bombing that killed several Malaitans, he correctly 
divined that the rest of them would survive the war. Crack Malaitan diviners 
I know are socially highly astute, and in addition to his other traits Nori had 
a reputation for social acumen. He was “in practice a pagan,” though he was 
later baptized as a Catholic.31
A now-famous story tells how, in a Guadalcanal bunker, Nori met with 
an American officer who instructed him to carry out Maasina Rule. A ver-
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sion circulating in 1945 said that Nori, along with Ratu (Fifi‘i’s uncle and 
later an ‘Oloburi full chief) and Sukulu (later a west Kwara‘ae chief), had 
met an American general who told them to organize a Malaita-wide council 
to administer the island on behalf of the coming American government. 
Later renderings became still more mythologized, and the general has a 
golden pipe, inspired perhaps by Douglas MacArthur’s famous corncob, 
while much later adaptations say Nori met John F Kennedy. Excerpts from 
one version capture the main themes: “Nori met with an American lieuten-
ant who was in a foxhole. He gave Nori a pipe. The American told him, 
‘The government is blocking the higher wages and the things we Americans 
want to give to you. You must work apart from the British government. They 
are treating you badly. We have died to protect you, and the British would 
not have done that. You must go and collect a pound-tax from each per-
son.’ . . . Nori was a bushman and unsophisticated . . . but after this meeting 
he came back to Malaita and launched the work.” Still other versions share 
elements with the 1939 story of the priest Noto‘i being given instructions by 
two American bird hunters, also on Guadalcanal. In these, Nori is given the 
word by two US captains named “Dio Wao” (Joe War) and “George Masin” 
or “Maasina.” The latter may be a spin on US General George Marshall, or 
perhaps on Captain John E Martin, who in 1950 commanded the few Amer-
icans still in the Solomons and received unsolicited letters and money from 
Malaitans seeking American help in removing the colonial government. 
Whether Nori ever met any Americans of significant rank is unknown. To 
my knowledge, he never claimed to have received direct instructions from 
specific Americans to organize Maasina Rule, though he did discuss his and 
others’ many political conversations with Americans, and this would have 
been interpreted and distorted in various ways by word of mouth.32
A key visionary for Maasina Rule, and a primary leader in its formative 
stages, was Aliki Nono‘oohimae (also known as Erehau), head chief for 
‘Are‘are, west Kwaio, and Kwarekwareo. His founding role has already 
been described, and he was a major force in the movement until his 1947 
arrest and then again later. In many places, especially in the southern half 
of Malaita, he is recalled as Nori’s equal or second-in-command and some-
times as his superior in social stature. Labor recruiter Ernie Palmer, who 
knew Malaitans well, especially ‘Are‘are and Kwaio, thought Nono‘oohimae 
was “the real brain behind the Movement.”33 There is less in government 
archives from this period about Nono‘oohimae than about Nori or Timo-
thy George, probably due to his more reserved countenance around offi-
cers and Europeans generally. Forster, for example, wrote, “Not much can 
be said of Nonohimae who is quiet and gives the impression of being a 
thinker.” Colin Allan, not given to praising resistant Malaitans, later recalled 
him as “a man with piercing eyes, grave, thoughtful, dignified, sensitive, a 
charismatic leader and an orator,” and in 1950, when the head chiefs were 
released from prison, amidst Allan’s demeaning caricatures of each of the 
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other head chiefs he wrote, “Undoubtedly he gives the impression of hav-
ing depth of character, capacity for thought, and fixity of purpose. One 
feels he has bourne his imprisonment and release with detached dignity.” 
(Allan wrote these words after Nono‘oohimae agreed to work with the gov-
ernment; see chapter 8.)34 Davies found Nono‘oohimae “inflexible” and 
wrote, “Above all else he was a traditionalist and probably more respon-
sible than anyone else for the emphasis on ‘custom.’ ” Malaitans accorded 
Nono‘oohimae high respect, and alone among the head chiefs he brought 
to the movement a chiefly status, from within the ‘Are‘are leadership sys-
tem. One of his key confederates in the south was Takataka Full Chief 
Waiparo who, as we will see, became the most influential figure in Malaitan 
post–Maasina Rule kastom politics.35
Another principal Maasina Rule leader to emerge from the south was 
Small Malaita’s Head Chief Timothy George Marata, of Ro‘one, Port Adam. 
At a meeting at Waisisi on 1 November 1945, he was formally elevated as 
the movement chief over ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita (though he had been 
selected some time before), and each local group presented him with shell 
money to hold. He later became for a time the formal head of Maasina Rule 
as a whole, with Nori named as his second-in-command. Over the longer 
term, George was less important than Nono‘oohimae and especially Nori 
in the movement’s advance, but he nonetheless stands as a key leader, par-
ticularly in the early stages.36
George’s background was unusual, having been born about 1892 in 
Queensland and raised there by his Langalanga father and Small Malaita 
mother, with whom he first arrived on Small Malaita around 1906. His 
father leased a small Queensland cane farm and could have been exempted 
from deportation but chose to return home to work as an SSEM teacher. 
George completed several years of education in Queensland, and he wrote 
and spoke English well enough to serve Norman Deck as a mission text 
translator. In 1913 he traveled to Australia and New Zealand where, Corris 
wrote, “he witnessed dock strikes and may have picked up some pointers on 
industrial action.” Forster observed of George, “Like many Australian-born 
people he is keenly interested in Labour activities and particularly strikes.” 
George had been a senior headman for Small Malaita beginning in mid-
1923, one of the few early appointees in whom Bell expressed confidence 
and expectations. At the end of 1925, however, Bell suspended him, citing 
allegations of sexual impropriety and assault, though George was already 
preparing to quit. He taught briefly at a school at the SSEM station at One-
pusu and then turned to crewing on mission and plantation ships. During 
the war, George organized the supply of Small Malaitan thatch leaf to US 
forces and made several visits to their camps on Guadalcanal.37
In early 1944, Forster appointed George an assistant district headman 
and also charged him with running a trade store scheme from his village of 
Ro‘one. Forster said he was “thoroughly reliable and trustworthy, and very 
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well educated.” When he learned George was to be the head chief for the 
south, Forster opined that he was “much too fond of his five pounds a month 
as storekeeper to be a serious nuisance.” These assessments soon changed 
when George did become an active leader, after which Forster wrote that he 
had been dismissed from earlier headman and SSEM positions because he 
was not reliable. Forster described him then as “an energetic man among a 
moribund people. . . . He has a smooth and hypocritical manner and is clever 
at saying what he thinks his hearers wish to hear. . . . It is doubtful if he has any 
great intellectual power. He enjoys his position on account of his knowledge 
of English and his experience of the outside world. It was felt [by Maasina 
Rule adherents] he would be able to supply knowledge formerly obtained 
from white people and would know best how to deal with them.” George 
resented the low status and wages that, despite his education, were his lot as 
a Solomon Islander, and, as Corris observed, it is no surprise that he became 
involved in Maasina Rule. Equally unsurprising is that many Europeans 
despised him. Trench thought him “mercenary minded” and “mostly in it 
for what he could get,” and others expressed similar contempt.38
Head Chief Jonathan Fifi‘i was not as prominent as Nori, Nono‘oohimae, 
or George in Maasina Rule as an island-wide movement, and his influence 
was limited primarily to east and central Kwaio. Still, Fifi‘i would attain a 
different sort of importance: his vision of the movement has significantly 
influenced the written history of Maasina Rule through his work, starting 
in 1962, with anthropologist Roger Keesing, and through the publication 
of his 1989 autobiography and other papers that give lively accounts of the 
movement as he experienced it.39
Fifi‘i returned from his first stint as the Sinalagu SILC section’s sergeant 
in mid-1944, hoping to organize political activities he had discussed with 
Nono‘oohimae, Nori, and others on Guadalcanal. He presented these ideas 
to people around Sinalagu, including his uncles Headman Sirifa and Assis-
tant Headman Balaone Kwarialaena (or Brown, Faana‘o), but they vetoed 
the plans, warning they might provoke government punitive actions like 
those of 1927. Sirifa, slowly dying of tuberculosis, pressured Fifi‘i to assume 
his position as headman, but Fifi‘i instead rejoined the corps. He returned 
to Kwaio in August 1945 at age 24 to find the political scene dramatically 
changed and Maasina Rule well underway. Sirifa, who died three months 
later, had become a movement supporter and had invited Nori to Sinalagu 
to tell people about the ‘Are‘are work. Though Fifi‘i had spent much of his 
adult life away from home, in mid-1946 Kwaio selected him as their head 
chief. By then Kwaio had told Sandars about their Maasina Rule activities, 
including the choice of Fifi‘i, whom Sandars met and approved. Shortly 
after, Fifi‘i led a large Kwaio patrol to ‘Aoke, where Sandars again endorsed 
his appointment but warned him to work with the headmen. Fifi‘i also led 
several patrols to ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita to meet with Nono‘oohimae, 
Nori, and others.40
Figure 5.2. Jonathan Fifi‘i campaign poster, ca early 1970s. Pictures of a house, 
canoe, or pipe cue voters to the correct candidate’s box in which to place their bal-
lot. (Author’s collection.)
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Fifi‘i was the only Adventist head chief, but he was not particularly reli-
gious. Throughout the movement and his life he nurtured staunch ties with 
Kwaio inland groups. During Maasina Rule, Christians were still a small 
coastal minority in east Kwaio, and many important movement leaders 
there came from the mountains, though others were SSEM men, like Full 
Chief Jason Frankie and ‘Abaeata Anifelo at Uru, and Fifi‘i’s Strife Chief 
Tome Toloasi Teoboo, a former policeman from Naanakinimae on the 
Sinalagu-‘Oloburi mountain border. For SSEM leaders, these men all main-
tained unusually good relations with the non-Christian community. The 
1947 Malaita Annual Report of Roy Davies, by then district commissioner, 
singled out Fifi‘i among the head chiefs as “perhaps the most fanatical of 
them all. Obsessed by religion and what he thought was his own mission in 
life, he was exactly the stuff of which martyrs and fanatics are made.”41 If so, 
Fifi‘i fully altered his personality by the time Keesing met him 15 years later, 
and Kwaio oral histories contradict this portrayal as well and depict him as 
having been a moderating influence (see chapter 8). On what Davies based 
his opinion is unknown—Fifi‘i got on well with Sandars and Forster, and 
until his arrest had not met Davies or his cadet Peter Cameron, although 
Cameron, based on secondhand information, believed Fifi‘i’s politics were 
more “extreme” than leaders of nearby Kwai. East Kwaio was perhaps Malai-
ta’s most fully Maasina Rule area, though the following was near 100 per-
cent in the east from Kwara‘ae south through at least Takataka. Fifi‘i spoke 
the truth when he testified at his trial, “I do not know of anyone in my dis-
trict outside Marching Rule.” Some months after Fifi‘i’s 1947 arrest, three 
people were outside the movement at Sinalagu, and none at Uru.42
Farther north, in Lau, after Loea’s early-1947 arrest, the head chief was 
Timoti Bobongi, age 26, of Kwalo‘ai. He had left Lau in his early teens, in 
1934, to work as a cook for Carpenter’s and then on Choiseul, and he later 
became captain of the BSIP Medical Department launch. This prepared 
him for wartime work driving an American barge. Davies, who denigrated 
the character of nearly every chief, later described Bobongi as “easily led 
by the wrong people, and almost completely lacking in moral fiber,” and 
Allan, who followed Davies’s example, said he had “no character, no per-
sonality.” Sixteen years later, anthropologist and folklorist Elli Maranda 
worked closely with Bobongi, an expert storyteller, singer, and carver. She 
wrote that he was intelligent and subtle, and noted, “Whatever the task at 
hand, Bobongi is a very ambitious man and sets himself high standards.” 
The head chief in adjacent Baelelea was Basi (or Basia, Basi‘a, Basi‘i, Bas-
ini), a former crewmember of the Melanesian Mission ship Gwen. Fifi‘i 
recalled Basi for his generosity and prowess as a feast giver. Davies wrote 
of him, “A pagan with no education but many years of experience of the 
ways of Europeans; emotional and unpredictable, he was an exhibitionist 
with admittedly considerable personal magnetism; the complete bully—
but of no consequence and social standing in the community according to 
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former native standards,” and later said that “he had no brains.” I present 
these officers’ comments on the chiefs to introduce readers to the deep 
disrespect many paid to Malaitans who dared to challenge white rule, not 
only in writing but also to their faces. Such attitudes purged Malaitans 
of any regard for these same officers and led to grave problems for the 
government.43
Christian Leadership and the Missions
Maasina Rule was not a religious movement in the usual sense, but that is 
not to say it was nonreligious, any more than almost anything important on 
Malaita was or is. Catholic priests said mass for chiefs, people who followed 
ancestors sacrificed and prayed to secure their support, SSEM members 
virtually melded their church with the movement, and Anglican laymen 
(though few clergy) prayed and sang hymns for its success. Even Adventists 
formed their own towns. In other words, everyone marshaled their various 
spiritual forces to the service of Maasina Rule, and a miraculous aspect of 
the movement is how they all worked together.
The other four northern head chiefs (Ganifiri, Hedley, ‘Atoomea, and 
Diote‘e) were SSEM mission teachers. SSEM leaders were well represented 
in Maasina Rule’s hierarchy overall, making up half of the original head 
chiefs. Even in Kwaio, ‘Are‘are, and other places where Christians were a 
minority, mission teachers were key participants. There were many reasons 
for this. First, teachers around Malaita had for years gathered regularly for 
training at SSEM conventions and schools such as Onepusu, and they held 
weekly sub-district meetings. Teachers had maintained letter-writing net-
works since the Queensland days. For Maasina Rule, such church networks 
offered ready integrative structures. Teachers also had the relatively high 
levels of European knowledge the movement was expected to need, and 
many were already experienced managers of larger coastal communities, 
much like those Maasina Rule was now creating. Teachers, like inland lead-
ers, had always dealt with many disputes outside of government courts, as 
Maasina Rule proponents now planned to do.44
There was a more fundamental reason for Christian enthusiasms for 
Maasina Rule, both among leaders and within the rank and file. In becom-
ing Christians, most had staked their faith not only on one version or 
another of the Christian God, but also on a brighter future that would 
follow if they took up other European ways and gave up valued Malaitan 
ones. White missionaries encouraged this expectation, though most envis-
aged tight constraints on Melanesian secular advancement. To the degree 
Malaitans accepted church rules against participating in local economies—
bridewealth, compensation, mortuary exchanges, and sometimes even 
shell money use—they were left more dependent on the cash economy and 
vulnerable to its vagaries. For them, too, the need for education was more 
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pressing and the dearth of medical services more glaring. Furthermore, 
Christians, particularly the large majority living near the coast, had little 
choice but to interact much more with Europeans and their surrogates and 
to allow their interventions in their affairs—not just missionaries but also 
colonial officers and police who frequented coastal areas, as well as the gov-
ernment headmen who lived there. In contrast, most inland people, except 
when laboring, could for the most part avoid such entanglements so long as 
they paid their tax and did not commit serious crimes. Many Christians felt 
they had given up and taken on much by breaking with their ancestors, kin 
groups, and past ways, and they expected to enjoy benefits in return. When 
these were not forthcoming, Christians had more reason to feel betrayed by 
the colonial system as they came to realize that it would continue to humili-
ate them and stymie their aspirations.45
For Christians, too, shared religious beliefs provided an ideological base 
that helped the movement transcend other divisions. Christians often cited 
biblical concepts of human equality and brotherhood as corroborating 
movement goals, and even non-Christians could relate to these and appre-
ciate basic Christian messages about liberation from oppression. As fore-
warned by Archdeacon Pritt at the century’s turn, Islanders’ “untutored 
minds” had taken literally “the doctrine of all men’s equality in the sight of 
Heaven,” and they were now determined to demand its fulfillment. In sum, 
it is little wonder the vast majority of Christians enthusiastically embraced 
Maasina Rule and its message. The movement over time also changed 
aspects of Christian ideologies and permanently redistributed power within 
the churches, particularly the SSEM.46
The SSEM’s power in the movement increased from Kwara‘ae north-
ward. The head chief in east Kwara‘ae was 40-year-old Justus Jimmy Ganifiri, 
a teacher headquartered at the settlement of Naafinua on the Bulia river 
(missionary McBride dismissed him as a teacher in early 1947 due to his 
movement activities). His father, Jimmy Fiuloa, who had been forced to go 
to Queensland by his family in punishment for misdeeds, returned years 
later as a Christian. Naafinua was founded (at a place named Rade) in 1916 
and grew into east Kwara‘ae’s main SSEM center. In 1938 Ganifiri started a 
school there and the site later became Maasina Rule’s base of operations. 
Overall, he was a moderating force within the movement, opposed to some 
of the antigovernment policies that eventually emerged in the north. Davies 
described him as “a shrewd and determined man, with many years of expe-
rience of exercising authority, and with a firm belief in his own inspiration 
and essential rightness,” and Cameron thought highly enough of him to 
recommend his appointment as a headman even though he was a Maasina 
Rule leader. Ganifiri’s intellect is apparent from reading his testimony at 
the trial of the head chiefs, the most impressive statement made there.47
The SSEM’s centrality to Maasina Rule peaked in To‘abaita. We have 
seen in earlier chapters that the mission there, particularly at Malu‘u, had 
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often crossed swords with Headman Maekali and his native council, and 
Maekali soon became a movement enemy. Cadet Wilfred Marquand wrote 
from his Malu‘u post in 1947, “The Marching Rule appears to be based 
around S.S.E.M. teaching tied up with religion.” There were many non-
Christian members—Frazer estimated that about half the To‘abaita were 
Christians in 1939, including many Anglicans, though Christian numbers 
likely had, as in most places, risen by 1946 (see note 93). The head chief 
there was SSEM teacher Arnon ‘Atoomea (or Anoni, Rinalu) from near 
Malu‘u. A former student at the mission’s Malu‘u school, he began teach-
ing at its Onepusu center in 1938, and during the war he administered 
Onepusu while white missionaries were away. In 1945 he returned home to 
start a new school and soon became a community leader. In April 1946, at 
age 26, he was selected as To‘abaita’s head chief. Davies called him “proud 
and arrogant,” and later “a zealot,” while in 1951 Resident Commissioner 
Gregory-Smith was struck by ‘Atoomea’s “presence and dignity.”48
To‘abaita’s key leader over a longer term, with a strong following also 
in nearby Baegu, was Full Chief Shem Irofa‘alu of Kalemane, ‘Airade. He 
was ‘Atoomea’s uncle and held great influence over him. Successor to the 
famous Peter Abu‘ofa as the area’s SSEM leader, Irofa‘alu had long been 
a bitter rival of Maekali—he pointedly reminded Marquand that he had 
always been excluded from Maekali’s government council “because he was 
not a proper chief.” During the early Maasina Rule period Irofa‘alu and 
his followers competed for power with Maekali, leading in June 1946 to the 
latter’s resignation for a time. One officer described Irofa‘alu as “a man 
of outstanding personality, tremendous egotism and ambition,” and Mar-
quand believed that Irofa‘alu, not ‘Atoomea, was the effective Maasina Rule 
leader in To‘abaita.49
Fataleka’s head chief was another SSEM teacher, Hedley Heber (or 
I‘amaea). Davies wrote that he was “a well-educated and highly intelligent 
man . . . quiet and intensely sincere, but embittered by imagined wrongs, 
and with a streak of fanaticism in him,” while Officer Tom Russell thought 
him “a personable man with intelligence.” A few years later District Officer 
James Tedder found him “intelligent and interesting” and running a medi-
cal aid post, and Hedley later earned high praise as a teacher at a Rerede 
elementary school. The head chief across the island in west Kwara‘ae was 
SSEM teacher Shadrach Diote‘e Kalani (“Shadrach Dio,” or “Joe”), from 
Okwala. Sandars had in late 1945 appointed Diote‘e head of the Kwaimela 
Native Council because he was not then a Maasina Rule member, and he 
was also headman for Kwaimela Sub-district. Davies later wrote that Diote‘e 
was “intelligent, able, and sincere, but with a deep conviction that he was 
leading his people away from an unrighteous bondage,” and in 1948 For-
ster said he was “a man of ability and influence and to be trusted,” but 
“suffering from a conflict of loyalties.” By then he had broken with Maasina 
Rule, and Fifi‘i disparaged him to me as the only head chief who “gave up 
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to the government.” As 1947 progressed, Diote‘e was pushed aside by Full 
Chief Nelson Kifo (or Kefu [SSEM]) of Fulisango, whom we will meet in 
the next chapter.50
As described earlier, many SSEM teachers had established themselves as 
political leaders and led sustained opposition to particular headmen and 
government policies. Many had also come to resent their church’s Austra-
lian missionaries, whom, as Maasina Rule grew, Malaitans began to dispar-
age as “church government.” The missionaries’ standing had declined dur-
ing the war and now began to slip away completely, especially in the north. 
The Decks and their colleagues were beside themselves when Irofa‘alu, 
‘Atoomea, Ganifiri, and other teachers thought to be steadfastly loyal 
rejected their authority, and the movement ordered men working for the 
SSEM at Onepusu to return home. At first the SSEM missionaries tried to 
maintain an outwardly neutral position toward the movement, but when 
they found themselves rejected outright by rebellious teachers and congre-
gations they became staunchly anti–Maasina Rule and labeled its people 
philistines. The church’s Wilbur Clark lamented, “The Devil has deceived 
the people into believing that their Movement is of God,” and Deck wrote, 
“The people have refused to hear us in their churches,” and then, “There 
can be no question I think of the Satanic deception of the movement, but 
the teachers don’t see it yet.” A popular Christian song was “Jesus He Say 
‘Yes’ for Maasina Rule.”51
The independence that Malaitan church leaders had enjoyed during the 
war continued to varying degrees, especially in the SSEM. In July 1947, cit-
ing Justus Ganifiri and Irofa‘alu as examples, Sandars argued that many 
government troubles were “directly traceable to these SSEM native leaders 
who have gone wrong through lack of supervision,” and he complained 
that SSEM missionaries would not visit their flocks: “Since 1943 they have 
done no fieldwork. The few European missionaries remain at Onepusu stat-
ing that they are hampered by lack of transport. This is true but so are oth-
ers who still get around amongst their people. The missionaries are now 
looked upon with scorn by many of their adherents—who have joined the 
Melanesian Mission.” Deck had left in late 1944, and Sandars hoped that 
his return that July would help matters, but an informant warned him that 
things had gone too far for that.52
Anglican missionaries were scarcely more successful in controlling their 
flocks; many people resented the church’s links to the government and 
thought some of its missionaries arrogant. The latter were not the compas-
sionate freethinkers some of their predecessors had been. Bishop Baddeley, 
in particular, still saw Melanesians as his inferiors: “an infant race, they are 
loveable—like children,” and he described the non-Christian life as one 
of “darkness, dirt, disease, devils.” (His more progressive successor, Bishop 
Caulton, promoted them in 1950 to “adolescents.”) Though most lay Angli-
cans joined Maasina Rule, few of the church’s 80 native priests and deacons 
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on Malaita did so, and for this they were shunned. Archdeacon of the Cen-
tral Solomons Harry Reynolds in early 1948 issued a pastoral directive—“To 
all the Faithful of the Church of Melanesia. I command . . . you all to leave 
Marching Rule at once”—to be read out in every church. Caulton claimed 
that Anglican Maasina Rule adherents had “without exception” remained 
loyal to the church, though he noted difficult personal relations between 
priests and laity. But in truth many Anglicans in the south and some in 
the north defected to the Catholic Church—some because of Reynolds’s 
directive—and others went over to the SSEM (though in places SSEM 
members became Anglican). Despite these troubles, most Anglican mis-
sionaries did not experience the degree of personal rejection the SSEM 
missionaries did.53
To the disgust of government officers, the Catholic Church was for a 
time sympathetic toward Maasina Rule. Father Bernard Van de Walle in 
‘Are‘are wrote to Bishop Jean-Marie Aubin in March 1947, “The Marching 
Rule has done only good for the advancement of our religion. The lagoon 
is ripe. There are fine villages of sixty to eighty people where formerly there 
were only one or two families.” Catholic numbers on Malaita grew from 
5,410 in 1946 to 7,694 in 1950. Hugh Laracy, who has detailed Marist–Maa-
sina Rule relationships, particularly in ‘Are‘are, pointed out that, relative 
to other missionaries, Catholic clergy tended to have closer, more social 
contacts with Malaitans, and in the south in particular the movement was 
friendly toward priests. The priests were also more distant from the govern-
ment, particularly compared with Anglican and even SSEM missionaries, 
who were committed to imperial rule. One priest in particular, Jean Tig-
gler, is said to have advised the movement early on at Rokera in ‘Are‘are, 
and after he died of blackwater fever in 1945 some thought the govern-
ment had poisoned him, perhaps for contacting the US Command on 
Maasina Rule’s behalf. It was later rumored on Guadalcanal that Tiggler’s 
skull was exhumed and taken back to Malaita. In places, Catholic prayers 
were offered before Maasina Rule meetings and, later, masses were report-
edly said for release of jailed chiefs. In early 1949, however, some Catholic 
priests turned against the movement since, said one officer, they “decided, 
rightly or wrongly, that the movement is communistic.”54
Maasina Rule dismayed most white missionaries and they spoke against 
it. Noel later told the high commission, “They have not failed to observe 
the religious note in Marching Rule propaganda, and the danger that it 
may result in the founding of some new amalgam of the various Christian 
faiths.” In April 1947, District Commissioner Central Crass was concerned 
that a “bastard religion” might be forming. Missionaries also worried that 
they would cease to be integral to Malaitan Christianities, and it was said that 
Shem Irofa‘alu and other SSEM teachers were already saying, “The day of the 
independent Malaita Church has dawned.” Charles Fox seems to have been 
alone in admiring how Maasina Rule united people across denominations.55
The Rise of Maasina Rule 185
Later, after the government began trying to suppress the movement, 
the SSEM would come still more to the visible fore, especially from the 
European perspective, because many non-Christians relocated their towns 
into the interior where whites rarely ventured. But the SSEM position also 
became more difficult to gauge because, in parts of the north at least, some 
movement settlements, even some with multidenominational and large 
non-Christian populations, began to be called “Mission Towns,” and Maa-
sina Rule council houses were, Cadet Marquand reported, “converted into 
schools and decorated with religious pictures”; he also said, “The teachers, 
although often unqualified as such by any recognized mission, are actually 
the Marching Rule leaders of the town and state that the pagans are ‘learn-
ers’ in the mission.” Some officers came to associate Maasina Rule exclu-
sively with the SSEM, to an exaggerated degree. Colin Allan’s misstatement 
that all but one head chief (or at times all of them) were SSEM men has, 
as Keesing noted, been much repeated. Allan despised the mission, which 
he thought was, “in the native mind,” a cargo cult, and at times he blamed 
Maasina Rule largely on its sins. The literature is infused with distortions 
drawn from Allan’s misstatements from this perspective. The SSEM’s role 
in Maasina Rule was also exaggerated when, as we will see, officers Mar-
quand, Cameron, Davies, Allan, and Russell spent almost all of their time 
in the north, especially at Kwai and Malu‘u, where SSEM leadership was 
strongest, and extrapolated the situations there to the entire island, includ-
ing many places they had rarely or never visited.56
None of these cautions are meant to downplay or deny the major role 
of the evangelicals in the movement—they were key in many places, as 
other churches, or ancestors, were elsewhere. This presented a problem 
for the government: colonial policy had long been to defer to religious 
practices so long as they did not deeply offend European sensibilities. Mar-
quand, for example, worried about the religious trappings he observed in 
Maasina Rule because, he wrote, “Owing to the necessity for allowing the 
people religious freedom this might make it very difficult in future to pro-
claim this a subversive organization.” Malaitans were well aware that offi-
cers were averse to interfering with things they perceived to be religious, 
from having long observed this in practice and having officers explain it 
to them. Though most Christians were sincere when wrapping what Mar-
quand called a “religious cloak” around their political pursuits, this did 
not preclude them and others from also doing so as a savvy political tactic. 
Later, when officers worked tirelessly to destroy Maasina Rule, particularly 
after 1948, some came to believe that the SSEM, run by teachers free of 
white missionaries, had become a religious veneer deceitfully covering 
secular, criminal political activities. Marquand said meetinghouses were 
falsely labeled as “churches” so officers would not destroy them, and some 
officers thought the SSEM in particular was no longer a legitimate reli-
gion or deserving of protection as such. They greatly overstated this, but 
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years later I myself watched Malaitans plan and execute manipulations of 
government noninterference policies. In 1951, Allan declared the SSEM 
teacher community was “an enemy of the state” and that the church was 
a “pathetic relic of Victorian evangelism” that should not be let to “once 
more fasten its stifling tentacles on the island of Malaita.” He also loathed 
the Catholic Church, however, and blamed Maasina Rule on its “endeav-
ouring and succeeding to roll its purple carpet across the length and 
breadth of Malaita.”57
Better Homes and Gardens: Maasina Rule Social Engineering
Beginning in November 1945, Nori spent two or three months with Timo-
thy George at Ro‘one to gain his counsel. On 15 December they com-
posed Maasina Rule’s “First Order for the Island” for circulation. Labeled 
“made up by Nori, under Chief Timothy George,” it directed that no one 
should volunteer to labor for Europeans, for all would be needed for new 
works at home, and it gave the first indication as to what those works 
would be: everyone was to consolidate in large villages and select chiefs 
for their areas. At this time also, plans were broadcast to plant large gar-
dens all round the island.58 The First Order formally launched a massive 
project of social revision soon taken up by most Malaitans, which entailed 
radical changes in leadership structures, residential and subsistence pat-
terns, substantive and procedural law, and social relations generally. What 
follows examines these undertakings and some of their successes and 
failures.
Key aspects of these endeavors were partly inspired by and closely 
resembled colonial projects described in previous chapters, most obviously 
the division of the fluid cultural landscape into circumscribed zones for 
administration, taxation, and the appointment of chiefs; the organization 
of native courts and councils; and aforementioned elements of the ‘Are‘are 
repopulation project. Yet it is a mistake to see these, as some have, as naive 
imitations of colonial ventures or crude mimicry of US military practices. 
As leaders set out to organize the diverse and atomistic Malaitan popula-
tions, many of which were dispersed in hamlets that shifted often across 
rugged country, they faced some of the same problems as had the colonial 
state, and in many cases they borrowed and adapted similar solutions: con-
centrating people into coastal settlements to better monitor and organize 
them and to sustain cooperative projects, devising rules by which the new 
society would be governed, conducting a comprehensive census including 
vital statistics, and even reviving the formerly hated maintenance of “roads” 
from place to place with groups responsible for specified segments. But 
now, because these endeavors were undertaken by and for Malaitans, the 
populace took them up with enthusiasm.59
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Towns and Farms
Following Nori and George’s First Order, Malaitans began planning large 
villages they called “towns” (taoni, or occasionally “communities,” komu-
nima) on or near the coast, building them most intensively from later 1946 
into early 1947. Towns became central to Maasina Rule’s development 
and, later, to its challenge to the government. Their nature and meanings 
changed through phases of the movement, but here I focus mostly on the 
initial towns in 1946 and 1947.60
People iterated many reasons for building towns. Most often stressed by 
leaders in the movement’s formative years was that concentrated communi-
ties would allow organization of projects through which Malaitans could 
attain development and earn money, impossible if many lived in scattered 
hamlets. Kwaio have portrayed the radical and difficult relocation to me as 
having expressed their shared commitment to work together for change. 
In the same vein, Fifi‘i later attributed to Nori the idea that towns would 
communicate to the government just how serious Malaitans were about the 
work. At a deeper level, relocation to the sea had over the decades come 
to symbolize a shift, sometimes a radical one, toward adoption of new ways 
and other kinds of changes, and this harmonized with Maasina Rule’s trans-
formative aspirations.61
Some hoped that coastal towns would protect their land from theft by for-
eigners. This threat was sometimes glossed as kolonia, “the colony,” inspired 
by conceptions of early land alienation in Fiji, encounters with dispossessed 
Australian Aborigines recalled from Queensland days, and probably also by 
US soldiers telling Islanders about the conditions that had led American 
colonies to rebel against England. Kolonia also referred more broadly to a 
dreaded situation of government control over every aspect of people’s lives.62
Kastom rhetoricians today still employ the Maasina Rule trope of rejecting 
“99 years” of oppression, inspired by land leases of that duration granted to 
Europeans in the Protectorate’s early years. Relatively little Malaitan land 
had been alienated, the key exception being a large plantation and several 
smaller ones run by the Young family (brothers of SSEM founder Florence 
Young) around Baunani on the west coast. Resentment lingered over how 
that land was purchased, shrine desecration on the estates, and the violence 
once inflicted on Malaitans who ventured onto the land. We have seen that 
Malaitans had feared land theft for decades, not just because of what they 
saw in Fiji and Australia but also from their experiences working on planta-
tion land alienated from other Solomon Islanders.63 Worry was only height-
ened by the Japanese and American invasions. Some officers tried to exploit 
these fears to further government goals: they warned Islanders that without 
Her Majesty’s protection they might lose their land to foreigners poised to 
invade. This tactic was ill advised, given that people credited Americans and 
not the British with turning back the Japanese, and a government propa-
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ganda imperative was to quash hopes for American return, liberation, spon-
sorship, or protection. But before long, officers began to charge Maasina 
Rule’s leaders with cynically fostering worries over invasion and highlighted 
this as an example of Malaitan delusion.64
Michael Scott has explored still greater fears of land-stealing invaders on 
nearby Makira, though, like Malaita, relatively little land there had been 
taken. On Makira, protecting land appears to have been the overriding 
concern of many Maasina Rule followers. Officer Len Barrow suggested in a 
1946 circular to Makirans that foreigners would like to come and take their 
land and the government would not be able to stop them if their popula-
tion did not radically increase, and Makirans subsequently massed their vil-
lages on the coast—permanently, as it turned out.65 On Malaita in the early 
years of Maasina Rule, worries over land loss were only one of many moti-
vational ideas in circulation. We will see that, for some Malaitans, anxieties 
about possible renewed war or invasion and the land alienation these might 
bring became more overt on Malaita during several years of severe govern-
ment oppression, as hopes for American assistance faded, and apocalyptic 
fears at times were rife.66
By early 1947, towns encircled the island and thousands of Malaitans 
were living in them full or part-time, including people who descended 
from their mountain hamlets. At first, in 1946, many mountain people built 
towns not on the coast but on upper reaches of coastal slopes. Ancestral 
spirits had long restricted their descendants’ movements within the coastal 
Christian villages because their taboos were openly flouted there, and these 
restrictions were still in force. During late 1946 and into mid-1947, how-
ever, many mountain people spent much or most of their time in coastal 
towns, sometimes alternating between residing there and in inland towns 
or hamlets. After government arrests began in the second half of 1947, 
many inland people went to the coastal towns primarily for extended meet-
ings. At their peak, some town populations on the east coast topped 600 
people, while others had only a few dozen. Overall, north Malaitan towns 
were smaller than those along the east coast, most having 100–300 people. 
The smallest of all were in Baegu, where people continued to prefer more 
hamlet-like settlements. Some towns, especially in the north, remained pri-
marily meeting places.67
Much of what happened in these communities was hidden from or mis-
construed by Europeans, and so here we depend on Malaitans for much of 
our information. Most of the oral accounts I have collected on this topic 
are from Kwaio, and, drawing also on material gathered by Burt in east 
Kwara‘ae, the picture presented here is to some degree biased toward the 
towns in east-central Malaita. However, there is enough information in gov-
ernment and mission sources, and in oral accounts collected from else-
where by others and myself, to piece together aspects of town life around 
the island. I hope Malaitan or other researchers will fill the many gaps.
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Written accounts by officers and missionaries about Maasina Rule towns 
in 1947 display their limited and distorted understandings of life in them, 
and some constructed highly negative portraits of repression and social 
calamity that were later cited to help justify repression. They were generated 
partly through ignorance and partly as calculated political propaganda, and 
even officers’ tour reports contradict the most disparaging claims. Europe-
ans got a good deal of their information on Maasina Rule activities from 
loyalists ostracized by the movement and keen to discredit it, or sycophants 
looking to please listeners already convinced that it was wrongheaded. At 
other times movement adherents knowingly misled Europeans.68 None of 
this is to say that town life was idyllic; there were many problems and diffi-
culties. Indeed, in many areas most people eventually wearied of these (and 
later, of government raids on towns) and returned to their hamlets, smaller 
villages, or inland towns, and visited coastal or other towns only for commu-
nal work and to attend codification and other meetings, which could last 
for many days. (In the north, it seems more people who moved to the coast 
during Maasina Rule stayed there after.) Nevertheless, most Malaitans were 
excited over and proud of what they did accomplish in the towns in 1946 
and 1947, and rightly so.
Europeans recorded few first-person observations of town life at this 
time. The SSEM’s Clark published one of the most detailed in the mission’s 
newsletter Not in Vain in 1947, after he toured towns along the east coast 
from ‘Oloburi in southern Kwaio north into Kwara‘ae. Clark did not say 
exactly when he was there, but it was in later 1946 or early 1947. He counted 
three large coastal towns at Uru and five in Kwara‘ae, each occupied, he 
said, by 500–600 people. Kwaio today say these towns were not arranged 
in any formal hierarchy, though Kwara‘ae told Burt that Head Chief Gani-
firi’s town of Naafinua was the effective center of operations for the Kwai 
harbor area.69
Although Maasina Rule delineated the island roughly into language 
groups (excepting west Kwaio and Langalanga), towns often had residents 
from more than one language zone. For example, there were Kwaio speak-
ers living at A‘arai and Age towns in Kwara‘ae, and at Farisi in ‘Are‘are, and 
people from both Fataleka and Kwara‘ae lived at ‘Ofakwasi town on the 
‘Auluta river that separates those two areas. Burt suggested that Age and 
‘Ofakwasi aligned themselves more with the Kwaio and Fataleka Maasina 
Rule districts, respectively, than with Kwara‘ae. Dense trade and marriage 
relationships have always crisscrossed language divisions. Malaitans living 
near linguistic borders typically know both languages, and most people can 
at least understand neighboring languages; one often hears Malaitans con-
versing in two tongues, each person speaking their own. Thus it is no sur-
prise that language groups mixed in some towns. This reflected an indig-
enous flexibility and fluidity that Maasina Rule’s structure allowed but that 
the government administrative system and its formal divisions could not 
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countenance. A frustrated Barley had written in 1930, “The natives them-
selves unfortunately have no clear ideas as to the geographical extent of 
the different recognized bush regions into which the interior of the island 
is divided and regard them each rather as the tribal homes and sphere 
of influence of some particular ‘line’ than as a definite territorial unit.” 
Dr Gideon Zoleveke described still more diversity at Abu near ‘Aoke, with 
residents from Kwara‘ae, Kwaio, ‘Are‘are, To‘abaita, and even Makira and 
Guadalcanal.70
Clark was informed that the chiefs told people to “make im town alsame 
white man, long saltwater.” He was taken aback by the flurry of construction 
taking place, and something that struck him at Naafinua reveals Malaitan 
attitudes toward this work as opposed to laboring for Europeans: “I saw 
men, women, girls and boys carting stones, breaking them and making a 
road to the water place. The bell rings for midday rest. Then bell and work 
again. And do they work? They DO. I was amazed yesterday to see men car-
rying huge logs for a community house. Two men would carry what would 
take six hired men.”71
From A‘arai, Clark described a residential pattern found in towns 
around the island, in which religious denominations formed distinct neigh-
borhoods: “The S.S.E.M. has about a dozen houses at one end . . . then a 
small gap before seven Seventh Day Adventist houses, then ten Melane-
sian Mission houses, and finally about forty or more S.S.E.M. buildings.” 
Non-Christians, too, had their own neighborhoods, or in some cases sepa-
rate, adjacent towns. For example, at Sinalagu they built their main town of 
Koontalake (“Contract”) just above Christian Kafulagelebasi, thereby pre-
serving a fundamental Malaitan symbolic spatial scheme of ancestral: uphill 
:: Christian: downhill.72
In September 1947, Cadet Marquand, working in and around Malu‘u, 
where the SSEM was especially strong, described seven smaller towns there: 
“All these villages have been built in the last year, they are all of a standard 
type except for the ones with the council house and office. They are based 
around SSEM ‘Church Houses’ and are laid out as regularly as the land per-
mits. They are all one-roomed houses about 12ft x 8ft. In every village is at 
least one larger house for the full chief or leader chief. . . . At the entrance of 
the village is a guardhouse containing four or six beds and in some villages 
a raised lookout has been built in the trees. . . . Separate from the Christian 
villages but only a short distance away are the heathen houses, these are 
built on exactly the same lines. The council house is built on the same 
style as the Government Council House except for the office attached.” 
Many towns were arranged in similar patterns, sometimes with neat rows 
of houses separated by graveled paths, reproducing a previous government 
and mission ideal and also resembling US military camps. Kwara‘ae at Fau-
maamanu used a tape measure to space their houses with exactitude. Many 
coastal towns, especially in later 1948 and 1949, as well as some inland ones, 
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were enclosed by fences, and some had watchtowers (Pijin haetaoa), which 
people have told me were modeled after a particular American military 
radio tower at Lunga. Towns were often entered via gatehouses manned 
by “sentries” (sentirii), inspired by American ones. A few fences resembled 
stockades made by early Christians, but most were mere symbolic rails (see 
chapter 7).73
People also initiated enormous gardening projects they called “farms” 
(or sometimes “union farms” or kabani gaden). These were inspired partly 
by the ‘Are‘are repopulation project, and several officers before the war 
had advised people to replace indigenous shifting horticulture with large 
permanent plots. Another model was the vast vegetable gardens Malai-
tans helped Americans work at Ilu Farm on Guadalcanal to feed troops 
and workers (later taken over by the Protectorate). Maasina Rule people 
planned to fund projects by selling farm produce on a large scale. In Malu‘u, 
Kwaio, Kwara‘ae, and elsewhere it was sold at local markets, though in some 
places a dearth of regular markets led to waste. Davies later charged that 
some chiefs in the north (but not the south) had sold farm yields for per-
sonal gain, and Dr Zoleveke hinted at this also, though neither offered 
evidence.74 Farms were not just important for fund-raising; town residents 
also had to be fed, especially after mountain people moved to the coast 
far from their inland gardens. With this in mind, in most areas farms were 
planted before towns were built and occupied, the people staying in small, 
temporary structures whenever on the coast to do garden work. Communal 
farms were also planted near inland towns during early and later phases of 
Maasina Rule.75
In some places, smaller kith and kin groups cultivated separate gardens, 
or plots within larger farms, but many farms and other Maasina Rule proj-
ects, particularly in the beginning, demanded broader cooperative effort. 
This concept was not new to Malaitans, and for many Christians group work 
was already routinized. For example, SSEM members had long labored 
for a week or fortnight per year to maintain their churches’ and teachers’ 
houses and gardens, and they supplied food to teachers. Other missions 
had similar policies, “collections,” and, at times, tithing. Mission teachers 
also received first fruits from gardens, which in the past had gone to ances-
tors through their priests, and some food from Maasina Rule gardens was 
supplied to the higher-level chiefs and sometimes to the duties.76 Mountain 
people, too, had often worked in teams, although except for massive feast 
preparations their groups were usually smaller. We have seen that the gov-
ernment had had only mixed success in trying to compel regular commu-
nity work. Now, towns and gardens required everyone to undertake much 
more cooperative labor than ever before, of a qualitatively different kind, 
and on behalf of much larger communities.
Male “farmer chiefs” or “gardener chiefs” officially directed the farms, 
though in most if not all places women supervised much of the labor.77
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Farming followed varying schedules and fees in different areas. Clark, who 
visited the east when many farms were not yet producing, was told that peo-
ple who were still living in the mountains had to descend every second week 
to garden and bring their own food for that week, and he commented, “It 
is no joke for them. No wonder they readily agree to come down and live at 
the sea.” At Faumaamanu town in east Kwara‘ae, everyone worked for three 
days each week and also brought to town produce from inland gardens. 
Those who missed work more than once were fined 5 shillings. A similar 
system operated in Kwaio, and in both places and elsewhere “farmer clerks” 
kept detailed records of work done and produce contributed. Some people 
hoped for reimbursement later, perhaps from Americans who would come 
to help. Leaders told Noel in March 1947 that people gardened two to 
three days a week, and in some places paid an annual fee of 2 to 5 shillings 
to access produce. Other towns charged a onetime fee, or no fee, and later 
Noel was told those who gardened paid nothing for food—by then almost 
every family was contributing labor, and gardens were producing their own 
stocks for replanting. In Fataleka and Baegu, and probably elsewhere in the 
north, at least, couples with more than one child were excused from com-
munal farm work.78
The coastal farm staple was sweet potato, but most people also grew 
other subsistence and cash crops such as pineapples, sugarcane, yams, and 
corn—and around Malu‘u and Langalanga, rice, which the government 
had introduced without much success just before the war. Some living 
inland experimented with cocoa, and people continued to maintain taro 
gardens there.79 Davies tried to persuade people that their large coastal 
gardens were folly because soils there were already overworked and taro 
grew poorly (and Malaitans were well aware that soil degradation would 
become a problem in the longer term). He predicted that soil exhaustion 
would force mountain people to return home, but by early 1948 many com-
munities, even those that still maintained towns, had given up coastal farms 
for other reasons, to work smaller plots inland.80 Davies said there were 
food shortages in some places, but did not say where, and blamed them 
on young men he said worked as duties but not in gardens. Later in 1947 
he reported, “The mass of the people are hungry,” but this, at least, was 
untrue.81 In fact farms did well in many places, and, after touring the east 
coast, both Cameron and Davies, in July and December 1947, respectively, 
reported ample food, vegetables in good supply, and regular markets. Mar-
quand, based farther north, said farms were “very well run, neat and tidy, 
and it may well be that the production per unit area is greater.” In January 
1947, there were 18 farms around Malu‘u alone. People had also planted 
farms inland where soils are far better and officers did not tour. Malaitans I 
have spoken with uniformly emphasize the abundance of food during this 
period. The government later claimed farm labor was forced, citing this as a 
reason to outlaw Maasina Rule, and Peter Worsley wrote, “Numbers of peo-
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ple had died . . . through being obliged to work long hours exposed to the 
heat of the sun in communal gardens.” He cited no source for this claim 
and I know nothing that backs it; surely officers eager for anti-movement 
propaganda would have reported such deaths.82
Many towns also started piggeries with large communal pens set away 
from the residences, particularly when and where the bulk of the popula-
tion lived on the coast. Sandars was told pig breeds had been brought from 
‘Aoke to the east to improve local herds, and likewise ducks and chickens. 
Both mission rules and government laws dictated the penning of swine, 
but most inland people had always flouted these, penning their pigs inside 
houses only at night and releasing them each morning to forage (some 
in the north fenced villages instead of pigs). In 1947 many people, even 
in the mountains, began to keep their beasts in communal pens. The first 
reason a Malaitan will give you for penning pigs in or near their house is 
theft protection—pig stealing had been a popular, nocturnal, ancestrally 
supported pursuit among young men—but there was less chance of theft in 
the towns. Some in ‘Are‘are and probably elsewhere instituted a system in 
which pigs were still loosed to forage, but each week a different man acted 
as swineherd.83
Roaming, marauding pigs had often caused disputes, and confining 
them removed a source of divisive conflict, but the shift to communal 
pigpens was also part of a larger Maasina Rule effort to implement sani-
tary practices in towns. Sweeping missionary and government statements 
that towns were “filthy” are contradicted by many tour reports and oral 
accounts. For instance, Cameron in mid-1947 reported that people on the 
Sinalagu and ‘Oloburi coast were healthy, and in mid-1948 Forster was 
impressed as he led a patrol through about a dozen Sinalagu and ‘Oloburi 
mountain towns: “The area presents a marked contrast to its prewar state. 
The people are living in large well-planned and maintained villages. All of 
them occupy attractive sites and it is pleasing to see how well these people 
have managed to organize themselves. They appear to have succeeded in 
adjusting themselves to community life.” Dr Zoleveke, writing years later, 
after he had served as Solomon Islands minister of health, wrote that in 
the north Malaitan coastal towns he visited in 1951, “everything was kept 
clean and tidy.” Kwaio told me of their great attentions to keeping towns 
hygienic and ordered. This had always been an ideal for both Christian vil-
lages and inland hamlets, though of course not everyone kept to the ideal 
and different rules and standards prevailed in the crowded towns. Allan 
wrote that when Langalanga and Lau island people moved to towns on the 
adjacent coasts they had little choice of location and building materials, 
and thus their towns were poorly sited and built, and most specific govern-
ment complaints of poor sanitation concerned these towns. Later, during 
the years of government raids and mass arrests, some towns suffered more 
sanitary problems.84
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Townspeople tried to establish schools. Justus Ganifiri and Sadius Oge 
taught classes in the Kwai area, and Headman Futaiasi had 50 students at 
‘Oloburi. David Ridley, later a district headman, tried organizing a Sinalagu 
school, but told Cameron that he was being hampered by his rival Fifi‘i’s 
attempts to control it. From the information available, it seems these and 
other schools around the island had little success—most teachers had inad-
equate knowledge, training, and supplies. Like Sandars just after the war, 
Maasina Rule leaders were loath to ask white missionaries for educational 
advice or assistance, and after the government began trying to suppress the 
movement, most shunned government assistance as well.85
The Social Life of Kastom
When Malaitans took up residence in coastal towns, their lives were altered 
not only spatially and organizationally but also socially. Inland people had 
always controlled their own territories and affairs, and those living close 
together propitiated mostly common ancestral spirits and strictly regulated 
contacts with the defilement of Christians, who ignored ancestral taboos. 
Most Christians already lived in relatively large coastal settlements, but 
the towns were much bigger and they now had to adjust to residing with 
not only inland people and their ancestral rules but also Christians from 
rival denominations. From the movement’s start, its founders Harisimae, 
Nono‘oohimae, and colleagues stressed the need to transcend religious 
divisions in order to work together.86
These distinctions and rivalries were imposing obstacles to movement 
cohesion. Students of Maasina Rule have always highlighted its achieve-
ment of an unprecedented Malaita-wide political unity that Europeans had 
always assumed impossible, but impressive as this was, more remarkable was 
its success in surmounting deep local-level divisions not only of long-term 
factionalism at every level but also of newer modernist versus traditional-
ist identities and, most daunting of all, religious faiths. Whereas Maasina 
Rule’s loose pan-Malaitan alliance had little impact on people’s everyday 
lives, overcoming local divisions between and especially within towns was a 
challenge that required constant innovation and negotiation of new rules, 
policies, and practices to allow coresidence and cooperation. A most fasci-
nating aspect of town life is how these rival groups did manage to live and 
work together as a community.
The mass relocations to towns could have bred chaos, and clearly lead-
ers saw this danger. When Malaitans today describe town life, they often 
recall first the regimented routines and restrictions on personal movement. 
At times, duties manned gates to check comings and goings, and people 
needed written passes for specific errands or moves. In the north, some 
people carried passes in small bamboo tubes to move freely in and out 
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of their towns. Zoleveke wrote of life in SSEM-dominated Abu town near 
‘Aoke: “Its leaders were elders of the church and attendance at services 
compulsory [for Christians]. The village itself was fenced and everybody 
passing in or out was checked. Strict rules governed the times of working 
and rest, and a bell was rung to remind people of the schedule. The late 
night bell rang at nine o’clock, by which time everybody had to be in bed.” 
Schedules and mobility were similarly managed in towns throughout the 
island. Some early kastom codes stipulated that young people’s movements 
be kept in check, and in May 1946 Noel told the high commissioner, “A 
few natives from Malaita who preferred to be demobilised from the Labour 
Corps on Guadalcanal still refuse to return to their villages, fearful lest once 
back in their villages they will not be free to move about as they wish but 
come under the orders of the Marching Rule.”87
Coastal town residents who also maintained mountain towns or ham-
lets, or smaller Christian villages, considered restrictions on coming and 
going and vigilance by duties necessary to protect unattended properties. 
Ma‘aanamae of Kwaio recounted to me in 1996, “During the time of the 
Maasina Rule towns there was little theft. One reason is that people’s move-
ments were tightly controlled. You could not just go and casually visit peo-
ple. If you walked off without a reason people would suspect that you were 
going to steal. The chiefs would tell you where to go and when, to work in 
the gardens and so forth. You did not just walk about as you pleased.”
The most obvious reason for tighter regulations was that many conven-
tional mechanisms of social control were incompatible with communal 
town life, based as they were on complicated alliances and rivalries between 
small flexible groups anchored in distinct territories, each liable for its own 
members’ actions and for settling disputes within and between themselves. 
Adding to the difficulty was that different groups brought to towns differ-
ent rules and conventions. While individuals and groups did not discard 
their old identities and social networks, the system was in disarray with all 
of them thrown together, and the strict rules shaped a new sort of stability.
Rules and obedience of them served more than practical needs; they 
embodied the new social order, and by following rules people displayed 
shared commitment to that order. Malaitans are famously, aggressively pro-
tective of their personal freedoms and independence, and I have always 
been surprised at how Maasina Rule veterans, men and women, recall town 
restrictions not as oppressive or invasive but with high approval, as exem-
plifying how well the people organized themselves. Today, it is said that 
people followed the rules without complaint, and Maasina Rule is recalled 
with nostalgia as a time when all conducted themselves as good citizens, 
obeyed their leaders, and bettered their communities. Ian Frazer wrote in 
the 1970s that To‘abaita people similarly evoked the period as one when 
“everyone was of ‘one mind’ ” about the tasks at hand.88
Kwaio elders, too, have often painted Maasina Rule for me as a period 
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of almost utopian social responsibility, especially when criticizing today’s 
young people as footloose and inattentive. I know for a fact that some of 
these same seniors were so criticized when they were young—such cross-
generational affectations are hardly unique to Malaitans—and readers will 
forgive younger Malaitans (and the anthropologist) for hearing such high-
minded, moralistic recollections with more than a little skepticism. But 
archival records do support claims that Maasina Rule’s rules were widely 
and freely obeyed. Read, for instance, from Forster’s report of a September 
1945 tour behind ‘Oloburi and Sinalagu, where he visited early Maasina 
Rule villages: “Influence of the activity in Ariari has spread to the bush but 
seems to have taken the right direction and chiefs were actively support-
ing law and order and admonishing their followers to refrain from stealing 
and killing. Telling the truth is not a strong factor among Koio people and 
statements as above should be accepted with a certain amount of reserve. 
The facts did however appear to bear it out.” And three years later he wrote: 
“This area was formerly noted for crimes of violence which seem to have 
ceased now that they live in bigger communities.”89 Even Malaitans today 
inclined to reassess Maasina Rule critically attest to the lawfulness. Further 
evidence of a civil society is the scarcity, despite the turmoil of the period, 
of nonpolitical crimes even in the reports of officers and informants eager 
to show the social project was failing. To manage problems that did arise, 
people convened their own “kastom courts” that applied “kastom law.”
Kastom Loa and Kastom Kouti
Issues of legal jurisdiction and judicial power proved critically important to 
both Malaitans and the government and became their most explicit sphere 
of conflict. We have seen that, although most Malaitans welcomed the end 
of fighting, through the 1930s and early 1940s colonial law had become a 
crux of general dissatisfaction with government rule—its presence always 
had been most conspicuous and intrusive in its courts and in its attempts to 
stop communities and congregations settling serious disputes on their own. 
Thus there was great symbolic as well as practical import to Maasina Rule’s 
move to reassert Malaitan-controlled legal mechanisms, not only for “cus-
tom” cases and minor offenses, as the government allowed, but for most 
crimes and disputes. Here again, leaders stressed that Malaitans needed to 
follow rules made by Malaitans. Movement codes, called kastom loa (law), 
were put forward as supplanting British law and certain mission rules, 
though many codes included rules derived from both of those sources. 
Many conceived of kastom codes as, in part, declarations of legal indepen-
dence to be presented to the government. Even after wide adoption of the 
name “Maasina Rule,” both Malaitans and district officers often called the 
movement “Maasina Loa” and “Marching Law.”
An exception to demands for legal autonomy centered on murder cases. 
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Most people wanted to retain the option of handing murderers over to the 
government, and it was usually said that all would be. Some colonial offi-
cers saw this as evidence of movement weakness, an indication that people 
expected the government to keep doing the heavy lifting of law and order. 
For Malaitans the subject was more complicated. They had long used gov-
ernment jails as a partial solution to the strife that inevitably followed a 
murder, and murderers themselves sometimes opted for prison rather than 
face the danger that they or their kin might be killed in revenge. Murder 
compensations had to be to delicately negotiated; the victim’s living rela-
tives and, in non-Christian communities, each of the victim’s ancestral spir-
its and the victim’s own spirit, had to be compensated with costly sacrificial 
pigs before the relatives of the killer and the victim could again interact 
socially. But if a murderer was imprisoned and thereby “disappeared” from 
the social scene, this reduced compensation costs, including to ancestors, 
and also likelihood of strife. Christians and mountain people alike knew 
the Maasina Rule project would fail if feuding capsized their new, fragile 
unity. Better to put murderers in a government jail.90
As Maasina Rule grew, communities throughout Malaita discussed and 
drafted codes of kastom loa that often went beyond what the government 
was instructing native councils to compile. They also collected genealogies 
in order to record descent group land rights, quash divisive property dis-
putes, and protect land from possible theft by foreigners. Maasina Rule 
code-smiths were prolific, and codification meetings that often stretched 
over days became a regular feature of town life, key performative events 
demonstrating Malaitans’ determination and ability to work together for 
strong communities, social stability, and collective goals.91
Some early codification projects, both within and outside of government 
channels, bred tension between Christians and mountain peoples and 
between different churches. Justus Ganifiri, paraphrased in a 1945 story in 
Not in Vain, declared that government native councils were (as translated by 
the editors) “taking advantage of their authority and reviving old heathen 
customs and . . . causing enmity in the Mission.” Some Christians, includ-
ing Ganifiri, felt compelled to compose their own codes, not to repudiate 
kastom per se but to counter kastom codes that seemed to dictate ancestral 
taboos, compensation, and brideprice rules for all, and to explicitly deny 
their applicability to Christians. In east Kwaio, Assistant Headman Anifelo 
had attempted this as early as 1940, likely with Norman Deck’s encourage-
ment, in response to district officers ordering Christians to pay compensa-
tion for having violated ancestral taboos. When I first stayed with Anifelo 
in 1980, he was at work on a kastom codification project with much the 
same thrust, incorporating both ancestral taboos and biblical command-
ments but clearly differentiating them and to whom they applied. Early 
codes illustrate these Christian-ancestral tensions: some were written by 
Christians and contested ancestral rules, others sought compromise and 
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listed both ancestral and Christian versions of many rules, while still oth-
ers contained explicitly anti-Christian passages. Ganifiri himself compiled a 
book of laws that sought to encompass both Christian and ancestral rules.92
Despite these initial conflicts, most Christians and non-Christians soon 
joined political forces and began to cooperate on codification, though dis-
putes over content still flared up from time to time, and in places Christians 
declined to participate in writing codes that highlighted ancestral taboos. 
Some codes, again, were conceived primarily as manifestos to present to the 
government, and Christians in Kwaio and likely elsewhere rationalized that 
for such purposes it was primarily ancestral rules that needed codification, 
since “the government already knew Christian law.”93
When Maasina Rule began, something more than one-third of Malaitans 
self-identified as Christians, with more in the north than in the south.94 In 
most areas, Christian communities and those following ancestors had for 
decades been intense political rivals, typically fighting their battles over and 
through conflicting religious and other societal rules. For this reason, and 
because government had always worked to impose its idea of proper laws 
on Malaitans, by the mid-1940s rules, codes, and law generally were already 
conceived in highly political terms.95
The great emphasis Christian missions had always placed on behavioral 
rules, including many with no biblical grounding, contributed to the recep-
tiveness of both Christian and non-Christian Malaitans to the codification of 
kastom, and this linkage is made explicit in many later kastom movements.96
Nonetheless, it is well to caution here against attributing to Christianity 
a determinative influence on the Malaitan concern with rules and their 
codification.97 We have seen that detailed systems of rules had long been 
fundamental to Malaitan ancestral religions. They were markers of identity, 
modes of interaction with ancestors, and mechanisms of cultural creativ-
ity. This deeply rooted attentiveness to rules intensified their importance 
within Malaitan Christianities, particularly as oppositional identity mark-
ers. One reason the SSEM was popular was its stern social regulations, and 
some Malaitans rejected (and still reject) Catholicism because it was seen to 
impose too few rules; they reasoned that a religion so “easy” could scarcely 
be powerful. More to the point here, concerns to codify kastom rules can 
also be traced directly and explicitly to the prodding of colonial officers 
from the 1930s onward to produce “custom” codes to help resuscitate 
Malaitan societies—officers linked the two tasks and framed them under 
the colonial rubric of “custom,” as Malaitans now pursued codification for 
societal renewal under that of kastom.98
Malaitan communities around the island convened proceedings, called 
kouti (courts), which varied in composition and style from place to place. 
Though there was less crime relative to the past, offenses and disputes did 
occur, the most remembered today being pig thefts and illicit sexual affairs 
in towns. Persons who committed such offenses or violated other movement 
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rules were sometimes fined or ordered to perform community labor, and 
many kastom codes listed specific sanctions for particular offenses. Lead-
ers, including some head chiefs, mediated or arbitrated serious disputes, 
though lower-level chiefs and their communities handled most troubles, 
particularly in mountain towns. Fifi‘i told me that he and the other head 
chiefs all agreed that one thing they liked best about the concentration of 
people in towns was that it facilitated dispute management. In Kwaio, as 
in many and perhaps all places, courts were held regularly, during some 
periods every second week, others every month. Fifi‘i presided over some, 
usually at Sinalagu, often with a government headman in attendance. A 
few times he toured to all three east Kwaio harbors (where no government 
native councils or courts had ever been implemented) with duties and his 
first cousin and clerk ‘Adifaka, who later became a high-ranking police offi-
cer. Similar courts toured in at least some other districts. As time passed, 
Malaitans’ deployment of their own legal system became their most overt 
rejection of government control of their affairs. Many kastom “courts” were 
legal, while the status of others was ambiguous, and a few were clearly ille-
gal under colonial law; officers had long allowed chiefs to handle voluntary 
arbitrations but not crimes like serious assault. We will see that Maasina 
Rule’s system of dispute resolution and its purported abuses later became 
the government’s prime justification for arresting leaders and trying to 
forcefully suppress the movement.99
There is little reliable archival data on Maasina Rule courts because until 
mid-1947 they were mostly hidden from officers, except as sometimes pre-
sented as regular native courts. Malaitans suspected of being government 
informants were at times barred from court, council, and other meetings, 
and in areas that had anti-Maasina Rule factions, many recall being on 
watch for spies trying to attend or overhear. There were in fact spies in 
places, often acting for loyalist headmen, but officers’ knowledge of most 
courts was partial or based on rumor, and it was often unclear to them, 
and sometimes to Malaitans, whether a body was acting as a Maasina Rule 
court or a government native court, and whether it was adjudicating cases 
or rather arbitrating or mediating them.100
In October 1946, Forster likened the Maasina Rule courts that he had 
heard about to what he called “kangaroo courts” convened on prewar plan-
tations and more recently within the Labour Corps. Some officers, particu-
larly higher-ups, later charged that the courts had been highly abusive and 
coercive. Some appear to have believed this, but others promulgated the 
claim in order to discredit the movement and justify its suppression. I have 
found no evidence of abuse in central Malaitan courts, and clearly it was not 
the norm elsewhere. Fifi‘i, in an undated personal letter to Nono‘oohimae 
and Nori that was later seized by the government, complained that Maa-
sina Rule courts had no real power because they wielded no sanctions and 
thus people had no fear of them. All of the Malaitans I have talked with, 
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including some who lost cases in the courts, recalled them as fair, and of 
east Kwara‘ae Burt wrote, “The courts seemed to operate to the satisfaction 
of all concerned.” The vast majority of people appear to have viewed them 
in similarly positive ways, and as better than government courts. This is as 
one would expect, considering the difficulties officers had always had in 
delivering verdicts that fully satisfied Malaitans, and given the political and 
symbolic importance the kastom courts had for Maasina Rule adherents.101
People brought most disputes to the courts voluntarily, where they were 
dealt with through mediation or consensual arbitration of compensation 
payments. This is important because, again, such proceedings were not 
illegal, and officers had even encouraged them just prior to and after the 
war. In June 1947, Cameron was sent for a month to Kwai, which was Jus-
tus Ganifiri’s sphere of influence and was, along with Malu‘u, one of the 
two most difficult places for the government. Cameron thought that nearly 
100 percent of the Kwai people were Maasina Rule followers. One of his 
assignments from Sandars was to investigate reports of illegal courts. The 
government native court had not convened for at least a year, and before 
that it had been a Maasina Rule court in practice. Cameron looked into 
proceedings that local chiefs had presided over and found them “arbitra-
tion committees rather than courts,” settled by compensation and based 
on “custom law.” “The standard of justice in the so-called courts must have 
been high,” he wrote, “In spite of the widest publicity I was unable to find 
any dis-satisfied ‘customers.’ Personally I do not think that this lack of 
complaint was due to intimidation.” Though he found gathering evidence 
difficult, he believed these were legal out-of-court proceedings, similar to 
those government had always allowed Christian missions and to those con-
vened by churches, clubs, and other bodies in England. In criminal cases 
he found “ready acceptance of authority of Government,” and “no conceal-
ment of crime.” From ‘Oloburi, on the Kwaio-‘Are‘are border, he reported 
the people thought the government sanctioned their court, and, “I believe 
the court is being operated correctly and fairly.” His colleague Marquand, 
posted to Malu‘u in 1947, and then as the district officer at ‘Aoke, later 
wrote of Malaita’s “alleged illegal courts” that they “operated satisfactorily 
in opposition to the unsatisfactory Government courts.” He could find 
nobody willing to give incriminating evidence about them, “either from 
witnesses or from persons who have been convicted in them, none of whom 
voluntarily complained.”102
Still, as officers became more aware of the extent to which Malaitans 
were settling their own disputes, they grew increasingly concerned about 
what they were up to and how to respond: Were their courts coercive and 
illegal, or were they lawful mediation and arbitration, or something in-
between? Might court actions of Maasina Rule adherents be prosecutable 
offenses, perhaps grounds for arresting even movement leaders not directly 
involved in any court so charged? Officers were unsure, but we will see that 
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many Malaitans were later prosecuted retroactively and jailed based on the 
hard-line answers a legal adviser gave to these questions.
Officers later worried over news that the courts were putting people 
in locally run jails, but here there was much confusion. There were some 
offenses for which people were sentenced to terms in “jail.” But this typi-
cally meant lax internment and performance of communal work—usu-
ally cutting grass or farmwork—for a specified number of days, often with 
the “prisoner” each night returning home or being restricted to a regular 
house. Some European critics decried this as slave labor, but it continued a 
long-standing government practice of punishing lesser offenses with a stay 
in the “calaboose belong headman” and “extra-mural imprisonment”—
community labor supervised by native authorities—in the government sys-
tem up to nine hours a day, six days a week, which guidelines Maasina Rule 
also followed. The Protectorate had borrowed this concept of “gaol” from 
colonial native courts in Africa. The underlying problem for the govern-
ment seems to have been not that the system was unjust but rather that 
Malaitans were in charge of it. In August 1947, a few north Malaitan courts 
did in several cases impose something closer to imprisonment, as will be 
examined in chapter 7.103
Making Kastom Fit
While it is clear that Maasina Rule developed competent mechanisms for 
settling disputes and enforcing community rules, achieving agreement as to 
exactly what those rules were to be posed a thornier challenge. The diverse 
groups that came together in towns each brought with them various rules 
and conventions of proper social interactions and boundaries, and these 
were often at odds. The most obvious divides were religious. In decades 
of interdenominational battles a weapon of choice had always been rules, 
about everything from marriage transactions to ancestral taboos, to prin-
ciples of dispute resolution, to biblical interpretation. The most daunting 
internal challenge to the Maasina Rule project was to work out these differ-
ences in ways that preserved social harmony and order. To illustrate, I will 
focus on the broadest division with the most obvious potential for conflict: 
that between Christians and those who worshipped ancestors.
Mountain people and their ancestral spirits had to make the most radi-
cal adjustments in relocating to towns. To begin with, Malaitan ancestral 
religions are firmly grounded in physical space that is highly charged as 
social and sacred space. It is imperative that communities maintain con-
trol over everything from who and what enters their gardens and taboo 
areas—shrines, men’s houses, and women’s areas—to the relative location 
of spaces and houses within hamlets—most basically, areas demarcated as 
ancestral shrines, men’s areas, family clearings, menstrual zones, toilets, 
and childbirth clearings.104
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The majority of mountain men had lived most of their lives within one 
home territory, excepting, importantly, their labor travels, and most of their 
key life experiences had taken place there. Married women identified with 
two areas—natal and affinal. A territory’s social essence transcended the 
lives of living people to encompass ancestors who had spent their mortal 
lives there and remained there in spirit, and whose deeds were preserved 
in myths, histories, and stories that stressed the import of specific places. 
The best way to grasp the theography of the mountains, even now, is to 
stroll with Malaitans through their home territory and ask them to narrate 
the terrain as you move along. What seems “natural” jungle will come alive 
with shrines and other spots of power and danger, and countless tales of 
people and spirits once and still attached to the land. It was these territo-
ries, saturated with social, religious, and historical meanings, that mountain 
people left to take up residence in coastal towns. Clark was told, correctly, 
that many of them were less than happy in the towns because “[t]heir ani-
mistic faith decrees that any pig offered as a propitiatory sacrifice MUST 
be slain on the worshippers’ ancestral, tabu ground. . . . They naturally wish 
to remain near such sacred places.” The system is more complex than 
Clark knew: ancestors can receive pigs in satellite shrines founded far from 
their home territories. But his point holds since, to my knowledge, no new 
shrines were established on the coast during Maasina Rule. Such concerns, 
which of course cannot be reduced to practical logistics, later contributed 
to most mountain people abandoning the coast for towns they built closer 
to home.105
In the mid-1940s some Christians lived inland, usually in or near home 
territories, and for them the move to crowded coastal towns was nearly as 
drastic. But Clark said they were the first to follow movement directives to 
descend, in defiance of missionaries, who were crestfallen to lose hard-won 
mountain footholds. He wrote: “Once we abandon the bush Mission places 
it is going to be very difficult to start them again. . . . The Devil is behind this 
removal of Christian witness from among the bush heathen.” Most Chris-
tians did in fact stay on the coast after Maasina Rule.106 Many Christians who 
already lived by the sea in 1946 had once lived in the mountains, recalled 
their own past experience, and empathized with those now forsaking their 
homelands.
The potential for different Malaitan social structures to be carried into 
the crowded coastal settlements varied. In parts of the north, a limited 
number of clans, each consisting of many nested groups, were hierarchi-
cally arranged over wide areas, and these integrative structures might be 
adapted more readily to town organization. By contrast, Kwaio and north-
ern ‘Are‘are descent groups were relatively atomized and acephalous, even 
if crosscut by extensive, complex webs of ancestral sacrifice, marriage, and 
exchange. Farther south, remnants of the former chiefly system lent them-
selves to movement organization, and indeed an ‘Are‘are word for “chief,” 
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alaha, was soon adapted to title movement leaders throughout the island 
(see chapter 6).
Although these organizational structures were sometimes muddled 
within the towns, one sort of social disintegration was being reversed. Over 
the preceding decades, many kin groups and even nuclear families had 
split up when members left to join rival Christian denominations, while 
others remained devoted to their ancestors. In the towns, broken families 
were now rejoined within a single community, pursuing common rather 
than antagonistic goals. Some of these rejuvenated ties were maintained 
long after inland people returned to the mountains and even after Maasina 
Rule. Here again, the movement not only established a remarkable island-
wide unity of purpose but also reunited individuals and local communi-
ties that had become estranged, fractured by religious and other factional-
isms. This is one striking sense in which Maasina Rule was what Laracy aptly 
termed a “reintegrative movement.”107
Grasping Maasina Rule’s integrative accomplishments is essential to 
understanding its intensity. Malaitans place tremendous importance in and 
put great efforts into the creation and activation of social ties. Success in 
doing so represents more than a logistical accomplishment—on an aes-
thetic level it is for Malaitans morally and emotionally fulfilling. The funda-
mental reason big men are “big” is that they excel at doing this by means of 
exchange, feasting, and other activities they organize; their bigness is mea-
sured by the quantity and quality of social interaction and integration that 
they and their groups create. The word alaha (or alafa) can be translated 
as wide or expansive, referencing the reach of such leaders’ social agency, 
their ability to merge people across social and geographic distance. Their 
challenge is that they must constantly fight the countervailing fissiparous 
tendencies of Malaitan societies. Likewise, the “biggest” ancestral spirits are 
those that link together the largest numbers of people who maintain rela-
tionships with and sacrifice to them in shrines dispersed across multiple, 
large territories. As with mortal big men, the bigness of Malaitan ancestors 
is highly relational, grounded in their position as a nexus of social relation-
ships and actions.108
I have written elsewhere, regarding contemporary Kwaio, of how kas-
tom political activities can be understood in terms of creating and restor-
ing sociality. Kwaio today fear their society is coming undone. Their kastom 
meetings have long been the principal events that bring together people 
from throughout the Kwaio area. These meetings are themselves performa-
tive acts, which, by their very occurrence, effectively deny the disintegration 
of their community. The same anxiety over ongoing social dissolution and 
breakdown was at the center of Maasina Rule’s kastom ideology (and today’s 
Kwaio kastom activities have their roots in the movement). But Maa sina 
Rule was more than reintegrative; it created an unprecedented, unified 
social group consisting of the whole of Malaita. As Charles Fox recounted, 
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“I talked to a native of North Mala and asked him why he had joined and 
why he liked Marching Rule. He said, ‘Because it has made us Melanesians 
all one. We are all brothers now.’ . . . And so it was too in the other islands. 
British rule had not united them, Christianity had not united them, and 
here they were suddenly swept into a unity never dreamed of before by this 
new movement for independence and self government. It amazed us all.” 
It astounded Malaitans as well and stimulated them to undertake projects 
and achieve goals together in a way that had been thought impossible.109
Many difficulties of integrating town communities were specific and 
immediate. Most ancestors had long imposed strict rules concerning their 
descendants’ contacts with Christians and their villages and especially with 
their houses, where menstrual and birth taboos were not observed. Also 
problematic were ancestral restrictions on food sharing between women 
and ritually mature men, which most Christians ignored. These taboos 
were most numerous and exacting for ancestral priests, many of whom 
were important in the Maasina Rule organization and now lived near and 
had to spend time among Christian men and women. Some communi-
ties responded by building separate towns or neighborhoods, and others 
erected men’s houses in the towns’ upper reaches where, as in the moun-
tains, stricter taboos applied and Christians and women could not enter. 
Priests living on the coast still ascended to inland shrines, sometimes many 
hours away, to perform rituals and sacrifices.
Christians had to compromise too. They consented to observe some 
important ancestral rules—or at least to breach them only discreetly—in 
deference to their new neighbors, although observance deemed less than 
adequate could still cause tensions. Malaitans already had well-developed 
systems for managing the great diversity of ancestral rules followed by dif-
ferent individuals and groups, and a cardinal principal was that one should 
show respect for another’s taboos while in their presence or their territory. 
Before Maasina Rule, the degree to which Christians had followed this tenet 
varied widely. Some, especially those who lived in the mountains, avoided 
openly violating neighbors’ taboos, and some even gave first fruits of their 
gardens to ancestral priests. At the opposite extreme were Christians who 
intentionally desecrated shrines and violated taboos in order to anger spir-
its so much that their descendants would have to flee to the churches for 
refuge; at times this had caused open conflicts. During Maasina Rule the 
former approach became the norm.110
For some Christians this required shifts in religious practice and atti-
tude as drastic as those demanded of mountain people. Their teachers, 
both European and Melanesian, had taught that ancestral rules were 
Satan’s rules and that to honor them was sinful. The SSEM, in particular, 
had insisted on separation from and restricted social interactions with “hea-
thens” and their wickedness (and sometimes with people from other mis-
sions). Practices and symbols exalted in some Maasina Rule rhetoric and 
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codes had been anathema to local Christian theologies. As interdenomina-
tional town life took shape, reactionary policies had to give way to flexibility 
and compromise. For example, in Takataka, ‘Are‘are, a small percentage 
of movement donations was earmarked as “kastom money” to be used for 
religious activities forbidden to Christians. Because Christians could not 
utter ancestral oaths of denial to settle disputes, they were allowed to use 
other sorts of oaths that did not invoke ancestors. To the consternation 
of some missionaries, members of rival Christian churches, too, began to 
collaborate.111
Though people made concessions all around, some ancestral taboos 
were impossible to follow rigorously in the close-quarter towns. Conse-
quently, these taboos were modified, relaxed, or waived. Priests in shrines 
carefully explained to ancestral spirits the necessity of cooperation and 
religious adjustment.112 Since the nineteenth century, Malaitans had been 
creatively tailoring and modifying ancestral rules to make them compatible 
with life on plantations and in urban centers (as Christians had with some 
church rules), and this equipped them now to better negotiate the novel 
town conditions using already established principles.
Tensions did arise, though, and women in particular sometimes criticized 
what they perceived as men’s growing laxity in following ancestral taboos in 
the Maasina Rule towns. In Kwaio, the flip side of today’s idealistic remem-
brances of the movement is that many men and women, including some 
who evoke the period as a golden age, also recall it as a time when people 
in the service of working together let down their guard against Christian 
and other incursions. They now credit the town scene with initiating a long 
slide into religious decadence that they see as ongoing. I have been told this 
many times, but have never heard it expressed more clearly than by Oloi‘a, 
a woman from the mountains above Sinalagu, when in 1977 she explained 
to Keesing how people discarded food and related taboos. She highlighted 
personal bags, and fire hearths and coals, because ancestors pay special 
attention to them, and they are thus prime conductants of tabooness:
When Maasina Rule came, the men said, “We have to work close to the coast now, 
mixing up with the mission people. And those mission people have to mix up 
with us non-Christians.” . . . And so bags were taken back and forth, people asked 
for tobacco back and forth, and for fire. Even men ate things from the bags of 
the mission people. And we women started to kindle our pipes from the coals 
of mission people. “The Rule governs you.” That’s the way they talked about 
Maasina Rule. “It has come. The Rule governs you.” And we looked around us 
and said, “Oh, the men are taking their bags into the [mission] clearing,” . . . and 
they were the ones who ate [sacred] consecrated pigs. “Let’s us women do it too. 
When we go down to the mission, let’s take our bags into the clearing. Let’s leave 
our bags outside and peep inside the church. Let’s kindle our pipes with their 
coals. The men who consecrate pigs, the ‘custom people,’ are doing it.” . . . The 
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important men saw us do it and they said, “Oh, that’s all right.” That was the 
beginning of things turning in a different way.113
Many Kwaio women were troubled by these new behaviors. I have no 
information on such apprehensions elsewhere, though they were likely 
widespread given that antagonisms and stark divisions between Christians 
and non-Christians had been ubiquitous on Malaita long before Maasina 
Rule. These and other anxieties among women found curious expression 
in Kwaio towns, which I will address only briefly here since I have analyzed it 
elsewhere. The women’s concerns exemplify subtle but deep ramifications 
Maasina Rule had for Malaitan societies that are invisible in archival sources. 
In east Kwaio, an epidemic of aberrant behaviors broke out among moun-
tain women in one Sinalagu town due to extraordinary, unprecedented 
spirit possessions. These sparked suicides and a rash of women openly com-
mitting or confessing to violations of menstrual and related taboos, and the 
phenomenon proliferated “like the wind” (mala iru) to other Kwaio towns. 
Most people came to blame this on foreign sorceries, perhaps brought by 
‘Are‘are Maasina Rule emissaries, or else on imported buru spirits.114
In-depth exploration of this would take us astray, but a major factor was 
that many women were unhappy in the towns, and the possessions can be 
seen as a form of protest of the sort famously described by I M Lewis. Most 
women were active Maasina Rule supporters (see chapter 7), but men dom-
inated most public movement activities and women worked hard on the 
farms and piggeries. Europeans often perceived Malaitan women as docile 
and subservient, but most display a very different persona in their own ham-
lets, neighborhoods, and gardens, where they take pride in their knowledge 
and work and can have significant authority. They often play important 
roles in community decision making. Senior women exercise substantial 
control over younger women by overseeing their observance of taboos 
and managing their labor, and young women gain status as “good women” 
through participating in reciprocal exchange, being hard workers, and 
conscientiously observing taboos. Removed from their homes to the towns, 
with taboos relaxed, women lost the social and spatial context in which they 
enjoyed the most status and power. Like the rest of the populace, they at 
times needed permission to even visit their hamlets or home gardens. Very 
few had shared men’s experiences of working away from home under the 
disciplinary regimes of plantations or US military farms. The explosion of 
women’s real and supposed taboo breaking during Maasina Rule initiated 
a steady escalation of such violations that continues in parts of Kwaio today 
and has transformed the ancestral religion.115
There were other sources of religious tension. When Malaitans deter-
mined they would settle their own disputes, this laid bare old conflicts over 
compensation. As discussed in previous chapters, compensation had before 
the war become a core symbol of Malaitan social life and dispute manage-
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ment, as juxtaposed to the government and its laws, while at the same time 
Christian churches, particularly the SSEM, had long directed their mem-
bers not to participate in compensation settlements if they could avoid it. 
Some Christians vigorously opposed compensation while others remained 
highly ambivalent about it, and still others paid and even received it, in 
at least some contexts. Now, as compensation became central to Maasina 
Rule’s ideology and practice of dispute resolution, many Christians found 
their positions awkward.
European and, initially, some Melanesian missionaries urged their flocks 
to resist: Clark wrote of how SSEM teachers had always taught people who 
were “at variance” to address their problems through talk and prayer, “But 
now the heathen custom of asking for money as damages . . . to settle griev-
ances and ‘make im belly (heart) belong man goodfella,’ is being pressed 
upon the Christians. Pray that, even if it means persecution, the believers 
will not disobey God’s Word.” Some areas managed the problem as the 
Naafinua court in Kwara‘ae did, with Justus Ganifiri presiding: most cases 
were settled through compensation, but Christians unwilling to compen-
sate could instead pay a fine. This followed a government plan to allow 
Christians the option of paying compensations into native courts treasur-
ies, which was probably first suggested to government officers by Malaitan 
Christians.116
Before the war, apart from annual tax collections, large gatherings 
inland had taken place primarily at mortuary, marriage, and other feasts, 
and around the coast at multi-community Christian church events. These 
usually took on a festive atmosphere, as they still do, and after a short time 
on Malaita one notices that any sizable gathering usually means high social-
izing. This carried over to the unprecedented concentrations of people in 
Maasina Rule towns, with music sometimes played until dawn. Naturally this 
worried puritanical missionaries like Clark, who bemoaned “the ukulele 
and guitar menace” among young people in the towns he visited, “with its 
heathen singing and dancing.” He had more reason for concern than he 
knew: large gatherings are also prime settings for young people to “date” 
and court. One former chief told me women acted fortuitously as “bait” 
to keep the young men working in towns. The upshot in towns was that 
romantic relationships and sexual scandals were fairly common, leading 
when exposed to demands for compensation or marriage. Perusal of Kwaio 
marriage histories of a certain generation reveals many took place during 
residence in Maasina Rule towns.117
The unprecedented mixing of Christian and non-Christian men and 
women in towns made another problem inevitable: brideprice disputes. 
Most missions imposed a drastic limit on brideprice payments, whereas 
non-Christians not only had no such limits but saw them as emblematic 
of Christian decadence and church warfare against their ways. What were 
people to do, then, when a couple wanted to marry across these religious 
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lines? The same problem faced Christian couples from different churches 
with different marriage rules. Even marriages within one church could 
bring controversy: many Christians themselves had long chafed at church 
brideprice rules, and their enforcement was and remains today a challenge 
for missionaries and more orthodox church leaders. Before Maasina Rule, 
when Christians buckled under pressures or their own desires to pay or 
receive higher brideprice, or when they participated because they felt that 
giving a woman “for free” was immoral or shameful for both the couple 
and their families, they were condemned by more pious church members 
as deviant “backsliders.” In the turbulent times of Maasina Rule, with white 
missionaries mostly out of the picture, these issues came to the fore and 
ideas about brideprice were in flux. For example, the SSEM brideprice 
limit was soon raised from three to five large shell valuables—tafuli‘ae ten-
string shell valuables in the north, or baani‘au six-string valuables made of 
the smaller shell beads used in the south.118
The problem was further met with an innovation in brideprice calcula-
tion: shell money denominations were redefined, with standard shell unit 
terms adapted to label longer-than-standard money bead strings. This was 
analogous to declaring, say, “A dollar now means 1,000 cents.” These seman-
tic adjustments allowed Christians to pay higher brideprices while techni-
cally staying within the letter of church limits on the number of valuables 
given. The strategy originated in the north and spread south throughout 
Malaita, and it was taken to great lengths: people exchanged only the maxi-
mum of five multi-stringed shell valuables, but the individual strings could 
be over 30 meters long. Each valuable thus contained shell beads equal to 
many valuables of normal size.119
This innovation, like the redefinitions of ancestral taboos and Christian 
compromises with other faiths, represented more than just a practical solu-
tion to religious squabbles. This is clear in that, for a time, mountain peo-
ple, too, adopted the five-valuable limit and elongated valuables for even 
marriages among themselves—I have known several non-Christian couples 
that were married in this way during Maasina Rule. People agreed to adopt 
these and other new practices because they saw them as part of forging a 
new social order, of replacing division with unity, conflict with “one-mind-
edness.” The dynamics of this surely varied in different parts of Malaita 
according to the religious makeup of communities. My case data on these 
brideprice compromises comes mostly from east Kwaio, but it is all the 
more striking for that, because nowhere else on prewar Malaita were divi-
sions between Christians and non-Christians deeper, and Christians were 
still a relatively small minority. That people nonetheless worked through 
their differences in such remarkable ways underscores their commitment 
to pursuing Maasina Rule’s social project together.120
Beyond religious divisions, people saw certain aspects of Malaitan life as 
catalysts for conflict more generally, and they were banned as incompatible 
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with movement solidarity and goals. This resembled government and mis-
sion attempts over the years to suppress “bad customs.” A few examples will 
suffice. Foremost were practices associated with fighting and stealing. Ances-
tors confer powers for these (including to Christian young men who appeal 
to them secretly), and some “fighting ancestors” (Kwara‘ae akaloramo‘a, Lau 
agalimae, Kwaio adalonimae, ‘Are‘are hi‘onaniramo) will pressure descendants 
to make use of those powers. Resulting success in fighting and stealing both 
pleases those spirits and brings renown to individuals and communities—
what appear to outsiders as starkly antisocial acts can have a profoundly 
social aspect. With the imposition of British law in the 1920s, groups devised 
innovative ways to stop ancestral demands for killing by magically shutting 
down relevant shrines or modifying them to support only theft or, some-
times, only mortuary ritual. Now, with Maasina Rule’s new orders against 
both killing and stealing, this process intensified. In 1946, on chiefly orders 
and wide public agreement, priests magically constrained, muted, or disen-
gaged from many of their more problematic ancestors.121
The movement also banned or altered certain compensation types, some 
of which Christians objected to but more basically those that commonly led 
to quarrels. For example, a man could no longer demand compensation 
from another if he discovered that the man had once secretly (but celibately) 
courted his wife. Disallowed, too, were demands that a widow pay money 
to her late spouse’s family when she remarried (ostensibly in case she had 
killed him by sorcery or violating taboos), and the exacting of compensation 
from women who walked near (but not into) shrines or from feast givers for 
property stolen or injuries occurring at their events. Trees or other property 
had sometimes been destroyed when demanding certain compensations, 
but this was now forbidden. Specific kinds of curses were prohibited.122
Also barred were certain marriage transaction types, the joyful destruc-
tion of property that sometimes occurred at marriage feasts, and a popu-
lar type of saturnalian men’s feast called totora in ‘Are‘are (Kwaio tootola). 
Totora attendees were expected to be rowdy, and there was much sexual jok-
ing and boasting of carnal exploits, which sometimes led to compensation 
demands or fights. Chiefs from Kwaio southward also stopped enchained 
competitive feasts (Kwaio di‘iriu) that gradually escalated in size, since they 
diverted labor and resources from Maasina Rule work, and even standard 
feasts had to be scheduled away from movement activities. Many practices 
abandoned were never revived, and my Kwaio field notes are sprinkled with 
descriptions of older ways that end, “but that finished with Maasina Rule.”123
Kastom in Maasina Rule
Starting very early in Maasina Rule, Malaitans began working to reinstate or 
strengthen selected indigenous principles and practices, as well as to insti-
tute many new and novel ones. They compiled codes that included older 
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rules, others that were older in form but new in meaning, and still others that 
were fully innovative. As they were made part of movement platforms and 
working codes all of these were labeled kastom, and the term soon became 
the overarching label for Maasina Rule’s entire program and ideology, for 
everything from towns and farms, to chiefs and courts, plans for education 
and development, and the drive to escape British domination. Some of the 
things highlighted—for example, compensation—were powerful symbols 
of opposition to colonial policy. These exemplify Nicholas Thomas’s point 
that some aspects of colonized societies labeled as “traditional”—particu-
larly those highlighting “ethics or cultural predispositions”—are “substan-
tivized” in opposition to perceived European ways. Thus compensation 
paid by and to groups was contrasted with the European emphasis (once 
imposed on Malaitans in serious cases) on punishment of individuals. This 
was particularly so among some Christians, who held their own ambivalent 
views of compensation and other practices emphasized in the codes. But 
these elements of kastom codes cannot be reduced to the process Thomas 
described. Compensation, for example, was not “invented” for this pur-
pose; it had long been a deeply rooted, broad-spectrum means of dispute 
resolution for many Malaitans, above and beyond the oppositional, politi-
cal meanings it acquired under colonial rule, and it continued to be so used 
during Maasina Rule (and after). More important, it is crucial to recognize 
that many elements of codes that were labeled as kastom were not attributed 
any “traditional pedigree”; rather, they were recognized as wholly new or as 
adaptations of European practices. Nonetheless, the entire enterprise was 
framed as moving forward in a Malaitan way, as opposed to the European 
way, which had failed Malaitans.124
We have seen that officers were confused by kastom since they thought it 
was, or should be, synonymous with their own concept of “custom,” mean-
ing enduring native ways from the past, from before European arrival in the 
Solomons. For them, it followed that because Maasina Rule grounded itself 
in kastom it was anachronistic. Officers writing of “custom” often perfunc-
torily added “old” or “ancient” to it (including when quoting Malaitans), as 
in, “The movement seeks a return to ancient native custom.” On one hand 
this was an innocent muddling of kastom and “custom,” neither of which dis-
trict officers understood. But it was also politically useful to depict Maasina 
Rule as a desperate flight from the modern world rather than a progressive 
movement, and as an ignorant and dangerous mass retreat into “ancient 
native custom” that had to be blocked.125
Malaitans did pine for the past in the sense of a return to controlling 
their own affairs, and particularly to recovering the dignity that colonial 
rule had taken from them. As in most human societies in flux, there were 
tensions within the movement between aspirations for change and desires 
to maintain some valued, established ways. To be sure, certain explicit prac-
tices from the past could symbolically encapsulate what had been lost. But 
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the indigenous ways Malaitans wanted most to maintain were not specific 
practices but fundamental and threatened moral principles and rules that 
provided frameworks and direction for proper social relationships, and 
these, too, could be marshaled for revolutionary reform. They saw the colo-
nial system as having both undermined Malaitan ways and blocked Malai-
tan progress; Maasina Rule adherents sought to counter both, and they 
worked to resolve conflicts inherent in this dual undertaking. Those who 
joined together to create codes worked not merely to recover but also to 
discover, to find the essence of what it meant to be Malaitan in a time of 
new hopes and possibilities. Kastom was declared to be the basis for a new 
civil society, and it soon became the label not simply for specific practices 
or even guiding principles, but for the entire Maasina Rule project for self-
determination in all of its features, including, as necessary, determined 
resistance to colonial efforts to hold them back.
A key ideological theme of Maasina Rule—which still runs through 
Malaitan kastom thought today, though often in competition with other 
ideas—was the principle that “foreign” ways, while not inherently bad in 
and of themselves, are ineffective or inappropriate for those to whom they 
do not belong, and that reckless adoption of them can lead to anomie or 
social collapse.126 This relativistic precept very likely predates the colonial 
era, but it took on new resonance, first, with the growing awareness that 
Europeans and their ways threatened or had already devastated key aspects 
of Malaitan life, and later, with colonial officers’ admonitions that only by 
following their true “custom,” albeit in modified form, could Malaitans sur-
vive as a people. Malaitans had previously applied this precept most impor-
tantly to regulate proper relations between different localized groups and 
their various ancestors with their diverse taboos, but by the time of Maasina 
Rule it had expanded in meaning, scale, and scope, and it was now evoked 
to critique the imposition of European ways on Malaitans and to censure 
Malaitans who embraced those ways to the detriment of their fellows. Malai-
tans believed that for as long as they had worked under European direction 
they had been in decline, and progress would come only if pursued in the 
Malaitan way under Malaitan leaders—according to kastom.
When Nori spoke during his first east coast patrol, a central theme was 
the necessity of being guided by Malaitan sensibilities and leaders. Sale 
Kaakalade recalled his words at ‘Oloburi:
When Nori spoke this is what he told us: “We have held meetings with the white 
men, and you have seen all of those laws they have brought. They don’t belong 
to us Solomon Islanders. They are their laws from their country. They came and 
gave us their laws, and we didn’t understand them and we just followed them. 
But now, under this Maasina Rule we are organizing, you will no longer follow 
another man’s laws. You will follow your own kastom. You must select a leader 
for yourselves and for all of your affairs. Your leader must be a man whose body 
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is like yours. If he is like you, then when he tells you something you can believe 
him. But if you follow some other man whose body is different, eventually you 
yourself will be different. You’ll be different from your own place. He will turn 
you in another direction with his talk and eventually will lead you astray. No. You 
must follow a man whose body is black like yours and who speaks your language. 
Then you will be following something true.”127
From the beginning, the movement framed kastom as “Malaitan ways of 
doing things,” though we will see that it was soon given additional mean-
ings, particularly that of political self-determination, which distanced it still 
further from European notions of “custom” (and also from classic anthro-
pological concepts of “culture”). Nori and other leaders emphasized the 
need to analyze kastom, modify it, codify it, and apply it, a process some-
times referred to as “straightening out kastom” (Pijin, steretem kastom). This 
included forsaking older practices that might disrupt the social cohesive-
ness Maasina Rule required and fashioning new rules and practices that 
would help Malaitans reach their objectives. In contrast to European con-
ceptions of “custom,” to qualify as kastom something required no real or 
contrived pre-European pedigree. Kastom did not denote old ways in any 
exclusive sense but rather labeled a revisionist and forward-looking pack-
age of rules, institutions, and goals. Also developing at this time were spe-
cific concepts of “Christian kastom.”128
In chapters 2 and 3, readers were introduced to the colonial usage of 
“custom” in some detail. To briefly review, the government had since the 
early 1930s espoused a policy of selective preservation of “native custom.” 
It was believed that tribal cultures were rigid and incapable of adapting to 
rapid change. If customs were undermined too much or too fast the result 
would be anomie or depopulation, even extinction. “Good customs” were 
to be protected as possible, but there also were “bad customs” that had to 
be suppressed. Because customs were by definition old and unchanging, to 
label any new innovation as “custom” was a corruption.
The European “custom” idea was deeply flawed in that Malaitan societ-
ies never had been static and, particularly over the previous 70 years, had 
been thoroughly transformed by colonization and by Malaitans themselves. 
By the mid-1940s, few Malaitans remembered pre-European life, and in any 
case many older ways were now irrelevant to their contemporary lives. Fur-
thermore, officers were largely ignorant of Malaitan cultures and had to 
depend on Malaitans to tell them what “proper custom” was. Despite the 
concept’s artificiality and officer ignorance, custom emerged as a keystone 
of administrative policy. “Custom chiefs” were granted powers to settle dis-
putes via “customary laws.” Just before and after the war, Malaitans were 
told that where their custom was concerned they would be given more 
rights and control in councils and courts. Custom was the one realm within 
which “the natives” would be granted a say in their own affairs.
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To Malaitans, “custom” as officers were using it must have seemed a nebu-
lous and puzzling concept. It had no direct counterpart in local languages, 
and it would have been difficult for people to fully understand what officers 
meant by it.129 They knew full well that what officers seemed to denote with 
that term—precontact culture—no longer existed. They also observed offi-
cers reifying as “custom” things that were obviously modern innovations—
“chiefs,” “lines,” limits on feasting, written codes, and the like. But if custom 
was understood more broadly to mean doing things in a Malaitan fashion, 
according to what were believed to be enduring principles and perspec-
tives, this was more in line with Malaitans’ own more flexible outlooks on 
their traditions, unfettered by a need for rigid conformity with the past. If 
taken in this way, then when Malaitans were told to codify their custom, 
they could be creative in good faith.
At the same time, Maasina Rule leaders did take advantage of the vague 
and confused nature of government custom policy and of officers’ dearth 
of cultural knowledge. In 1988, Fifi‘i told me how, especially during early 
phases of the movement, leaders strategically employed kastom as a gloss 
for movement activities, including those that harmonized with government 
policies. They knew officers would be less inclined to suppress custom than 
Malaitan innovations. When officers delegated to Malaitans more control 
over custom matters, Malaitans marshaled them as kastom, an expansive, 
predatory category that came to encompass more and more aspects of 
Malaitan life that Malaitans wanted control over. As Makira’s Officer Len 
Barrow wrote: “Native Custom was always a safe card to play since it was 
Government policy to protect it so long as it did not run counter to the dic-
tates of humanity, but it could be used to cover a multitude of sins.” Other 
officers similarly portrayed Malaitan use of kastom as cynical and fraudulent, 
but the reality was more complex; while there was political manipulation, 
kastom was also a useful mediating category for interacting with Europeans. 
It could be used to translate Malaitan ideas into a category that officers 
found accessible and palatable. Some officers saw Malaitan presentations 
of kastom as simply ignorant, based on crude misunderstandings of what 
“custom” really meant. But it was not Malaitans who were confused.130
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Chapter 6
Maasina Rule and the Government
In early 1947 Maasina Rule was at its zenith. Towns were in full flower, Malai-
tans were settling most of their troubles by kastom, and for most people 
the government seemed a distant entity. This historical moment was short-
lived. As the year progressed, some officers came to believe that negotiation 
and compromise with Malaitans were undesirable or impossible and that a 
forceful crackdown was essential. This and the next two chapters examine 
in succession how the government learned of Maasina Rule, beginning in 
1945, then the path to confrontation, government attempts to destroy the 
movement, and Malaitan responses. After several years this culminated in 
an end to both British efforts at gendarme suppression and overt Malaita-
wide resistance. What emerged was a new relationship between the govern-
ment and Malaitans quite different from that before the war, as well as new 
kastom political ideologies and practices.
The Government Becomes Aware
Will you kindly, indicate briefly the nature of the “Marching Law”?
—Secretary to government to District Commissioner Malaita Sandars, 29 
Dec 1945
In describing Maasina Rule’s programs and actions, I have come out ahead 
of my story, and readers are surely asking how the government reacted to 
the movement’s meteoric ascent. One answer is that it was an organized 
and powerful force across much of Malaita before officers were fully aware 
of its existence. Their isolation from Malaitan life was at no time clearer, 
with such grim consequences for the government, than during the period 
dealt with here. As detailed earlier, movement meetings began in early 
1944 and by year’s end the name Maasina Rule had been adopted and the 
work was tooled up and running. As 1945 progressed, emissaries carried 
the movement over the island, it melded with other new political groups, 
and an overarching structure emerged. Nori led his first patrol north that 
July, and District Officer Forster later wrote that, by October, the move-
ment “was firmly established throughout the whole district” and “very little 
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opposition to it remained.” Resident Commissioner Noel later told High 
Commissioner Grantham that officers had not heard of the movement or 
of the names “Marching Rule or Mercy Rule” until 1946, and that there 
were no open manifestations of it until May of that year. This was untrue 
and suggests that he was chagrined at having ignored the movement and at 
being so tardy reporting it. In reality, officers Forster and David Trench had 
been trying to monitor Maasina Rule since mid-1945, and Sandars’s 1945 
Annual Report notified Noel, based largely on Forster’s tours, that “Mercy 
Rule” was everywhere.1
In early May 1945, a group of ‘Are‘are chiefs at Wairokai shocked Offi-
cer Fred Bentley and Cadet Roy Davies by announcing that all the people 
would soon move to the coast “so that government’s task would be made 
easier.” The officers did not object but cautioned them about problems that 
would result. Forster, who readers will recall was close to southern Malai-
tans, first got wind of Maasina Rule as a movement that June. He and Davies 
heard that Nori and Nono‘oohimae were collecting money, but Hoasihau, 
the southern region’s most important and trusted headman, and Onepu-
su’s Headman Joe Tepi both said this was untrue. Then, while Forster and 
Davies toured west ‘Are‘are in July, Hoasihau told them that he himself was 
behind a plan to install a chief for all of south Malaita. He said his ambition 
was “to see Ariari with one Council, one custom, one Paramount chief.” The 
officers departed believing that they had persuaded him to drop the plan. 
The administration’s view, Davies later wrote, was that Malaitans “did not 
have the innate organizing ability” to run such regional councils and should 
therefore form sub-district councils and worry about larger ones later. The 
Malaitan view was that government was trying to thwart their organization 
and advancement. Soon after, the two officers found the movement had 
extended throughout east Kwaio, where, as in ‘Are‘are, large meetings 
were being held. They authorized chiefs at various places to continue meet-
ing and to convene courts “to try routine native customary offences” and 
advised them to codify their “true and correct native custom.” Still, they 
were perplexed; they knew something big was in the works, but what exactly 
it was remained a mystery.2
As Malaita’s officers learned more about Maasina Rule, they could not 
settle on how to regard its activities. After a late–August 1945 ‘Are‘are tour, 
and another inland in Kwaio, Forster worried about the movement’s evi-
dent secrecy, possible misgovernment by unqualified chiefs, and the dif-
ficulties they might cause for government relations with the people. He 
lamented “the apparent lack of confidence in the Government,” which in 
‘Are‘are he blamed on the collapse of the prewar repopulation project. 
Still, he asserted that, all things considered, the movement was “a good 
thing,” citing cleaner villages, a drop in crime, and new enthusiasm for 
communal work and improvement.3 In early September, Forster brought 
Nori and Nono‘oohimae to ‘Aoke for discussion, where they spent several 
216 Chapter 6
weeks waiting for an absent District Commissioner Trench to return and, 
Davies later guessed, imparting their message to west Kwara‘ae villages.4
In November, Sandars arrived to replace Trench and sent Nori 
and Nono‘oohimae home with, Davies said, “the mildest of lectures.” 
Nono‘oohimae later testified that Sandars at this time gave them permis-
sion to appoint chiefs and build farms and villages but forbade them from 
carrying the movement elsewhere unless invited, and other Malaitans from 
traveling to visit them in ‘Are‘are without Sandars’s permission.5 Sandars’s 
initial reaction to the movement was more negative than Forster’s, and he 
told Noel that Shadrach Diote‘e (who later became a head chief) should 
replace Amasia as head of the Kwaimela Native Council in west Kwara‘ae—
partly because Amasia had “undoubtedly been mixed up with a subversive 
movement known as the ‘Marching Law’ ” and had lied about it. Soon after, 
Sandars’s 1945 Annual Report described “a semi-political and pseudo-reli-
gious movement known as the ‘Mercy Rule,’ ” which in its ‘Are‘are begin-
nings had been laudable but as it spread had been corrupted by “disciples 
fascinated by their own eloquence” and “grandiose and foolish schemes.” 
His examples of the latter were plans to shift residence from hamlets to 
larger villages and put aside family gardens for community ones. Both were 
bad ideas, Sandars thought, especially because “the naturally contentious 
and extremely parochial nature of the Malaita man would make constant 
strife and bickering inevitable.”6 But he was not overly concerned; he 
thought that the troubles were due mostly to recent contact with Ameri-
cans, particularly “Negro troops,” and that once men went back to work 
things would return to normal and native administration plans could move 
forward. “Mercy Rule” seemed “fairly under control.”7
Sandars’s remarks exemplify a dual vocabulary found in government 
writings about Maasina Rule: Here, what was formerly a pioneering gov-
ernment “project” had become in Malaitan hands a “grandiose and fool-
ish scheme.” In many officers’ writings, crowds summoned by the govern-
ment or its supporters were “gatherings” or “meetings” but Maasina Rule 
assemblies were “mobs” or “hordes.” (For Davies, the entire movement was 
“a mob.”8) Government constabularies were “police,” while Maasina Rule 
ones were “thugs.” The government sponsored “native courts,” but Maasina 
Rule held “secret tribunals.” Loyalist headmen were “confident,” but unco-
operative chiefs “swaggered” or “strutted.” I call attention to such loaded 
terms not to argue that there were never ill-advised undertakings (on both 
sides), unruly crowds, thuggish duties (or police), or swaggering chiefs (or 
headmen), and some legal proceedings were indeed kept secret from white 
people (though many were not), but rather to note that the negatives were 
often default terms applied indiscriminately to Maasina Rule and its peo-
ple. This language was heartfelt and displayed deep prejudice against the 
movement and indeed any Malaitans who undertook political actions out-
side government auspices. When this attitude met with Malaitan prejudices 
against the government, cooperation was difficult.
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By early 1946, officers recognized the breadth but not the depth of dis-
content. Sandars and others for a time downplayed it as a problem of young 
Labour Corps returnees, thankfully frowned on by older, “more respon-
sible” men. Against growing counterevidence, officers viewed the return-
ees much as Europeans once had regarded men back from Queensland—
as scallywags corrupted by naive misunderstandings of their experiences 
abroad and as outside the mainstream of Malaitan society.
Yet Sandars soon tempered his derision of the movement, and over the 
following months he and Forster met most of the main Maasina Rule chiefs 
around the island and approved their selection (Sandars was on leave June–
October 1946). At Wairokai in January 1946, Sandars rejected calls for a 
single chief to represent Malaita as well as requests that chiefs be allowed 
to judge all legal matters “according to custom,” but he did give Nori and 
others suggestions on setting up their chiefly structure and other move-
ment matters. He had determined to take up a more salutatory policy of 
constructive engagement to try to steer Malaitans’ new enthusiasm toward 
goals he approved of. Officers on other islands were instructed to follow 
his lead; in District Commissioner Central Ken Crass’s words: “Every effort 
should be made to direct the movement into Government channels where 
it may be observed controlled and assisted.”9
Early Altercations
The first half of 1946 was fairly uneventful, and officers remained much 
in the dark while the movement further consolidated. Tensions persisted, 
and Forster later wrote that by June “the movement had attained danger-
ous proportions,” and “the natives were excitable and truculent.” He was 
undoubtedly referring to three mid-1946 incidents of open defiance. The 
first involved Officer Cyril Belshaw during his May tour of Ngorangora 
village at the northern end of Ulawa. Belshaw had first visited there the 
previous December, at which time he had declared five houses unsanitary 
and ordered them axed and burned. In the 1920s Solomons, “unsanitary” 
dwellings had sometimes been destroyed, but it was no longer common 
practice even though a regulation that allowed it remained on the books. 
After Belshaw departed, angry villagers met and talked of challenging him 
the next time he came.10
On his next visit, 23 May, Belshaw ordered the village cleaned in prepara-
tion for another sanitary inspection, and the community decided that the 
first man he confronted should protest. Belshaw entered each house in 
turn, while his wife and a constable named Matanigabu waited outside. Near 
one house he saw betel nut husks and leaves on the ground and ordered 
its owner, Taheolo, to clean them up. Proceeding to the next house, he 
glanced back to see the constable sweeping them up. He shouted at him 
to give the broom to Taheolo, who sat down and untied it, he claimed in 
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order to tighten it (palm-bristle brooms require this often). Belshaw, prob-
ably correctly, interpreted this as defiance and berated both Taheolo and 
the constable, at which Taheolo vigorously challenged the entire surprise 
inspection as illegal—cleaning days were always scheduled, and only on 
Tuesdays and Saturdays—and refused the command. A large and noisy but 
not violent crowd gathered, encouraging Taheolo “not to be frightened and 
go ahead.” Afterward, Belshaw called a village meeting and determined that 
the episode was, in the words of his superior, District Commissioner Ken-
neth Crass, “entirely due to the subversive influences connected with the 
Mercy Rule Movement.” According to Belshaw, people said that Timothy 
George, who was expected to visit soon, had advised civil resistance (though 
not resistance to Belshaw specifically), and that they wanted George as their 
headman. The Ulawans themselves ended the meeting, Belshaw reported, 
“saying further talk would lead to losing of tempers.” He was told by some 
that they did not want the government anymore, but he was also told that 
Sandars supported Maasina Rule, and that “they wanted T. George and D.C. 
Malaita.”11
Belshaw urged his superiors to punish the “premeditated insolence 
unconcealed hostility and resistance.” He telegrammed Crass a list of Ulawa 
rumors (including that George was arming and fomenting violent revolu-
tion), advised “time for action soon,” and warned, “Unless I have strong 
police backing [to arrest Ulawans] there will be resistance which will set 
ablaze movement in Malaita.” He urged restriction of George’s movements. 
Crass ordered Belshaw to take no action and to apply “care and reasonable-
ness” so as not to interfere with Sandars’s Malaita policy of working with 
the movement; he also asked Makira and Malaita officers to investigate the 
rumors. Forster, who had just toured Small Malaita, telegrammed a reply: 
“Timothy George elected chief Small Malaita by General consent of people 
to which Sandars raised no objections. . . . Movement is generally for bet-
terment social conditions people,” and Maasina Rule was “anti-European 
exploitation.” Forster thought George “highly unlikely to start any actual 
resistance against Government.” Still, planter Henry Kuper, a bitter Maa-
sina Rule opponent on Makira, reported that Ulawans were “elated” at hav-
ing stopped Belshaw, and David Trench, now acting as resident commis-
sioner, ordered Crass to arrest “ringleaders” at Ulawa and to detain George 
if he visited.12
Crass’s early June investigation on Ulawa concluded that Maasina Rule 
there (where everyone was a supporter) was not obviously anti-government. 
One organizer “stressed the need to use Government backing and assis-
tance in getting the aims of the movement,” and those who had visited 
Malaita for George’s guidance, he was told, brought back instructions to 
follow the government.13 He noted anger at Belshaw’s house burning and 
believed subsequent discussion “centered round the Mercy Rule as the only 
hope of a permanent relief from such interference” in their private affairs. 
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He concluded that the trouble had been caused by Belshaw’s actions both 
previously and that morning: “Such actions would probably not of them-
selves have produced the disturbance had it not been for the radical ideas 
and feelings of self assertion which are in existence throughout the Solo-
mons. . . . But at the same time such ideas and feelings would probably not 
have produced such an incident but for the lack of confidence resulting 
from such actions.” Still, Taheolo was sentenced to two months of hard 
labor since he “failed to make his complaint in a manner through his Head-
man.” For the next few months Maasina Rule seemed tranquil on Makira 
and Ulawa. No more houses were burned.14
I present this incident at length because it so well displays a new attitude 
that had emerged among southeast Solomon Islanders: many were willing 
to cooperate with government, and at least some Maasina Rule leaders were 
disseminating instructions to do so, but they would not tolerate bullying. 
Further, the government’s speedy dismissal of Belshaw’s call for soldiers 
and suppression highlights the sincerity of its policy of positive engage-
ment, with which Belshaw’s actions were out of step. (It seems he then knew 
little of either Maasina Rule or the policy.) Nonetheless, the episode was 
later excavated as evidence that the movement was dangerous, and Noel 
(and later Colin Allan) identified it as perhaps the point at which “March-
ing Rule first showed its hand” as anti-government. Belshaw soon published 
his reading of the Ulawa situation, concluding: “There was no question 
here as to the aims and desires of the natives; concern with economic rights 
and benefits, basic as it may have been, did not appear to be uppermost in 
their minds. Instead, there was envy and hatred of the white man—hatred 
so irrational as to resemble religious hysteria.”15
Two other “truculent” events to which Forster referred took place con-
currently at ‘Aoke in mid-June just after Sandars departed on leave. First, 
people of ‘Aoke Island in Langalanga staged an honor guard of 48 men to 
greet visiting Maasina Rule dignitaries, much as government police forma-
tions had always greeted visiting colonial bigwigs. Such guards were being 
formed everywhere and greeted Nori at stops on his patrols. The ‘Aoke 
Island guard wore homemade white uniforms with red sashes and carried 
mock rifles of coconut boughs, bugles made of leaves, and drums of kero-
sene tins and paper. Their Maasina Rule leader then was Sale “One-Arm” 
Fotarafa, who had once served as a police sergeant under Bell. Forster had 
already arrested men of a guard farther north for drilling and, he said, for 
coercing a bush hamlet to move to the coast. He later charged that such 
“bands” pressured people to join Maasina Rule. Drilling itself was illegal and 
would soon become a government worry if not a preoccupation. Inspired 
partly by US soldiers and parades in the Labour Corps and Defence Force, 
it had a much longer history. Malaitans drilled on some Queensland plan-
tations; Rev Arthur Hopkins in 1904 watched a former policeman direct 
hundreds of north Malaitans in drilling; and Edge-Partington held twice-
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daily police parades and drills at ‘Aoke. Drill was also routine for students at 
some of Malaita’s mission schools, and aspects of it were adapted by SSEM 
“young people’s bands” (later called “marching bands”) in performing 
religious songs. Police touring the east coast with medical officer Gordon 
White in 1929 were asked by local people to entertain them with bayonet 
drill, or “dance belong soldier.” White said the drilling looked “for all the 
world like a bushman’s dance.” Lambert described public drills by police 
escorting his 1933 medical tour, which left a Malaitan crowd “speechless 
with awe, wonder, and a high degree of jealousy among the young men who 
envy the smart short lavalava and belt and especially the rifle.”16
At this time Maasina Rule was gaining strength in Langalanga, from 
whence men had paddled south to meet with ‘Are‘are leaders. But a rival 
Red Cross movement was still active, and some of its followers informed 
Forster about the guard. Forster later said the headman complained to him 
that Maasina Rule used the drills to “overawe” the local council and inter-
fered with native court decisions. On 12 June, Forster arrested Fotarafa and 
38 others, “tried” them on the spot, and sentenced them to four months 
of hard labor for drilling (Fotarafa, later, to six months). One of those 
arrested, Tome Waleanisia, insisted to me in 1987 that they were summarily 
sentenced with no inquiry or trial after they affirmed that they had formed 
Figure 6.1. Schoolboys drilling at the SSEM’s Onepusu center, ca 1922. (Photo by 
Norman Deck, courtesy of the SSEM Archive, 55P160~1.)
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the guard (but only an honor guard, which they had thought legal). The 
prisoners and their community hotly protested and several hundred Lan-
galanga in a fleet of canoes accompanied the district boat as it took their 
men to ‘Aoke, escorted them to the prison gates, and announced that they 
all wanted to be jailed.17
The resident commissioner later approved Forster’s arrests and reported 
that, while touring in August, “The leading Elder from the Langa Langa 
Lagoon . . . thanked the Government for the action taken to relieve his area 
of intimidation by some foolish people.” Later reports highlighted this same 
unnamed “leading Elder” (Red Cross member or not), typifying a future 
pattern of officials pointing to anti–Maasina Rule individuals or small anti–
Maasina Rule minorities and declaring that to protect their interests the 
movement and the vast majority who belonged had to be brought to heel.18
At this same time Forster received word from west Kwara‘ae headmen 
Ngwangwaki of Fiu and Amasia of Kwaimela that two Maasina Rule chiefs, 
Nelson Kifo and Sukulu, had formed what Forster loosely called a “private 
army” to the north of ‘Aoke. The next day he walked to Fiu and, after a 
meeting during which Kifo and Sukulu told him that Maasina Rule was 
not subject to government councils, he ordered the two to ‘Aoke. But they 
summoned a “mob” of 200–300 to come with them, which, Forster wrote 
to Trench, they did “in good humor.” Once at ‘Aoke the others refused to 
leave, and Forster recorded all their names and “locked them up” in groups 
of 25 in leaf houses (from which they could wander if they wished). That 
night, Norman Deck later wrote, each policeman slept surrounded by many 
Kwara‘ae, Agricultural Officer Jock Beveridge and a Chinese shopkeeper 
fled south to Buma, and Forster and Davies were “marooned” in Forster’s 
house. The next morning hundreds more Kwara‘ae arrived, having gath-
ered at neighboring Abu village, saying they too wanted to go to jail. For-
ster feared trouble, but all left when Sukulu and Kifo “exercised a quieting 
influence on the crowd” and Forster announced that the two men could 
go home, evoking cheers. Forster was bluffing and had always intended to 
release the two (he had no grounds to charge them, let alone the hundreds 
of others), but in Davies’s view, “There was no doubt that that particular 
round had been won by the Marching Rule.” Further, Davies wrote, “This 
was all done without incident and the self-discipline of the Kwara‘aes was 
even more thought-provoking in its implications than a bit of turbulence 
would have been.” Kifo was a particular worry, since “he was quite clearly 
not going to be bluffed or overawed.”19
The next morning another Langalanga fleet arrived carrying several 
hundreds to demand their men be released or that they be arrested, too. 
Unlike the Kwara‘ae, this group was disorderly, and Davies said a virtual 
riot ensued as the crowd pushed Sergeant Major Steven Sipolo and several 
other policemen off the wharf into the sea and rushed the prison, while 
Davies struggled to prevent frightened clerk Alec Maena and police from 
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shooting into the crowd. Once the police were settled and the crowd had 
surrounded the jail, Forster suggested to Davies that, given they could do 
nothing, they go and enjoy a beer at his house. In the end the crowd did not 
break into the prison and, after failed bargaining with Forster, they gave up 
and went home. Forster afterward told Trench he “had to be quite rude” to 
get rid of them and begged Trench to send over footballs and cricket balls 
so young men could “let off steam.”20
These were important events because, in Malaitan eyes, civil resistance 
in the form of the well-disciplined Kwara‘ae group lining up to be jailed 
and peacefully refusing to back down had forced the government to yield, 
while the unruly Langalanga had won nothing. The former was to become 
a basic Malaitan resistance tactic in years to come. The first incident was 
also significant as the first successful action led by Kifo, who the next year 
was to become a key north Malaitan figure in Maasina Rule’s conflict with 
the government. Further, the Langalanga considered their men unjustly 
jailed, and while Forster believed their harsh sentences had frightened the 
Langalanga and given them “a well-deserved kick in the pants,” Waleanisia 
told me that they instead incensed many Langalanga outside Maasina Rule, 
who now joined the movement. Finally, it was whispered on the station that 
Sipolo, the Malaitan there whom Europeans trusted most, had prior knowl-
edge of the Langalanga action and had incited the rowdiness.21
“Things are of course fizzing at Kwai, Kwarade (bush) and Malu‘u,” For-
ster wrote on 17 June in one of a series of personal letters to Trench. From 
these it is clear he was both amused and exhilarated by these events, but 
for the moment they altered his view of Maasina Rule. He told Trench, 
“Finally figured out that Mercy Law’s object is Malaita for the Malaitans 
and no Government” and on 15 June had noted, “Now the fact of its anti-
government aspect is revealed it should be easier to deal with.” Two weeks 
later he wrote, “The Marching Law is a political party run on Nazi or Com-
munistic lines and is tending to create a state within a state. . . . The time 
has come to wind up the Marching Law.” But Forster still thought any 
show of force inadvisable. “It would appear that natives have been going 
round with a chip on their shoulders,” he told the government secre-
tary, “and care should be exercised in choosing the time to knock it off.” 
Soon he weighed whether to arrest Nori and George, though he had little 
grounds on which to charge them with anything. In June or July he visited 
‘Are‘are, and, Nori later testified, told them their work was permitted, but 
he ordered a halt to any drilling or honor guards. He took Nori and his 
wife and Timothy George to ‘Aoke and persuaded Nori to join the ‘Aoke 
police as a third-class constable—Davies claimed by offering an alternative 
of arrest. Nori agreed, went home for five weeks, and returned to ‘Aoke 
to don his uniform. He wore it till the end of 1946, when he left under 
pressure from other movement leaders, who said he should not work as 
Sandars’s “cook boy.”22
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Provisional Cooperation
Despite Forster’s strong words, 1946 saw no more altercations, and both 
movement leaders and government officers sustained a less confrontational 
atmosphere. Sandars earlier in the year had consulted with and advised 
various chiefs on how to pursue Maasina Rule’s agenda, as he understood 
it, in tandem with the government’s, and when in mid-October he returned 
from leave, things calmed further. He resumed his previous strategy of try-
ing to canalize the movement, now working especially closely with Nori, 
whom he sent about wearing his police uniform to advise councils on Maa-
sina Rule and government working together. The two men subsequently 
took trips together around the island on a district vessel, carrying the same 
message. Sandars later testified that Nori “went out of his way on more 
than one occasion to assist Government and in preaching moderation,” 
and Divisional Officer Germond wrote that Nori “was used to solve knotty 
problems which the local headmen had failed to settle.”23
Davies later claimed that Forster fully opposed Sandars’s friendly tac-
tics. Decades later, in a book manuscript on Maasina Rule to be discussed 
presently, he was at pains to portray Forster at this time as despising the 
movement and as trying to stamp it out, and Sandars as having on his Octo-
ber return ruined Forster’s tough approach by reinstating appeasement. 
Forster’s writings contradict this claim, at least in the blunt terms in which 
Davies presented it. To believe Davies, one would have to suppose that by 
reporting his more nuanced and shifting approaches and views Forster had 
intentionally deceived his superiors, and explain why. Forster’s assessments 
oscillated between positive and negative in reaction to events at hand. In 
August 1947, soon after taking over Malaita from Sandars (while Forster 
was away on leave), Davies was to launch a crackdown on Maasina Rule 
that wrecked government administration on Malaita for years. A central 
goal of Davies’s manuscript was to justify this action despite its disastrous 
consequences, and in service of this he attempted to portray Sandars as a 
dupe of mendacious Maasina Rule leaders, to discredit his more placatory 
approach, and to isolate him by depicting Forster and other officers as hav-
ing been firmly in Davies’s own camp.24
In 1946, Forster had opposed using force against the movement, writ-
ing to Trench on 1 July, “I know Sandars more or less said it could be 
done . . . but he was about to go on leave and would not have to cope with 
the aftermath.” Then, just before Sandars’s return that October, Forster, 
in a comprehensive report on Maasina Rule, again called attention to the 
movement’s positive gains in law and order, “custom” codification, bet-
ter villages and gardens, health and sanitation, and, especially, a “revival 
in natives’ interest in their own affairs.” Since June he had seen “a great 
increase in frankness and willingness to co-operate with Government.” He 
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hoped this could be sustained, since “failure to win and maintain the con-
fidence of the Malaita people . . . may seriously prejudice the future of the 
Protectorate.” Forster was optimistic, for he believed Nori’s influence was 
waning, headmen’s confidence in the government had been restored, and 
white SSEM missionaries were now reining in their flocks. Disappointment 
awaited him on all three fronts, and, as Davies bemoaned, “The Marching 
Rule proved a plant of sturdy growth.”25
Beyond trying to reroute Maasina Rule, Forster and Sandars had a wily 
aim in bringing Nori into the police and working with him publicly: they 
hoped that by appearing to co-opt Nori they could undercut his reputa-
tion and thereby weaken the movement. Readers should remember this 
when appraising later, pious government complaints that movement lead-
ers manipulated or deceived officers. The two officers succeeded to the 
extent that Nori suffered criticism, most notably from some southern lead-
ers, that he was now government’s man, or had “turned the movement over 
to the government,” and he was for a time abandoned as an overarching 
leader. But the officers were too clever by half—Nori was relatively moder-
ate and progressive and was the leader with the strongest working influ-
ence throughout the island. In the end, to the degree they deflated him, 
they undermined government’s ability to deal with Maasina Rule. Contrary 
to their assumption, the movement had not hitched its wagon to Nori’s 
star. More important, their tactic had the unintended consequence of add-
ing to Malaitan confusion about Sandars’s own position on Maasina Rule. 
The spreading idea that he fully supported the movement caused the gov-
ernment serious problems. Already the previous May, Ulawans had told 
Belshaw that Sandars supported the movement, and while Sandars was on 
leave in September, letters circulated saying he had gone to England to 
secure for Solomon Islanders a £12 monthly wage. Davies said that clerk 
Maena told him in October that people from Laulasi, in Langalanga near 
‘Aoke, saw Sandars as Maasina Rule’s leader, and Davies claimed that even 
loyal headmen suspected Sandars really was “the Father of Marching Rule.” 
This confusion extended upward; after Noel later met with movement lead-
ers, letters circulated saying that he, too, had approved the movement’s 
programs, except for demands for a £12 monthly wage. Years later Allan 
wrote that leaders respected Sandars and had asked him to be the move-
ment’s secretary: “His tongue in cheek response was that they could not 
afford to pay him the wages; to which, they asked how much did he earn, 
adding that they would pay him £100 more.” When the head chiefs were 
later arrested and tried, multiple defendants, including Nori, told of San-
dars’s, Forster’s, and Noel’s authorizations of various Maasina Rule activi-
ties, citing or quoting multiple, specific talks with them.26
A final defect in the strategy to undercut Nori was that he was no fool 
and likely spotted their game; it was probably due at least partly to his 
influence in ‘Aoke that the entire police force joined the movement, and 
Maasina Rule and the Government 225
not long after he returned home they temporarily resigned en masse (see 
below). Still, as Sandars had instructed, Nori did hold discussions at various 
places—by all accounts in earnest and good faith—about how Maasina Rule 
should work together with government councils.27
By late 1946 most Europeans in the Solomons had awoken to Maasina 
Rule’s magnitude. Initial disbelief gave way to shock. Fears of a violent 
Malaitan uprising had always lurked, but it had been taken for granted 
that Malaitans were too fragmented, xenophobic, and backward ever to 
unite as a serious political threat. A divided Malaita was controllable, but all 
knew that, as Sandars later wrote, “Malaita would be extremely difficult to 
run if all the people were good friends together.” While the ‘Are‘are were 
constructing a multi-tiered Malaitan leadership structure, legal codes, and 
social programs, Trench had bemoaned the difficulties of native adminis-
tration in the face of “the general backwardness of the population, to whom 
the conception of Government as we know it in any form is still rather 
strange.” And how could officers have anticipated that Malaita would pro-
duce powerful political organizers? Most had long believed Malaitan lead-
ers, including many headmen, to be weak, incompetent, or corrupt, and 
a tour report cliché was the notation that an area visited had “no suitable 
leaders or outstanding personalities.”28
Charles Fox recalled European distress at the movement’s impressive 
organization and the fact that Islanders had hidden it from them: “Men 
you had known from their childhood, who you expected would tell you 
anything, would not tell you a word about it. . . . It astonished those of us 
who knew them best.” Many Europeans began criticizing the government 
for not cracking down, for they saw officers’ attempts to work with Maasina 
Rule as condoning the intolerable.29
A turning point came on Boxing Day, 26 December 1946, when by 
arrangement Sandars and the head chiefs held the first of several public 
meetings at ‘Aoke station. In an orderly and cordial atmosphere, nearly 
6,000 men attended what was at that time the largest gathering ever held on 
Malaita. Just beforehand, Sandars was handed a list of policies titled “The 
Heads of the M.R. Council Decision,” which stated, in sum: Maasina Rule 
would work together with the native courts and leave “big” cases to Sandars; 
communities would have at least 100 residents; the movement would not 
oppose mission or other training and would send young men for agricul-
tural instruction; anyone could join Maasina Rule who agreed to follow its 
rules; the movement did not oppose the government or the missions; and 
finally, chiefs across Malaita were to set their people to work on economic 
development.30
Sandars responded to each point: he approved larger villages and sec-
onded the calls for training, cooperation with the government and mis-
sions, and economic development (especially production to market to 
outsiders), but he said that the movement must not put “moral pressure” 
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on people to join. He also stressed “the need for loyalty to our King by 
all” and warned against drilling. More problematic was the court issue, on 
which Sandars vacillated. He told the gathering that “matters of Native Cus-
tom, small criminal and civil cases were already dealt with by the existing 
Native Courts and Councils; that many of the men present at the meet-
ing were both Councilors and Justices and that the system seemed to work 
well when all the people pulled together.” This tiptoed around the call for 
Maasina Rule’s direct participation in the legal system. Soon after, Forster 
observed and publicly approved of a court at ‘Ataa run by the headman and 
movement chiefs together, with the verdict decided by the local Maasina 
Rule council. When the chiefs later told Sandars of this he was, according 
to Head Chief Heber, “very pleased.” A few months later “Maasina Rule 
courts,” some presided over by the same “councilors and justices” who had 
received Sandars’s approving nod, became government’s main grounds for 
attacking the movement.31
At the ‘Aoke meeting, Sandars formally received the names of the nine 
head chiefs. Nori, despite Sandars and Forster’s efforts to weaken him, was 
again presented as an overarching chief. Sandars wrote afterward: “These 
men [except Loia of Funafou in Lau] are of good character and known to 
the District Commissioner [Sandars] personally. It is the District Commis-
sioner’s opinion that these men have the well-being of the people at heart 
and if they can be guided by friendly advice they may assist the Government 
in its aims.” Sandars was also informed that people thought a fair wage 
would be £12 per month.32
Cadet Davies’s experience of this meeting was strikingly different from 
that of Sandars and also of the several Malaitan attendees I have known, 
and it betrayed a visceral fear that would mark his dealings with Malaitans 
in the coming year. He had awaited the meeting with trepidation: “Perhaps 
the District Commissioner was at last to be given his orders and told what 
he could and could not do on Malaita henceforth. I wondered whether 
the leaders would produce a large mob and whether they got around to 
considering violence. . . . There was no longer any doubt in my mind that 
the Marching Rule was going to stage some sort of coup.” He described 
Sandars at the meeting as “being harangued and haranguing.” “The men 
were disciplined and orderly, but the naked menace was there; weapons or 
no weapons, 5,600 adult male Malaitamen gathered together was a danger-
ous event. . . . The multitude was quiet but emanated curiously disturbing 
wavelengths and I formed the impression that it could quickly become an 
excited mob.”33
Wavelengths notwithstanding, other officers and many Malaitans saw 
the meeting as a breakthrough, and it ushered in a high point in relations 
that lasted into the following spring. Sandars still worried that northern 
areas—especially To‘abaita and around Kwai harbor, and excepting west 
Kwara‘ae—might be developing “along quite different and less desirable 
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lines” than the south, but he hoped that was “largely a matter of political 
growing pains.” Government options were in any case limited. The great 
majority of Malaitans now belonged to Maasina Rule. It could no longer 
be spoken of as a commotion by a recalcitrant minority; the 1946 Annual 
Report acknowledged that 95 percent might, as claimed, be adherents, and 
officers reported unanimity in many areas.34
A few days after the ‘Aoke meeting, Davies left for a post on Makira, happy 
to leave behind “Marching Rule with its truculent bloody-mindedness; its 
perverse obstruction of everything the Government tried to do even when 
this patently meant cutting off their noses to spite their faces; the lies, the 
threats, the distortions, and all that pathetic wasted energy,” and rumors of 
foreign invasion. “I was sick of the bloody lot of them.”35
In January, High Commissioner Grantham visited the Protectorate and 
met with Noel and district commissioners. Afterward, he penned a report 
to the secretary of state for the Colonies: “[Maasina Rule] is not primarily 
subversive or disloyal in intent. On the contrary, the fundamental aim is the 
development and welfare of the people, who, the leaders consider, should 
have a greater control over their own affairs, at any rate in minor matters. 
These are admirable aims, and are in fact the policy of Government. In a 
primitive community, such as the Solomons Islands, it is only to be expected 
that there should be some undesirable manifestations. But these on the 
whole have not been the result of deliberate malice or wickedness, but are 
rather the result of wild rumours coupled with the general unsettlement 
consequent on the war, and an insufficiency of females as wives for the 
young men. . . . If we can keep the movement along these lines and not drive 
it underground, good will come of it.”36
Much credit for this upbeat assessment must go to Sandars, who by 1947 
was the Protectorate’s most senior officer under Noel and highly respected 
by other officers (excepting Davies), especially regarding Malaitan affairs. 
He had spent over seven years on Malaita since his arrival just after the 
assassination of Bell, the only officer to serve there longer. For Maasina 
Rule’s younger leaders, Sandars had from their childhood been the most 
important government officer and, except for Forster in some quarters, 
he was the best known and liked. Sandars now knew more about Malaitans 
than he had in the mid-1930s, knew more of them personally, and, most 
important, clearly held them in higher regard. He knew the chiefs were not 
evil or reckless and respected them and many of their goals, some of which 
he himself had promoted for years. In many of Sandars’s reports of 1947 
one finds a palpable excitement at the rush of activity and people’s eager-
ness for change. Now in his fifties, he approached the end of his career, 
having seen many a well-meaning project falter along or fail outright, often 
for lack of Malaitan enthusiasm or for, as District Officer Bengough had put 
it, a dearth of “natural leadership, sense of public responsibility and com-
munal co-operation.” Now Malaitans had grabbed the reins to undertake 
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some of these same projects, with impressive leaders, solidarity, and intense 
initiative. It is no surprise that Sandars viewed Maasina Rule more positively 
than did most Europeans, particularly after the affable Boxing Day meet-
ing. Perhaps he recalled his stint attached to the British “Black and Tans” 
in Ireland during the 1920s, when he had been sympathetic to the cause 
he was tasked to suppress, which he termed “Ireland for the Irish,” as he 
now expressed sympathy toward Maasina Rule and its desire for what he 
called “Malaita for the Malaitans” (though he certainly would have opposed 
Malaitan independence). Davies wrote that Sandars saw Maasina Rule “as 
a heaven-sent opportunity to get things done after years of fighting the 
deadweight of conservatism,” and Norman Deck said Sandars told SSEM 
missionaries that it was “the very thing that he had been hoping for, and 
that he was going to foster and guide it into right channels.” For the next 
six months Noel would follow Sandars’s advice and back his efforts to tame 
the movement. But when the following July Sandars left Malaita for the last 
time, so did the government’s strategy of cooperation.37
The Path to Conflict
Initial and later European impressions that Maasina Rule was subversive 
were, from a colonial perspective, accurate in the sense that a central tenet 
held that Malaitans should control their own affairs with minimal interfer-
ence, to a degree that the government had no intention of allowing. The 
movement did conceal some of its initial organizing activities, though later 
movement leaders became quite candid, and as Cadet Wilfred Marquand 
observed, they held many meetings “within a stone’s throw” of ‘Aoke sta-
tion. One often gets the impression that some of the secrecy stemmed not 
from hostility or a fear of suppression but rather from a belief that govern-
ment was no longer terribly relevant to Maasina Rule’s project. During the 
war, Malaitans had, in Forster’s words, “seen white people in a new light,” 
and their perception of the colonials’ place in the wider world had changed 
accordingly: “From being ‘masters’ they had become a minor party of a vast 
machine.” Reading the archives, too, one realizes that many officers consid-
ered “secret” almost any idea or activity that they had not pre-approved and 
were not supervising.38
Then again, to say that Maasina Rule was fully subversive is inaccurate in 
that many leaders and members were not unequivocally anti-government. 
As we have seen, some movement courts and councils separated from their 
government counterparts, particularly where headmen were antagonistic, 
but they more often absorbed or melded with them, sometimes with head-
men as members, their status left ambiguous to Malaitans and Europeans 
alike. Leaders, particularly in the south, often denied that the movement 
was anti-government—they welcomed and even urged the government 
Maasina Rule and the Government 229
to help with medical, agricultural, and other services, and they consulted 
often with colonial officers. For many leaders and followers this coopera-
tive stance was clearly genuine, if fragile and at times tentative, into early 
months of 1947 and, for some, after that. Even Davies, who usually por-
trayed Maasina Rule as a disingenuous conspiracy, acknowledged that Maa-
sina Rule chiefs did not see their dispute resolution proceedings as illegal.39
Some of the ambiguity came from similarities of movement goals to 
those promoted by the postwar colonial administration: new councils and 
courts, codifying “custom” and shedding “bad customs,” law and order, 
larger and cleaner villages and gardens, and medical services and educa-
tion. Ambiguity increased when officers began to openly encourage these 
and other aspects of the movement and worked to integrate them with 
government programs. Because many Malaitans perceived officers as sup-
porting many Maasina Rule projects—as indeed Sandars, Forster, and even 
Noel at times professed to—they did not see joining the movement as a 
seditious move, and a steady flow of letters and rumors fostered that view. 
In the midst of this, Sandars hoped to shepherd Malaitan ambivalence into 
full collaboration between government and the people. It is important to 
remember when talking of Maasina Rule as a “resistance movement” that, 
though adherents were keen to resist a return to the prewar colonial sys-
tem, many at this time did not agitate for outright rejection of the govern-
ment, and even those that did so sought not just to resist but also to create 
new, forward-looking programs to improve Malaitan life.
We will see that when relations later collapsed, some officers declared ret-
rospectively that Maasina Rule statements of cooperation with government 
had always been a massive charade. To explain events in this way requires 
belief in a fantastic conspiracy reaching far beyond secreting aspects of the 
movement, one that thousands of Malaitans acted out for years—not only 
in their actions toward government but also among themselves—and even 
maintained for decades after. The reality was far more complicated and pre-
sented awkward problems for those who later determined to bluntly vilify 
and crush Maasina Rule. Officer Marquand later wrote that many Malaitans 
had said, “They joined because they did not believe that the movement 
was against the Government. Often they held responsible positions in the 
movement, and it seems hard to believe that they did not understand what 
they were joining. . . . It makes one wonder if the theory that the movement 
was subversive is really correct. Undoubtedly the natives demonstrated 
avoidance after the end of the war, but this in itself is hardly subversive.”40
Shortly after the Boxing Day meeting, in January 1947, a new Native 
Administration Regulation was adopted. It authorized native councils, but 
communities could only nominate their members for appointment at the 
resident commissioner’s pleasure. Headmen were automatically council 
presidents and assistant headmen vice presidents, and all council resolu-
tions required the resident commissioner’s approval. Marquand wrote, “A 
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resolution passed by the council through the District Officer to the Resident 
Commissioner and to the Legal Adviser and back again, usually returned 
so long after the event, that it had either been put into effect regardless, 
or forgotten. It had also usually been rewritten by the Legal Adviser so as 
to be completely meaningless to the people who had passed it in the first 
place.” The regulation assigned to councils a range of responsibilities: to 
define and regulate “non-repugnant” native customs; to pursue develop-
ment, public health, and education; and to preserve law and order. It set 
rules for native council funds into which native court fines and fees would 
be paid. Headmen would control these funds, for use, again, only with the 
resident commissioner’s consent.41
Aspects of this and the 1945 Native Courts Regulation potentially gave 
considerably more leeway to councils and courts to run their own affairs. 
However, Marquand lamented the BSIP administration’s insertion of sec-
tions, such as one requiring high official approval of their resolutions, that 
undermined the basic principles of “community development” toward the 
self-government that the secretary of state had declared were to guide Brit-
ish colonial policy worldwide. Their insertion showed “a lack of understand-
ing and knowledge of these principles, or an unwillingness to put them into 
effect.”42
In the first months of 1947, two new cadets were assigned to Malaita who 
over the next two years became central figures in government dealings with 
the movement. Peter Cameron, age 27, spent much of 1947 working on the 
island’s northeast coast, at times based in the Kwai area in east Kwara‘ae. 
In March, Forster took extended leave due to “nervous exhaustion,”43 and 
in early June his replacement, the earlier-quoted Wilfred Marquand, age 
29, began working in Malu‘u and other areas farther north. Cameron and 
Marquand wrote some of the most detailed accounts of events during this 
period. Cameron was to remain committed to the government program 
until his departure at the end of 1948, while Marquand later became disil-
lusioned and authored a scathing critique of the government’s Maasina 
Rule policies for a 1950 London Devonshire Course for colonial officers.44
Davies wrote in his manuscript that both Cameron and Marquand “had 
only recently left the Armed Forces after spending all the war years in them, 
during which time both were badly wounded, and they saw things in largely 
military terms—people who broke the law should be dealt with firmly and 
promptly. There was no question of compromise for them.” But this por-
trayal, like Davies’s depiction of Forster as reactionary, was a concoction, 
and we shall see it starkly contradicted in their reports and, for Marquand, 
in Davies’s own writings.45
While the two cadets worked in the north, Sandars also toured, visiting 
most passages around Malaita, including the most difficult areas of Kwai 
and To‘abaita: “At every center I was well received,” he recorded, “and the 
people were very willing to hear what I had to say.” He believed that the 
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southern people would cooperate with government councils, but about the 
north he remained less confident. The only complaints he heard in east 
‘Are‘are, in areas that were 100 percent Maasina Rule, were that he should 
visit more often. He discussed with people everything from the tax that a 
king’s regulation would soon reimpose, to how to base a council’s future 
laws on “the best of native customs together with a certain amount of ‘white 
men’s’ laws,” to the meaning of “freedom.” He even arranged for the gov-
ernment to buy produce from movement farms.46
Cracks did appear in the amity. In February Sandars recruited 50 north-
ern men to work in Honiara, breaching movement policy and broad Malai-
tan consensus that men were to stay home. Then, in March, Loea of Lau, 
the only head chief Sandars disapproved of, was given five months in jail for 
nonpolitical “sundry misdemeanors.” In early March, also, Sandars found 
out that his two top policemen, Sergeant Major Stephen Sipolo of Ngon-
gosila in the Kwai area and Sergeant Eban Sau (full name Funusau) of 
Fokanakafo in Fataleka, were involved in plans for a constabulary walkout 
set for 30 June. Forster had the previous year jailed Sau for participating in 
and probably leading a police strike for better food, but Sau later returned 
to duty. People had whispered their suspicions about Sipolo’s loyalty for 
months, including to Sandars, but Sandars had known both men for as 
long as he had been in the Solomons, so when matters came to a head he 
was astounded. Sipolo had been an exemplary officer since the 1920s (he 
refused to take part in the 1927 attack on Kwaio) and had helped to sup-
press the Fallowes and Red Cross activities, but then he retired in 1939, only 
to return to duty during the war. Trench said that for the first half of 1946 
Sipolo had “acted, in effect, as District Officer” at Kirakira on Makira. After 
the previous strike Sipolo had replaced Sau as ‘Aoke’s commanding officer. 
In late 1945 Sandars had told Sipolo to stay with Maasina Rule, “to help 
me to keep this as a good movement which it was when it started.” Other 
police looked up to Sipolo and Sau, and now Sandars wrongly blamed 
them for ongoing problems in Kwai and To‘abaita since they had trained 
many police from there. He threatened to cancel their pensions unless 
they renounced Maasina Rule, but they refused and were dismissed. We will 
encounter both men again. After a short walkout, Sandars reported, the 
other police reenlisted and seemed happy, but they remained “Marching 
Rule almost to a man.”47
Rejecting Indentured Labor
On 17 March, Sandars and Noel met at ‘Aoke, first with headmen and then 
with several of the head chiefs. The chiefs told them an island-wide strike 
for a £12 monthly wage was planned for 30 June, exempting at Sandars’s 
suggestion hospitals and missions. Further, they said people had no money 
to pay the impending tax. After the meeting, Noel wrote that Maasina Rule 
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“manifests an irresistible, blind urge, illogical and unyielding,” which could 
not be suppressed but only “guided,” and once again he stressed the move-
ment’s positive potential to develop into “a naturally evolved form of indi-
rect rule.”48
For Malaitans to strike seems redundant insofar as the vast majority had 
turned down outside work throughout 1946, in remarkable solidarity. Of 
the diverse expressions of Maasina Rule across the island, this was the most 
consistent and unifying.49 Why then were strike plans announced to Noel 
and Sandars? Malaitans had bandied about calls for a £12 wage since the 
1930s, as had movement leaders for some time, but a formal strike and 
refusal to pay taxes would be a new, open challenge. Trench, Davies, and 
Colin Allan later supposed the chiefs knew that £12 was unrealistic and 
were merely underscoring the determination not to labor. There is truth in 
this, and Nori later testified that Timothy George had told him in mid-1946 
that he did not think a strike could win that wage. The timing may have 
been prompted by Sandars’s recent recruiting in the north, which might 
have tempted some young men to break ranks, and indeed Noel hoped so. 
Some officers portrayed the strike as a cynical political maneuver by chiefs 
aimed at defying the government or a crass attempt to control the populace 
and, particularly, impetuous young men.50
Chiefs were conscious of the political import of keeping young men in 
line with movement policy, but most of the rank and file also wanted men 
to stay home for other reasons. The previous October Forster had writ-
ten, “In telling the natives not to work for the white people the Masina 
Law is mainly preaching to the converted.” Because Malaitans’ refusal to 
labor was a core aspect of their conflict with the government, readers need 
to understand their motivations. First, the refusals to labor and to pay tax 
were inextricably linked. Noel addressed long-standing criticism that peo-
ple were taxed to force them to labor. He argued that, unlike the prewar 
poll tax, the new “Native Administration Tax” about to be imposed would 
be kept and spent by native councils (under his supervision) and was not 
an income tax, so the critique was now invalid. However, even if Malaitans 
had trusted this explanation—and Marquand wrote that in fact the primary 
reason for the new tax was, as in the past, to compel labor—the tax would 
still be compulsory, which, since few Malaitans could earn money at home, 
meant that many would have to enlist for extended periods as indentured 
plantation workers. I note this to argue not that the tax was unjust per se 
but that Noel’s dismissal of a tax-labor linkage was disingenuous. Or per-
haps Malaitans, from long experience, simply understood that linkage and 
its implications for their communities better than he did.51
The Native Tax Regulation of January 1947 imposed a 5-shilling tax on 
Malaitans (and a tax on employers for each person hired), though as it 
turned out no taxes were collected there until late 1949. The regulation 
said the money would be deposited into sub-district native council funds; 
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internal documents said it would go into the general revenue, and district 
commissioners would have the option of so depositing some or all of the 
money. Sandars assured unhappy Malaitans that he would do so, but he 
met with complaints that since councils could not hold their own funds the 
government would earn interest from them. More to the real point, they 
saw paying the tax as a submissive act, and indeed Tom Russell later recalled 
that there was extreme reluctance to allow Islanders to collect their own tax 
because “the tax was symbolic of fealty.” Some officers still held Ashley’s old 
view that Malaitans had no use for money except to pay tax.52
To begin to grasp the enduring impacts of taxation and circular labor 
migration on Malaitan communities, we can turn to District Officer Wil-
liam Bell. With his experience as a labor official on Fiji vessels, and then 
as a BSIP labor inspector in the 1910s, Bell recognized how the plantation 
system fundamentally exploited not just laborers but also their families at 
home: “Many employers of native labor in the Solomon Islands appear to 
think that they should receive all their money back from the labourer forth-
with [by selling them goods in company stores at 100 percent profit], and 
also the labourer back, unless he has become useless and then he can be 
dumped onto his people. They appear to think that the natives should be 
treated as cattle, and they do not for one moment consider the people who 
have suffered pain, and years of worry and toil, in order to bring the natives, 
who become labourers for the white man, into the world and to provide for 
them until they reach a state of usefulness.” As Judith Bennett has noted 
in relation to this same Bell statement, his critique anticipated neo-Marxist 
models of the 1970s, most famously that of anthropologist Claude Meil-
lassoux, who argued that self-sufficient rural communities subsidize the 
capitalist sphere of production when they supply it with workers “fed and 
bred” in their own domestic economies. They thereby bear the costs of 
reproducing its labor force—nurturing boys to working age and later car-
ing for them when they are too old to work. Further, the community loses 
the fruits of the labor of its fittest men to the productive endeavors of out-
siders (Solomon Islands men aged 16 to 60 were to be taxed). Another cost 
of the system on Malaita was that, with so many men away, the burden of 
women’s work grew. Work conditions had improved since Bell’s time, but 
indenture’s negative social impacts remained.53
Colonial policy had exacerbated these impacts when, long before the 
war and at the behest of plantation interests, beach payments were banned 
and the wage advance cut. Before this, kin typically shared in recruits’ trade 
goods, and the recruits gave them some of their advances to pay their own 
taxes. Jack Barley and others argued the changes were needed to “protect” 
the recruit “from being duly imposed upon by relatives, friends, and others 
who remain at home and for whose sake under present conditions he is 
virtually compelled to labour for six months without remuneration.” One 
intention, then, was explicitly to reduce the benefits that families and com-
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munities received in return for their men going abroad. This forced more 
local men to the plantations to earn money for taxes.54
Malaitans were attuned to the socioeconomic costs of raising workers to 
adulthood. Short- and longer-term adoptions were common, and if bride-
wealth was later paid for an adoptee as an adult, adopters could claim a 
share by citing their expense and effort in having “fed” the woman who 
would now labor for her husband’s family. Malaitans also recognized the 
opportunity costs the labor system imposed on them. Noomae, an elderly 
‘Oloburi man, in 1982 explained to me the reasoning: “Thousands of 
Malaitan men have worked in other places. If they had worked here on 
Malaita for their own people, Malaita today would be like Honiara town.” 
Since Maasina Rule’s 1945 “First Order of the Island,” leaders had said men 
could not go abroad because they were needed to work on and for Malaita, 
but officers rarely took this argument as legitimate or sincere. For example, 
when Ken Crass was visiting the London Colonial Office, an official sug-
gested to him that ongoing labor problems were due to continuance of the 
indentured labor system. Crass replied the issue was not that, but rather “the 
politically active M.R.M. with its ‘apparently’ nationalistic aims was largely 
responsible,” along with people having been spoiled by the high wartime 
wages. In August 1948, as Malaitans still refused to work, Noel told the new 
high commissioner, Leslie Freeston, “There is, I can assure Your Excellency, 
nothing in the rights or wrongs of the present system of indenture which 
is relevant to the present political ills. Men who volunteer on Malaita for 
work on plantations ‘overseas,’ realize that there is advantage in securing a 
contracted period of service, and do not object to a period of one year.”55
The years of no plantation work or taxes had removed any doubt that the 
indenture system was parasitic on Malaitan societies. Take Forster’s observa-
tions from an April 1948 tour of Malaita, by which time shortages of cash 
and foreign goods were even more acute. In a section on labor he wrote: 
“Although a number of scattered young men would like to work almost the 
entire population is opposed to working away from their homes. Most of the 
chiefs absolutely refuse to discuss this question at all. The effect of having 
the former labour force at home has been extremely beneficial to the Dis-
trict. Areas which before the war were notoriously poverty-stricken and with 
declining populations are now prosperous and vigorous communities.”56
Noel’s comments on Forster’s report ignored this section, although, or 
because, labor was a prime concern of Noel’s, and this perhaps motivated 
Forster’s extended commentary on the topic two months later: “The native 
condemnation of the plantation system is that the man power is better 
employed at home. The returns from plantation work were too small to 
justify the absence of the men.” Forster granted this argument’s validity, 
and wrote, “The changes that have occurred since the war with the cessa-
tion of outside work have been remarkable.” He proceeded to blame the 
indenture system for past malnutrition; poor living conditions and espe-
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cially poor housing; marriages deferred until a later age, which led to more 
orphans and widows with higher mortality rates and too many spinsters; 
fewer men at home, who therefore “were hard pressed to keep their depen-
dants alive and had little energy to spare in improvements”; and wealth 
concentration in young men’s hands, emasculating elders’ authority. 
Chiefs at their trial (see chapter 7) stated, “Our work was to help the poor, 
orphans and widows,” which sounds maudlin until considered against this 
background; whites portrayed it as laughably disingenuous. This was also a 
basis for Malaitan complaints that white people were “robbing” Malaitans 
and assertions that Maasina Rule would stop this. Forster sketched possible 
solutions of hiring fewer men and for just six-month terms, concentrating 
workers and maintaining their links to their homes via government ships, a 
more flexible wage, and even profit-sharing tenancies.57
Readers will recall that Bengough had blamed ‘Are‘are depopulation 
partly on late marriages, which he credited to the marriage system he hoped 
to change; overall he blamed feasting and other ‘Are‘are practices for the 
problems Forster now laid at the labor system’s door. This highlights the 
contradiction in the British approach of the 1930s, when the putative goal 
of protecting Malaitan cultures from a harsh European impact clashed with 
the government’s dependence on locking Malaitans into the indentured 
labor system, the institution that most damaged local societies. This was in 
contrast to Fiji, where under the justification of protecting Fijian village life, 
partly by restricting Fijian movements, South Asian laborers were brought 
in to work plantations beginning in the late 1870s.58
There were international pressures to end indenture globally, and 
eventually laboring would resume under a system that incorporated some 
changes like those Forster suggested, while others came later (including 
a free labor system). But in early 1947 the government and planters were 
determined to reinstitute, and Malaitans to resist, a system much like that 
of before the war, and there was little serious negotiation for comprehen-
sive labor reform. It was clear that indenture would once again sap the 
strength of communities, but it was thought utterly necessary if the copra-
based economy was to recover. If the government had instituted a freer 
labor system at this juncture it might well have both undermined Maasina 
Rule unity and eased the labor shortage.59
Again, officers sometimes depicted the labor strike as a means chiefs 
used to oppress the Malaitan people, who really wanted to work, but there 
are further indications that on this matter the chiefs were indeed “preach-
ing to the converted.” In April 1947, Nori negotiated with Levers recruiter 
Ernie Palmer at Waisisi and told him to come on 25 July when he would 
have 50 men for him. This led Noel to tell the high commissioner in early 
July that Levers had started to recruit Malaita at Nori’s invitation, and that 
he, Noel, had issued a permit to sign 1,000 men. But when Palmer arrived 
only nine men were waiting, and Nono‘oohimae told him, “He could not 
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possibly agree to boys leaving Malaita, as they were urgently required there 
for the purpose of rehabilitating their village and gardens.” In a bizarre 
turn, Nori told Palmer he feared being killed and begged for protection. 
Both men told Palmer privately that if they allowed recruiting the people 
would be angry with them and tribal strife might result. “Therefore,” in 
Palmer’s words, “the ten leaders of the Marching Rule were forced to hang 
together.” The three agreed to later organize a Malaita tour by Palmer and 
the ten chiefs, to talk to the people about laboring, a plan Noel approved. 
Nono‘oohimae wanted and received Palmer’s assurance that if another war 
broke out laborers would not again be left stranded on plantations, as both 
he and Nori had been.60
Declarations of economic noncooperation dismayed officers counting 
on Malaitan labor to put the Protectorate back on its economic feet—early 
the next year Trench warned Noel that they faced £340,000 in projected 
expenditures, with an estimated revenue of just £65,000. Only if the econ-
omy was resuscitated could government improve—and native councils 
fund—social services, and only in that way could the government begin 
to reclaim ground lost to Maasina Rule. Malaitans made up an estimated 
80 percent of the potential labor force, and people of other islands were 
watching for Malaita’s lead on both laboring and taxation.61
To return to the order of events, these looming concerns, combined 
with Maasina Rule’s growing co-optation of courts and councils, provoked a 
notable shift in Noel’s attitude toward the movement after the March meet-
ing. While acknowledging that leaders might be unconscious of the degree 
they were challenging authority, he said, “The situation must . . . be faced up 
to at once, and appropriate action must be taken forthwith to prevent dete-
rioration of the position—obviously the Government cannot allow itself to 
drift helplessly.”62
Noel began exploring the legality of a strike. The head chiefs, too, via 
Sandars, asked for legal guidance, but in April the Protectorate’s legal 
adviser and judicial commissioner, William T Charles, refused to counsel 
them, because it was “potentially controversial”; he also said, “The Legal 
Adviser must always have regard to the false and embarrassing position in 
which he may be placed as a Judicial Commissioner should a matter upon 
which he had previously advised come before him for decision in the lat-
ter capacity.” Over the next months Charles gave Noel and other officers 
close legal advice on how to construct charges against the chiefs, including 
regarding a strike, and indeed he became a vital architect of a crackdown. 
Yet he later cast aside concerns about falsity and embarrassment to sit in 
judgment of the chiefs on these same charges. With an eye to a possible 
strike, Charles in May advised Noel that any organization demanding an 
oath or affirmation was illegal unless specifically exempted by law. Noel 
opined that the “drastic powers” this legal reading gave the Crown could 
be used only if the safety of the realm was imperiled. He believed that a 
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strike for an “uneconomical” wage of £12 would so imperil the Protector-
ate, but that if leaders called a strike they should be advised to form a labor 
union (dubbed by the Australian press “a jungle trade union”), and only if 
they refused would prosecution be warranted. Yet he asked Sandars to tell 
leaders that a strike before there was a registered trade union would be an 
offense unaffected by subsequent registration. Due to Nori’s negotiations 
with Palmer, Noel was optimistic that things would not come to that. Noel 
made no mention of Solomon Islanders who lived on other islands and 
had never worked as plantation labor, or whether by not doing so they too 
imperiled the Protectorate—to labor had been and always would be Malai-
tans’ role and obligation.63
Regarding other issues at stake, Noel said that even a boycott of govern-
ment councils might be seen as legitimate, but, “We cannot tolerate under 
any pretext whatsoever the usurpation of the powers of the Judiciary by a 
political organization.” This suggested that the grounds on which leaders 
might be prosecuted lay in movement members settling Malaitan disputes.64
Alaha‘ou‘ou and the North-South Split
Sandars continued to assure Noel that, in Noel’s words, there was “still 
nothing subversive in the activities of the Marching Rule” on Malaita, and 
in mid-May Noel wrote, “It is not so material to the issue that the present 
leaders may be hostile; it is more material that they are the leaders.” He now 
believed that the movement was not merely a reaction to the war and that 
it could not “be expected to vanish under the pressure of so-called instant 
‘strong’ action; for example something dramatic, a coup in the form of 
spectacular arrests of leaders and the show of the glitter of bayonets of the 
Armed Constabulary.” But, citing reports submitted by Crass and Davies 
from Makira, he suggested that the time for repressive action on that island 
might be near.65
Sandars had been employing Cameron to keep an eye on the Kwai area 
and in early June he sent him to spend a month there to investigate pos-
sible illegal courts. When Cameron and his police arrived and tried to draw 
water from a well the people had constructed, an angry (but not threaten-
ing) crowd demanded a fee. He warned them that they would take water 
by force and ordered his police to fix bayonets, but the people would not 
back down. He finally agreed to deposit a sum with Stephen Sipolo to hold, 
after which he found “real friendliness,” and people brought him coconuts 
and a chair. Cameron realized that his rude demeanor and bringing armed 
police had been mistakes, and he told Sandars the episode “taught me a 
valuable lesson.” He quickly proposed major changes: the area’s Maasina 
Rule leaders were “capable and sincere in their willingness to work with 
the Government,” and he suggested that Head Chief Justus Jimmy Ganifiri 
or Chief Sadius Oge be appointed to replace the reviled headman there, 
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Tome Siru, or at least that they be allowed to convene native courts. Kwai 
island people favored Ganifiri but wanted to pay him themselves, while 
nearby Ngongosila island people said Ganifiri should receive only room 
and board so that he would not grow arrogant toward the people. Cameron 
said that the area was too far from ‘Aoke to administer directly, and since 
it was “99.9%” Maasina Rule, “any form of indirect rule based on an anti-
Marching Rule policy is impossible. . . . Nothing will be more harmful to the 
orderly administration of this island than a suggestion that the Government 
is raising ‘black and tans’ and the creation of little Ulsters.”66
Strike day, 30 June 1947, proved a redefining moment. Sandars had 
arranged to meet alone in ‘Aoke with Cameron, Marquand, and the 
head chiefs, after they had held discussions with their people on taxation, 
finances, and wages. While ‘Are‘are followed that plan, “the North came 
to the meeting almost to a man.” Some 7,000 attended in all, including a 
sizable Kwaio contingent. Sandars was notified that all the people wanted 
to hear the discussion. Nono‘oohimae and Shadrach Diote‘e told him pri-
vately this “was far from their wish but it was the business of the north.”67
For weeks, northern people had talked of the coming event, and word 
was, Waleanisia later told me, “The egg is going to break at ‘Aoke.” Mar-
quand described the impressive orderliness he witnessed at this and other 
‘Aoke assemblies: “No arms were carried at these meetings, not even sticks, 
and the people marched on to the station in three ranks, and formed up 
on the parade ground. There was no talking, except by the leaders when 
addressing the District Officer, and except where the people were requested 
by a leader to show their approval.”68 After a 45-minute entrance proces-
sion, discussion began with the strike—it had been called off because, 
Nori (who was not at this meeting) later said, Sandars had told him, fol-
lowing Noel, that it would be illegal. But they wanted laborers off-island to 
return home as their contracts finished. Sandars praised the decision and 
on request explained the basics of a trade union, translated by Timothy 
George in what Sandars called “the finest display of pidgin English I have 
ever heard.” Jonathan Fifi‘i told me that Sandars said he would help them 
to form a union. Sandars had just recruited 52 ‘Aoke-area men to work in 
Honiara, and Baelelea Head Chief Basi demanded that they be returned 
and that the government help punish them for breaking Maasina Rule’s 
order. Expulsion from the movement was an insufficient penalty, he said; 
“In Malaita everybody must obey the native custom.”69
Here Basi used kastom to label not ancient “custom” but Maasina Rule 
policies, and this meaning, which by now was standard on Malaita, is crucial 
to understanding the next item discussed. On 30 May the head chiefs had 
met at Nono‘oohimae’s village of Arairau and decided to defer the strike 
and instead present Sandars with a different topic. After the strike cancel-
lation was declared, speakers from the north told Sandars “in no uncertain 
terms” of the people’s unhappiness with government councils and courts, 
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and Maasina Rule’s desire to take over their functions and control council 
money and court fines and fees. Toward this end the chiefs announced 
the institution of a new office, the alaha‘ou‘ou (which Sandars wrote “alaha-
ohu”). This was an old concept on Small Malaita and in southern ‘Are‘are, 
where alaha (or araha) is a word for hereditary leaders, and ‘ou‘ou an honor-
ific suffix. Sandars was told that each district would appoint an alaha‘ou‘ou 
to determine and oversee kastom law, on which henceforth the island’s 
courts would be based.70
This plan did not spring from nowhere, and its history is important 
because so many would soon be arrested for participating in it. As described 
in earlier chapters, officers before the war depended on “elders”—some of 
them not in fact elderly—for guidance in settling the local disputes that so 
sapped officers’ time and resources.71 In 1939, Bengough began bringing 
them into the legal apparatus and told Malaitans he would allow “councils 
of elders” powers, under headmen, to adjudicate custom matters in native 
courts and to impose fines and even jail time. In the south in 1940 and 1941, 
the men who he indicated would exercise these new powers were the alaha. 
Moreover, Bengough encouraged alaha (and in the north, “elders”) to arbi-
trate cases outside of courts with compensation when possible, and Davies 
wrote that leaders in the mid-1940s received further permission to so settle 
“customary offense” cases as practice for eventual official courts. Within 
this same framework, Bengough, Forster, and Sandars urged Malaitans to 
codify their “custom laws.” Thus alaha, custom law, codification, and self-
directed courts had for some years been bundled in a single, ongoing gov-
ernment initiative. The prewar southern Malaitan response to Bengough’s 
initiative had been tepid, though alaha did settle disputes, but just after the 
war the people quickly appropriated the model for their own kastom proj-
ect. For example, in late 1944 the Takataka Council told Nono‘oohimae 
that they had appointed leader Waiparo “head alaha” over 12 other alaha 
to oversee the area’s “native custom.” Kwaio soon adopted the Kwaio cog-
nate term alafa to similar purpose. Alaha throughout the south, like Malai-
tans everywhere, continued to participate in kastom codification efforts into 
1947, which Sandars encouraged so that, he said, government could learn 
“exactly what the people desire.”72
The approach of letting local leaders hear cases had been applied in 
a mostly informal manner, without official authorization from above, and 
later officers were often unaware that it had been employed. For exam-
ple, though these policies were enacted during Noel’s tenure, he seemed 
unaware of them in August 1947 when he told High Commissioner John F 
Nicoll that, despite his plans to arrest Maasina Rule chiefs for court offenses, 
he would meet with other leaders, because, he said, “Their proposal for 
Native Custom Courts may have much to commend it and it may prove par-
ticularly suitable in the southern areas of Malaita where formerly some such 
courts are believed to have existed prior to the advent of Marching Rule.” 
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Either Noel had not read reports over the years, or else he muddied the his-
tory to conceal from Nicoll that he had allowed informal courts or that he 
was about to arrest Malaitans for acts that officers on his watch had permit-
ted and even instructed them to carry out. The next year, in May 1948, Divi-
sional Officer J D A Germond lectured “line chiefs” and “alahas” from the 
‘Aoke and Fiu areas regarding their claims that Sandars had said they could 
“try minor cases in accordance with Native Custom,” telling them, “I do not 
believe that he ever made such a statement,” and that Sandars must have 
meant “arbitration.” At the same time, Forster was telling chiefs and alaha 
around Malaita that they could adjudicate, but when Germond upbraided 
him he recanted and said he only told them they could arbitrate.73 In other 
words, in 1947 and for some time after, the government could not settle on 
its own policy or its history, but Malaitans who misunderstood (or under-
stood) the very points on which officers were confused would be jailed for 
it, including for settling cases by what was clearly arbitration.
Over the months before the June 1947 ‘Aoke meeting, the desire to settle 
disputes according to Malaitan sensibilities and methods rather than “white 
man’s law” had moved ever more to the fore across the island. Northerners 
also adopted the alaha title, though some applied it to different ends than 
southerners. In early June, Nori, Nono‘oohimae, and other ‘Are‘are chiefs 
had presented Sandars with the plan to appoint alaha‘ou‘ou and, not grasp-
ing their full meaning, Sandars had casually supported their selection as, 
in his mind, “experts on Native Customs and Compensations to sit with the 
Headmen in court and expound the true native law.”74
Now, at the ‘Aoke meeting, Nono‘oohimae told Sandars that head-
men knew little of kastom law and asked him to again approve their select-
ing alaha‘ou‘ou. When Sandars replied they could be chosen to serve as 
advisers or assessors on the headmen’s courts, “the assembly” objected. 
(An unknown man shouted, “We don’t want the headmen!”) Northern 
spokesmen Head Chief Basi and especially Full Chief Nelson Kifo explicitly 
rejected future government involvement in legal matters except for murder 
and rape cases. Malaita’s legal system would be built on kastom law, as deter-
mined by alaha‘ou‘ou, and applied in kastom courts presided over by chiefs, 
with compensation as the primary means of resolution and punishment.
Sandars told the ‘Aoke gathering that it was illegal to hear cases outside 
a “legal native court,” but his request that native councils compile codes 
joining custom law with European law met no favor. When pressed—not 
wishing, he said, to argue with 7,000 people—he promised to convey their 
wishes to Noel and report back with his answer. The next morning, he 
met alone with chiefs in the ‘Aoke courthouse to clarify the meaning of 
alaha‘ou‘ou, and he told them to proceed to select them around Malaita and 
submit their names, and that they should set the laws. But he said that the 
headmen should give judgments in courts when required, and he insisted 
that he could not by himself approve alaha‘ou‘ou hearing cases on their 
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own. Finally, he asked them “whether they were against the King and the 
British,” and their reply was “definitely NO.”75
Despite the boldness of Kifo, Basi, and others at the main ‘Aoke meeting, 
the alaha‘ou‘ou system remained only vaguely worked out. None had been 
appointed, and many northerners conceived of them differently than did 
Kwaio people and especially ‘Are‘are. Southern leaders had throughout 
Maasina Rule deftly maneuvered between government “custom” policies 
and their own kastom ones, exploiting overlap and ambiguities and marshal-
ing and expanding elements of government policy that delegated to them 
more control. This was again the case with their presentation of alaha‘ou‘ou, 
and it was a savvy course for negotiating with Sandars. Nono‘oohimae later 
testified that Sandars told them he thought alaha‘ou‘ou were a good idea, 
a claim supported by what Sandars wrote to Noel soon after the meeting: 
“Provided bad native custom is not revived their scheme of evolution has a 
certain amount to recommend it and the creation of Alaha-ohu is a basis 
upon which society might work. . . . From all I can gather the people will be 
very careful in the selection of the Alaha-ohu and will choose the best men 
possible.”76
The alaha‘ou‘ou concept, especially in the southern half of Malaita, was 
more than a political tactic for dealing with government. As explained in 
chapter 5, kastom ideology encompassed twin goals: the expansive transfor-
mation and advance of Malaitan society and a reassertion of valued indig-
enous ways, many of them relatively new and many Christian. The govern-
ment was perceived to have stifled the former and, along with missionaries 
and the labor system, undermined the latter. The Maasina Rule project 
pursued both goals and the resolution of conflicts between them toward 
a single blueprint for the future. Within the movement, differing outlooks 
on the relative emphasis that each of these should receive were an ongoing 
source of tension. This was not a simple factional issue; most people were 
dedicated to both objectives and their integration and they were sometimes 
torn between them. One expression of this was strain between people’s 
desires for leaders knowledgeable in European ways and for leaders whose 
power was grounded in their local knowledge and networks. Most of the 
head chiefs and many lesser chiefs were young and had spent significant 
periods of their lives abroad. Many were not recognized experts in indig-
enous legal principles or dispute management, or local ways generally, and 
they had been chosen in large part for their knowledge of and ability to 
negotiate foreign ones. Most people did not want Maasina Rule to relegate 
established local leaders and the social principles they represented to a sec-
ondary or mere advisory role, as officers and headmen had always done. 
The plan for alaha‘ou‘ou, particularly in the south, was in part an attempt 
to allocate powers to these leaders both symbolically and practically, and 
one realm in which they were seen to have superior qualifications was the 
determination of proper rules for and means of dispute management. Sig-
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nificantly, many Malaitans said neither alaha‘ou‘ou nor head chiefs would 
outrank the other.77
We have seen that there had long been generational tensions through-
out Malaita, especially when the end of warfare and economic shifts favored 
young men’s growing independence, but it is a mistake to understand 
the alaha‘ou‘ou idea as speaking simply to a generational divide, a rivalry 
between old and young. Many younger people were erudite in indigenous 
rules, had been dismayed at the prewar decline in community authority, 
and ardently supported creation of alaha‘ou‘ou, just as elders backed the 
younger chiefs. The distinction between alaha‘ou‘ou and head chiefs was 
grounded more in ideological than generational matters, and the move 
to elevate both together followed a model for balancing the movement’s 
dual and sometimes conflicting aims within a cohesive leadership structure. 
Even today Malaitan kastom groups sometimes select such dual leaders and, 
as in the past, refuse to declare one to be of higher status than the other.78
All that said, at the June 1947 ‘Aoke meeting some northern chiefs like 
Kifo and Basi presented the alaha‘ou‘ou plan to Sandars most immediately as 
a move to absorb courts openly into Maasina Rule, and before and after the 
meeting, especially in parts of the north, there was considerable public pres-
sure on leaders to pursue this agenda.79 The meeting exposed another fun-
damental tension within Maasina Rule: the old division between north and 
south was quickly reemerging and was soon to fracture the movement for a 
time. Many north Malaitans, particularly just before and after this meeting, 
followed a very different course from the south. They marshaled kastom, 
and more specifically the alaha‘ou‘ou position, as bases for wholesale rejec-
tion of the government’s role in courts and sometimes in Malaitan affairs 
generally. Led by Basi and especially by the audacious Kifo, their approach 
was less negotiation than declaration. At the June meeting the rift was obvi-
ous to Sandars, who reported to Noel regarding the hard-line demands of 
these speakers, “I fancy the South do not agree with the North. . . . There is 
no doubt that the north will not have much to do with government councils 
and want to run their own business according to native custom. . . . It seems 
to me that the Marching Rule party are beginning to split into the moder-
ates (who would be willing to evolve along the lines of the Government 
Council) and the young hot-heads who wish to run before they can walk 
and desire a policy of non-co-operation with Government. I should have 
liked an opportunity of visiting the South before writing this report but it 
has not been possible.” There were northern moderates, and some south-
erners opposed compromise, particularly on labor issues, but that more 
northerners wanted more of a break from the government became evident 
in several places over the following weeks. Kwaio, which the government 
mostly ignored, sat somewhere in the middle, but except for parts of the 
Uru area people there looked more to the southern lead.80
A most revealing expression of north-south differences was how the 
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alaha‘ou‘ou idea was put into action. Southern areas, in line with Sandars’s 
directive, did not formally appoint them. The three who were eventually 
appointed were all in the northeast, and their qualities contrasted sharply 
with southern conceptions of the office.81 Two—Belo and Basi, for the Lau 
sea and bush areas, respectively—were young with no special legal knowl-
edge and were already important Maasina Rule chiefs (Basi retained his 
head chief status). The third appointee, Steven Sipolo, chosen for Kwai 
along with three “assistant alaha‘ou‘ou,” was different: he was older, had 
more legal expertise from two decades of police work, and did not want 
the position. He had never been a chief and was nominated in absentia at 
a meeting of about a thousand people at Naafinua on 31 July during a visit 
by Kifo. Only in mid-August did he reluctantly agree, under great pressure. 
Sipolo knew Sandars had approved selecting alaha‘ou‘ou, and Kwai people 
told him that he was chosen because he knew both government and kastom 
ways and that they all wanted him to work with the headman to “straighten 
the custom with the Government.” He later testified that Sandars told 
him to do that same thing, for which he was highly qualified from hav-
ing traveled Malaita with Trench to explain courts and councils. Yet Sipolo 
clearly knew more was at stake, and he glumly told people that taking the 
alaha‘ou‘ou position would be his downfall.82
In late July and early August, Kifo “appointed” these three alaha‘ou‘ou 
with varying levels of community input during patrols of the northeast with 
a group of Kwara‘ae. He was the most openly radical of the major Maa-
sina Rule leaders, and one must be cautious of sweeping readings of “the 
north” based on his actions. But the appointments were part of a broader 
shift in northern stances toward the government. People now misconstrued 
Sandars’s statements more than ever. Both sincerely and not, many read 
into them more than he intended or heard distorted accounts from others. 
For example, five days after the 30 June meeting, To‘abaita’s Head Chief 
‘Atoomea wrote from Malu‘u to his ally and uncle Shem Irofa‘alu: “We have 
face our Government for the Custom, and he well bright agreed to let the 
Malaita Island hold his own. ‘I am quite agreed to let the Alaha oo to hold 
the Law for this Island of Malaita.’ . . . Then afterward he try to make Excuse 
for the R. Commissioner he said . . . I cannot make any program to this Island 
without [the high commissioner and the resident commissioner]. But he is 
already agreed to us.” Later ‘Atoomea, and then his lieutenant, Chief Jason 
Alaikona, surprised Marquand by telling him that Sandars had, in his pri-
vate 1 July meeting with chiefs, agreed that alaha could try cases by kastom. 
At ‘Ataa, also, word was passed that Sandars had approved alaha‘ou‘ou selec-
tion (which was true) and said they could “start holding trials in accordance 
with our custom” (which was not). Some Kwara‘ae and Kwaio said that not 
only had Sandars ceded the courts, he had acquiesced or even given his 
blessing to self-rule. Ma‘aanamae remembered that some speakers at the 30 
June meeting told Sandars that they wanted the government to leave and 
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that Sandars “did not answer,” which in a Malaitan debate is taken as ceding 
the issue. In the south similar news was circulated, but to a lesser degree, 
and not, it seems, by head chiefs.83
That many had both desired and anticipated this outcome from the 
meeting was clear in Cameron’s report to Sandars from Kwai two days after, 
telling him how opinion had congealed:
The people want . . . to appoint their own Headman and pay him themselves. To 
have their own Council and rule in its name according to their own custom. 
They seem unable and unwilling to see that the Native Council as under the 
1947 Regulation was their “own” and that it offered them practically all the free-
dom and independence that they wanted. The implication was that they did 
not want the Native Council as established, neither did they want a Headman. 
They wanted something completely free from any part or sign of Government, 
symbolical or actual. . . . [Their position since the ‘Aoke meeting] seems to have 
crystallized into a request for a system of Malaita-wide independence based on 
a combination of Custom Law and Marching Rule. In wider issues, apart from a 
certain minority, they are not disloyal. The more educated appreciate the need 
for Government but rather on a Protectorate level. As far as their own affairs 
are concerned they are adamant and I fear are becoming increasingly intransi-
gent. . . . However, I consider there is still a chance for a satisfactory settlement. 
They have some intelligent leaders and although these people’s demands are 
great and in some cases impossible they are made with good will and a genuine 
desire for settlement. At the same time it must not be forgotten that there exist 
less moderate spirits in the movement. It is difficult to assess their influence but 
it is potentially harmful and flourishes on un-certainty.84
Roy Davies Takes Charge
At this critical juncture, on 17 July, Sandars stepped down as district com-
missioner, nearly twenty years after his first posting there. He needed 
a hernia operation and the plan was for another officer to replace him 
briefly, but in fact he would never again serve on the island. The timing was 
unlucky, because with Forster on leave there were no district officers with 
suitable Malaitan experience to take over (Cameron and Marquand were 
still cadets). Moreover, government–Maasina Rule relations had to date 
oscillated with Sandars’s presence or absence: They had warmed after his 
return in late 1945, but when he took leave in May 1946, Davies recorded, 
“immediately we found ourselves in a state of crisis,” referring to the June 
episodes at ‘Aoke. Things improved again on his return that October, 
Davies writing: “It was as if the Marching Rule was happy again now that 
Sandars had returned to take charge again from its arch-enemy Forster.”85
Davies wrote this within his account dedicated to portraying and isolating 
Sandars as a lone fool, and Forster and other officers as sharing Davies’s 
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opposition to any compromise with Maasina Rule, and we know that in 
reality many Malaitans liked Forster. All the same, the archives confirm that 
these shifts did occur, and their timing indicates Sandars’s importance to 
sustaining workable relations with the movement.
Noel tapped Davies to stand in as acting district commissioner. Davies 
had been a cadet on Malaita from February 1945 to January 1947, from 
whence he was posted to Makira as district officer and then assistant dis-
trict commissioner Central District under Crass, and he was soon to have 
succeeded Crass. Though he had spent nearly two years on Malaita, Davies 
by his own account had mostly been anchored at ‘Aoke while Sandars and 
Forster toured, and even when he convinced Forster to take him along on 
tour Forster routinely slipped away from him when there were delicate mat-
ters to discuss with Malaitans. Davies now returned with limited knowledge 
of most Malaitans, and they of him.86
Davies in the late 1970s penned a remembrance of his experiences with 
Maasina Rule, the longest work written about the movement. The typescript 
is available only as a poor quality microfilm and has scarcely been cited 
by historians. Before proceeding, it requires comment. When I obtained 
the microfilm it was quickly apparent that it had great value to me for its 
first-person accounts of several events I had already written about for the 
present book, and for details found nowhere else in writing. Davies’s manu-
script is unified by one unstated but patent goal: to justify his decision to 
suppress Maasina Rule by force. An unwary reader will finish it convinced 
that Davies inherited with the district commissionership an unholy mess left 
by his incompetent predecessor, Sandars. Sandars did make mistakes—and 
it would have been an extraordinary man who did not—but what Davies 
inherited seems tidy compared to what he left his own successors.87
As I began reading Davies’s work, my enthusiasm turned to disappoint-
ment as it became clear that he was misrepresenting events to push his case, 
often by distortion or omission of information damaging to it. Blatant con-
tradictions abound. Then again, the manuscript starkly reveals his attitudes 
toward Malaitans and Maasina Rule, and I was buoyed by the prospect that 
it might shed light on what had motivated his decisions as district commis-
sioner. And so it does.
A case in point is Davies’s accounts of Malaitans, and also Makirans, which 
display disdain and a nimbus of fear that verges on paranoia. He seems to 
have perceived looming violence in almost any political gathering or com-
plaint, regardless of the people’s demeanor: “Solomon Islanders who have 
worked themselves up to the point of making a mass protest are usually in 
a sullen and obstinate mood which does not acknowledge logic.” We have 
seen that for Davies even the affable Boxing Day meeting had threatened 
riot, palpable to him in “curiously disturbing wavelengths.” His manuscript 
tells episodes of his publicly humiliating communities, which angered peo-
ple but provoked no violence, and yet afterward he believed that he had 
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narrowly escaped with his and his party’s lives. After one such incident in 
a small village on Makira in early June, where he browbeat people into 
finding money to pay the dog tax after they had pleaded poverty, he con-
cluded: “It was clear to me at last that there lay within the Marching Rule 
much stronger seeds of potential violence than I had hitherto believed, 
or indeed wanted to believe. As far as I was concerned now we needed to 
review our entire policy towards Marching Rule urgently for it could no 
longer be based on the belief that it was non-violent in intent.” Davies was 
convinced that barbarity lurked “deep down inside” Maasina Rule. He was 
uneasy even outside of political contexts. For example, the killing of pigs 
at a friendly feast had, for Davies, “an air of unrestrained savagery about it 
which I found disturbing,” and Makira Harbour, on that island’s western 
coast, had “an eerie and sinister atmosphere, and I wondered how much of 
it was due to the memory of the murder of a Roman Catholic bishop there 
in 1846.” Other officers of the period, even the few who clearly despised 
Solomon Islanders, evinced no such dread of them.88
And yet, while Davies’s fears may provide insight into his actions, one 
might also read them as a sham. His prime justification for his crackdown, 
both at the time and later, was that Maasina Rule was innately violent, and 
thus arrests were necessary to avert “the threat of violence which hung so 
heavily over the island in August 1947 . . . which a sudden spark could have 
changed into a bloody rampage through the Mission stations.” In his manu-
script Davies had to amplify the peril in order to justify his actions, and the 
impression that he was obsessed by it may in fact derive from Davies the 
author having overplayed his hand. Regarding this and many other matters, 
one is never sure the degree to which his words convey his real views or are 
instead contrived to persuade readers that his response to Maasina Rule 
was the only possible or responsible one. The same holds for his reports 
of the period, which later officers and some scholars accepted and cited as 
true, objective accounts. Readers of the present book will see that Davies 
was often untruthful when working to advance his position, and they may 
already have noticed my frequent use of cautionary qualifiers to bracket 
information drawn from him alone.89
Davies’s understandings of Maasina Rule were crude. Consciously or not, 
he filled vast gaps in his knowledge with conjecture that he presented as 
fact to superiors and, later, to readers of his manuscript. He had left Malaita 
for Makira already highly antagonistic toward the movement and its leaders 
and dismayed at Sandars’s attempts to work with them. For him, Maasina 
Rule had absolutely no political legitimacy, and of its followers he believed 
“perhaps one per cent had any real idea of what was going on and why.” He 
saw Malaitans’ noncooperation as despicable, irrational, and dangerous, 
and yet over and again when they showed willingness to discuss, negoti-
ate, or even cooperate, he dismissed this as subterfuge to conceal Maasina 
Rule’s diabolical plans. While at times he allowed that a few Malaitans were 
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sincere, he wrote that they “were a small minority in the midst of a mob of 
uneducated people of primitive instincts, to whose inherent and historical 
love of anarchy and destruction the movement appealed greatly.”90
Most damaging to the government in 1947 was Davies’s inability to grasp 
or cope with the complexity or diversity of the movement and its rela-
tionship to the government: “What it boiled down to was that one either 
believed the Marching Rule was subversive and potentially dangerous or 
one believed it was not subversive and was susceptible to guidance.”91 He 
consequently reduced Maasina Rule to a caricature of a homogeneous 
scourge that had to be smashed. In his final analysis, he saw little difference 
between north and south Malaita, or at base even Malaita and Makira. Any 
untoward action by a single village or individual, however minor or singu-
lar, real or imagined, he conceived as embodying Maasina Rule throughout 
the southeastern Solomons, and presented it as such to his superiors to 
convey the dire need to put down the entire movement without delay.
Even before returning to Malaita he had determined, “The whole pol-
icy of Marching Rule was so patently fraudulent: join us and live a life of 
luxury and idleness or desert us and die; so poverty-stricken in real ideas; 
and so capable of degenerating into primitive reaction, that I had progres-
sively moved to the view that we had no real alternative but to put an end 
to Marching Rule, and I was beginning to urge this view strongly on my 
superiors.” Davies’s reports from Makira that I have read contain no such 
urgings, but if he was pushing this view, perhaps verbally, this gives pause to 
ponder why Noel chose him to spell Sandars.92 Be that as it may, Davies was 
now poised to orchestrate a drastic change in policy that had dismal and 
enduring consequences for Malaitan relations with and perceptions of the 
government, and vice versa. How the government decided to try to destroy 
Maasina Rule has been subject to debate, often grounded in limited or 
erroneous information concerning the events I will now summarize.
Just before leaving ‘Aoke, Sandars, likely mindful of Davies’s views, 
briefed him and urged caution. Davies wrote of this briefing: “Malaita was 
now in a very tricky state, he said, and precipitate action on my part could 
upset the apple cart completely. Sandars made it quite clear that he only 
expected to be away six weeks and hoped to find on his return that I had 
not stirred up any hornets’ nests; in fact, it would be best if I took no action 
at all.” For a confluence of reasons this was not to be. Davies wrote, “Sandars 
had no sooner departed for Honiara than things started to fall apart,” and 
indeed the timing of Sandars’s illness was fateful in terms of the rush of 
events in parts of the north where a harder line was emerging.93
Less than a week after Sandars’s departure, Cameron reported that a “so-
called illegal court” had fined three Malu‘u people over a curse. The court’s 
three “victims”—two women and a nine-year-old boy—had complained to 
the loyalist Fo‘odo Headman Ba‘etalua. Cameron and Marquand inves-
tigated and recommended charging five “pseudo-justices” from villages 
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along the northwest coast around and south of Bita‘ama with holding an 
illegal court and To‘abaita’s Head Chief ‘Atoomea with instigating it.94 Mar-
quand warned that to turn a blind eye would leave the government open 
to ridicule, but he and Cameron, perhaps with Davies’s outlook in mind, 
counseled a low-key approach of serving summonses for the men to attend 
a preliminary hearing at ‘Aoke. They expected no disturbance and Cam-
eron urged against “any abnormal or spectacular police action,” for “the 
object of this action is to restore respect for law and order not to maintain 
the rule of an occupying power.” He advised that a prosecution would serve 
to frighten leaders at Kwai. On 26 July Davies issued the summonses, for 6 
August, on charges formulated by Legal Adviser Charles. If the men failed 
to show up, Davies said, “extraordinary measures should then be taken.”95
Davies later contended that he felt pressured by Cameron and Marquand 
and was himself reluctant to take any such measures, fearing they would 
lead to large-scale confrontation, until Marquand convinced him the area 
was “plunging into anarchy” and, in Davies’s words, the people “babbled 
about having at last obtained their ‘freedom’ from the Government.” He 
said Cameron told him, “Our Police detachment, properly organized and 
deployed would suffice to make the arrests, if it came to that. [Cameron] 
had worked out an Operation Order, which he gaily called ‘Operation 
Delouse.’ ” Davies said he now decided to “take the plunge,” later recalling 
“a desire on my part to commit us all to positive action and have an end 
to the years of temporization which had landed us in such a sorry mess. 
Certainly I had crossed my personal watershed: from then on I was to press 
whole-heartedly for action to break up the Marching Rule.”96
Three days after issuing the summons, and twelve days after taking over 
Malaita from Sandars, Davies went to Honiara to tell Noel of his plan and 
convinced him that a hard-line approach was now imperative. During their 
conversation, Davies said, Noel decided to back him and told him “he had 
always had grave misgivings about the intentions of Marching Rule and 
was not overly surprised at my news.” He asked Davies, before returning to 
Malaita, to prepare a report for him to send to Suva “so that he could justify 
a reversal of Government policy to the High Commissioner.” Davies’s 31 July 
report, “Illegal Courts on Malaita,” said that in the north government courts 
were defunct and Maasina Rule courts were proliferating, and that people 
were intransigent, obstructive, and refusing to meet with Marquand and 
Cameron. (The last was only true at Malu‘u, and not completely so there.) 
Davies rejected Noel’s suggestion of a week earlier that alaha‘ou‘ou might be 
adaptable to native administration, because, Davies said, in the north they 
had “no historical basis, nor any roots in the social structure,” and in any 
case they had already assumed jurisdiction that the government could not 
tolerate. In fact, at that point people had followed Sandars’s instructions 
and no alaha‘ou‘ou had heard any cases. Davies represented a handful of 
worrisome events in parts of the north as “Marching Rule policy.”97
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Noel still saw the refusal to labor as the crux of Maasina Rule’s political 
challenge and believed that if men gradually returned to work, “solution of 
the present political impasse would be in sight.” But the court issue had now 
become the rudder of government policy. Legal Adviser Charles, assessing 
Davies’s report, told Noel what he saw to be the fundamental issue: “A tri-
bunal which purports to exercise compulsory power is illegal, offending 
against one of the elementary principles of British law, dating at least from 
Magna Carta, that no person shall be condemned in his liberty or property 
without due process of law.” Charles opined that the justices in the courts 
were also guilty of assault, false imprisonment, theft, robbery, and perhaps, 
he suggested, sedition. He declared the courts “inherently instruments of 
oppression and extortion and their existence is a challenge to Government 
and the Court which cannot be ignored. . . . All means at Government’s dis-
posal” should be used to suppress them.98
Noel’s commentary to Davies on his report was more measured, indi-
cating that he was not yet so fully swayed by their conversation as Davies 
later claimed. He said he was “not, of course, disposed to act in this transi-
tional stage of native thought against institutions which are freely accepted, 
merely because so far they have not been recognized by Government.” He 
expressed doubts that it was fair to prosecute the courts given Sandars’s 
past talks with chiefs, and referred to Cameron’s report from Kwai that 
courts there were voluntary (though a confused Noel thought Cameron 
had been living in Kwaio—“Koio”—rather than at Kwai in Kwara‘ae). Cor-
rectly surmising that Malaitans had not worked out details of what they 
wanted their courts to be, he proposed to meet with the chiefs in October 
to discuss and clarify court issues. Noel said Davies’s summons of the “jus-
tices” had been proper because it was not clear that the courts in question 
had been freely accepted, but he ordered that if they did come to ‘Aoke 
on 6 August, the preliminary exam be postponed until 4 September, when 
Sandars would be well.99
Into early August, Cameron still found Kwai area people courteous, 
respectful, friendly, and also confident that the government would grant 
them the right to hold courts. Ganifiri made no claim to have that right yet, 
but Cameron wrote, “The people genuinely believe that the Government 
has ceded its jurisdiction to Marching Rule, in particular since the 30th 
of June. In a way, I suppose this means that they submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of these tribunals of their own free will,” though he thought, 
“The moral pressure is so great as to be equivalent to compulsion.” Still, he 
said at Kwai there was no atmosphere of intimidation such as there seemed 
to be at Malu‘u, where Marquand had found “an obstructionist attitude.” 
Cameron thought that the movement was neither disloyal nor subversive 
but that both qualities were latent and that the people were “started on 
a path that can have only one ending.” Nonetheless he felt that attitudes 
had improved slightly, that with the planned arrests of the “pseudo-justices” 
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things would improve further, and that in general Kwai gave “grounds for 
optimism.”100
But Malaitan officers could not assess the island-wide situation. While 
Cameron and Marquand saw so far as they were able what was happen-
ing from To‘abaita down the east coast to Kwai, and some information was 
coming in from the northwest, little was known from the southern half of 
Malaita, where no officers had been for some time. Cameron did briefly 
visit as far south as ‘Oloburi in Kwaio and came away guessing that the area 
was “progressing satisfactorily,” having gotten his limited information from 
Kwaio headmen who belonged to Maasina Rule but were, he said, “loyal 
and enlightened.” Davies told Noel that his 31 July report “Illegal Courts 
on Malaita” applied only to the north, and in it he made no mention of the 
south. But this distinction was soon lost in his reports and, consequently, in 
his superiors’ understanding of the movement. Thus officers pursued a pol-
icy based predominantly on the situation in the two most volatile parts of 
the north, which, notwithstanding Sandars’s belief that there were funda-
mental north-south differences, they soon extrapolated to the entire island. 
The particular came to represent the whole in guiding Davies’s course due 
to his inability to fathom, or a desire not to see, the larger and many-sided 
Malaita picture.101
In early August, the Malu‘u justices, probably steered by ‘Atoomea, indi-
cated they would refuse the summonses, and the government issued warrants 
for them all to be arrested on 4 September. Soon after, officers heard reports 
of five additional courts in the area. But even in the north it was difficult to 
determine what was really going on. Unlike in the south, in the north there 
were minority but significant and bitter anti–Maasina Rule factions grouped 
loosely around Timi Kakalu‘ae in Lau and Ba‘etalua at Fo‘odo. Most his-
torians have labeled these factions “loyalist,” and while probably accurate 
for the headmen, the term is a misnomer for many of Maasina Rule’s foes. 
Noel himself warned the high commissioner that these factions were not 
necessarily pro-government and that some disdained Maasina Rule’s aim of 
more independence because they remained hopeful of getting help from 
Americans. Complaints about courts had come from these groups, and 
Marquand had already concluded that both pro–and anti–Maasina Rule fac-
tions, including the headmen, were lying to him. One of the government’s 
stated reasons for not accepting Maasina Rule–dominated councils was that 
they did not represent everyone. Maasina Rule leaders in the areas in ques-
tion told officers that they had not formed fully representative councils, as 
the government had urged for many months, because headmen and opposi-
tion factions refused to participate and instead threatened them. This was 
true, but the hostility was, or at least became, mutual. By early 1947, when 
Sandars, speaking through Nori, told people that the Maasina Rule and gov-
ernment councils had to join into one, people answered, “They would join 
with any headman other than Kakalu‘ae.”102
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Many in the opposition expressed anger at being steadily pressured 
to join the movement, and they were sometimes harassed. As Cameron 
guessed from Kwai, “The life of such a person in a wholly Marching Rule 
area would be made very unpleasant.” One way to understand the harass-
ment of those outside the movement is by analogy with a striking union’s 
hostility to scab workers, particularly since some opposition members were 
acting as informants for the government, sometimes untruthfully. Noel had 
suggested this perspective in July: “Another instance could also be consid-
ered, before we condemn what is apparently an attempt to force on the 
people a one party autocracy, and that is the Trades Union outlook. Malaita 
has little wealth to expect other than labour, hence their approach to politi-
cal problems may well be on the familiar lines of unity amongst workers.” 
But, he said, Maasina Rule had to learn that “Trade Union Congresses do 
not aim at controlling affairs outside their own particular interests.”103
The northern opposition groups are a key to understanding why Maa-
sina Rule evolved differently in the north and south. Nearly all of the south-
ern headmen were movement members, which made it possible to sustain 
a more ambiguous status for courts and councils and for overall positions 
toward the government. Overt resistance was unnecessary. In parts of the 
north, by contrast, headmen like Kakalu‘ae, Ba‘etalua, and Maekali deter-
mined to sever any cooperative links with Maasina Rule, despite appeals 
from movement leaders (and some of their own relatives). Hard lines 
were drawn between Maasina Rule and these headmen—who, as Cameron 
observed, were “the outward and visible symbol of the Government”—and 
thus in effect between the people and the government as a whole. Readers 
will remember that Bell had drawn heavily from particular northern groups 
for his constabulary, and headmen there had always been granted more 
power; the interdependence of certain headmen and the government 
was now well over two decades old. This situation led Marquand to assure 
‘Atoomea in July that the government was not taking sides. But antago-
nism escalated when the aforesaid headmen publicly declared themselves 
to be movement enemies and acted as government agents against it, even 
dispatching spies to falsely join. It was in their areas—Malu‘u and particu-
larly Lau—that Maasina Rule opposition to government was growing more 
strident. Sandars’s proposal to Maasina Rule followers was that they place 
themselves under government courts and councils, but this meant recog-
nizing the authority of the headmen who were automatically heads of both 
bodies. In the north, that meant people would have to submit to the power 
of their bitterest enemies. This was a nonstarter, particularly since some 
of the headmen had previously ruled their councils and courts in doctri-
naire fashion (ie, “Maekalism,” as described in chapter 2). It is a puzzle why 
so few officers seem to have grasped this; a common refrain for years was 
that foolish Malaitans could not see that government courts and councils 
offered them everything they said they wanted.104
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Kifo, though still only a full chief, had unofficially eclipsed the more 
moderate Head Chief Shadrach Diote‘e in west Kwara‘ae and, as we have 
seen, starting in late July he patrolled areas of the north and helped 
appoint three alaha‘ou‘ou. Some people had heard about Kifo’s defiant 30 
June speech to Sandars that people would hold their own courts, and on 
this tour he confirmed this with exaggeration. He told them not only that 
Sandars had agreed to alaha‘ou‘ou hearing cases independently, but also 
that throughout the south they had already been appointed and were hear-
ing cases. At this time several courts had already been held in the north 
and, over the next two weeks, two of the appointed alaha‘ou‘ou and oth-
ers there heard several more cases and even sentenced a few people to 
imprisonment.105
Noel waited ten days to send Davies’s 31 July report to High Commis-
sioner Nicoll and inform him that things had “very suddenly deteriorated” 
and that he had decided to reverse his Maasina Rule policy. He vouched 
for Davies’s reliability by pointing to his success in having turned the politi-
cal situation around in parts of Makira (although he surely knew this was 
phony) and asserted the promise of his methods for Malaita. He described 
the troubles with courts—Noel thought Maasina Rule courts were called 
“alaha-ohu”—and minor incidents (eg, Malu‘u people having delayed 
gathering for a church service until Marquand had departed the area) and 
quoted Cameron: “Barring natural differences of climate, economic and 
geographical this (ie, Maalu [Malu‘u]) district bears an astounding resem-
blance to a National Socialistic Gau during the heyday of that party’s power 
in the Third Reich.” Noel added, “The mystic appeal of this movement 
makes a further parallel with the strange fervour that swiftly swept over Ger-
many and resulted in the promotion of the Third Reich.” Noel nonetheless 
said he planned to meet with chiefs in October about the courts. Nicoll’s 
cool response asked why it had not been made clear to the chiefs that “no 
parallel system of [courts] could be contemplated.”106
In a series of August cables, Noel pressed Nicoll to find warships to 
attend the planned 4 September arrests of ‘Atoomea and associates and 
to remain in the Protectorate for a time, as “good will ambassadors.” He 
argued that the root problem was a belief that the government was impo-
tent, and that warships would counter this, which would in turn facilitate 
negotiation with the Maasina Rule chiefs in a “less tense atmosphere.” Most 
important, it would reduce chances of violence, which he said he feared not 
from Maasina Rule but rather from the anti–Maasina Rule factions. Noel 
worried that where leaders were arrested their followers would face ven-
geance attacks from these factions, setting off tribal strife that would spread 
to other islands. And yet, he also planned to have the loyalist headmen 
personally make the arrests. An unnamed headman had told Davies that 
“the bodies of the police belong to the Government but their hearts to the 
Marching Rule,” and Davies recommended that Western Solomons police 
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be deployed to Malaita. Nicoll for a time resisted sending warships but in 
the end secured visits by several. He also sent to Noel Malaita’s former dis-
trict commissioner, David Trench, now Nicoll’s assistant secretary, to serve 
as “secretary for development and native affairs” and assist in “the restora-
tion of authority.” Noel promptly sent Trench to ‘Aoke to take charge of the 
upcoming arrest operations.107
Meanwhile, Head Chief Bobongi and Belo announced that on 18 August 
a court would be held at Sulione, in Lau. Headman Kakalu‘ae told Cam-
eron and they arrived at Sulione together. Cameron warned a line of duties 
carrying truncheons and a large crowd that the court would be illegal and 
that Maasina Rule must end. In front of all, he argued with Bobongi, and 
with Belo, who the week before had been appointed an alaha‘ou‘ou. Belo 
declared that on 30 April Noel had granted Malaita “freedom,” and on 
30 June Sandars had given permission to run their own courts. Cameron 
said Belo lectured him with “a spate of demagogic nonsense concerning 
freedom,” which was Belo reading a list of 15 “freedoms” that the people 
had compiled. Belo and Bobongi, parroting Kifo, declared (in Cameron’s 
words), “Marching Rule was holding courts and imprisoning people all 
over Malaita,” and Bobongi added, “If the Government wanted to try and 
stop this business the Government would have to fight all Malaita, many 
thousands.” Another man shouted that Cameron would have to “bring 
back plenty of ships to arrest us all.” There were claps, cheers, and shouts 
that people did not want “the headman,” referring to Kakalu‘ae, but there 
were no physical threats. After Cameron repaired to his vessel, a court was 
held near the beach, which a new assistant headman, Molea of Funafou, 
observed and reported on.108
Cameron’s understanding of Bobongi’s threat became important. Later, 
at the chiefs’ trial, Molea testified that Bobongi had actually said that to 
stop Maasina Rule “The Government should go round and arrest every man 
all round Malaita, and after that it would have to arrest all the people in 
Lau” (my emphasis). Confusion as to what Bobongi (who did not attend 
the 30 June meeting) said to Cameron was likely due to multiple meanings 
of the Pijin word faetem; although it can refer to physical fighting, it as often 
means nonviolent conflict or competition or even effort in the pursuit of a 
goal (eg, hemi faetem seleni = “he is trying to earn money”). When Bo bongi 
told Cameron the government would have to faetem all Malaita, especially 
in the context Molea placed it in, it was likely threat not of violence but of 
resistance that would lead to thousands of arrests, and thus Molea’s more 
benign translation was accurate. The latter also matches the reality of what 
did in fact happen.109
Davies wired Noel about the Sulione incident, with Cameron’s quote 
of Bobongi, and told him, “Marching Rule saying same thing everywhere 
and if Government wishes to stop Marching Rule Courts they must fight 
all Malaita.” This had the perhaps-intended effect of panicking Noel, who 
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forwarded the quote to Fiji, but it nearly sparked disaster. Noel, expressly 
in response to the wire, ordered Secretary to Government Stanley Master-
man, who was visiting ‘Aoke, to recruit 20 police and 70 “special constables” 
from among the northern anti–Maasina Rule factions. He warned Nicoll 
that from this, “We must expect immediate armed repercussion Malaita 
and elsewhere,” and he pleaded again for a warship. Davies was appalled, 
knowing that to enlist such constables would lead to catastrophe, but Nicoll 
saved him: doubtless recalling that Noel in arguing for a warship had just 
warned of attacks by these same factions, he quashed the “dangerously pro-
vocative” plan. Noel quickly wired Davies to disregard his order and told 
Nicoll: “Did not intend actually recruit North Malaita if by then situation 
improved by unanticipated success in other measures also in hand.”110
I have noted the pattern of officers over the years being overruled and 
stymied by men in Tulagi or Fiji who were ignorant of Malaitan realities. 
During 1947 a reverse pattern emerges, of Davies, knowingly or not, mis-
leading Noel as to the Malaitan situation, and Noel in turn, at least some-
times knowingly, distorting reality in his exchanges with Nicoll in Fiji. Noel, 
in particular, continued this practice until he left the Solomons, and we will 
see in the next chapter that, even after his departure, high commissioners 
were often kept in the dark about much that was happening. During this 
crisis on Malaita, when having correct information was so crucial for decid-
ing how to proceed, Fiji was fully dependent on news passed on by resident 
commissioners, who in turn relied on intelligence from their district com-
missioners. The result was policy tragically misconceived from below and 
approved from above.
While Cameron was at Lau, Davies was in the midst of his first tour of 
the south as district commissioner, along with Marquand, who had never 
been there before. Hoasihau on 18 August told Davies that no courts or 
councils had operated since well before the 30 June ‘Aoke meeting, and 
that Nono‘oohimae had put both on hold “until custom had been codified” 
(and people still had no answer from Noel regarding Sandars’s inquiry as 
to whether they could manage their own courts). Meanwhile, Davies wrote 
that, though there had been no move to usurp government courts, “matters 
were being settled quietly according to native custom. . . . In other words the 
South was in much the same state as the North, but without its turbulence 
and excitement.” As we know, much the same situation had long held in 
the south, with people settling most disputes by “custom,” sometimes with 
officers’ (including Davies’s) approval or encouragement. On 20 August, 
Davies held two meetings with Nono‘oohimae and other southern leaders 
at Onepusu. Given his vilification of the entire movement and its leaders in 
reports to Noel, his account, written decades later, is striking: “For people 
who were supposed to have thrown off the hated Government yoke they 
were very civil, and we were able to argue sensibly if inconclusively. I had 
the feeling, not for the first time, that if we could have dealt with the Ariaris 
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in isolation from the rest of Malaita, we might have been able to work out 
some sort of acceptable compromise. They were not out to throw down any 
gauntlets: they simply wanted to go their own way and for the Government 
to leave quietly; and I was not out to rock any boats with the day for the 
arrests coming closer. In a way it was all rather unreal, and I was fooling 
only myself in half-believing that they could be won over, because from 
the first to last the Ariaris were quite immovable on the subject of March-
ing Rule.”111 Some have written that by this point leadership of Maasina 
Rule had passed to northern leaders. This reflects the government’s atten-
tions: As parts of the north became more confrontational in mid-1947, the 
government mostly ignored the southern half of the island in terms of its 
officer postings, touring, and written record. Southern people certainly did 
not see northern chiefs as their leaders, and indeed many saw them as dis-
torting, endangering, and ruining the movement.
Two days after, as arrest day approached, Davies ratcheted up pressure 
not merely to arrest the summoned north Malaitan “justices” but to begin 
on 4 September a crackdown on Maasina Rule across the island. On 22 
August, he reported to Noel that the south was basically the same as the 
north, and “the entire movement is subversive.” He told Noel, “In the past 
Malaita was pacified and remained peaceful because the Government was 
feared and respected—synonymous terms to the Malaitaman. . . . There will 
be no real respect for the British Government henceforth unless and until 
the Government has demonstrated its own power to impose its will.” “The 
Marching Rule is in fact an organization controlled by a vicious clique,” he 
wrote, which along with local “committees” was oppressing the people, forc-
ing them to buy food from them (“the mass of the people are hungry”), and 
ransacking their houses and stealing their belongings. In sum, “The people 
must now be protected from themselves and the power of the clique broken 
before it has succeeded in destroying completely the progress of a quar-
ter of a century.” That same day Davies, Trench, Masterman, Allan, Legal 
Adviser Charles, and Noel met in Honiara and, Davies later wrote, “It was 
a far cry from the situation a month previously, with the Resident Commis-
sioner now fully prepared to take a good crack at the Marching Rule.” On 
their return to ‘Aoke on 24 August, Davies and Cameron began planning 
a new “Phase III” of “Operation Delouse,” entailing widespread arrests of 
Maasina Rule’s leaders.112
On that day also, Norman Deck brought to ‘Aoke alaha‘ou‘ou Belo, who 
wanted to apologize to Cameron for their argument at Sulione, as well as a 
prisoner, Oliga, who had been sentenced in a court held immediately after 
that argument to six months for getting a woman pregnant. Deck and fel-
low missionary Robert Vance met with officers and told them they thought 
the SSEM teachers would now cooperate with government. Furthermore, 
at this time Nori and Timothy George, visiting ‘Aoke, became alarmed 
by developments in the north. They called a meeting for 3 September at 
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nearby Abu for all of the higher and lower Maasina Rule chiefs to quell ten-
sions, and George borrowed Deck’s boat to visit the north for preliminary 
talks. For Davies, “This was the worst thing which could have happened.” 
He did not want the meeting to take place because it would complicate 
his plan to begin arrests on 4 September. He apprehended Belo on the 
spot and convinced Noel to move up the arrest date to preempt the Abu 
meeting.113
Nicoll visited Honiara from 28 to 30 August to determine for himself 
what actions to take. He arrived thinking that the serious problems were 
limited to north Malaita; by the time he left, Noel could write to Sandars, 
“His Excellency has made up his mind that Marching Rule is an illegal body 
and that there can be no temporizing with its adherents.” Noel had likely 
asked Davies to write the incendiary 22 August report to convince Nicoll 
that Malaita-wide suppression was essential, much as he had with Davies’s 
provocative 31 July report.114
Readers are probably wondering where the convalescent Sandars had 
been over the six weeks Davies substituted for him, while these decisions 
were being made. Given that Davies’s policies so contradicted and shat-
tered those of Sandars, I searched the archives for answers, but in vain. 
After July they are mute on the question, almost as if Sandars, his policies, 
and reports had never existed. I have already warned that Davies’s accounts 
are highly suspect concerning Sandars, but his is the only account of what 
happened, and for basic facts it rings true:
[Sandars] and the Resident Commissioner had quarreled bitterly over handling 
of the Marching Rule. Noel reproached Sandars for not telling him the real 
truth about the movement; Sandars retorted that he had told him the truth as 
he understood it and could not help it if other, inexperienced people (i.e., me) 
saw the situation in more highly coloured terms; if a policy of repression was to 
be followed he washed his hands of Malaita and gave the required six months’ 
notice of his intention to retire, which he was perfectly entitled to do. The basis 
of Sandars’ refusal to have anything to do with a policy of repression stemmed 
not from moral revulsion, but from a belief that it would (1) spark off God only 
knew what strife and (2) that it would fail. His first belief proved absolutely cor-
rect; the second—in the long run anyway—was wrong. The weakness in his posi-
tion was that he would not face up to the fact that the alternative to repression 
had been tried, and tried very hard, but had failed dismally.
Davies went on to recount a drinking session in ‘Aoke with Sandars, who 
had come to collect his belongings: “He certainly told me what he thought 
of us all but curiously enough appeared to exonerate me personally of all 
blame for everything except bloody stupidity, and that I could scarcely help 
anyway. It was all the Resident Commissioner’s fault for listening to me.” 
That Sandars fell out with Noel is clear in that since at least 31 July he had 
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been cut out of strategy discussions. Noel on 30 August in a personal letter 
instructed Sandars that if he talked to any Malaitans in ‘Aoke while gather-
ing his things he was to voice only the government’s firm line and informed 
him, “As doubtless you know, arrests are now to be made in North Malaita.” 
He told him nothing of the plans to arrest Maasina Rule’s leaders through-
out the island.115
During the high commissioner’s visit, on 29 August, Legal Adviser Charles 
drew up a new king’s regulation, the “Public Order (Recognizance) Regula-
tion,” which provides a window into the legal mind of the man who, though 
the chief architect of the sometimes contorted legal grounds for arresting 
Maasina Rule’s leaders, would before long judge them. It declared that any-
one merely suspected of doing “or being about to do any act” that would 
“occasion grave danger to public order” could be arrested and ordered 
to enter a “recognizance,” to include monetary payment, restrictions on 
where they could reside, and orders to report to officials at specified times 
for up to two years, with violation punished by two years with or without 
hard labor. Charles cited for legal precedence Article 56 of the Pacific 
Order in Council 1893, under which such recognizance might be imposed 
on persons who had actually committed such acts. But that law, he argued, 
was inadequate, for, “It is well known that certain partially educated natives 
have been spreading false reports which are likely to have a very dangerous 
effect on their more primitive and excitable fellows, and lead them to actual 
rebellion and civil war.”116 Unfortunately for the government, it had proved 
impossible to obtain real evidence of most leaders having done this—thus 
the regulation. Charles admitted that it involved “a departure from English 
law” but justified it for Solomon Islanders due to “the requirements of pre-
serving law and order in the future amongst a primitive people susceptible 
to rumours and mass hysteria.” He noted that a regulation that so departed 
from “accepted principles of law” would normally require prior secretary of 
state approval, but he opined that in this case Nicoll could “properly assent 
in the name and on behalf of His Majesty.”117
With this and other unusual legal opinions in hand, and the momentum 
toward Malaita-wide suppression now unstoppable, on 31 August Noel put 
the arrest plans in motion. He informed the Protectorate with the following 
radio address:
The Government has arrested certain alleged leaders of Marching Rule or, as 
commonly known, “Massina Rule,” against whom complaints have been made by 
natives of the Protectorate. Other arrests are pending. The complaints which have 
been made are to the effect that the persons who have been or will be arrested 
have sought to establish an organized terrorism and robbery of the native people 
by a system of illegal police spies and courts, and have even threatened death 
to those who do not obey their dictates. It is alleged that the illegal courts have 
usurped the functions of the properly constituted native courts which have been 
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established, and even of the superior Court, in the Protectorate. The complaints, 
if true, would indicate that the individual liberty of the native people has been 
endangered by a military despotism like those of Nazi Germany and Japan which 
recently threatened the world. . . . 
People of this Protectorate, do not listen to rumours. If you are in doubt 
about what some people are telling you, consult your District Officer, missionary, 
nearest planter, all those in fact who share your lives, have looked after you and 
whom you so often consulted in the past. Remember that you have with you Dis-
trict Officers, missionaries and planters who shared with you the horrors of war 
and of the Japanese invasion, as they had shared with you the fortunes of peace. 
Your welfare and their welfare are one, for welfare is indivisible.
Let us all remember that war and strife lead to havoc and that peace and work 
alone lead to a better life. I would like this opportunity to congratulate the native 
producers of copra in the West Solomons on their efforts and commend their 
example to all.118
“Operation Delouse” was now under way.
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Suppression and Resistance
Operation Delouse
Early on the morning of 31 August 1947, three forces commanded by Cam-
eron, Marquand, and Trench staged surprise raids in north Malaita. They 
came on ships with squads of police from the Western Solomons. High 
Commissioner Nicoll had offered Fijian police, which Noel badly wanted 
but declined when Nicoll warned that they would draw press attention.1
What was now officially “Operation Delouse” began arresting head chiefs 
and some lesser chiefs, men charged with holding illegal courts, and vari-
ous duties or others perceived to be interfering in the arrests (in Trench’s 
case, even by wearing an armband). Houses were searched for incriminat-
ing documents. The next day Davies jailed Nori on minor charges in ‘Aoke, 
where Kifo and Basi were also picked up and Belo was already in custody. 
Arrests had started earlier on Makira, Isabel, Gela, and Guadalcanal, and 
over the next two months operations would move south across Malaita. 
Most chiefs could have escaped inland but chose not to. Noel reported to 
Nicoll that in the first month they made 190 arrests, all “as a result of com-
plaints preferred by natives.”2
The government worried about violence, and the 31 August forces car-
ried several thousand .303 cartridges for their Enfield rifles. But not a shot 
was fired, and though officers met angry crowds in places, they suffered 
only verbal hostility. Cameron told Davies he believed that, but for the 
police, there would have been clashes at Malu‘u, but Marquand wrote that 
of all the arrests he made, he never used more than three policemen, and 
usually just one, and was never resisted: “There have been reports that had 
a large force not been available there might have been unrest but in my 
opinion a large force only aggravates.” Special Constable Charles Lamond 
later testified, “On the day of [‘Atoomea’s arrest at Malu‘u] I saw no indi-
cation that the people were against the Government.” Noel assured Nicoll 
that violence would have been certain without the warships he had sent, 
though they arrived after the opening arrests in the most difficult areas: 
ships Warramunga, Contest, and Shoalhaven visited Malaita between 4 and 
15 September, and soon after that, destroyers Cockade and Aeneas called at 
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various harbors and escorted the aircraft carrier Theseus, which launched 
14 fighter planes to soar around the island’s coastline. Marquand gave a 
Pijin message to headmen to read out to their publics, telling people not to 
fear or flee: “They are coming to show all the people the British airplanes 
and warships that are working with us for the people to keep any enemy 
from stealing their land and to see that no native tries to stop government 
work.” Marquand later wrote, “The natives . . . realize that the appearance of 
destroyers and other war-like materials is only show.”3
As Cameron made arrests he proclaimed to spectators that “Marching 
Rule was finished, and its leaders would be tried and if found guilty of break-
ing the law would be punished. The Government was doing this because 
these men had lied to the people, robbed the people, and oppressed the 
people.” Knowing what we do about Maasina Rule’s levels of popular sup-
port, to depict chiefs to the people in this way seems absurd, but the por-
trayal of chiefs as tyrants, and the notion that with strong action the peo-
ple might come over to government’s side were not subterfuge—officers 
shared and took comfort from these ideas. Cameron would have known 
from his time at Kwai that his caricature was false there, but it did match the 
image he had formed of Malu‘u, and officers possessed little or no reliable 
information about most areas.4
Cameron’s arrest of Kwaio Head Chief Fifi‘i at Sinalagu on 18 Septem-
ber is instructive. Cameron knew next to nothing of Kwaio and had never 
seen Fifi‘i, but he berated the crowd of several hundred who had awaited 
him: “I told them of the lies and extortions of the Marching Rule leaders. I 
told them how these men had grown proud, how they had broken the law 
and oppressed the people. When I felt that these points had been appre-
ciated and understood I announced the Resident Commissioner’s order 
that Marching Rule must finish. I told them of the action in the North and 
of the arrests that had been made. I told them that all the evil men who 
had broken the law and deluded the people would be arrested.” He also 
declared that Americans had lied to them and the British were their real 
protectors. His Kwaio audience knew all about the previous arrests, and 
Ganifiri and Sipolo had visited to warn of the pending ones. What Cameron 
did not know was that many men hid in the surrounding jungle armed with 
rifles and other arms, and a few had been trying to convince Fifi‘i to agree 
to their wrestling down the police, but Fifi‘i hotly forbade any defiance. “We 
could have killed them all easily,” one of them told me years later. When 
the people refused Cameron’s demand that they identify him, Fifi‘i stepped 
forward. As Cameron led him away, the crowd raised a tongatonga, or war 
cry, of anger and defiance. Cameron’s party knew the danger but Cameron 
did not, reporting to Davies, “There was a moment of silence then a burst 
of cheering and shouting. I may be wrong but my impression is that the 
cheers were for the Government and not against it.” Facing a real threat of 
violent resistance, the officer imagined himself hailed as a liberator. On this 
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day Cameron also arrested Ganifiri, Sipolo, and Heber, and the next week 
Nono‘oohimae and George.5
Where did officers’ profound misreading of chiefs’ standings in their 
communities come from? Dynamic as well as areally and ideologically 
diverse, Maasina Rule posed a complex challenge for the government. San-
dars, for all the gaps in his knowledge, grasped this and the necessity of 
dealing with the movement gingerly, flexibly, patiently, and with a degree of 
respect and humility. We have seen that, by contrast, his successor Davies’s 
conception of Maasina Rule was crude: to him, its dealings with the gov-
ernment had been wholly fraudulent, a sham masking a Malaita-wide con-
spiracy with a nefarious agenda to oppress gullible or helpless Malaitans:
The Marching Rule is in fact an organization controlled by a vicious clique, who 
have secured the allegiance of the vast bulk of the population by methods run-
ning the whole gamut from mild persuasion to dire threats. Vast as is the power 
of the big leaders they can be deposed by the sinister “committees” in the back-
ground as easily as the Jacobins removed their leaders when they failed to please. 
This hard and vigorous minority inside the Marching Rule has oppressed the 
mass of the population and curtailed its liberties to an alarming degree. . . . When 
the people are lined up in the mornings in the villages and marched off under 
escourt to work in the gardens all day, in order to feed the hordes who trek from 
meeting to meeting and the numerous “duties” who strut amongst them with 
their uniforms and truncheons; when after all their labour on communal farms 
the people are told that they can only obtain food from them by purchasing it 
from the chief; when after all the propaganda about the big farms that were 
being made, the mass of the people are hungry; when the people are unable 
to leave or enter a village until they have obtained permission of a “duty,” and 
submit to a rigorous cross-examination; when they are liable to have their houses 
searched by duties and have anything purchased from a trade store confiscated 
by them, when their every movement is watched and controlled un-til they are 
frightened of mentioning the words “Marching Rule” to an outsider, it is clear 
that an organization has grown up which is wholly repugnant to our conception 
of liberty.6
Noel, knowing little of Malaitan realities and thus fully dependent on 
the counsel of his district commissioners, had abandoned that of Sandars, 
whose more nuanced, cautionary approach had failed to resolve the situ-
ation or induce sufficient Malaitan cooperation, particularly in providing 
laborers. Clearly frustrated, Noel embraced Davies’s twisted perspective 
and the clarity of the response it demanded from him as resident commis-
sioner. “Marching Rule must finish” became the official line, which over 
the following weeks officers delivered everywhere they went. The key to 
finishing Maasina Rule was to remove the “vicious clique” of leaders and to 
display government power in order to overawe the “sinister committees.” 
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Surely the people, liberated from the oppression, bullying, and cruelty that 
Davies described, and given the Malaita scene’s “astounding resemblance” 
to Nazi Germany reported by Cameron, would welcome rescue, and yes, 
perhaps even cheer the arrest of chiefs. Government officers, though they 
knew little about the situation in most places and possessed ample coun-
terevidence from areas they did know something about, had become con-
vinced by their own propaganda. Their reports, particularly Davies’s, also 
served to mislead their successors, who would read them as factual and thus 
misconstrue the movement they were struggling against and the roots of 
Malaitan anger and resolve.
Officer confusion regarding the position of head chiefs was a critical 
element in the government’s misunderstandings of the movement overall. 
Chiefs had told officers all along that it was not they but the people who 
held the real power; they had been selected and approved by popular opin-
ion, and many accepted warily under community pressure. They often told 
officers, “It’s not my fault I’m a Marching Rule chief, the people made me 
one,” which, as Marquand came to realize, “was perfectly true.” Malaitans 
openly worried their chiefs might become bikihedi (proud, or arrogant) in 
their positions, and several times when officers and chiefs had tried to meet 
in private, the public had objected, saying that they, too, wanted to hear 
what was said. Ganifiri testified that the head chiefs never met together 
alone but always had many other chiefs present. In 1946 Noel had reported 
of Nori and Timothy George, “Both deny that they are the leaders and 
admit only that they are the mouth-piece of people,” and we saw in chapter 
6 that Nori and Nono‘oohimae told Palmer that they feared people’s anger 
if they tried to allow labor recruiting. Even ‘Atoomea, often depicted as 
the most dictatorial chief (excepting perhaps Fifi‘i), repeatedly told Mar-
quand he could not tell To‘abaita people what to do. In July, Marquand had 
watched people ignore ‘Atoomea’s instructions to boycott a medical clinic, 
and when ‘Atoomea, having been bitten by a snake, was eager to go with 
Marquand to the hospital, the people had stopped his going. Nori later 
testified, “My appointment was as head of the Marching Rule. This did not 
mean that I controlled Marching Rule policy but I was only there to carry 
out the people’s wishes; we natives differ from Europeans in respect of pow-
ers given to a leader.”7
Officers had dismissed chiefs’ assertions that their positions were con-
strained as a conspiratorial deception, as their deploying a fatuous popular 
will as a smokescreen for personal machinations. Leaders, Noel warned, 
would try to “bluff the Government that [their programs are] what the 
people want.” Trench said chiefs “pushed themselves forward and were 
accepted by a people who did not really know what it was all about,” while 
Cameron wrote of them as “misguided men” who “under the intoxication 
of power . . . became perverted and evil.” Some officers soon realized their 
mistake, however. The chiefs, Marquand later wrote, “were careful not to 
Suppression and Resistance 263
incur the displeasure of the people upon whom they depended for their 
position,” and officers “were convinced that the movement was controlled 
by a minority who were bullying the people and therefore, if the leaders 
could be arrested, the movement would collapse. But the Marching Rule 
did not collapse. There was no minority of bullying leaders. The whole of 
the Marching Rule members were the leaders; it was controlled by the peo-
ple.” In mid-October, Cameron told Davies that the “evils and vices” of the 
leaders “were only the sublimation of the evils and vices of the mob, there-
fore understandable to the mob.” “Since it was a people’s movement,” he 
said, “it is to the people that we must appeal.”8
Marquand came to see that fundamental to the people’s lasting enthu-
siasm for the movement was the fact that the “direction of control” in their 
lives was upward from them, in contrast to the top-down control of the 
government system: “The chiefs of the Marching Rule were always careful 
to ensure that a contemplated move was popular before submitting it to the 
[Maasina Rule] Council. The Government headmen on the other hand, 
with the District Officer on his tail, forced any required move through his 
council regardless of popular opinion.” Malaitans were resolved not to 
resubmit to this structure of government authority imposed via headman, 
especially now that Kakalu‘ae, Siru, Maekali, and Ba‘etalua and some other 
headmen had helped to imprison their leaders. Their resolve would only 
deepen over time as these headmen urged and assisted in the arrests and 
jailing of more and more Malaitans.9
For a brief period, Operation Delouse put Malaitans in disarray, and 
colonial officers, flush with apparent triumph, began speaking of a mis-
sion accomplished. The chiefs had been seized and Maasina Rule crushed 
with speed and panache. On 10 September, Davies told Noel that opera-
tions in the north had been “a great success and . . . have demonstrated most 
effectively that disobedience to Government orders and lawlessness will not 
be tolerated.” Even at formerly unyielding Malu‘u, Marquand reported, 
“They are too afraid of the Government now to be anti-Government.” Noel 
was particularly exultant, assuring Nicoll in early October, “It is generally 
believed . . . that the threat of further disorders is not likely to occur for 
some time if at all.” In early November he read the Advisory Council a mes-
sage from Nicoll saying of Maasina Rule, “Happily the outbreak was of short 
duration and dislocation to public business caused by it was not of serious 
proportions,” and praising officers who had dealt “so expeditiously and 
efficiently with the situation caused by the Marching Rule leaders.” Noel, 
like Nicoll, knew by then that things were not nearly so rosy as that, but he 
nonetheless reassured the council, “Respect for Government authority has 
now been restored, except in certain remote areas where it has not yet been 
possible to deal with the recalcitrant leaders.” The press, too, carried stories 
of movement collapse and a government back in control, citing Colonial 
Office statements from London. With smug optimism, Adventist Pastor J 
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H Newman told readers of his mission’s magazine, Australian Record: “The 
natives have once more learned a lesson.”10
In the glow of perceived victory, officers of every rank failed to grasp the 
profound discontents that had brought about the movement. They could 
not fathom the depth of Malaitan anger at being second-class citizens of 
their own country, disdained and belittled by aliens who controlled them 
with the arrogance of taken-for-granted superiority. We have seen that 
various officers through the years had spoken of Islanders’ “imaginary” or 
“mythical grievances,” and in the months after arrests began, this view came 
to the fore as officials endeavored to quell any idea that Maasina Rule was 
incited by legitimate complaints, especially about inept British rule. Key 
to this propaganda was a revisionist history that dismissed Malaitan criti-
cisms as concoctions or fantasies. The movement’s wide following, Nicoll 
reported, had been due to “ignorance and dissatisfaction with the existing 
economic conditions” that lay beyond government control. Noel instructed 
officers to remind Malaitans they had no grounds to complain about pre-
war labor conditions, since they should have reported problems to an offi-
cer or court at the time. Davies was soon singing praises of the old native 
councils, citing Maekali’s at Malu‘u as most outstanding, while Cameron 
said the problem with previous councils had been that “people mistook 
Figure 7.1. On Santa Ana, trader Henry Kuper at left and Major H S N Robinson, 
general secretary of the Melanesian Mission, displaying a “captured flag” of the 
Native Union Council, an early name for Maasina Rule, ca 1947. (Anglican Church 
of Melanesia Archive, Box 5-45-1, photo album of Archdeacon Harry Reynolds, Sol-
omon Islands National Archive.)
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them for expressions of the Government’s will rather than as a means of 
expressing their own will.” The courts “failed for the same reason as coun-
cils: courts were misunderstood and were regarded as an attempt to force 
an alien code on the people by means of the Government through the 
headman. That this was not true we know but it was one of the Marching 
Rule’s most successful lies.” The chiefs, Noel concluded, copied courts and 
councils since they were so popular, and the only problem with these gov-
ernment bodies had been that “Their leaders lacked the political and legal 
experience necessary to operate these institutions without the guidance of 
trained District Officers.” Trench quipped, “Surely imitation on this scale 
is flattery,” and dismissed the Maasina Rule legal apparatus as having been 
simply “a mischievous copy of existing law.”11
Trench went farthest in dismissing the idea that Malaitans might have 
had sound reasons for their unhappiness: “The question now arises as to 
why this rebellion—for such it was—broke out. My conclusion . . . is that 
there were no specific grievances which gave rise to the movement. . . . The 
ordinary villager is remote from Government and does not have sufficient 
contact with Government to make any serious specific grievances possible.” 
He further observed that there were in New Guinea “cults astonishingly 
similar” to Maasina Rule, and he reasoned that because government poli-
cies there were different, BSIP policies could only be blameless. Nor would 
concrete changes address the problem—which was, though policy had 
been sound, that “Government has failed to give the appearance of good 
government.” Therefore, he argued, “The first aim must be to convince 
Solomon Islanders that they have a better government than they think.” 
From claims that Malaitans had no rational basis for complaint, it was but a 
short step to judging Malaitans irrational, and we will see that some officers 
and other Europeans came to explain Maasina Rule as a mass delusion of 
“the native mind.” What choice did a responsible government have, then, 
but to destroy it?12
Noel and his officers hoped to reach a quick “reconciliation” with Malai-
tans, perhaps even as they were arresting their leaders. On 6 September, 
Noel spoke to 300 people at Malu‘u with this in mind but encountered 
hecklers, including one who “pointed out that I could not always return 
with a warship,” and another who shouted, “Marching Rule is not finished.” 
The north, Noel concluded, was “unrepentant.” Touring the south six 
weeks later, Davies could find nobody there interested in giving up March-
ing Rule. Waleanisia told me that, after the arrests, most of the remaining 
anti–Maasina Rule people in Langalanga joined the movement. Malaitans 
soon began to reoccupy coastal towns, and, toward the end of 1947, to build 
new towns there and inland.13
By the end of 1947, with the chiefs long jailed and Malaitans still openly 
defiant, officers realized they were dealing with a ground-up movement, 
now a rebellion. They increasingly and perhaps unconsciously began evok-
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ing “the Marching Rule” as a euphemism for “Malaitans” but as if it were an 
ethereal entity with a single mind: “the Marching Rule says,” “the Marching 
Rule expects,” “the Marching Rule believes.” It was more palatable to talk of 
suppressing “the Marching Rule” than “the Malaitan populace,” and some 
officers, even years after, could not acknowledge that they had battled the 
people, so wedded were they to the notion of Maasina Rule tyranny and the 
moral justification that perspective had afforded the government’s own.
Colonial Justice: Rex v Bobongi and Others
As officers went round Malaita to seek out the mood of the people, the word 
they heard everywhere was that all were awaiting the verdict on their chiefs. 
But the people’s wait was to be a long one. Despite consultations with Legal 
Adviser William T Charles, Trench was finding it difficult to construct a case 
against many of the prisoners. Charles had first advised what charges to 
file based partly on Davies’s assertions of widespread oppression and abuse 
by Maasina Rule’s chiefs, evidence for which had not been forthcoming. 
By September’s end, Trench told the district commissioners that prisoners 
would be separated into three groups and each group tried for “conspiring 
to effect a public mischief on the grounds that Marching Rule agreed that 
illegal courts should be set up and agreed on certain other aims contrary to 
law.” By early November, Nicoll in Fiji was pressuring Noel to try the chiefs 
quickly. Noel telegrammed in reply that delays had been unavoidable and 
told him for the first time that the leaders would be tried jointly for con-
spiracy. Nicoll was displeased: “In your memorandum of 4th October . . . you 
stated that all persons had been arrested as a result of complaints preferred 
by natives, and charges were either making illegal arrests or being mem-
bers of an illegal court that sentenced people either to fines or imprison-
ment. I now observe that it is proposed to prosecute jointly on conspiracy 
charges. I shall be grateful if you will confirm this is really necessary, and 
that there is not some more straight-forward manner in which the bulk of 
the persons arrested could be brought to swift and substantial justice.” Noel 
rejoined that a “greater number of serious offenses have been committed 
than was [previously] expected,” but that “sifting evidence reveals that pos-
sibly 10 major leaders could not be charged with holding illegal courts hav-
ing only advocated others to do so as part of general Marching Rule policy 
and illegal activities. In these circumstances and in light of evidence Legal 
Adviser [Charles] advises conspiracy is sole charge.” Otherwise, he added, 
playing to Nicoll’s concern for speed, the “legal calendar might have been 
filled with [an] unnecessary number of separate trials.” Three days before, 
Trench had told Davies there was “no evidence at all” against 15 of the pris-
oners, including Head Chief Fifi‘i, and insufficient evidence against four 
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others, and he asked, “Could any of [these] be let off with flea in ear after 
sentence of leaders or dealt with summarily?”14
The chiefs had in early October formally asked for legal council. Nori 
said movement funds had been put aside in case of arrests and that they 
had £1,000 to hire a lawyer. Noel wired Nicoll that this was refused because 
no lawyer was available, because one was “unnecessary as no injustice would 
result since there was no legally qualified prosecutor,” and because the 
chiefs “would be assured trial before Judicial Commissioner.” The prosecu-
tion would begin with a preliminary examination to decide if there was 
sufficient evidence to proceed to trial. David Trench chose as magistrate 
for this examination none other than Roy Davies. Trench, reasonably see-
ing that stage as a mere formality, said that he would act as prosecutor at 
both the exam and the trial. As Noel had assured Nicoll, the trial judge 
would be a judicial commissioner—William T Charles, who for months 
had worked closely with Noel, Davies, and prosecutor Trench to construct 
charges against the defendants. There would be no assessors, “there being 
no indifferent persons to act in that capacity.” With the deck thus stacked, 
the head chiefs never had a chance of acquittal; this was an exercise not in 
considered justice but in calculated suppression.15
The head chiefs and several lesser leaders (33 men in all) were indicted 
and tried together in Rex v Bobongi. The preliminary examination was held 
from 17 November to 6 December, the trial from 15 December to 14 Feb-
ruary. The indictments, exam and trial transcripts, defendant statements, 
and verdicts total 280 single-spaced legal pages, including testimony by 
31 prosecution and 13 defense witnesses and their cross-examinations by 
defendants and the prosecution.16 The government also entered ten exhib-
its selected from documents seized.17 A detailed study of the trial is impos-
sible here, and I will just summarize some key points.
Given the minimal amount or absence of evidence against so many, the 
government’s case had to be that Maasina Rule was a massive orchestrated 
conspiracy, involving all of the defendants, to depose the government. The 
charges were worded such that the great majority of Malaitans, including 
most of the government witnesses, could have been convicted under them:
He the said [defendant’s name] on diverse dates between the 1st day of Janu-
ary 1944 [changed after testimony to 15 August 1947] and 1st October 1947 at 
diverse places in the Protectorate did in company with others unlawfully com-
bine and confederate c.s. 2 Unlawful Societies Act 1799, s. 25 of the Seditious 
Meetings Act 1817, in that they did become members of an unlawful society or 
club known as the “Marching Rule” or did act as members thereof or did directly 
or indirectly maintain correspondence or intercourse with the said society or 
club [“on Malaita” later added] or with a committee or delegate, representative 
or missionary, or with officers or members thereof as such or by contribution of 
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money or otherwise did aid, abet or support said society or club or the members 
or officers thereof.18
The only head chief not so charged was Shadrach Diote‘e, who alone now 
renounced Maasina Rule, and against whom the government therefore 
judged there was insufficient evidence. Fifi‘i told me that Charles explained 
the sedition charge to them by analogy with Judas having betrayed Jesus. All 
pled not guilty.19
A large portion of the prosecution testimony came from witnesses who 
had stood before or had observed 15 purportedly illegal courts. All but two 
of these courts had been held in the north after 30 June. The witnesses told 
of proceedings that were generally just, and almost all who had been tried 
admitted their guilt, both in the proceedings themselves and again in their 
testimony at this trial. Few declared they had been treated unfairly, and 
some said they were still Maasina Rule members. Just two said they attended 
the courts because they were afraid not to (and how many would not have 
said this about government courts?), while one man had bargained suc-
cessfully with those hearing his case to halve his penalty. Some found guilty 
were “jailed” in the sense described in earlier chapters, held under minimal 
restraint and working for the same hours as in government custody, some 
because they could or would not pay compensation. All but four had faced 
charges of sexual trespass or assaulting women, and some agreed that they 
were placed in custody for their own protection from angry relatives of the 
offended women.
Several of these courts were, technically, probably legal, since officers 
had allowed chiefs to conduct arbitrations.20 Government headmen were 
usually present at the proceedings, but in most cases they merely observed. 
Not in evidence at the trial were reminders of Nazi Germany, Gestapo-like 
“secret tribunals,” or the originally planned charges of assault and rob-
bery.21 The courts’ fundamental offense was not injustice or maltreatment, 
but that they were held outside of government auspices. These were the 
cases the prosecution chose to present, and clearly they were unable to find 
any evidence of the sorts of abuses earlier alleged. The government gave 
much attention to the presence of duties in most courts, often carrying 
truncheons, since this implied involuntary arbitration, but they were also 
there when the accused clearly attended voluntarily, more as performance 
than menace, and no evidence was presented of any duty inflicting or even 
threatening violence.22
All of this aside, the evidence about courts was most important to estab-
lish that some people in the movement, even a few, had conducted them, 
and it was presented to assert that the entire movement was seditious. Only 
two of the head chiefs, Bobongi and Heber, were charged with actually con-
vening illegal courts, but all the others were judged guilty on this score 
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since they were leaders of Maasina Rule and thus said to have conspired to 
overthrow the government court system.23
Proving that Maasina Rule was unambiguously conspiratorial and sedi-
tious was a challenge. It was imperative to refute defendants’ repeated, 
detailed testimonies of how they had, in many ways, worked with and been 
guided by the government. The cooperation, advice, and at times open 
support of officers—particularly Sandars and Forster—could mar the gov-
ernment’s case, and it was important to show that the chiefs’ cooperation 
had been a charade to conceal their conspiracy. The government for this 
critical point depended heavily on its opening and star witness: Lau Head-
man Timi Kakalu‘ae. Though he had briefly been Lau’s Maasina Rule head 
chief, Kakalu‘ae subsequently stepped down—or more likely was pushed 
out—and became the bitterest Malaitan enemy of the movement. His testi-
mony centered on his detailed account of a private talk he said he had with 
Nori, when Nori’s second patrol visited Lau in June 1946:
[Nori said] we must start to make gardens, big gardens, farms. We must make 
big towns. We must make this work strong. The Government has been on Malaita 
a long time now, and it has done nothing but rob us. The Marching Rule must 
work hard to take everything from the Government’s hands. We must stop the 
Government holding courts on the people, from putting us in prison, from fin-
ing us. No-one must work for any other white man either. No-one must pay tax—
we must collect this ourselves. We must block everything that the Government 
wants to do to us, and we must do everything ourselves. He said that we must 
make the big gardens and big towns so that we could point to them when the 
Government came round and say that we were too busy with this work to do any-
thing that the Government wanted us to do. He said that the headman must lie 
to the Government, and hide what was going on.24
Kakalu‘ae also attributed earlier and strikingly similar statements about 
Maasina Rule’s secret plan to a Lau man named England Kwaisulia, which 
he said England made in 1945 after he visited ‘Are‘are and returned to 
Lau a movement supporter. Nori and several others challenged Kakalu‘ae’s 
testimony (and that of his assistant Saeni, which was the same), not only his 
claims that Nori had said Maasina Rule’s mission was “to finish the govern-
ment on Malaita” and that the towns were phony, but that the private meet-
ing that Kakalu‘ae recounted even took place. Years later Fifi‘i emotionally 
told me of Kakalu‘ae’s “lies” that sent them to prison, and it did always 
seem to me bizarre that Nori would have chosen to reveal a secret, seditious 
master plan to Kakalu‘ae, of all people.25 And it appears that Kakalu‘ae did 
concoct the conversation. Davies, in a part of his manuscript unconnected 
to the trial, quoted from his field diary of a stop in Lau the month after 
Nori’s visit there:
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On the 14th [July 1946] I had Kakaluae hammering away at me all day on the 
subject of Marching Rule, mostly about Nori’s tour of the North in [June].26
He said that at the big meeting Nori called, attended by some 7,000 people, he 
Kakaluae grew hot under the collar and told the assembled multitude that if the 
Marching Rule was in any way anti-Government he wanted nothing to do with 
it. Nori had denied publicly that the movement was anti-Government, but he 
[Kakalu‘ae] suspected that Nori would have spoken differently to him had he 
proved more susceptible to his blandishments. He said that others had given 
him vastly different versions of what Nori said at his meetings. Just what Nori 
did or did not say at his meetings was always the subject of flat contradiction: 
he preached subversion; he preached cooperation with Government. Here was 
Kakaluae saying he knew he was subversive, but admitting that Nori’s public 
utterances in his presence were not.27
Kakalu‘ae, eager to convince Davies of Nori’s subversive intent, was frus-
trated that he had heard Nori say nothing subversive, and so had no first-
hand evidence to offer against him. Nor did Davies say that Kakalu‘ae had 
mentioned England Kwaisulia’s reputed earlier seditious statements. This 
indicates not only that, as Nori and others charged, Kakalu‘ae made up 
his courtroom story, but also that Davies should have known he was lying 
when he presided over his preliminary exam testimony, yet said nothing. 
Several explanations are possible. Davies might have suborned Kakalu‘ae, 
and in support of this, his testimony was just the evidence the government 
required but could not otherwise find. Or Davies might have known his 
testimony was false but kept silent about it. Or he may have forgotten the 
conversations with Kakalu‘ae that contradicted his testimony. That Davies 
included this diary excerpt in his manuscript favors the last interpretation, 
though there he said nothing of Kakalu‘ae’s testimony before him. Against 
this interpretation, one would think that Kakalu‘ae, if he had not planned 
or cleared his testimony beforehand with Davies, would have feared, after 
having “hammered away all day on the subject” during Davies’s visit to Lau 
the year before, that Davies would now recognize that he was lying under 
oath in his court. In any case, officers afterward cited and even quoted 
Kakalu‘ae’s testimony as conclusive proof that Maasina Rule’s more mod-
erate platforms had always been a conspiratorial fraud, and that its towns 
were a “complete sham”—a “bogus” contrivance to avoid working on gov-
ernment projects. This became a common government narrative that sub-
sequent district officers learned as historical truth.28
Kakalu‘ae’s is but one example of prosecution testimony that any 
defense lawyer would have demolished, and it is no wonder the chiefs were 
denied one. Several witnesses significantly changed their testimony under 
defendant cross-examination. Kakalu‘ae had particular trouble explaining 
under such questioning why he had agreed to become Lau’s head chief 
just two weeks after, he said, England Kwaisulia had told him that Maasina 
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Rule was highly seditious. He testified that he did have strong suspicions, 
yet he voiced these to no one, including men he subsequently appointed to 
high movement positions, such as Shem Irofa‘alu and defendants Basi and 
Ramo‘oli. He had instructed these men to make the very towns and farms 
that he claimed England and then Nori had told him were fakes to fool the 
government. Kakalu‘ae, moreover, had retained the head chief position for 
some time after Nori’s visit. None of these contradictions appear to have 
troubled Commissioner Charles.29
In delivering the guilty verdict, Charles began his summary of evidence 
with a page-long synopsis of Kakalu‘ae’s testimony, stating that both he and 
Saeni “impressed me as truthful witnesses and Nori impressed me as a liar, 
particularly in respect of this conversation.” And toward the end of the ver-
dict he wrote, “The unavoidable conclusion from the above findings is that 
England and Nori correctly told Kakaluae of the real aims of the Marching 
Rule and that at least from the time of that conversation the secret aims of 
those controlling Marching Rule policy were intended to bring into hatred 
and contempt the administration of justice and the Government. In other 
words, the real and secret policy of Marching Rule, as directed by its lead-
ers, was a seditious one.” He acknowledged that the leaders had canceled 
the strike when Sandars told Nori it was illegal, but he wrote, “The signifi-
cant feature was . . . that it was not brought to Government’s notice until at 
least six months after Nori had disclosed the aims of Marching Rule to 
Kakaluae.” Thus did Charles make Kakalu‘ae’s story the centerpiece of the 
government’s case. This required a sweeping dismissal of contradicting tes-
timonies of defendants and witnesses, which, given the dearth of evidence 
against so many, left Charles only a subjective justification: “I am confirmed 
in my conclusions as to the real aim of Marching Rule by my observation 
of the accused who gave evidence . . . their demeanour as witnesses was most 
unconvincing, particularly in denial of alleged advocacy of anti-Govern-
ment policy.” Like Nori, they all impressed him as liars.30
On 13 February, Charles sentenced all the head chiefs and Nori to six 
years penal servitude, and other defendants to terms ranging from several 
months to five years. Six less important men were acquitted. Noel lamented 
that more did not receive maximum sentences, but noted that “Charles 
could not have done anything else in the light of such evidence as was avail-
able,” the lack of which Noel credited to Malaita’s officers having been too 
busy to collect it.31 Seven months later, High Commissioner Freeston’s legal 
adviser, J H Vaughan, took Charles to task:
In view of the amount of “illegal” advice the Marching Rulers have clearly been 
receiving during the last year or two it is unfortunate that some attempt was not 
made to enable them to obtain legal advice when they asked for it. Furthermore, 
no class of case is more likely to lead to injustice than a “political” trial. The 
prosecution have to rely almost entirely upon the truthfulness of their witnesses 
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uncorroborated by “material” evidence. Unless their veracity is tested by expert 
cross examination injustice is likely to result. I do not think it is proper, particu-
larly in this type of case, for the Legal Adviser to advise the prosecution and then 
try the case as Judicial Commissioner. . . . Such procedure is quite contrary to the 
principles upon which criminal trials in British courts are conducted, and gives 
the Marching Rulers just the sort of ammunition they are looking for.
Charles responded: “I think it may be safely said that until I received the 
proceedings of the preliminary examination I knew very little more of the 
nature of the case for the Prosecution than would normally and unavoid-
ably be known to any member of the public in a very small community 
with a daily newspaper.” The advisory opinions he gave to government offi-
cers, he said, he had regarded as “being upon hypothetical cases.” As to the 
absence of a defense lawyer, “The accused . . . consisted of some educated 
and intelligent natives who were able to guide their fellows, as in its essen-
tials their defences were the same.”32
The Peaceful Wars of Savages
Malaitans mostly marked time during the trial, and officers worried about 
how they would react to the verdicts. After all, Davies’s and Noel’s most 
urgent rationale for the crackdown had been the looming threat of vio-
lence, and the government still did not control much of Malaita. But even 
before the judgment, Malaitans initiated a different sort of response. In 
early November, Headman Siru had ordered people of Faumaamanu and 
A‘arai towns in east Kwara‘ae to repair a dilapidated tax house. People tore 
most of it down. This may have been a dismantling before rebuilding and 
thus not political, but Davies had heard talk that it was the latter, and he 
arrived with Cameron and 25 police and ordered that 50 men be assembled 
the next morning to repair it. In the morning he found the 50 on the beach 
with their bags packed for prison. Davies had 64 arrested, and afterward he 
mustered a “surly” crowd of 700 in order to tell them “they were a disgrace 
to themselves and to the District, and that as they had shown they did not 
wish for anything but anarchy, the area would now be taken under direct 
rule again.” When he departed, the tax house was torched. One prisoner, 
David Kosionami, told Ben Burt that they were abused en route and some 
were displayed at Malu‘u in hopes of frightening people there.33
Readers will recollect that Kwara‘ae had done something like this before, 
when in June 1946 hundreds challenged Forster to imprison them all at 
‘Aoke, forcing him to back down. This would soon become the foremost 
resistance tactic across the island. In December 1947, Marquand submitted 
a prescient forecast: “I consider that the collection of tax from these people 
is essential even though it may be more difficult to collect than in Mr. Bell’s 
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time. There is no doubt that when the time comes to collect tax there will 
be mass refusals to pay in some districts, to which the only reply can be mass 
imprisonment. The collection of tax will undoubtedly require a consider-
able force of police when villages will have to be rounded up one by one.”34
As Davis lamented in the Annual Report at year’s end, Operation Delouse 
had been a great disappointment, and Maasina Rule was now an outright 
revolt. Officers thought it imperative to force obedience, to compel Malai-
tans to accept government’s absolute authority in the land. For several years 
they and their successors would chase after this paramount goal by order-
ing Malaitan men to perform a series of actions that would signify their 
capitulation, the three main ones being, in general order of appearance, 
that they remove fences from around their villages, that they provide census 
data about themselves and their families, and that they pay the tax. These 
were important not so much in themselves but rather as acts of surrender 
to British suzerainty.35 Men or communities that refused were subjected 
to familiar tools of a repressive regime: mass arrests and imprisonments, 
catchall sedition laws, and collective punishments, all imposed by partisan 
courts, often with contempt and derision. A common historical narrative 
has been that these tactics eventually succeeded in forcing defeated Malai-
tans to abandon resistance and resubmit to British rule on British terms. We 
shall see that this is in error.
Late in 1947, J D A Germond arrived from Africa to fill a new post of 
“divisional officer,” ranked above district commissioners and based in 
‘Aoke.36 It was an awful time to put in charge a man so green, particularly 
with a tutor like Davies, who claimed that Germond soon adopted his views, 
vowing, said Davies, “No offence was to be too unimportant to be pursued 
and pressure must be remorseless.” Like so many before him, Germond 
arrived brandishing Africa models for ruling the natives (he liked to quote 
Lugard). Knowing little of Malaita or its history, he straightaway criticized 
previous administrations and called for sweeping changes, including aban-
donment of indirect rule plans for which “backward” Malaitans had never 
been ready, and bringing in more police to implement an intense, direct 
approach. This earned him a rebuke and lecture from Noel, who (with his 
eye as always on the labor problem), warned, “Militant administration will 
never balance a budget,” though he did agree that more police might be 
useful “to facilitate production of copra,” that is, to get labor. Noel clearly 
detected Davies’s influence on Germond (Cameron was away Novem-
ber–May) and told him, “If your District Officers have told you otherwise, 
leading you accordingly to believe that Government policy must be varied 
out of recognition, then their error is due to their lack of experience and 
understanding of administration and the Malaitaman.” Noel also corrected 
criticisms that Germond, misinformed, made of how Sandars had dealt with 
Maasina Rule.37
Davies’s manuscript says that just after the verdict on the chiefs Noel sent 
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Germond a dispatch to tell him that Maasina Rule would now cease to be 
a threat and that police action would be unnecessary. I have not found this 
dispatch in the archives, and Davies’s assertion does not match Noel’s views 
at this time. Davies wrote in his manuscript that Noel blamed him for Maa-
sina Rule’s failure to dissolve, and he depicted Noel as, like Sandars, naive 
and soft on the movement. He blamed the failure on Noel for having given 
him insufficient resources to crush the movement and for having agreed to 
Davies being taken away to judge the preliminary examination. But if Noel 
was angry with Davies for having advised him to attack Maasina Rule, and 
for the dismal results, he did not commit it to writing; to do so would have 
exposed his own blunders, and he had presented some of Davies’s flawed 
analyses to the high commissioner as his own. Be that as it may, two weeks 
after Germond’s report, in early March, Noel replaced Davies with Michael 
Forster, who had just returned from leave.38
Soon after Germond arrived, he, with Davies and a police detachment, 
had made a three-week tour around the southern half of the island, just 
before the verdicts were announced. They visited nearly 100 places, and 
whereas before the arrests many southern people had met officers courte-
ously, now Germond reported everywhere only “studied indifference and 
insolence” and a state of “suppressed revolt.” Wherever Germond suggested 
native councils might be restarted, “I was told bluntly that there could be 
no question of this until the return of their leaders from Honiara and that 
in any case the councils would have to be run ‘in accordance with Native 
Custom’ which means that they must be free to run them their own way and 
not the Government way. The high sounding phrase ‘in accordance with 
Native Custom’ is just so much nonsense. Very few of the men who babble 
about ‘Native Custom’ know anything about Custom.” Germond found the 
usage of kastom absurd: “This island has no administrative background—
there never was any native judicial and administrative system as was the 
case in Africa and in some of the territories in the far East; therefore, to 
talk about Native Custom in so far as Courts and Councils are concerned 
does not make sense. In this respect it may be of interest to mention that 
at one of the District Centres I paraded all the ‘Alahas’ of the area who I 
was informed were the experts on Native Custom, they were almost to a 
man young Marching Rule adherents who, I am convinced, know almost as 
much as I do of ‘Malaita Custom.’ ”39
Germond criticized the government’s approach, without naming 
Davies: “The present mode of administration . . . can best be described as 
armed forays into a hostile country with no attempt at sustained or sympa-
thetic contact with the people.”40 Yet for the rest of the decade this would 
remain most officers’ primary mode of interaction with most Malaitans. 
Most wanted the sympathetic contact Germond called for, but on govern-
ment terms—policy soon became that all Malaitans had to fully capitulate 
before government would deal with the island in any positive way. Most 
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refused, concluding from the gendarme rule, oppression, and harassment 
that, despite timeworn promises of schools, medicine, and development 
if they cooperated, gafamanu’s (the government’s) character and policies 
had changed little or had even deteriorated since the prewar years. Offi-
cers who knew little of the history of Malaita-government relations, or, like 
Germond, had been taught a distorted history by others, saw this attitude as 
ignorant and unreasonable.
Fences, Operation Jericho, and Civil Resistance
When the verdicts were announced on 15 February 1948, most Malaitans dis-
played little reaction—though, when Marquand toured 57 northern coastal 
towns soon after, many showed him their backs as he passed. Others told 
him that they would continue Maasina Rule and were ready to be arrested. 
Norman Deck, in the same area when people heard the judgments, found 
hostility and tried to convince people he was blameless. About two weeks 
later Forster returned as district commissioner, placed in charge, under 
Germond, of implementing government’s program to break the back of 
Maasina Rule. He soon reported being shunned on Small Malaita and said 
that in west ‘Are‘are the convictions had been “a severe blow to their pride.” 
He felt the south was less confident than the north, where he said the move-
ment was dominant and people gave no thought to compromise, while in 
west Kwara‘ae and Langalanga public opinion had hardened. Most defi-
ant was the Kwai area, where police were barred from towns, and Assistant 
Headman Dausabea’s house was reportedly burned. Davies later recalled 
more broadly that though Malaitans were dismayed by the chiefs’ heavy sen-
tences, they were “completely unbowed and, if anything, even more deter-
mined to hang on to Marching Rule than before.”41
At this time many towns were rebuilt or newly built. Particularly in the 
south, but also in parts of the north, many non-Christians had after the 
arrests returned to the mountains to build towns or villages there, visit-
ing the coast mostly for meetings. Christians urged them to stay, and some 
complained they were deserting the cause. Officers showed little inclina-
tion to bother inland towns. The week before Christmas of 1947, people 
had started to erect light fences around towns, first in the north and then 
everywhere.42 Marquand described the fences in the north as a single rail, 4 
feet high, with posts every 8 feet, decorated with cross-sticks and gates. They 
prevented no one from entering or leaving; some people, like Headman 
Siru, told Marquand that they were mere decoration, and others said they 
were to facilitate cleaning. Still others—Marquand does not say if they were 
Maasina Rule followers—said the fences would signal to any Americans who 
might come that the village was friendly. He thought the fences were harm-
less, intended merely to keep the people interested in Maasina Rule. He 
also met complaints from men outside Maasina Rule who said this town 
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or that stood on their land and demanded eviction. Forster soon asked, 
seconded by Germond, that new ordinances be instituted under the 1947 
Native Administration Regulation to forbid building any village for more 
than 40 people without an officer’s approval, and to allow officers to order 
any villages built after 1944 removed if the majority of occupants were not 
landowners, on grounds that they might cause quarrels or be unsanitary.43
The government was as yet in no position to widely enforce such mea-
sures; police numbers were too low—Germond said he needed at least 80—
and ships were under repair. “It is no good showing our hand until we are 
strong enough,” Noel told Germond. He counseled him to be patient and 
plan for collecting taxes when they were ready, “For it is the collection of tax 
which will convince all except the fanatical amongst the Marching Rulers 
that not only can we rule, and intend to rule, but that we are ruling. 1948 
must be a year of change.” “By May,” wrote a later resident commissioner, 
“the Divisional Officer and the Administrative Officers were ready to apply 
themselves to the imposition of the will of Government on the people.”44
As it happened, the tax was not the first issue to be prosecuted. In June 
Noel issued an “Order” to people of Malu‘u to remove all fences, for which 
they would be “held jointly and severally responsible.” Forster and Ger-
mond proposed to Charles that if people reerected fences after they had 
been torn down they would be guilty of sedition, and that they as well as 
anyone suspected of “contemplating action likely to disturb the peace of 
Malaita” would be liable to deportation to Vanikolo in the distant eastern 
Solomons for up to two years. Charles feared other judicial commission-
ers would reject deportation under Article II of Pacific Order in Council 
(instituted to expel undesirable Europeans); to avoid this he advised that 
they exploit a rule whereby Noel could declare any location in the BSIP a 
“prison” and send people there. Charles also detailed how officers could 
tear down fences and other structures in people’s private villages without 
being technically guilty of “trespass” or “forcible entry,” and he suggested a 
Native Administration Regulation amendment to allow officers to destroy 
the fences without seeking an injunction from him. Later, in August 1949, 
he advised that fences and towers could be destroyed on sight without war-
rant because they were “seditious publications” and thus legally forfeited 
to the state, but Germond told officers to stick to established procedure, 
which “is more correct.” Charles decreed that fences could be legally cat-
egorized as dangerous: “The enclosures are not in themselves dangerous. 
Their danger lies in their symbolism to the native mind of successful defi-
ance of Government.” Initiating what was to become a pattern for govern-
ment decrees, the definition of fences as symbols of overt resistance was 
self-fulfilling.45
The anti-fence program was named “Operation Jericho,” and Malu‘u was 
picked to assault first since its people were believed to be leading the rest 
of Malaita, or at least the north. Also, it had been decided at Germond’s 
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urging to build a government station there, which Cameron, just back 
from leave, would open in June. Cameron wrote that the northern people 
reacted to Noel’s order as he had expected: they built more fences. A dead-
line of 1 July was announced when arrests would begin wherever fences 
stood, but Cameron told Forster that since the “Maasina Rule must finish” 
order had gone unenforced, people were saying “Government ‘im ‘e talk 
no more.” When Cameron spoke with leaders of the first villages scheduled 
for raids, they agreed that the fences should be removed but said they were 
powerless to make people take them down—an argument Cameron called 
an “old Marching Rule gambit.”46
Officers could only wonder who were the real leaders, though they knew 
that ‘Atoomea’s uncle, Shem Irofa‘alu, was one. In fact, excepting Irofa‘alu, 
no overarching leaders had replaced the head chiefs. Nonetheless, Noel 
conjured up leaders for High Commissioner Freeston, “fanatical in their 
dislike of British rule,” who “appreciate that they are beginning to lose that 
vicious omnipotent grip they had over all and sundry.” This he said was 
behind their orders to make fences in “defiance to Government authority,” 
so as to prevent young men leaving towns or villages to work on plantations. 
(Forster had just reported that across Malaita perhaps only 50 men might 
be willing to sign on as indentured labor.) The government, Noel argued, 
had to show the many “waverers” that it had the power to “free them from 
fenced in villages,” from which, he wrote, many “desire to escape and secure 
once more their personal liberty.” This elusive mass of “waverers” became 
a perpetual government hope. From this point forward, Noel would credit 
almost every action taken and rumor heard on Malaita to vicious, omnipo-
tent Marching Rule leaders.47
On 1 July 1948, Operation Jericho was launched with the arrest of all 
of Malu‘u’s 28 men, including Irofa‘alu. They were tried before Charles, 
and most were sentenced to two months at hard labor. Over the follow-
ing days Cameron and his police arrested a total of 99 men from three 
other villages. They waited for him, lined up for arrest with kits packed, and 
pleaded guilty. He opined that they employed civil resistance because, as 
Europeans had said since the nineteenth century, Malaitans had “no physi-
cal courage.”48
After a ten-day “truce,” the people still held firm, and Cameron proposed 
arresting all of the estimated 600 men in Malu‘u Sub-district—but in shifts, 
so that no more than 400 would be in jail at once. “Except for the Head-
men and their friends,” he said, “the whole sub-district is enthusiastically 
pro Marching Rule.” But Germond predicted that Malu‘u people would 
get so tired of it all that they would stand down in two or three months, 
and he hoped this would frighten all other Malaitans into doing so as well. 
However, Cameron warned, if people did not give in, the government had 
to be prepared to jail most of the adult male population of the entire island. 
He found this prospect “alarming and it may be considered that in the long 
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run the MR civil disobedience campaign is bound to succeed. However, 
Malaita is not India and from a purely technical point of view there is no 
reason why we should not be able to organise ourselves to cope with the 
problem. From an administrative point of view we should be able to do it 
without serious harm to the community; we may even do a certain amount 
of good.” Still, Cameron worried about lasting effects of such “a full scale 
attack”: “Over an entire generation is going to pass through our prisons. 
Their experience during the next two months is going to influence their 
attitude toward us, hence Malaita politics, for the next 30 years, possibly 
permanently.” Meanwhile, Germond pondered whether Shem Irofa‘alu 
had Gandhi’s moral courage and intelligence.49
Over the first eight months of the campaign, only three places tore down 
their fences, and a prisoner cap of 400 proved unrealistic. In August, Noel 
told Freeston there were 25,000 people in the northern towns and that 
they had to arrest every man there since they did not know who the leaders 
were—and if tactics changed and leaders stepped up “for martyrdom” such 
that only they were arrested, Malaitans would detect a “government admis-
sion of weakness.” He offered a domino theory: if rule was not imposed in 
the north, a militant form of Maasina Rule might engulf the Protectorate. 
He expected that a limited number of operations would convince Malaitans 
“that the British Government is not impotent and that Marching Rule is 
a tragic farce.” This letter is a prime example of Noel’s pattern of hood-
winking high commissioners into allowing his oppressive tactics; unless one 
takes him for an utter fool, it is an exercise in distortion and deception. It 
worked; Freeston responded with blanket agreement.50
In mid-August, Cameron laid out plans for Operation Jericho Phase II, 
which would expand raids into Lau and selected major towns elsewhere in 
the north, into early October. Forster now reported Maasina Rule’s influ-
ence waning in the north, even in Kwara‘ae, and that it was completely fin-
ished in Baegu, but he warned, “Disaffections from the Marching Rule are 
no cause for complacency because they mean no more than that the people 
are tired of it and it by no means follows that they become pro-Government.” 
Cameron, too, now submitted an upbeat report from To‘abaita saying that 
people had made no new fences, were friendlier, and were ready to obey 
government orders. But just three days later, Marquand, now in charge of 
‘Aoke, reported that women and children at nearby Abu had rebuilt fences 
as soon as they were torn down, directed by an old man named ‘Akote‘e. 
Soon Cameron conceded that his To‘abaita report had been “over-optimis-
tic”; people were queuing up for prison again, this time for resisting his 
attempts to census them, or for refusing to pay fines he tried to impose in 
lieu of jail. He and Forster blamed the setback on Shem Irofa‘alu’s recent 
return from prison, and they urged Germond to deport him. Irofa‘alu’s 
influence could not be countered, Forster said, since it was religious. Nor-
man Deck tried to turn Shem: “I have again stressed the Christian principle, 
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enunciated in Romans 13:1–7, of non-resistance against properly consti-
tuted authority, as I think this will appeal to his conscience.”51
This scenario was to be replayed over and again: Officers reported 
Maasina Rule to be on its last legs and resistance in decline, with the news 
relayed up to the resident, the high commissioner, and even to London. 
The pattern was that the higher the position held by a report’s intended 
recipient, the more upbeat the report was.52 But in each case these hopes 
were soon dashed by renewed defiance, often in reaction to officers try-
ing to consolidate a perceived advantage by intensified suppression. This 
unremitting cycle of illusion and disillusion bred a frustration that soon 
became palpable in reports, yet officers at every level were to prove unable 
to reassess and revise their approach. They became trapped in a mindset in 
which the only way forward was to pursue a still harder line. Any concilia-
tory move, however reasonable, had to be scrupulously avoided for fear that 
it would be taken as a government admission of weakness. Cameron’s warn-
ing about permanently poisoning the Malaitan political well was forgotten 
in a dogged quest to force submission.
This was not simply a matter of muddled strategy. In 1950 Marquand 
wrote, “The machine for implementing the policy of arrest had started and 
could not now stop without loss of face.” Officers’ “determination to show 
that they were the masters” was “aggravated by the lack of respect shown 
by the people,” and thinking in the terms of the past, the officers “still 
consider that they have sufficient force to impose their will as their grandfa-
thers did,” and “do not think, or perhaps do not realize, their force is rather 
weak.” To resolve the situation, he advised, the government had to sacrifice 
face and accept people’s right to have their own leaders.53
On the other side, Malaitans were just as loath to surrender, not only in 
the immediate sense of abandoning Maasina Rule resistance, but also in the 
larger one of resubmitting to a system of alien rule that they believed would 
continue to be humiliating and unjust. Increasingly, this became the over-
riding motivation for resistance, and government oppression and demean-
ing actions simply reinforced the widespread belief that colonial attitudes 
and actions would never change without a determined struggle.54
In late August 1948, Forster reported that in some places on the east cen-
tral coast, particularly at Uru in Kwaio, people were building not just fences 
but virtual stockades. One at Ilanunu at Uru had a gate, and the local head-
man Maenaa‘adi was refused entry and treated “generally rudely.” Others 
were being built at Sinalagu, ‘Oloburi, and in adjacent east Kwara‘ae. Like 
some towns elsewhere around Malaita at this time (but not in ‘Are‘are), 
these had watchtowers 50 and more feet tall. Lookouts manned these crow’s 
nests with conch horns to blow an alarm if government ships approached. 
Forster called for a surprise attack on Uru to arrest the men in the towns 
and force them to tear down the structures, and Germond concurred. For-
ster proposed also to demolish the local SSEM chapel, “as it has undoubt-
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edly been used as a center of sedition”; he reasoned, “As Deck has described 
the M.R. as damned I don’t see that he would have any objections.” If at the 
same time they destroyed structures at Kwai and Ngongosila, Forster said, 
“I think the M.R. would just about be done.” At his request warship HMS 
Shoalhaven passed through the area. He sought warrants to arrest Anifelo, 
Jason Frankie, ‘Adifaka, and other Kwaio for instigating the building, but 
only ‘Adifaka was arrested.55
Uru was raided on 21 October 1948, and ‘Ilemi (Fifi‘i’s home) and Laa-
lalo towns at Sinalagu soon after. Ganifiri’s former base of Naafinua, a town 
with 600–700 inhabitants, was attacked on 6 December. A letter from ‘Adi-
faka in jail had been smuggled out, warning of the impending raids, so 
Kwaio and Kwara‘ae people met to decide who should stay to be arrested 
while leaders repaired to the bush. Mountain people had been summoned 
to the coast, but after a brief stay and no sign of police they went home. 
When the police did come, 61 Kwaio were arrested, and the next day 20 
men were ordered to raze the Ilanunu stockade. They declined until they 
were threatened with bayonets, at which they began to work. When women 
berated the men to stop, Forster had 21 of them arrested, prompting the 
men to sit down and refuse orders. The women were jailed in the ‘Aoke 
lunatic asylum to separate them from male prisoners.56
Women’s roles in the resistance have been missed or even denied in pre-
vious accounts of Maasina Rule. Most of the exceptions have been mentions 
of their pressuring men to end their resistance, but as Fox wrote, “The Gov-
ernment hoped that the women, left to do all the heavy garden work the 
men usually did, would persuade their men-folk to give in; it was not real-
ized that the women were in the movement as strongly as the men.” Later, 
in places in the north, some women did so pressure men, but many commu-
nities appointed specific men to comply with tax or census demands, or to 
evade arrest, so as to be able to stay home and help them. Men also intensi-
fied their work before pending arrests; when the government announced 
a plan to tax and census Malaitans in late 1949, a Catholic priest at Buma 
wrote, “All the natives are now feverishly working their gardens in prepara-
tion to go to gaol for five months.” Women sometimes pressed men not to 
capitulate, as in the Uru episode just described. The absence of women in 
writings about Maasina Rule is partly a result of officers’ keenness to dis-
count and expunge their role, especially Germond, who in October 1948 
replaced Noel in an acting capacity until early 1950. The report on the 
Kwaio raids that he sent to Freeston, who requested one in advance, omit-
ted the 21 women from both the report and prisoner count. Trench, writ-
ing for Germond from Honiara, ordered Forster not to proceed further 
against the women he had jailed until Germond arrived, and I have found 
no subsequent mention of them.57
In November, Germond issued officers formal orders on Maasina Rule 
policy, which stated, “The female population do not and must not come 
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into the picture at all. We have no quarrel with the women folk for this is 
a ‘game’ which does not fall within their province. The native understands 
and appreciates this as he has shown time after time in our recent opera-
tions on Malaita.” He no doubt feared, and rightly so, that to drop this 
fiction and arrest women across Malaita would both further inflame the 
situation and jeopardize the support he required from his superiors for the 
campaign to continue. It would also have undercut the claim that one rea-
son the movement had to be repressed was that it oppressed women. Euro-
peans had long depicted Malaitan women as docile drudges who toiled 
under men, and portrayals of them having no part in Maasina Rule played 
to this stereotype. Women’s exclusion from the Maasina Rule record is but 
one facet of the invisibility of women and their perspectives in the colonial 
archive concerning Malaita, though it stands out in its calculation.58
Women sometimes took even more active roles in the resistance. In his 
mid-twenties, Tom Titiuru of Ulawa was a member of the constabulary 
charged with raiding towns. In 1987 he recounted to me how the men in 
the watchtowers would see them approaching, and sometimes women and 
children would leave: “By the time we got there only the men would be 
left. . . . Sometimes they would all be standing in a line ready to go to prison. 
Most people behaved very well, especially in Small Malaita and in ‘Are‘are, 
and Makira. . . . But in the north everyone would be in the villages when we 
came, even the women would be there throwing stones at us while we were 
tearing down the fences [the men by then having been arrested]. And they 
would all be cursing us.” Germond’s instructions that women “must not 
come into the picture at all” is probably why such episodes are invisible 
in most reports and thus have been mostly hidden from the purview of 
historians. After Germond’s orders, one finds few mentions of women at 
all, though Peter Hughes did note in an early 1949 telegram, “Allan reports 
women taking more active part at arrests.” And that May, Allan said the 
women in one Makwanu town “massed to cheer their men folk as they were 
marched off” to jail, and at ‘Ofakwasi town at Fokanakafo, “as the prison-
ers were marched off, the women burst into hysterical shouting and crying 
and made to follow the men through the gateway. Imprecations and oaths 
were shouted to the [Western Solomons] police who fortunately did not 
understand and for a moment the atmosphere was unpleasant.” Any Malai-
tan man would have been speedily arrested for such behavior. Shortly after, 
some women in the north were found to have started rumors that all Maa-
sina Rule opponents were to be exiled from Malaita, and they were warned 
that if they repeated those rumors they would be arrested.59
Even putting aside that women were watching husbands, fathers, broth-
ers, and sons jailed for standing up to the government, they had shared 
men’s humiliations and suffered hardships under the indenture system that 
Maasina Rule was repudiating. Recall that women had marched on ‘Aoke in 
1943 to demand return of their men from the Labour Corps. Women were 
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not apolitical, and the idea that they were expressed not only a dismissal (or 
fear) of their agency but also the view that Maasina Rule was an abstract, 
male ideological cause, “a game,” rather than an earnest protest against 
real privations and degradations shared by all Malaitans.
Resistance was not always fully passive even among the ‘Are‘are, despite 
their more benign reputation with officers and police. Titiuru described 
another incident in which he and other police landed on a beach in the 
southeast: “We were ordered not to shoot anyone except in self-defense. 
I remember during one raid at Takataka a crowd came down and slowly 
walked toward us and backed us up until we were knee-deep in the ocean, 
and then waist-deep, neck-deep, and finally we were out there floating and 
swimming. [Akin: “What did they say?”] No, no! They didn’t say anything! 
They just came down, and they were having fun with us. Maybe a thou-
sand people, or two thousand. And we only fifty soldiers. We were very 
frightened.”60
Such actions were not the norm, and the dominant Malaitan mode of 
response to Operation Jericho was a well-ordered civil resistance campaign, 
carried out mostly in the north where officers focused their attentions and 
actions. A puzzling feature of the literature on Maasina Rule is how little 
attention it pays to this, given that it was for so long the movement’s key 
strategy and the principal target of government’s attempts to end it—civil 
resistance was the crux of the matter, yet many writers seem unaware that 
there was any, and no one has stressed its intensity and central importance. 
Some state only that thousands were arrested, suggesting either pervasive 
Malaitan disorder or that the government simply rounded up and jailed 
people.
Other writers have not just omitted the civil resistance but have told 
of violence by Malaitans or officers that never took place. Many merely 
implied this with references to unspecified “Maasina Rule militants” or “ter-
rorism.” Others went farther, like William Davenport and Gülbün Çoker, 
who said that the government only resorted to suppression after “tax col-
lectors had been attacked.” (No postwar tax was instituted until late 1949, 
and the officers and headmen collecting it were not attacked.) Gideon 
Zoleveke recalled, “Inevitably the police were brought in to maintain order, 
violence broke out and lives were lost.” Belshaw credited the establishment 
of native courts and councils on Gela in early 1948 with the fact that there, 
“political discontent did not reach the peak of violence that it has reached 
in other areas.” Remo Guidieri wrote, “For the first time, violent political 
conflict between colonized and colonizer became inevitable. The chronicle 
of the Maasina Rule that ended in the violent suppression of the movement 
around 1948 was marked by deaths, by military expeditions on the part of 
the colonial administration, by bloody suppressions and prison.” In Allan’s 
1950 anthropology thesis, an entire section titled “Terrorist Tactics” alleges, 
“Flags were being carried from village to village, drilling was increasing, 
Suppression and Resistance 283
open threats to British life and property were being offered and mass meet-
ings, accompanied by mass-hysteria were becoming more popular.” But 
beyond this sentence of crass distortion, the thesis mentions nothing that 
could be construed as “terrorist.” A section called “Passive Resistance” tells 
merely of refusals to destroy fences and says nothing of the thousands he 
and others had arrested for civil resistance. Later Allan said that the head 
chiefs were arrested due to “evidence of bodily injury sustained by a number 
of people” and that at every ‘Aoke Maasina Rule meeting from 1946 onward 
“rioting had narrowly been avoided.” None of these authors cite sources for 
these statements, even each other, and the statements are false. Most writers 
were ignorant of the facts; others, like Allan, distorted intentionally. The 
Maasina Rule years saw just one anomalous, tragic death, when a policeman 
shot a man in self-defense in a confused situation, an incident to which 
I will return. The truth is, there was an extraordinary dearth of violence 
despite the years of intense repression and resistance and high emotions on 
both sides—something for which both Malaitans and government officers 
deserve high praise.61
To be jailed for the cause was honorable, and especially during Opera-
tion Jericho people went to prison with enthusiasm, under sardonic mottos 
like “Eat government rice,” or “Work free for government.”62 As described 
by Marquand, who was in charge of many arrests, they believed “they had 
done nothing to justify this treatment by the Government and determined 
to show their disapproval with dignified passive resistance.” Malaita’s 1949–
1950 Annual Report recorded, “Impatient ones crossed the island to a vil-
lage that was to be arrested rather than wait for their turn. Adolescents 
and young boys, mere children, entered the line with their fathers, uncles 
and brothers and sometimes had to be forcibly ejected, as tears of disap-
pointment streamed down their faces.” Marquand observed the “faultless 
discipline,” excepting such young men and old ones unhappy at being 
pulled from the arrest lines. “Courts were convened on the spot,” wrote 
Tom Russell, “ ‘Rex v Alabaia and ninety-nine others,’ and off they went.” 
Allan reported that Baelelea men resented having been ignored in favor of 
Fataleka and that they eagerly awaited the soldiers; and after arrest opera-
tions were carried out there, he believed, “The single month gaol term has 
given every man in Baelelea a personal stake in the Marching Rule.”63
Once men were jailed, security was easy. As Marquand wrote, “The prison 
facilities being inadequate for such numbers [at times well over 1,000 at 
‘Aoke alone, with others in Honiara], the overflow were often billeted in 
ordinary houses, and sometimes unguarded; and yet they made no attempt 
to escape. They worked, armed with picks and shovels, in gangs of up to 
fifty and sometimes more, guarded by one warder, generally insufficiently 
trained, armed with a truncheon. They worked hard and conscientiously 
without complaint, and once released and return home, they are treated 
very well by their own folk as soldiers are who return from the wars.” Russell 
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gave a similar account of some 1,500 prisoners who toiled on an ‘Aoke to 
Malu‘u road in 1949, when each warder oversaw 100 men. In this peculiar 
symbolic struggle, Malaitan prisoners experienced the government’s power 
to impose its will as embodied in isolated, untrained guards carrying sticks. 
In March 1949, Germond told High Commissioner Freeston that prison 
labor had built 24 kilometers of road; a Fiu river bridge; a police camp, 
barracks, and school at ‘Aoke; and the Malu‘u station. These accomplish-
ments he hoped would help to defray the extra £10,000 cost of operations 
on Malaita for the 1948–1949 fiscal year and the £10,000 more projected 
for the coming year. Allan, however, said in mid-1949 that ration costs for 
those arrested for fences and census refusals in To‘abaita alone had been 
£10,000, “or about £62 per Marching Rule adherent censused.” The gov-
ernment that had for decades suffered a lack of money from London to 
develop Malaita was now given ample funding to jail its populace.64
Germond’s November 1948 directive said that his anti-Maasina policy was 
one of simple direct rule. Officers were to announce: “Government will not 
tolerate Marching Rule in any shape or form and is determined to stamp it 
out and obtain the submission of the people to its authority and to that 
of its approved native officers [ie, headmen].” They were not to discrimi-
nate: “What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, in other words 
what is good for Malu‘u is good for Ari Ari.” They were strictly forbidden to 
vary from this policy, since Malaitans had to know it was that of the govern-
ment and not of an individual officer. The goal was “to impose the will of 
Government over the people” through destruction of fences, forced compli-
ance with a census, and “the reimposition of taxation on the whole island.” 
These steps would be pursued in that order, he said, since each required 
the completion of the previous stage: fences prevented access for censusing 
(in truth, few did), which was necessary to compile rolls for the taxation, 
expected to begin on 1 April. Germond’s resolve to avoid all nuance bred 
a simplistic, hard-line approach with no flexibility. As with the unremitting 
decree of 1947 that “Marching Rule must end,” the government placed itself 
in a position from which it feared that any policy modification, negotiation, 
or gesture of reconciliation would lead Malaitans to think that it was backing 
down—which indeed it would be by the terms of its own proclamations.65
The Census and the Tax, 1949
With Noel’s “year of change” now over, in early 1949 Malaita’s officers met 
in ‘Aoke to set new strategy for the coming months. They estimated that 
more than 150 fenced towns and villages remained on Malaita, and, unlike 
the biblical Jericho, once destroyed these could quickly be rebuilt. Forster, 
under Germond’s November plan, expected to arrest 300 men a month, 
while Colin Allan, who had just taken over Malu‘u from Cameron, would 
arrest 200. But at Forster’s lead it was decided that pulling down fences 
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would be unproductive—they had lost much of their symbolic significance 
and did not restrict movement, and while people still made or repaired 
some of them, many were simply rotting away. “The real symbol of March-
ing Rule power and principles was in the town itself,” said Forster, and the 
fence policy “slowly applied would, and in fact was, raising a nagging resent-
ment and not the respect for authority which was necessary if Government 
were to prevail.” He tabled a new approach in which officers would inspect 
towns and, if they were deemed unsanitary—and Forster clearly thought 
most could be—condemn and destroy them, “if necessary by fire.” For 
speed’s sake officers would arrest only those who resisted. However, when 
Germond received their plan he rejected it and insisted his policy as previ-
ously stated be followed to the letter.66
Readers know that Forster, before taking leave in March 1947 for “ner-
vous exhaustion,” was devoted to Malaita and close to southern people. 
Perhaps this was a factor in what now proved to be his inability to maintain 
composure in the face of defiance and disrespect. He suffered this more 
than other officers because, as in the past, he toured almost continuously 
(now with a large police contingent); Cameron in January asked that rou-
tine Malu‘u matters be administered separately because Forster was so rarely 
at ‘Aoke. Forster’s assessment of Maasina Rule had always been capricious, 
reacting to events at hand. Even now he was more openly sympathetic to 
Malaitan grievances than were other officers, but with the people in full, if 
civil, rebellion, Forster proposed the most drastic tactics, such as destroying 
Uru’s SSEM church and burning towns. Matters came to a head on 26 Feb-
ruary when he arrested 51 ‘Are‘are men at Takataka—essentially because 
he was offended by their demeanor—and charged them with rioting. When 
all but four refused his attempt to, in effect, extort shell money deposits 
from them for future good behavior, he sentenced them to six months in 
prison. A headman protested, and Germond asked for a report and sent it 
to Charles, who declared Forster’s actions “inexcusable,” “a serious derelic-
tion of duty,” and “a mere travesty of a trial,” which gave an impression that 
Forster was “actuated by anger and a desire for revenge and not a desire to 
do justice.” Charles saw no evidence that most of the men, who had by now 
been in jail for six weeks, had broken any law, and he said they should be 
released. Germond conceded the injustice but urged Freeston not to order 
their release pending review since to do so would undermine government 
authority.67
As 1949 began, more than 2,000 Malaitans had been arrested, and many 
more soon would be. This is a fitting place to pause and note how unhappy 
most officers were as they carried out these actions. None had come to the 
Solomons seeking this sort of job. In Russell’s words, “Those of us who went 
out into the colonial service after the War, we’d had a year’s academic study 
at Cambridge or Oxford with three months at London University, doing 
regional anthropology, languages, if they could teach you one, under Evans-
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Pritchard and Raymond Firth. And we really believed that our mission, the 
career we’d chosen, was decolonization.” Further, the staff “profoundly dis-
liked the imprisonment policy which they were directed to implement, and 
had a sneaking feeling of regret when it undoubtedly paid off.” That some 
officers did not share Russell’s perspective is evident from their writings, 
but we have seen that Marquand came to see the suppression he took part 
in as ineffectual and unjust, and Forster was obviously a troubled man. How 
many of them came to think as Marquand or Russell did I cannot say; most 
were in no position to write critiques of policy, and few recorded their can-
did views after. In mid-1954, District Commissioner Val Andersen wrote that 
due to “strenuous and exacting” conditions, since the start of 1947 only one 
Malaita officer had finished his full term there.68
What is clear is that mass arrests wrecked officer-Malaitan relations and 
scuttled government objectives—above all its two declared, essential goals 
of securing respect and acceptance of its legitimacy and Malaitans’ coop-
eration toward advancing its plans. Well-intentioned officers arrived to 
find themselves pegged as the enemy; a handful of young men bore the 
brunt of Malaitan resentments built up across decades of misrule, neglect, 
and degradation. Colonial officers typically lived under less than luxuri-
ous conditions with a heavy workload, and few would call them overpaid 
(they joked that they were “the cheapest form of labor in the colonies”), 
but a mitigating factor for many had been that in their jurisdictions they 
held positions of status, responsibility, and power, in the sense of an ability 
to make things happen. Now they found themselves among a population 
who refused to grant them either respect or authority, with their principal 
duty being to punish them for this. Without proper briefing in even recent 
Malaitan history, let alone training in local cultures or languages, most offi-
cers could not fully fathom the anger they met, which therefore seemed 
to them unreasonable, offensive, bigoted, or irrational.69 It is little wonder 
that through their time on Malaita some officers came to dislike the people 
with increasing intensity, as expressed in their reports. The atmosphere was 
noxious and, in terms of strategizing, debilitating. During 1948 and 1949, 
in particular, when policy did change it was generally in the direction of 
still further repression, with public humiliation the weapon of choice. Later 
shifts toward conciliation were to be instituted by officers who had spent 
little time on Malaita and were not caught up in this crippling cycle.
Readers may think it misplaced to highlight the plight and unhappiness 
of a handful of officers in a period when thousands of Malaitans were being 
imprisoned away from their homes and families for what they felt were acts 
of conscience. Yet it is critical to be aware of the subjective factors that 
contributed to officers’ actions and shaped government policy. It is also 
important to keep sight of the fact that most of Malaita’s officers during 
this period were charged with carrying out policy rather than making it, 
particularly once Germond took charge.
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The officer who bore the bulk of the work and strain of mass arrests in 
the near term was Colin Allan. As his predecessor Cameron had recom-
mended, Germond in mid-March designated a new “Malu‘u Sub-district” 
that included the area north of Kwara‘ae, to be administered largely apart 
from the rest of the island. At the same time, Germond ordered an intensi-
fication of anti-fence enforcement and census taking in that area, particu-
larly along the eastern coast. This escalation, titled “Operation Orestes,” 
ran from 12 April to 16 May. As Orestes began, Operation Jericho by itself 
had resulted in the arrest of more than 2,000 Malaitans, the large major-
ity of whom served at least a month in jail for refusing to destroy fences. 
Malu‘u’s police, under Choiseulese Sergeant Frank Taburi, had torn down 
41 fences, though by early 1949 many were so rotted that they were hard to 
find and even loyal headmen puzzled over why Allan arrested people for 
them.70
Allan reported that fences now meant nothing to people except as sym-
bols of defiance; he said, “If Government were, for instance, to ban the 
wearing of grass hats popularized by some members of Marching Rule, that 
order, too, would be resisted and all who wished to sacrifice themselves to 
the Marching Rule by going to gaol, would automatically wear grass hats.”71
In fact, Germond’s approach was no different than the Malaitan one Allan 
described—at issue were symbols, not substance. Germond’s goal was not 
simply to make people obey the law, as officers often flatly stated, but rather 
to make new laws to ban whatever symbols of resistance they employed and 
force them to either capitulate and be humbled or go to jail. This was an 
aggressive policy of mass humiliation.
In just over a month, Orestes arrested 1,060 more people, and Allan 
calculated that over 76 percent of the men in Malu‘u Sub-district had been 
given jail sentences of 2–16 weeks. In places, 80–99 percent were impris-
oned, most not for the first time. Not arrested were the old and infirm, 
the 5 percent who quietly agreed to be censused in private (almost never 
publicly), and men who ran away. Some of the latter two groups had been 
chosen by their communities to stay home to work. Several area headmen 
refused to be censused and went to jail. At saltwater villages, people readied 
for the police by decorating their decomposing towers with flowers and 
bunting, and men put on dancing regalia. An overarching goal of Orestes 
had been to prove to people that the government had the ability to “arrest 
the entire population of Malaita desiring to go to gaol for the Marching 
Rule.” After it was over, Allan worried it had done no good and had actu-
ally harmed census plans. People had started to bring some legal and other 
problems to Malu‘u station for help, but Orestes ended that. Intelligence 
also dried up as Allan’s primary function became to arrest people. This 
made Malu‘u administrative work “impossible,” and Allan reported his situ-
ation as “unfortunate and unhappy.” In a summary report to Germond, 
however, he conveyed Headman Kakalu‘ae’s worry that police actions had 
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been too weak and jail sentences too short, and that in consequence the 
government might lose the respect of even the few loyalists. Germond high-
lighted this concern in the report’s margin and wrote one large, under-
scored word: “Tax.”72
Taxation indeed was to be the new focus of arrests, though census and 
fence prosecutions would continue. This was all to proceed under a new 
district commissioner. Though Forster remained through 30 May 1949, 
Germond had in February decided to replace him, even before the Taka-
taka false arrest fiasco. Germond felt that Malaita’s staff was not working 
together, that his officers held varied views of his approach, and that this 
might lead Malaitans to think that policy depended on officers’ individual 
notions. Rev Arthur Devlin said Maasina Rule leaders in the area around 
Buma were happy when Forster was removed because he undermined their 
claims that the government was uninterested in people’s welfare. Germond 
sent Forster to Guadalcanal and replaced him with Stanley “Monty” Master-
man. A later resident commissioner called Masterman’s appointment “not 
a very desirable move but necessary and unavoidable in view of the absence 
of experienced Administrative Officers.” Even granting the staff shortage, 
the choice of Masterman for this most critical assignment in the Protec-
torate is baffling. His only qualification cited was that he had been in the 
Solomons for a long time. A likely explanation is that Germond expected 
Masterman to pursue his rigid policy without question and with gusto. If so, 
he was not disappointed.73
Except for serving in Europe during World War II, the 50-year-old Mas-
terman had been in the Solomons since 1922, working mostly as a clerk or 
labor inspector. He had acted as secretary to the government from 1946 
to 1948 but had no formal training in administration. Russell wrote, “He 
had two negative attributes. . . . He had no political antennae and was about 
the worst Pidgin English speaker in the service.” More than one person 
described him as “old school.” As a labor inspector in the 1930s, he had 
complained for years about not being promoted. This angered Resident 
Commissioner Ashley, who communicated to him in 1938, “The correspon-
dence shows little evidence of your fitness for promotion, even were a suit-
able vacancy available.” In 1935, Masterman was investigated for brutally 
beating a prisoner because, he told Ashley, the man “grinned in the man-
ner that is objectionable in a certain type of native,” and, “I think very few 
of us are willing to tolerate direct impertinence from natives.”74
Many Malaitans would have heard in these remarks a fair indication of 
Masterman’s attitude toward them. Today he stands alone among officers 
in his historical reputation as a churlish thug, and he is still cited as the 
epitome of a reviled type of European, even by young people who have 
only heard elders tell of him. His actions as district commissioner further 
worsened his standing. Policeman P V Collins, reporting on shots fired near 
Masterman’s house at ‘Aoke toward the end of his service in May 1950, 
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wrote, “It is common knowledge here in Malaita that Major Masterman is 
utterly disliked by the majority of Malaitans, and from information received, 
people have sworn by native custom to kill him. Their dislike for him goes 
back to the time when he led a party into Sinarago District to suppress riots 
after the Bell murder.” Masterman had to be placed under 24-hour police 
protection. To Malaitans, his selection to administer their island spoke 
loudly of the government’s outlook and intentions, and for this alone it was 
a long stride backward. Fifi‘i told me in 1987 he thought Masterman was 
sent specifically to try to frighten people.75 A keystone of Malaitan resent-
ment and resistance was the disrespect Europeans had always paid them, 
and now a man who personified that attitude was being placed in charge.
As Masterman took office, Germond told him that while “the dogged 
resistance of the Malaitamen has not been broken,” the government had 
achieved much—in having earned “the respect, if not the regard, of the 
people” in showing they could conduct mass arrests, in people no longer 
building fences, and in a few young men signing on as labor. “This being 
the position,” Germond continued, “it is now time, not to relax, but to press 
on!” He promised more police and directed harsher sentences for fence 
and census offenses. When the 1950–1951 tax came due, Germond told 
Masterman, he should meet refusals to pay that, or the 1949–1950 tax, with 
further imprisonment.76
Masterman soon did increase sentences and proposed building “a hold-
ing cage at Sinerango on the site of the one I set up there in 1927.” He 
destroyed a building identified as a church at Kwai and raided an Ulawa 
church service. The latter raid provoked charges that his men had stolen 
from houses and defecated in a Catholic church, and that one had exposed 
himself to women. Charles Fox wrote to W J Durrad of “police surround-
ing the [Ulawan] churches when the people were at prayers, and going 
in with fixed bayonets, telling the people not to bother about God, and 
arresting and taking to gaol every man on Ulawa except at [one] village.” In 
early July, Masterman reported to Germond the first of what would become 
regular rumors of planned attacks against the government. Though these 
never developed beyond hot talk and rumor, they did indicate a general 
shift in mood.77
Two months after Masterman’s appointment, Tom Russell arrived to 
take over Malu‘u from Allan. During the war he had been a parachutist and 
then a prisoner in Italy. He quickly began intensive touring of the north 
(Masterman even told him to make his tours shorter) and soon reported 
that Maasina Rule had become “an integral part of the social structure of 
Malaita” and was “likely to remain for some years.” He said that eliminating 
it as a political force would be a long and slow process and that for the time 
being officers could only try to keep its adherents within the law.78 Russell 
found that officer relations with the people had been “severely damaged” 
by the arrest policy and warned that the few links that remained might 
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be destroyed: “That children should run screaming from an approaching 
Government officer on an Administrative tour is a serious indication of the 
present divorcement between people and the administration.” He noted, 
too, the “coloring” of officers’ and headmen’s attitudes brought about by 
the people’s “studied insolence, by the snubbing and ignoring of genuine 
efforts towards the common weal.” Russell’s own reports are notably free of 
slurs, and perhaps his attitude is one reason that some people soon grew 
friendlier toward him. He gave the example of people of one Fataleka town 
who offered up their Maasina Rule kastom (meeting) house for his party to 
sleep in. Masterman’s comment on this captures his and Russell’s dissimilar 
approaches: Masterman said he always occupied such houses “in any event 
as being the best in the place. That is one reason why I do not destroy 
them.” The other reason was that he expected to soon put kastom houses to 
government use, after Maasina Rule had surrendered.79
Rumors, Hopes, and Fears
There are always ten stories about a fight; the tenth and last is the one 
to believe.
—Lau proverb80
As officers toiled to defeat Maasina Rule, Malaita was thick with rumors 
of still more drastic government actions to come, pending arrivals of for-
eign ships or troops, or looming apocalyptic wars. The rumors’ frequency 
peaked in 1949 at the height of the arrest campaign, but they were not 
limited to that period. The stories proved impossible for either officers or 
Malaitan leaders to control and hampered the efforts of both to commu-
nicate their messages. Some Malaitans were motivated by these rumors to 
prepare for the events they warned of or promised.
People have disagreed as to the relationship of such ideas and actions to 
Maasina Rule. Some Europeans, particularly certain officers of the period, 
saw in them the movement’s essence as a millennial movement or mystical 
“cargo cult,” and for years anthropologists studied Maasina Rule within the 
cargo cult literature. In a historical study of the concept, Lamont Lind-
strom described how “cargo cult” first surfaced in print in 1945, in a New 
Guinea resident’s political diatribe in Pacific Islands Monthly. The basic idea 
in its crude form was that Melanesians, envying the wealth of whites but 
having only distorted understandings of how they got it, decided that it 
could be obtained magically, usually from the spirit world—the perfor-
mance of proper rituals would summon goods in staggering quantities. 
This was said to express their primitive, magical worldview and cupidity. 
The phenomenon was at times portrayed in the singular as “the cargo cult,” 
attributing sameness to diverse movements across time and the region, and 
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even beyond. From this idea administrators and soon anthropologists con-
structed models for understanding Melanesians and their movements. In 
time, some anthropologists developed theories of cargo cults that were far 
more complex, nuanced, and varied, but the concept as applied by key 
colonial officers during Maasina Rule generally was not.81
The first BSIP officer to mark Maasina Rule as an instance of a broader 
Melanesian phenomenon was Noel in March 1947, just after the head chiefs 
told him of their strike plans. Reporting this to his officers and the high 
commissioner, he likened the movement to “strange transgressions from 
common sense” found in “Fiji, New Hebrides, Papua and New Guinea.” 
We have seen how Trench equated Maasina Rule with “cults astonishingly 
similar” in New Guinea and thereby absolved BSIP policies of any blame for 
it. Belshaw later cited the Ulawa incident described in chapter 6 as having 
sparked his interest in “messianic movements,” and in 1950, in an Australian 
Intelligence Digest article that was distributed to officers, he submitted Maa-
sina Rule as “a strange native cult,” representative (along with the Fallowes 
movement) of a general type.82 Colin Allan’s 1950 anthropology master’s 
thesis at Cambridge, supervised by Reo Fortune and finished just before 
Allan became Malaita’s district commissioner, portrayed Maasina Rule as 
most importantly an irrational cult seeking magical cargo delivery. Accord-
ing to anthropologist Davenport, whom the government consulted on vari-
ous matters during the 1960s, Allan’s thesis “became sort of the official 
version of the movement to subsequent administrators in the Protectorate.” 
Allan later donated a copy to the Malaita District Office for his successors, 
suggesting that they read it along with “Mr R Davies’ excellent political sec-
tion in the 1947 Annual Report.”83
For officers who could not understand Malaitans or why they were so 
unhappy, the cargo cult model was simplifying and liberating. It explained 
Maasina Rule, obscured political and ethical grievances, and morally vali-
dated repression as saving Malaitans from their own folly. More specifically, 
the government’s most fundamental problem with the movement was, as 
Noel so often emphasized and as Allan put it in the opening paragraph of 
his thesis, “the stranglehold which it has had on the Protectorate’s econ-
omy.” The cargo cult portrayal suggested that Maasina Rule could not be 
dealt with as a labor movement because Malaitan economic thought was 
delusional. Europeans often stressed the idea that Melanesians thought 
wealth could be “free.” Officers lectured them that prosperity came not 
from cargo but hard work, and the BSIP Annual Report for 1948 scolded, 
“Marching Rule leaders must learn that the world does not owe Solomon 
Islanders a living.” Noel and other key officers were confident this argu-
ment would soon win the day since they believed Malaitans judged power 
and most everything else in materialistic terms, and cargo cultism would 
not deliver the goods. In other words, the materialist core of the cargo cult 
model was central to its meaning and usage and to how officers subscribing 
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to it tried to combat Maasina Rule. It diverted some officers from consid-
ering or addressing practical Malaitan concerns and thus severely under-
mined their effectiveness.84
As occurred with other Melanesian movements, traits of “the cargo 
cult” absent from Maasina Rule were at times attributed to it, sometimes 
taken from New Guinea anecdotes, and minor features were inflated to 
fit the type. Among other things, this was good propaganda for checking 
criticisms that might surface abroad that officers were repressing legitimate 
labor or political actions. An excerpt from a story from the Sydney Herald 
will illustrate:
Marching rule is similar to the New Guinea cargo cult. The natives believe that 
ships laden with goods and food are due to arrive shortly, and that they will then 
enjoy a Utopian life with everything free and no work. The difference is that in 
New Guinea they think the ships will be manned by their own dead ancestors, 
while the marching rule adherents expect them to be manned by Americans—
they regard the shipments as a magic form of Marshall Aid. . . . British officials in 
the Solomons have found marching rule a great nuisance. Thousands of natives, 
at times, have refused to work or co-operate with the Administration. . . . There 
were a number of similar cults among the North American Indians when the 
palefaces moved into their territory.
I know of no organized conspiracy to spread such portrayals, but officers 
did give them to the press. For example, the high commission’s chief sec-
retary, G D Chamberlain, told the same newspaper about movement prom-
ises: “In September 1947 Liberty ships crammed with goods would appear 
off the Solomons; The skin of all the natives would change from black to 
white; European houses, complete with refrigerators and bathrooms, would 
be distributed free to the natives; and never-ending supplies of food, drink, 
and comforts would be handed to the natives,” and “when these things did 
not materialise ‘Marching Rule’ suffered a setback.”85
While some officers highlighted cargo beliefs as the mainstay of Maa-
sina Rule, others in their writings minimized their significance or do not 
mention them at all.86 This second view was more in line with that of later 
historians and anthropologists, who challenged the cargo cult portrayal as a 
misrepresentation of what was actually a movement for social advancement 
or liberation. Most allowed that some cargo-like ideas were in circulation 
but discounted their importance. Keesing wrote, “Cargo doctrines were 
peripheral in Maasina Rule, if they occurred at all,” and Laracy later said, 
“The expectation of the arrival of ‘cargo’ was never a major influence on 
Maasina Rule thinking or behavior.” Peter Worsley claimed that cargo ideas 
were “lingering myths” and unimportant on Malaita.87 These writers all pro-
vided vital corrections to past distortions. That said, in rectifying cargo cult 
distortions one must be careful not to obscure less practical ideas and activi-
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ties that did motivate many Malaitans, ideas that could be just as political 
in spirit as strikes or civil resistance but were based on misconceptions of 
global political realities.
Some Malaitans did suppose that Americans could bring goods—and 
not only in later stages of the movement, as is sometimes asserted. San-
dars wrote in Malaita’s 1946 Annual Report that over the preceding year 
some Malaitans had thought Americans might bring “boatloads of free sup-
plies . . . and free issues of cutter boats and all the good things in life,” and 
the next July he noted, “The hopes of free cargoes from the Americans 
still persists although I feel sure that in their hearts they know it is false.” 
There is ample archival and oral evidence that such ideas circulated widely, 
evoking Malaitan reactions ranging from belief, to skepticism, to laughter.88
An episode at Uru in Kwaio shows how they could coexist with other very 
different expectations and actions. In 1982, Saelasi Lounga of Uru told me 
what happened there in 1948 when people learned Forster and his soldiers 
planned to raid their town of Ilanunu, and rumors spread:
The Americans are out there at sea watching everything we do. If the govern-
ment tears down our fences, then Americans will come and defeat them, and kill 
off all of their soldiers. They are waiting off to the side. And cargo [Pijin kago] 
will come. The Americans will bring it for all of you. When you move down to the 
sea don’t worry about going hungry there; Americans will be bringing cargo for 
you all, and we will eat what they bring. There is a big submarine [Pijin daefasifi, 
or “diver ship”] out at sea. Everyone go down to the sea, and when the subma-
rine comes . . . all of you will go inside until it is full, and it will take all of you to 
America. And there will be plenty of cargo left for those who stay behind. Those 
are the lies they told.89
As described earlier, the soldiers destroyed Ilanunu in October, and Lounga 
said this left some people disillusioned: “The government said, ‘Who told 
you to build these things for war?’ And they chopped down every tower 
at Uru, and every fence. . . . We thought, ‘Hey! The Americans they said 
would come, the Americans to fight with us, what’s taking them so long?’ ” 
Lounga did not identify the “they” who spread the stories, but Kwaio gener-
ally blamed people to the north.90
Several Kwaio have told me of participating in this event, and some talked 
of hopes that Americans might come. Yet only Lounga stressed “cargo” (or 
mentioned submarine trips), and most said nothing about it unless I asked, 
at which they responded with something like, “Oh yes, some people said 
Americans would bring kago.” This resembled accounts of Noto‘i’s 1939 
movement, in which the idea that Americans would bring wealth was men-
tioned only as an afterthought, when Keesing or I asked about it. People 
did not omit mention of cargo due to embarrassment; a common theme 
was chagrin for thinking Americans might come at all, and people laugh 
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at their gullibility. No one ever hesitated to discuss cargo ideas when I 
broached them.
Forster’s reports mention no Americans; he saw Kwaio fenced towns as 
a political challenge to the government. That leaders were not behind the 
rumors seems clear in that, on learning of the coming raid, they called a 
meeting to decide who would stay to be arrested. Further, mountain peo-
ple—and the large majority of Kwaio then lived inland—told me they went 
to the coast reluctantly, under pressure from people there to show soli-
darity against the raid, and that they heard rumors about Americans but 
few believed them. Forster’s account supports this: “All bush people were 
induced to come down to the shore on Saturday but when the Government 
did not appear that day they went back to the bush next morning. A similar 
attempt to induce the bush people at Sinalagu to support the people of 
Lalalo [Laalalo town] and Ileni [‘Ilemi] was frustrated by [Headman David 
Ridley,] who told the bushmen that the notice only applied to the Lalalo 
and Ileni people. The bush people seemed pleased to hear this and went 
away.” In fact, at Sinalagu some mocked Christians angry at their departure: 
“It’s good for them to arrest you, to protect us all! It will leave we bush 
people strong to carry on the work. You should not be angry!”91
Here leaders prepared people for a civil resistance action, which, as 
described earlier, is what did happen, but rumors that Americans would 
come, with and without goods, piggybacked on the event, and different par-
ticipants held varied expectations. This was likely true of similar episodes 
around Malaita, though sadly we currently have no reliable, multiperspec-
tive accounts of events elsewhere. Lounga truthfully told of cargo hopes, just 
as officers and informants did at times, but obviously this event cannot be 
reduced to those. Yet desires for American goods should not be dismissed 
as trivial, since they did inspire some people, and others thought it pos-
sible they might turn up. Remember that Americans had recently expelled 
the Japanese and, by local standards, bestowed great wealth. In Keesing’s 
words, “Solomon Islanders had been up to their ears in real cargo.” Fur-
thermore, some US soldiers advertised their dislike for the British (even 
to their faces), counseled Islanders to rebel, and said America might keep 
its new bases. To many Malaitans it seemed feasible that the United States 
might come to their aid and perhaps, as before, also bring good things. 
They built hopes on the interpersonal politics they knew and had pursued 
with US soldiers, not realizing its irrelevance to global politics.92
Speculating on how “cargo” beliefs got to Malaita, Keesing focused on 
diffusion through plantation networks. Malaitans also at times had access 
to Pacific Islands Monthly. Tim Fulbright has suggested that officers’ denun-
ciations of cargo ideas may have piqued Malaitan interest in them. That 
could also be true for other ideas about American help, since officers lec-
tured people on their absurdity, as they had to Labour Corps men.93 Still 
more likely is that such derision led anti–Maasina Rule informants to stress 
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cargo ideas in their reports—most news of them in archives came from 
informants. Many Malaitans came to believe that loyalists were trying to 
undermine the movement by inflating cargo beliefs in their statements to 
officers or even by starting the rumors; Waleanisia told me that Langalanga 
people accused loyalist Lau headman Tome Wate with initiating them, 
and Fifi‘i made the same charge. Tricksters were certainly at work; Aliki, 
once a duty at Kwai in Kwara‘ae, in 1992 told me of an incident, notorious 
across Malaita, in which two men littered a beach with boot tracks, cigarette 
butts, and tin cans scavenged at ‘Aoke, and the next morning called them 
to everyone’s attention as evidence a submarine had come, causing great 
excitement.94
My oral historical data from the east coast indicates that for most but not 
all people, “cargo” expectations were secondary, fleeting, or nonexistent. 
More common and enduring were hopes that Americans would drive out 
the British and become political benefactors (sometimes with grim conse-
quences for loyalists). One can consider these ideas separately, but note 
that while those seeking liberation were often blasé or dismissive toward 
cargo ideas, rumors of cargo always predicted that liberation would arrive 
with it. The distinction is, I think, not as significant as has sometimes been 
implied. The concern to separate the two, and then to minimize cargo 
while recognizing the hopes for liberation, reflects a distracting preoccupa-
tion with a flawed European taxonomy. Because some colonial officers used 
the cargo cult label to impute mysticism and deny political legitimacy (and 
some anthropologists and other writers perpetuated this), some scholars 
have countered by playing down or denying hopes for American wealth, 
as if such hopes would in themselves mark the movement as “a cargo cult” 
with everything that label implied. This bolsters a simplistic cargo cult con-
cept by arguing in its terms. The fact is, to anyone who understood global 
political realities of the later 1940s—which few Malaitans did—expecting 
Americans to liberate Malaita from colonial rule was no more realistic than 
waiting for them to arrive bearing gifts. Yet neither fallacy was inherently 
irrational or mystical, and most Malaitans expected that any American 
arrival would herald this-worldly, political-economic reform.95
It is often hard to distinguish cargo from liberation hopes in the written 
record since, although some officers stressed Malaitan wishes for Ameri-
can intervention, others simply presumed that hopes for Americans were 
largely about cargo. Just as those who misconstrued kastom automatically 
added “old” or “ancient” to “native custom,” so too “Americans” were per-
functorily coupled with “cargo.” Moreover, these two misunderstandings 
were linked: Maasina Rule adherents were seen to seek both a return to 
an ancient past and benefits of modernity, to be isolated yet enjoy foreign 
wealth or conveniences. This perceived discrepancy did not lead officers to 
reassess their own understandings; rather, they believed it expressed a fully 
contradictory Maasina Rule ideology, which in turn showed that Malaitans 
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were confused, or to use a favored term, “bewildered,” and did not really 
know what they wanted. The BSIP Annual Report for 1948 explained this:
Marching Rule [fostered] ridiculous rumours of a paradise to come—the most 
persistent and firmly believed . . . being that American ships would soon come to 
the Solomon Islands and hand out free gifts of rice, meat, cotton materials and 
everything else that the Solomon Island heart could desire in unlimited quanti-
ties, all free. It is difficult to write clearly of what Marching Rule aims are, since 
they vary from time to time and from area to area; no one seems able to give 
any precise account of them. Nevertheless, the general trend has been similar 
everywhere. The Marching Rule advocated, firstly, a return to the ancient way of 
life, a revival of all old customs, even those which had been dropped by mutual 
consent for many years, strong leadership by the few and discipline for the many, 
and a decidedly anti-foreign attitude generally. Coupled with this reactionary 
attitude, however, was a marked desire to obtain the material advantages which 
Western civilization had to offer—hospitals, schools, imported goods and so on. 
No attempt was made to reconcile the two desires, and, if the matter was given 
any thought at all, the common feeling seemed to be that the foreigners, whose 
friendship was shunned, had a duty to provide these material blessings. . . . They 
cannot withdraw into a shell of ancient customs and exclusive systems of self-
government and yet expect others to aid them in their search for a higher mate-
rial standard of living.96
Malaitans did want a return to the past—to kastom—but in the sense that 
they wanted to again control their own affairs and organize and advance 
their lives according to their own principles and ideas rather than Euro-
pean ones. The desire for American benefactors, far from contradicting 
this, gave lie to presumptions that kastom ideologies articulated an archaic 
agenda; that Malaitans, as officers commonly said, were deeply anti-white 
or anti-foreign; or, as officers often asserted, that they simply “wanted to 
be left alone.” Though hopes for American help were unrealistic, they also 
expressed an important realism: Malaitans well knew they were unprepared 
to go it alone in the larger world. Keen awareness of this is what made gain-
ing American help so important to so many. Malaitans hoped Americans 
would not only free them from what they saw as the fetters of colonialism 
but would also help them transform their lives toward a more progressive 
future such as Maasina Rule had sought from the start. Some thought they 
had to first liberate themselves from the British, after which Americans 
would come. They did not want separation from the world but liberation 
from a particular type of connection to it, which they thought would keep 
them an oppressed people not only in the Solomons but also on the global 
stage.
Throughout the Solomons, particularly in the southeast, there had since 
the war been ideas that Americans might end British rule. Even though the 
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numbers of Americans in the Solomons fell steadily from early 1945, rumors 
that they would intervene intensified in 1946 and 1947 and persisted in vari-
ous forms into the early 1950s. In east Kwara‘ae (but not Kwaio), some men 
practiced drilling and training with wooden rifles—divided into “scouts” 
and “enemies”—to perhaps fight alongside Americans, though it is unclear 
if this was in earnest. This took place even though, as Burt has detailed, 
their Head Chief Justus Jimmy spoke out against pursuing American help.97
Actual vigils for American arrival were episodic, and in Kwaio at least, 
many took part just once and dismissed later rumors as hoaxes. The first 
such event on a large scale occurred in 1947, before the arrests began. Fifi‘i 
recounted how Nelson Kifo, just after an ‘Aoke meeting, spoke to the chiefs 
and brashly rejected working with Sandars: “Are you all afraid of Mr. San-
dars? Come January we will carry him to the ship Nancy and push him out 
to sea. You are all afraid, and he wants to tell you all sorts of things, but he 
is a rubbish man.” No others present voiced support for this. But later Kifo 
called a meeting at Naafinua, which people from Sinalagu and northward 
attended. He said an American force was on Guadalcanal and would evict 
the government, and he initiated a collection of $2,000 that was apparently 
taken and offered to the small US contingent still at Lunga.98 Soon Kifo cir-
culated letters reporting that submarines and ships had been sighted, that 
Americans would soon land, and that people were to gather on shore. In 
Kwaio, duties one night scoured the area to summon people. There was no 
coercion, but most everyone came, including those far in the mountains. 
After three days and no Americans, people said the stories were lies and 
gave up the wait, but not necessarily their hopes for future American help.99
For many Malaitans, anticipation of American assistance had been and 
remained an important motivator to carry on with Maasina Rule. Years 
later, Fifi‘i told Keesing of this event: “We heard [Kifo’s message] and we 
wanted to believe it. We thought it was true, and we pushed on with more 
confidence. This time we didn’t want to give in to the government—our 
heads were strong because we thought the Americans were really going to 
help us.” And he later recalled, “We’d seen some pretty amazing things dur-
ing the war, so it wasn’t impossible.”100
Ma‘aanamae of Kwaio credited Malaitans’ diligence to prospects of 
American help: “During Maasina Rule . . . everyone worked very hard, every 
man and every woman was so willing. The reason things went so well is that 
at that time people were still ignorant. When those lies came from Kwara‘ae, 
and Lau, they led people to work hard and that made Maasina Rule strong.” 
Toloasi Teoboo, a key Kwaio leader after Fifi‘i’s arrest who openly dispar-
aged such ideas at the time, told me years later that he thought, on balance, 
hopes for Americans had been a good thing since they sustained people’s 
will. Said Tom Titiuru, “The hope for Americans made the people thought-
ful and unafraid of the British: ‘Don’t be afraid, the Americans will come, 
with gunpowder, and food, and to help us. We must keep on with the strug-
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gle.’ It boosted their spirits; encouraged them. They worked hard because 
in this they had trust, faith, and great hope.” Though rumors of Americans 
at times caused problems for Maasina Rule leaders who could not control 
them, they also stymied the administration. Forster, after an early-1949 tour 
of the north, urged that strategy “must include complete disillusionment 
on the American Question. There is little doubt that the attitude of these 
people is largely being sustained by the hopes of deliverance by the Ameri-
cans.” These hopes should not divert us from understanding Malaitans’ 
pragmatic grievances and actions, which persevered long after most people 
realized Americans would never come, but neither were they marginal to 
Maasina Rule, especially during certain periods.101
Many government officers routinely blamed such ideas on a cynical 
conspiracy devised by the head chiefs, or sometimes a vague Maasina Rule 
“intelligentsia,” to keep people engaged. They offered no real evidence and 
appear to have simply assumed this was true.102 Except for Kifo, I have found 
little to show that senior leaders falsely manipulated such hopes, and Fifi‘i, 
likely ‘Atoomea, and probably some others were themselves susceptible to 
them, at least initially. On the other hand, there is little to indicate that 
senior leaders other than Teoboo and Ganifiri spoke strongly against such 
ideas before their arrests, though they may have, and it seems that ‘Are‘are 
people sat out Kifo’s call to action. A lack of evidence of either manipula-
tion or critique cannot resolve this question, but it is highly unlikely the 
head chiefs, or any group of high-level chiefs, conspired to fool the people; 
the realities regarding different places and times were more complex than 
that. Rumors swelled rather than declined after the head chiefs were jailed, 
and when they heard of rumor-generated actions after their arrests, they 
conveyed their disapproval back to Malaita.103
Starting in late 1948, some rumors became more apocalyptic, warning 
of vicious government punitive plans or of cataclysmic battles that would 
follow invasion by Americans—or, in a few cases, Japanese or Russians.104
Many responded to these not by gathering at the coast but by retreating 
inland. Some (and only some) communities dug holes or trenches like the 
wartime foxholes, and, in parts of Kwaio at least, people made long tunnels 
for cover from government bombings or battles that might come. Some in 
the north built hidden mountain villages, just as officers had instructed in 
1942 when the Japanese were invading. Many communities collected huge 
stacks of firewood, said from Kwaio south to be stockpiles for the war’s dura-
tion or to be lit as beacons for American ships. In the north Russell said 
that he was told the wood was to cook food that would arrive, but he did 
not say who told him this. Stockpiling of firewood is symbolically important 
for intensive social events such as mortuary feasts. In 1950, some in the 
north retreated to hidden villages in response to rumors that Maasina Rule 
men were going to attack the government. These sorts of activities, which 
peaked in 1949 into early 1950, were varied and sporadic, and the lack of 
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island-wide coordination at this time is obvious in the diversity of purpose 
and actions in different times and places.105
These more fearful rumors rose with falling hopes for American eman-
cipation, a disappointment that led some to reject Maasina Rule or at least 
its original leaders. As officers came to realize, this did not mean that such 
people had decided to capitulate to or work with the government, or that 
they would not follow different leaders and messages. The government’s 
true challenge was not to disassemble Maasina Rule as a movement but 
rather to counter Malaitans’ deep alienation from the government, which 
was more fundamental than any particular movement following specific 
chiefs, and which repressive policies were only exacerbating. As 1949 drew 
toward its end, new leaders appeared on the scene with different anti-gov-
ernment agendas. Officers, already weary and frustrated, were dismayed.
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Chapter 8
Attrition and Compromise
As 1949 drew to a close, operations to suppress Maasina Rule had been 
ongoing for nearly two and a half years. The results could only have dis-
appointed officers. Some tried to boost morale by tallying successes: most 
fences were destroyed or rotting, a few men had agreed to labor on shorter-
term contracts, and if many Malaitans now saw the government as their 
worst enemy, it was said that they “respected” it for having shown that it 
could arrest thousands. Yet officers on the ground knew that most Malai-
tans remained resolute. Russell wrote that attitudes, especially in the north, 
had “hardened” into an “unbroken front of defiance.” Masterman said the 
census had been “a complete failure” due to refusals, and the enumerators 
were dismissed in April 1950. He laid plans for more arrests and longer 
sentences and asked for a new boat to transport the many prisoners he 
expected to take. Those in jail were given harder labor, and plans were 
made to reduce their food rations.1
Russell in September had suggested a new “constructive approach” for 
when taxes came due on 1 November 1949: to prosecute only leaders for 
census and tax refusals and to target followers with propaganda to alienate 
them from those leaders. He guessed there were 250 “chiefs” in Malu‘u 
Sub-District alone, with several heading smaller groups in each town. By 
Allan’s estimate of the adult male population the previous May, this would 
mean that about one in five men was a “chief.” Officers, Russell proposed, 
should not again pursue the rank and file until April. He feared that mass 
arrests were failing as a political weapon and that to continue them “would 
merely aggravate the situation.” Masterman agreed and offered the new 
approach as his own to Germond, who approved. If this failed, Russell said, 
the choices would be to either arrest—in most cases rearrest—the entire 
male population of north Malaita, or perhaps begin seizing property in lieu 
of the tax. If that renewed crackdown failed, he advised, a “neutral com-
mission” might then be brought in “to arrive at a solution to the impasse.” 
It would include a mediator—he suggested anthropologist Ian Hogbin—
“with semi-mandatory powers” recognized by Malaitans, who could offer 
compromises the government could not, even if they harmonized with its 
own plans, since to do so “would be regarded as weakness and might have 
serious repercussions.”2 No commission was ever formed, but Russell’s pro-
posals represented the first time an officer had suggested that full-blown 
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suppression was failing and that less-confrontational alternatives might be 
required.
These suggestions stemmed in part from a growing awareness that, 
though there had been and would be progress in getting some Malaitans to 
be censused, pay tax, or labor, this did not at all mean that they had given 
up Maasina Rule or resistance in some other form. Thus Allan had reported 
the previous May that a minority of To‘abaita people had agreed to be cen-
sused, but only “for reasons of family, health, private interests, or Marching 
Rule policy”; he also noted, “that they will not join the battle on some sub-
sequent issue is extremely unlikely.” As for laborers—who would sign only 
shorter-term, non-indenture contracts—Russell wrote in November, “Head-
men report that labourers employed outside the District for short periods 
are merely replenishing diminishing stocks of trade goods and return to 
Marching Rule with renewed zest.” Later he warned that tax payments were 
a poor measure of movement decline: “Young men in Marching Rule are 
allowed to tax to go out to plantations; to draw their Labour Corps and 
Defence Force gratuities; in hardship cases to avoid imprisonment; to main-
tain skeleton caretaker staffs in Marching Rule towns. There is no guaran-
tee that these people will tax next year and whereas payment of tax once 
was the badge of loyalty it may now represent no more than a temporary 
relief from imprisonment.”3
Thus, just as destroyed towns could be rebuilt, officers were beginning 
to recognize that apparent acquiescence was fleeting. They, not Malaitans, 
had long and often declared that people paying tax, censusing, or labor-
ing would spell the death of Maasina Rule, but the officers’ preoccupation 
with these specific issues had blinded them to Malaitans’ enthusiasm for 
the movement’s core ideology, which could be expressed in any number 
of ways. So long as there was serious resistance, or even widespread, passive 
refusal to interact or cooperate, the government was trapped, unable to 
pursue any projects but expensive repression, except for those that har-
nessed the copious prison labor. Starting in early 1950, the administration 
slowly and haltingly began to shift from confrontation to conciliation. Over 
time it would grant a series of concessions that—although at times pub-
licly framed as seizing an advantage or even as conciliatory gestures to a 
defeated foe—were in fact pressed on it. This would culminate in later 1952 
in a government-sponsored Malaita Council dominated by leaders of the 
resistance and an end to both overt suppression and acute resistance. This 
chapter explains how this shift occurred.
Hardened attitudes toward the government at the end of 1949 were 
displayed at two meetings in ‘Aoke. At the first, on 22 November, about 
500 mostly Kwara‘ae people presented Masterman, ‘Aoke’s Officer John 
Bartle, and clerk Timeas Teioli with demands “To raise our custom, but not 
to despise the King’s Rule,” and that the government recognize the local 
councils that Malaitans were already running and give them better wages 
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and “freedom.” Afterward, Masterman distributed a curt reply—“All People 
Read these Words and Know This Is the Truth”—approved by Germond, 
declaring that Maasina Rule would not be tolerated since it oppressed the 
people, that headmen were the only proper representatives of the people, 
that councils would not be revived until Malaitans “recovered their senses” 
and obeyed the law, and that they had to learn to work for what they 
wanted. He added that the English people were short of money from help-
ing starving people in India and China, and Malaitans needed to do their 
part. While his letter circulated, Malaitans were also consuming a rousing 
nine-page manifesto that laid out historical and current grievances, written 
by Ariel Sisili of West Kwara‘ae and distributed to dozens of towns. Sisili 
was a principal organizer of and the key speaker at the ‘Aoke meeting, but 
officers would not grasp his importance until later 1950.4
On 22 December, over 2,000 men from as far away as Small Malaita and 
Ulawa met the same officers and Russell. Sisili’s manifesto was read out 
by Ariel Billy of Ngongosila, and Sisili then stated more specific demands, 
including for the release of the chiefs, for locally run councils and courts 
and election of a leader over Malaita, and for the division of Malaita between 
Maasina Rule followers and opponents. Unlike previous ‘Aoke meetings, 
many men carried their everyday weaponry, and Russell described an ugly 
mood and expressions of anger when Masterman dismissed their points. 
Masterman himself called the situation “tense” but said the group was “excel-
lently organized” and “very well behaved.” His circular in reply to this meet-
ing told people that the chiefs would not be released and that nothing else 
they wanted would be allowed until every last man on the island had paid the 
head tax and every person had provided the information required for the 
census. If they did this, he said, a Malaitan could be chosen to sit on the BSIP 
Advisory Council, an enticement that officers held out over the months to 
come. Though officers put great stock in this offer, few Malaitans knew what 
the Advisory Council was, and even if they had it would have carried little 
weight; they sought more than an advisory role in government. They would 
also have assumed that a staunch loyalist would be chosen, and indeed Mas-
terman later proposed that the symbolic position be used to reward head-
men, with Ba‘etalua, Kakalu‘ae, and Tome Siru atop his list. In his insistence 
that these headmen should and would act as Malaitans’ primary representa-
tives in governance, we see Masterman’s political antennae at its weakest.5
Relations worsened markedly after these meetings. Some who had been 
outside the movement now joined or rejoined it. Northern headmen called 
for a prohibition on further meetings since they encouraged Maasina Rule, 
and Russell agreed that meetings should be banned until Malaitans had 
submitted to taxation and the census. Compliance, he said, was an issue 
between individuals and the government and did not merit discussion: 
“The proper redress for grievances was by reference to the Headmen for 
submission to an Administrative Officer.”6
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This period also saw a shift in Malaitan tactics from waiting for the 
police, to fleeing them, which stymied Masterman’s plans to step up arrests. 
In early December he tried to stage raids along the northeast coast from 
Fokanakafo to Malu‘u; as Russell reported, “Every effort was made by day 
and night patrols to apprehend offenders but an elaborate warning system 
coupled with the density of the Malaita bush made Marching Rule avoid-
ance tactics highly successful from their point of view.” Bartle described 
a smoke signal warning system to track patrols, and Russell told of alerts 
being spread by torch, drum, and runner systems. Farther south, Kwara‘ae 
and Kwaio soon adopted the same tactics. More prisoners, whom officers 
had once counted on to stay put, began to escape, and by early 1952 Allan 
said they had to be jailed in Honiara since “It is the determination of all 
recalcitrants to endeavour to escape from prison.”7
As 1950 began, officers worried over rumors of plots to violently con-
front the government, perhaps at a third ‘Aoke meeting. Many north Malai-
tans, in reaction to this “coconut news” or simply to evade arrest, moved to 
hidden mountain villages. It was impossible for officers to know what truths 
the stories might hold, as Russell wrote years later: “What credence were 
we to give to rumours that government and mission stations were to be 
sacked, an open confrontation with the Government was being organized, 
and individual government officers attacked? The killing of Bell and Lil-
lies . . . twenty one years before was a reality.”8
On 8 February, Russell and 20 police set out on an all-night march to the 
Suu‘aba peninsula to attempt dawn tax arrests. At dusk, the patrol heard 
the chop of an axe nearby, and Russell sent Sergeant Taburi and two police-
men to see if there was a hidden village. They surprised an older man, who 
shouted, “The army have come to kill me!” Men came to his aid and threw 
spears at the policemen, wounding one in the wrist. The police fired on 
them and killed a man named Ramositau. The next day, four men involved 
in the attack turned themselves in. At their trial, Russell pleaded for leni-
ency since they had thought they were defending their kinsman, and they 
received three-year sentences.9
Two days after this clash, an emergency meeting was held in the resident 
commissioner’s office, at which some argued for removing European women 
from ‘Aoke since “the natives” did so with their women before fights and, 
Germond said, it would show that the government “meant business.” Police 
Superintendent E J H Colchester-Wemyss (whom Tedder later described 
as “a Col. blimp”) disagreed, because an evacuation would show “weakness 
and fear.” He argued also that guns should be taken away from the Malai-
tan headmen, who might use them against the government. Masterman 
thought that possible but unlikely since northern headmen in particular 
“were too deeply involved to turn against Government now.” In the end, the 
resident commissioner ordered ‘Aoke’s white women brought to Honiara, 
let headmen keep their rifles, and sent more police to Malaita armed with 
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10,000 extra rounds of ammunition. Malaitans, however, reacted to the 
shooting with calm, and some, though antigovernment, expressed anger at 
the men who had attacked the police. It was said that in Ramositau’s area 
there was talk of revenge but that his relatives vetoed it. Rumors circulated 
in the north predicting that Americans would come now, in reprisal.10
Gregory-Smith and the Release of the Head Chiefs
Ramositau’s tragic death had an immediate impact on the government’s 
approach to Maasina Rule. As Russell readied for his patrol, a new resident 
commissioner, Henry Graham Gregory-Smith, had just arrived to replace 
Germond. Gregory-Smith had spent years as an officer in the Kikuyu area 
of Kenya where he had dealt with anticolonial movements, and he was sent 
to the Solomons in the hope that he could make a change. The high com-
missioner had wired Germond the week before that Gregory-Smith would 
seek “a rapprochement with Marching Rule,” since its aims were the same 
as government, and noted, “It may well be that the people are as tired as 
we are of the present stalemate.” Now, at the emergency meeting follow-
ing the Malaita shooting, Gregory-Smith ordered that ‘Are‘are Head Chief 
Nono‘oohimae be brought to him from Gizo prison in the Western District 
so that he could ask him if he would be “willing to talk to his people and 
use his influence to restore peace and order,” possibly in return for a remis-
sion of his sentence. Colchester-Wemyss objected to the “awful gamble” 
of letting the prisoner address his people and said that if they pardoned 
Nono‘oohimae they would be obliged to do the same for all of the chiefs, 
to which Gregory-Smith replied, “If resistance broke down this would cer-
tainly be considered.”11
As Gregory-Smith already knew, the chiefs themselves had suggested a 
similar approach in January. Through Justus Jimmy as their spokesman, 
they had told Davies—now district commissioner of the Western District—
that the ongoing arrests distressed them, and, in Davies’s words: “They 
themselves have been in prison for two and a half years and have made no 
comments because Government had chosen not to believe them,” but “they 
knew that there would be continued resistance to Government on Malaita 
unless they, the leaders, told the people to obey orders and remain quiet.” 
They asked to meet with Germond, but Davies reported that he thought 
most of them just wanted out of jail and that Ganifiri was still “fanatically 
pro-Marching Rule,” and Germond did nothing. Steven Sipolo, on his own, 
had in November offered to go with Germond to Malaita to talk to the 
people, but this had been rejected as “unwise.”12
Gregory-Smith met a week later with Nono‘oohimae, who much 
impressed him. Gregory-Smith had been misled into believing that Nono-
‘oo hi mae had the power to make all Malaitans be censused, pay tax, and 
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behave. If they did all of these things, he told Nono‘oohimae, he would 
meet with them to discuss their grievances. A week later they met again, but 
Gregory-Smith had now dropped his preconditions for a meeting—he just 
wanted to be sure that if he called one, people would attend. Nono‘oohimae 
told him that he had influence only in ‘Are‘are, but that he would ask the 
other head chiefs about writing letters to their people. He did soon write 
one that told ‘Are‘are to meet with Gregory-Smith, but it was not dissemi-
nated because he labeled it an “order,” and officers feared it would appear 
they acknowledged his legitimacy. But Gregory-Smith, during a mid-March 
round-Malaita tour with Masterman, Germond, and Russell, read parts of 
the letter to a meeting at Onepusu in ‘Are‘are. When the people asked if he 
would let Nono‘oohimae visit them, he told them no, but that if, and only 
if, they all paid taxes, he would let three ‘Are‘are men visit Nono‘oohimae 
in Gizo and would institute a Malaita-wide council, with half its members 
elected and the district commissioner as its president. But they turned 
him down. ‘Are‘are leaders had already told Masterman in January that, 
although they disapproved of the north’s confrontational mode, the peo-
ple thought they should all disobey and go to prison anyway, at least once, 
since they had started Maasina Rule and owed it to the suffering north, 
where the vast majority of arrests had been made.13
Gregory-Smith was now convinced Nono‘oohimae was the key to all of 
Malaita. Though his tour had little impact and most of his meetings drew 
few people, he returned to Honiara believing Malaitans were sick of the 
conflict and that they sought only a way to save face. Masterman after-
ward circulated a letter, titled “Read and Remember My Words Again You 
People of Malaita,” saying the king had sent Gregory-Smith since he had 
heard “there is much foolishness and badness in the island of Malaita.” 
He declared it illegal for adults to miss any meetings called by government 
officers or headmen.14
While Gregory-Smith pondered new approaches to Maasina Rule he con-
tinued the suppression campaign and instructed Russell to step up arrests 
along the northeast coast. This was easier ordered than done, since people 
were still fleeing officers, with the motto “Let’s jail in the bush, not with the 
government,” and they were warned of some raids even before policemen 
got their orders. Allan said evasion “presented Government with one of the 
greatest problems in dealing with the movement.” Others promised to pay 
the tax—later. “The Malaitans,” Russell said, “are deliberately playing for 
time in the hope that they can avert decisions on policy until the release 
of the ‘Nine Chiefs.’ ” Masterman guessed that up to half of Malaitans had 
now paid the tax, but this was a considerable overcount, and many payees 
were To‘abaita and Lau who could not evade police.15
By mid-April, Gregory-Smith had decided that he would probably let 
Nono‘oohimae out, though, citing Masterman, he still said it was contin-
gent on people paying taxes first. But on the 30th he traveled with Master-
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man to Gizo to meet with the nine chiefs with an eye to releasing them all, 
with no taxation proviso. Fifi‘i later told me how Gregory-Smith asked them 
what their grievances were, what changes they wanted, and how they would 
pursue them, and informed them of his plans to start a Malaita-wide coun-
cil and to let people manage their taxes for their own benefit. Fifi‘i said 
the chiefs all liked him because he listened to them and because he made 
Masterman treat them with dignity. Each signed an agreement to work at 
convincing people to cooperate and to “deplore law-breaking.” They were 
instructed to announce that if everyone paid their tax then a Malaita coun-
cil would be formed, consisting of ten members chosen by the people and 
ten by the government, and that a Malaitan would be placed on the Advi-
sory Council. All, with Steven Sipolo, were released at ‘Aoke on 8 June at a 
flag parade for the King’s Birthday, right after Masterman formally turned 
the district over to Colin Allan, who had just returned from England. Few 
people attended, and against expectations there was no visible excitement 
at the chiefs’ return.16
The released northern chiefs spent a week at Malu‘u so that Russell could 
assess their sincerity, which most northern headmen doubted. Russell had 
opposed their release, particularly because Masterman had assured Decem-
ber’s ‘Aoke meeting that the chiefs would stay in jail until every Malaitan 
stood down. The government had now conceded a key demand that Malai-
tans had been making for nearly three years, and Russell feared the reac-
tion: would they expect other demands to be met, for “freedom,” “recogni-
tion of a single popular leader for Malaita,” and “Marching Rule councils”? 
He warned that the chiefs might revive a strike for higher wages.17
Arrests were now suspended to see what the chiefs could and would do, 
and as Masterman departed he recommended that if they did cooperate 
and all Malaitans paid the tax and submitted to the census, then his succes-
sor should release all political prisoners, including tax and census offend-
ers. However, he said, under Charles’s advice, if chiefs failed to bring about 
change, then any civil resistance should be proceeded against as a criminal 
conspiracy with two years in prison for each offense. But he hoped “that a 
fresh start can be made through the medium of the District Council and 
the native Member of the Advisory Council.” This proved unduly optimistic; 
most of the chiefs were sincere, but officers, as so often in the past, greatly 
overestimated the chiefs’ power to control the populace. Most Malaitans 
had wanted the chiefs back as leaders in their struggle, not as advocates for 
government policy. It may be that the chiefs did not fully realize just how 
much people had suffered while they were away and failed to foresee how 
many would reject their message and themselves as leaders. It seems the 
only officer who anticipated this was Russell, the one closest to Malaitans on 
a daily basis. He warned, “Should the nine chiefs have a genuine change of 
heart they may find that popular feeling supports the radical element who 
controlled Malaita in their absence. . . . The position of the nine chiefs is 
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not an enviable one.” Their release did ease the situation in certain places 
but not in the more difficult ones, and most of the chiefs found themselves 
in no position to bring about the sort of rapprochement Gregory-Smith 
desired. As Ben Burt noted for Kwara‘ae, “The government had effectively 
destroyed the moderate faction.”18
Reactions to the chiefs’ return differed from place to place. In the north 
the welcome was muted. Some prepared by cleaning towns and rebuilding 
meetinghouses, but at ‘Ataa notices of their pending release were defaced, 
and many elsewhere declared they would refuse to pay the tax regardless of 
what the chiefs might say. Some in To‘abaita said they would pay, but only 
later, and the previous trickle of payments in other sub-districts stopped 
altogether. By mid-June, most in the north were boycotting meetings the 
chiefs called. In east Kwara‘ae, Justus Jimmy Ganifiri was fully spurned, and 
Sipolo found himself berated by even his wife and children. Allan described 
Sipolo’s humiliation as “a thousand times worse punishment than any he 
had undergone in prison.” Only ‘Atoomea, who ruthlessly spurned his 
uncle Irofa‘alu’s approaches, regained influence, and To‘abaita was the 
only northern area besides Lau from which substantial taxes were paid that 
summer. Elsewhere, wrote Allan, “The mere asking of a man about his tax 
obligations was tantamount to arresting him.” By mid-August, most of the 
northern chiefs had been rejected as “yesterday’s men” and “turncoats,” and 
talk of a government Malaita-wide council fell on deaf ears. “They won’t tax 
and they won’t go to gaol,” wrote Allan, “so they remain in the fastness of 
the bush.” Russell said that those who did pay in no way renounced Maasina 
Rule and, in September, that even To‘abaita remained strongly anti-British 
and “vindictive.” After Gregory-Smith presided over a meeting there, Allan 
warned him that the only candid question he had been asked was, “How 
long does the government intend to remain at Malu‘u?”19
The situation in the south was brighter for the government. In vulner-
able Langalanga, most people paid their taxes in June. In ‘Are‘are, Allan 
reported, people would no longer listen to anything Nori said; he became 
a scapegoat for many, including northern head chiefs who ironically now 
blamed him for their arrests. Nono‘oohimae fared much better. On arrival 
he told a meeting that he “had never advocated resistance to Government 
authority and he never would.” Many ‘Are‘are still saw him as their leader, 
and at amicable meetings that he and Allan held in later June most paid 
their tax or said they would soon. Small Malaita attitudes were mixed, but by 
September many there had paid tax as well, largely due to Timothy George 
having reestablished his influence. It is instructive that, across Malaita, 
only in these two places, the parts of the island that had suffered the least 
government oppression (other than loyalist Lau), did officers find a genu-
ine willingness to cooperate. However, Allan cautioned that they paid the 
tax “because they think that Nono‘oohimae, Timothy George, and maybe 
Fifi‘i, want it. They are looking to their chiefs, not the government.” But 
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not all ‘Are‘are liked Nono‘oohimae’s stance, and more resistance would 
soon coalesce there under his former ally, Waiparo of Takataka. Also at 
this time priests in ‘Are‘are were forming “the Catholic Welfare Society” as 
a church-based organizational alternative to Maasina Rule, but Allan and 
Gregory-Smith believed it to be subversive and convinced Bishop Aubin to 
shut it down.20
Kwaio is of interest because it was there that Malaita’s political attitudes 
divided. Fifi‘i met a mixed reception. Although like some other chiefs he told 
people their failure to pay tax might land him back in prison, many initially 
vowed not to pay, citing the lack of returns for their prewar taxes and the gov-
ernment’s refusal to allow a single leader for Malaita. Some who had hoped 
Americans would intervene blamed Fifi‘i for the letdown. Few east Kwaio 
people came to July meetings Allan called, and he said their attitude resem-
bled that he found in east Kwara‘ae: “coldly insolent, truculent and contemp-
tuous.” Kwaio had long had split affinities, looking both north and south for 
political direction. Now in the Uru area, Anifelo effectively promoted an anti-
government ideology emanating from Kwara‘ae, while at Sinalagu and ‘Olo-
buri more people began to pay the tax after Fifi‘i on 13 July read out a letter 
from Nono‘oohimae urging them to do so. Otherwise, most Kwaio wanted 
no contact with the government, and a year later Allan reported that they 
“were still wild and refuse to obey the headman.” East Kwaio people today 
remember this period as marked by rivalry between Fifi‘i and Anifelo. West 
Kwaio was similar; when Fifi‘i called meetings there, he was welcomed nearer 
the ‘Are‘are border but could hardly raise an audience north to Kwara‘ae, 
and the area as a whole remained “thoroughly disaffected.”21
Fifi‘i was further weakened at Uru when headmen there publicly 
de meaned him, for which Allan reprimanded them. This, too, evinced a 
Malaitan split, in that northern senior headmen disliked the chiefs and 
tried to surveil them, while from Sinalagu south friendly chief-headman 
relations were reestablished, and the conditions of the chiefs’ release—
including that they report to headmen every two weeks—were interpreted 
liberally. The northern tensions presaged a dilemma that officers were to 
face when they tried to cultivate popular leaders but met with resentful 
headmen accustomed to being the people’s only legal representatives.22
The Federal Council
Even before the chiefs’ release, Kwara‘ae had become a new center of 
resistance, with its influence first and most strongly felt in Fataleka, Baegu, 
Baelelea, northern Kwaio, and parts of To‘abaita, and eventually reaching 
everywhere on the island. Its leaders were a group known variously as “the 
Nine New Chiefs,” “West Council Malaita Property Owners,” “the Kwara‘ae 
Council,” or “the Malaita Council.” In 1951, some leaders settled on “the 
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Federal Council,” the name the literature uses to label this group and, at 
times, all resistance of this period. Starting in late 1950, Sisili and some 
other leaders said, “Maasina Rule is finished.” Some of them were keen 
to distance their project from certain discredited aspects of Maasina Rule, 
and a new name served this purpose. Those who rejected the old name 
also underscored their break from head chiefs who were urging coopera-
tion. People in Kwaio and throughout the south, however, continued to 
use “Maasina Rule,” or sometimes “New Maasina Rule,” as did some farther 
north. Sinalagu and ‘Oloburi resistance veterans I have asked—even some 
related to men like Anifelo who were said to be its key leaders—have never 
recognized the name “Federal Council,” though district officers in 1951 
reported that “the Federal Council” had permeated those areas. Officers 
used it as a generic label for diverse antigovernment ideas and activities that 
were hard to pin down in their dynamism, complexity, and interconnec-
tions. I stress this here not to discount the name, which was important to 
many, but rather because the different appellation, and disavowals by some 
Federal Council leaders of “the old Maasina Rule,” can obscure fundamen-
tal continuities in the leaders, adherents, grievances, and goals of Malaitan 
resistance, and the fact that Maasina Rule and the Federal Council were 
different phases of a single, evolving movement.23
Some of the continuity is clear in the leadership, which like the structure 
was far less formal than during Maasina Rule before the 1947 arrests. Offi-
cers found both the leadership and structure enigmatic since both changed 
through time, and depending on whom they talked to. Some of the men 
whom others said were leaders denied or rebuffed the status. But there was 
a core of men who anchored the northern activity over time. Most feared 
by the government was Eban Funusau, or Sau, of Fokanakafo, the sergeant 
Sandars had jailed for organizing a 1946 police strike for better food and 
then dismissed, with Sipolo, for involvement in the 1947 police walkout. 
Sau had been a wanted man since Operation Delouse, living armed in 
the jungle with a varying band of companions and wielding influence far 
beyond his native Fataleka. He was said to hate the government bitterly, 
and for some time officers blamed Sau more than anyone for their unend-
ing political problems. Another key leader, Jasper (or Josepa) Irofiala of 
Fo‘odo in Baelelea, had also been a sergeant under Sandars, who had 
known him since he was a boy. He was with Marchant on Malaita during 
the war, and for that and his role in a 1942 attack on Japanese in north 
Malaita he had earned a British Empire Medal. To punish his Maasina Rule 
activities, in 1947 Irofiala was given two years at hard labor and his medal 
was canceled. When released, he joined Sau. Allan called Irofiala “proud” 
and “resolute.”24
Jason Alaikona of Bokolo in To‘abaita had been a constabulary corporal, 
and during the war he had led dangerous patrols hunting Japanese. He had 
been a Maasina Rule full chief under ‘Atoomea at Malu‘u, and after arrest 
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and prison he returned to the movement. Readers already know ‘Abaeata 
Anifelo of east Kwaio as another former corporal, headman, the designated 
president of Kwaio’s native council, and a Maasina Rule leader from the 
movement’s beginnings. Beni Ramoalafa of Agia in Baegu had as a corpo-
ral in 1942 led a police squad to capture downed Japanese pilots, but in 
1947 he was tried with the head chiefs, convicted of sedition, and jailed for 
two years. Takanakwao of west Kwara‘ae had also been a constable, whom 
Sandars called “very bright and a great talker.” From 1938 he was head-
man for the ‘Aoke area, and from 1945 president of ‘Aoke’s native council, 
but he was jailed over fences in 1948.25 Salana Ga‘a (full name Maega‘asia) 
of Areo, north of ‘Aoke in Kwara‘ae, had from age 12 worked for several 
years for Charles White on his yaws-eradication tours and on a trip White 
took to Rennell and Bellona with the Whitney Expedition ornithologists. 
Ga‘a had been in the police for many years, rising to the rank of corporal. 
He had acted as a scout during the war and was also the senior orderly for 
Resident Commissioner Marchant from 1940 through the war’s end, and 
then for his successor Noel. In 1947 Ga‘a was charged with stealing china 
from the resident commissioner’s house and imprisoned. On release he 
joined Maasina Rule and had been a wanted man ever since. In 1950 he was 
named the Federal Council’s “vice president” under Ariel Sisili. Dr Gideon 
Zoleveke described Ga‘a as “a man of real integrity”; Colin Allan called him 
“a supreme liar.”26
Nearly every leader, then, had once belonged to the loyalist elite and 
had subsequently joined Maasina Rule. Each had been forced to choose 
between devotion to colonial benefactors and relinquishing his position 
to stand with his own people.27 For making the second choice, they were, 
despite having served the government well and long, condemned as trai-
tors of weak moral fiber and punished or hunted. Assistant High Commis-
sioner G D Chamberlain explained the official view when stripping Irofiala 
of his war medal: “Irofiala had an exemplary character and was one of the 
outstanding natural leaders in the Solomon Islands. His loyalty had never 
previously been questioned and there is little doubt he joined the ‘March-
ing Rule’ under considerable pressure. Nevertheless . . . he should have had 
sufficient strength of character to withstand pressure as had many other 
Solomon Islanders of similar experience.” It is easy to understand the deter-
mination of these men not to again submit to the colonial system, as well 
as the resolve of their followers who had gone to jail and undergone great 
hardships, only to hear their views dismissed by Davies, then Germond, and 
then Masterman as illegitimate, ignorant, and unworthy of consideration or 
even discussion until they bowed down before them.28
An exception in background was Ariel (Eluele) Sisili, who had been an 
SSEM teacher at Bina in west Kwara‘ae and a clerk for that area’s govern-
ment council. He now lived inland, and in 1950 most northerners saw him 
as the resistance leader. He had not at first joined Maasina Rule and became 
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a political organizer only in early 1948. Sisili had written the 1949 manifesto 
read at ‘Aoke, but officers, focused on Sau and others, did not begin to 
realize his importance until September 1950; that August Allan still called 
him “one of Sau’s runners.” When his status was finally grasped, Allan rein-
vented Sisili as cursed with “a marked inferiority complex” and displaying 
“schizophrenic characteristics . . . so typical of Christian Malaitans” and “the 
driving force behind much of the terroristic behaviour in Western Kwara‘ae 
and the Langa Langa in 1946 and 1947.” When Allan had earlier met with 
Sisili at ‘Aoke, he described him as “quiet and reserved” and “obviously 
intelligent.” Sisili was certainly smart and determined and, like many north-
ern leaders at this time, not the sort of man to quietly queue up for arrest 
and imprisonment.29
Since early 1948, this loose-knit group of northern leaders had kept links 
to an ‘Are‘are “Kiu Council” based near Nono‘oohimae’s village of Arai-
rau and to Waiparo’s activities at Takataka. But their leaders had not met 
together since 1949, and after Nono‘oohimae’s release the Kiu activity sub-
sided for a time. Russell was told that these two groups had disseminated 
instructions across Malaita, such as to refuse to pay taxes and to flee from 
government parties.30
Beginning in later 1949 and increasing through 1951, the government 
and the resistance carried on a running propaganda battle via dueling writ-
ten documents, each posting its messages in villages and destroying the 
other’s. Several written or inspired by Sisili highlighted “the Four Free-
doms”—of speech and expression, of religion, from want, and from fear. 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s famous 1941 speech proposing these rights 
to be universal had been found in a book given by a US soldier during 
the war, and many documents circulated at this time were copied directly 
from this and other books.31 The Four Freedoms had been much discussed 
within Maasina Rule for years, most importantly as embodying the idea that 
there were universal human rights not dependent on one’s race or cul-
ture. Nelson Fo‘ogau had read them aloud to Noel at ‘Aoke in March 1947. 
Decades later, older Malaitans could still rattle them off for me. Other docu-
ments produced included a “Malaita Declaration of Independence” copied 
largely from the American one, as well as many original statements stressing 
rejection of the government and noncooperation regarding its taxation, 
census, and other demands. In July 1950, the “Kwara‘ae Council” sent an 
unsigned dispatch to Fataleka’s Headman ‘Itea, warning that people would 
reject the tax and the census until the government compensated them for 
past costs of Maasina Rule and listing losses sustained. To my knowledge, 
this was the first of many instances of Malaitans demanding that the govern-
ment pay compensation to Malaitans as a group. After the released head 
chiefs had spread government’s message, some proposed suing them for 
movement costs, and in 1953 there was much talk of exacting compensa-
tion from loyalists.32
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From 1949 into 1950, couriers for the “West Council Malaita Property 
Owners” hand-delivered a series of letters intended for the United States. 
The first letters were given to John Martin, commander of a small US Topo-
graphic Battalion still on Guadalcanal. One laid out Malaitan grievances, 
but Martin wrote back saying he was uninterested in Malaitan affairs. These 
last Americans left Guadalcanal on 25 May 1950, but in June a bundle of 
documents targeted at Americans was delivered to New Zealander salvag-
ers working there. One asked to buy guns to drive out the British. Russell 
thought these letters were in earnest and that they indicated a changing 
mood captured in a popular slogan, “I will die for Malaita.” Allan, always 
fond of conspiracy theories, was not sure but that they might be a ruse to 
confuse officers.33
Some of the letters were in Sisili’s handwriting, and it seems clear he was 
behind most of them. Yet some contradicted parts of his revolutionary mes-
sage, as least as it developed subsequently. Sisili rejected aspects of Maasina 
Rule that had led some astray, specifically ideas about “cargo and lies, and 
Americans,” and he later told Allan the movement was being retooled on a 
sounder basis. American and even some British documents and ideas would 
remain important, but by later 1950 most Malaitans seem to have discarded 
serious hopes of direct American help. Allan came to see this new approach 
as more dangerous than “the old Maasina Rule,” which he understood as 
a cargo cult, since this-worldly ideas of Malaitan independence would be 
harder to discredit and suppress. Still, he understood Federal Council’s lead-
ers and adherents, like those of Maasina Rule, to be “irrational,” “pathetic,” 
“mystical,” and “messianic.” Meanwhile, Malaitans were beginning to explic-
itly liken government’s perennial, unfulfilled promises of development proj-
ects to the rumors of cargo en route that never arrived.34
By September, government relations with Malaitans in the north had 
further deteriorated. Most people still refused to pay tax and more had 
moved inland, where they ignored officers’ orders and coastal visits. When 
Gregory-Smith toured the north that month, taxpayers and defaulters alike 
snubbed him, and turnouts at his meetings were “insultingly bad.” Rus-
sell urged withholding the promised district council and Advisory Coun-
cil position until all of Malaita “capitulated to taxation.”35 This followed a 
policy meeting Gregory-Smith held with Malaita’s officers at Sinalagu. They 
devised a strategy to intensify pressure where people refused to pay tax, and 
grant rewards where most had paid up, namely ‘Are‘are, Small Malaita, and 
To‘abaita. In the latter places, Allan warned, “The initiative had passed to 
the Marching Rule. They had done all that Government had asked. Govern-
ment must therefore do something tangible and quickly.” Unfortunately, 
focused for so long on suppression, “Government had been caught with-
out a plan”: no cash crop was ready, scarce medical resources were over-
stretched, and there was no machinery to start education. Gregory-Smith 
said he would ask Fiji for £10,000 for education and medical projects and 
Attrition and Compromise 313
would argue that this would be less expensive than if London had to send 
troops later. In the meantime, it was suggested, in the north they “must 
cover up” the lack of readiness to provide promised services “by saying that 
this was deliberate policy on account of the recalcitrance of other parts of 
the island.” The island’s southern half would be easier since, as one officer 
remarked, “The present situation in South seemed to be much the same 
as at the beginning of the M.R. movement when Major Sandars was work-
ing through Nori.” Gregory-Smith soon did convince High Commissioner 
Freeston that development funding was essential, warning him, “A pistol is 
being shown at our heads and we would be unwise to take no heed.” He also 
urged Freeston to permit initiation of graded administrative positions that 
Solomon Islanders would fill.36
In the uncontrolled areas, officers and their police had toiled without suc-
cess to capture leaders, whom Gregory-Smith called “bandits . . . ensconced 
in a veritable Edinburgh Castle.” Russell, about to go on leave, said that 
it was imperative to arrest them and resume arresting tax defaulters, and 
he proposed what now seem desperate measures. One was to form a spe-
cial armed constabulary of loyalists to hunt leaders down, which might also 
frighten others into paying the tax. With such constables, sweeps could be 
conducted and gardens guarded to catch people forced to come out of 
hiding for food. A difficulty, Russell warned, was that everyone would try 
to help fugitives. He said officers also needed a law that would allow them 
to make “lump sum assessment of tax by villages” and seize an equivalent 
amount of property. Gregory-Smith did not at first take these suggestions, 
but he later presented to Freeston the idea of a loyalist constabulary—“a 
few platoons of young indigenous natives”—and added that the inhabit-
ants, whether they had paid their own tax or not, could be forced to pay 
for the constables themselves, which he thought would turn the populace 
against the rebels. Allan had himself suggested in August that Fijian com-
mandos might be required to hunt down leaders, but he also pointed to the 
1947 arrests of the head chiefs to forewarn that even if all leaders were so 
arrested, resistance would continue.37
Allan now thought they should try a succession of approaches, in the 
following order if each failed in turn: further persuasion, “fully fledged 
police action,” still more police, deployment of “tribal police,” and if these 
all failed, bringing in foreign troops, by which time “the island would be 
in a state of bloody rebellion” and it would be years before “the remot-
est confidence” in government could be regained. Beyond some targeted 
police actions, these plans were never implemented. As Allan intimated, 
the more repressive ones surely would have brought about political disaster 
and probably worse. He also said that even if “persuasion” did end outright 
resistance, the government was unlikely to be left in a position to “put into 
operation plans for Malaita’s political and economic rehabilitation,” which 
was, after all, Gregory-Smith’s assigned mission. Allan felt persuasion had 
314 Chapter 8
to be tried anyway, with a focus on separating “recalcitrants” from leaders.38
Nonetheless, plans were soon laid for more large arrest operations.
Despite the grim political situation, Gregory-Smith thought it essential 
to set up a Malaita District council and sub-district bodies as rapidly as pos-
sible. Officers debated which of these should come first, but in late 1950 
it was clear that only ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita would cooperate. When 
Gregory-Smith toured Malaita in September, people in those places told 
him they had elevated Nono‘oohimae and George as their “chiefs.” He 
officially recognized them (he saw them as “similar to Members of Parlia-
ment”) and explained how their duties had to be balanced with those of 
headmen. He hoped people would later choose such chiefs across Malaita 
to, in Allan’s words, be “the ultimate authority in the district on matters of 
native custom,” tell the government “what actually is custom,” and convey 
to the government people’s wishes regarding land, labor, the economy, and 
agriculture. Behind the scenes, Allan told Gregory-Smith that he feared 
people would see his recognition of the two chiefs as another Maasina Rule 
victory.39
Officers worried over how northern headmen would react if chiefs were 
recognized there and if a Malaita-wide and local councils were started—all 
of which would require headmen to share power. That their concern was 
justified became clear at a headmen’s conference held soon after. Malai-
tan headmen were shocked and dismayed when Gregory-Smith told them, 
in Allan’s rendering (in a letter to Gregory-Smith), “Headmen must not 
worry about money or wages but must work for the people and for the love 
of the people.” Allan said they interpreted this “as being an instruction 
to join the Marching Rule and cease to work for the Government. . . . The 
headmen believe and have been taught to believe for forty years that they 
are working for the Government. Such an abstract idea that the Govern-
ment is the servant of the people is almost impossible for the Malaitaman to 
understand in his present stage of development. That anyone should ever 
work for nothing for an institution or even for an abstract idea is entirely 
foreign to their philosophy.” Beyond the facts that Malaitans’ understand-
ings of the colonial government were based not on backwardness but on 
long experience, and that most had for years been working for Maasina 
Rule and its ideas without pay, officers like Allan seemed oblivious also to 
the headmen’s unhappy position—reviled by their people for urging and 
helping the government to stifle and punish them, and now told to go and 
earn their love. These headmen were wedded, for better or worse, to direct 
colonial rule and domination, and their fellow Malaitans recognized that. 
To understand this is to better appreciate people’s blunt rejections of gov-
ernment orders to obey headmen as their proper representatives.40
Allan also advised Gregory-Smith, “The Malaita people are highly suspi-
cious and very conservative,” and their headmen “extremely imaginative 
like all primitive people.” The headmen were angry, too, at the overbearing 
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manner of Sale Vuza, who, Allan said, acted at the headmen’s conference 
as if he were the Protectorate’s “paramount headman,” and especially at 
Vuza’s open criticism of High Commissioner Freeston in front of everyone. 
Officer Frederick Bentley added that the latter anger might reflect “that 
the essentially magic-believing Malaita people have a faith in a semi-mystic, 
powerful being in the back-ground” (ie, Freeston). In any case, Allan told 
Gregory-Smith, the conference had so dashed headmen’s confidence in 
the government that widespread police actions they had been planning 
against north Malaita had to be shelved.41
Meanwhile, Russell and Allan had been offering selected resistance lead-
ers amnesty if they would surrender, comply with the census, and pay taxes, 
but most refused. Allan asked Sisili to come to ‘Aoke and tried to “negoti-
ate” with him, reporting after, “I told him he was a liar. He accepted the 
rebuke gravely.” He thought he had convinced him to pay the tax, but Sisili 
reneged.42 In December, Malaitans tried to hold another ‘Aoke meeting, 
but Allan forbade it, posted notices to that effect, and had police patrol the 
station’s perimeter to block anyone who came. He told Gregory-Smith why: 
“The Government had permitted or had been forced into permitting or 
had called massed meetings in connection with Marching rule in June 1946, 
June 1947, December 1946, and December 1949. At all of these meetings, 
rioting had narrowly been avoided, no advantage had accrued to Govern-
ment, all speeches had been deliberately misconstrued, anti-Government 
activity had been stimulated by them, and at the last previously held meet-
ing on the 22 December 1949, Ariel Sisili who was the main speaker and 
who had called the meeting, had deliberately insulted the District Com-
missioner by walking off the assembly field before the District Commis-
sioner had finished speaking.” He cited also rumors that Sisili and Sau had 
threatened violence and noted that unlike the other meetings, organizers 
had not sought his permission, so allowing it would lower government’s 
prestige. No meeting was held, and another planned for January was also 
forbidden and therefore canceled.43
Afterward, leaders rebuffed Allan’s invitation to meet with him alone. 
Kwara‘ae headmen Dausabea and Shadrach Diote‘e did meet with Sisili, 
Ga‘a, and Takanakwao, who gave them papers for Allan, including the 
“Declaration of Independence,” parts of the United Nations Charter, and 
Roosevelt and Churchill statements on “peace aims.” Sisili said these would 
explain why people disobeyed the government.44 Allan decided it was point-
less and perhaps dangerous to try to talk to Sisili, and on 27 January 1951, 
‘Aoke’s Officer Alexander MacKeith and Police Officer Frank Moore led 
a raid of Sisili’s village of Namogisu, arrested him, and seized a “bank” of 
US$1,185. They expected to find guns but did not. Sisili, who had been 
quite sick, resisted mildly (his convictions for assault and resisting arrest 
were soon quashed). On their descent to the coast the patrol was harassed, 
but not attacked, by large groups of angry men, some from Kwaio.45 In 
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September Sisili was tried under the 1848 Treason Felony Act, contrary to 
which he did “intend to deprive Our Most Gracious Lord the King, from 
the Style, honour and royal name under which His Majesty holds, exercises 
and enjoys jurisdiction within the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.” 
The specific offenses were “writing” the “Declaration of Independence” 
that he had sent to Allan and planning to read it out at the blocked ‘Aoke 
meeting. In September he was sentenced to 12 years in prison.46
In his 1951 Annual Report, Allan said that evidence seized in the raid 
showed that disaster had been narrowly averted and that if he had allowed 
Sisili to read the Declaration of Independence at the blocked ‘Aoke meet-
ing, it “would have set the political fires of Malaita blazing from one end 
of the island to the other.” But in a confidential report to Honiara written 
at the time, he said that the raid revealed they had overestimated both the 
threat Sisili posed to security and the sophistication of the Federal Council 
“intelligence service.”47
In mid-April 1951, ten weeks after Sisili’s arrest, northern people as far 
south as Uru posted notices in every village, much like those Allan had 
posted to forbid Malaitans entering ‘Aoke, but these barred entrance to 
loyalists, police, and officers. Other notices presented aspects of Federal 
Council propaganda. Officers, particularly Allan, were deeply frustrated at 
how effective these seemed to be in stiffening resistance across the north, 
though in fact how much they incited rather than simply expressed hostil-
ity is unclear. Officers had no means to strongly repress them—it would 
have been impossible to catch those who posted them at night, Malu‘u’s 
officer Bartle was ill, and Charles advised that people could not be pros-
ecuted for notices in their villages if they did not block officers from remov-
ing them. Furthermore, ‘Aoke’s Officer MacKeith and 12 police were kept 
busy through much of April guarding geologist Frank Rickwood as he pros-
pected across Malaita for a Colonial Development and Welfare project. 
People almost everywhere forbade Rickwood’s team to enter their land, 
fearing it might lead to its alienation, but MacKeith and his police forced 
him through, and this likely sparked the growing defiance more than Allan 
realized. In any case, Allan told police to merely tear down the notices when 
they found them and to order people not to put up any more. People soon 
stopped posting them in the north, and Allan later said that the govern-
ment should have handled the fences and towers in this way in 1948 and 
1949, rather than responding with severe repression. He had inadvertently 
discovered—though he later recalled it as thoughtful strategy—that ignor-
ing civil disobedience could be more effective than attacking it, though, 
as usual, he explained the outcome as due to primitive Malaitan notions 
of magical causality: when notices did not keep police out of villages, he 
said, people ceased to believe in them. In fact, the notices had made their 
point.48
On 30 August 1951, Minister of State for the Colonies John Dugdale 
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visited ‘Aoke and spoke to a large crowd of Malaitans, loyalist and not. One 
of the latter was Salana Ga‘a, whom Allan thought had replaced Sisili as the 
Federal Council’s head but in fact had resisted pressure to do so. Before-
hand, Anifelo gave Dugdale an unsigned letter that asked, among other 
things, that Malaitans be allowed to choose a “president” of the island; that 
a Malaita “capital” be established inland; that an eagle (a sacred bird across 
Malaita) be on the district seal (the government wanted a turtle); and that 
headmen who “caused enmity or division [between] the people and the 
Government” be replaced with “trusty, faithful persons.” It complained that 
people had been “chased . . . in the forest as dogs hunting animals,” that 
they had been prevented from meeting with the government at ‘Aoke, and 
that Malaitans had never known how government spent their tax money, 
which they now wanted their own “president” to collect and oversee. Dug-
dale’s prepared speech focused on Americans, and he told the audience 
that some of their “colonies” were worse off than British ones. He gave 
the now-standard lecture that if they wanted good things Malaitans had to 
work rather than wait for Americans, and that they had to start cooperating 
with England. He responded to the Federal Council letter, bluntly rejecting 
some points and refusing to address others. Allan later cited this as a high 
point for the quarter: “The people have heard a Minister of the Crown 
berate their idiocy.”49
Though the posted notices heralded intensified northern resistance, the 
real tragedy for the government was emerging in the hitherto cooperative 
south. At first the notices were stopped from spreading past Sinalagu in 
Kwaio, when in April Fifi‘i and Headman David Ridley led a group of men 
to block a patrol Anifelo tried to lead from Uru to post them there. But 
in May and June, notices flowed from the west coast into southern Kwaio 
and across ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita. This coincided with a rapid turn of 
‘Are‘are’s alaha chiefs and most of the people against Nono‘oohimae and 
his message of cooperation, to the point where he threatened to resign his 
“chief” position if it continued. Their leader was Waiparo (also named Hai-
ware) of Takataka, a Maasina Rule founder who had never been arrested, 
whom Allan called “the second most influential man in Ariari, Waeparo, 
hypocrite, liar and leading subversive agent of the South.” Waiparo had 
started challenging Nono‘oohimae’s efforts earlier in the year and now 
restored links with activists in the north. By August, he was touring ‘Are‘are 
and Small Malaita, telling people not to pay the 1951 tax until they received 
something for their 1949 and 1950 payments. Headman Hoasihau told 
Allan that Federal Council ideas had spread throughout ‘Are‘are, and in 
much of Small Malaita George was in a bind similar to Nono‘oohimae’s. 
Allan promised to respond by taking stern measures to collect taxes there 
and by encouraging recruiters to take laborers without consulting their 
alaha. By December the alaha had announced that no ‘Are‘are taxes would 
be paid until they were allowed a “president” of Malaita, selected by Malai-
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tans in congress. Allan wired Honiara to report that the alaha “asserted that 
just as Government conceded to demands for release of Nine Chiefs so it 
would in time concede on this one. It is only a matter of time states Alaha 
Council.” People expressed regret that Nono‘oohimae had sided with the 
government, and in early 1952 Allan reported that Waiparo had “success-
fully annulled Nono‘oohimae’s authority.”50
In the north, in December, the situation remained little changed, or in 
places had grown slightly worse, though things were relatively quiet. The 
government now faced noncooperation or open opposition across the 
length of Malaita. The deadline for 1951 taxes was 17 December, after which 
Allan vowed to begin “prosecutions and large scale police operations” with 
six-month penalties for nonpayment. He said Malaitans had to learn that 
“This Government would not tolerate the open flouting of the law and that 
whether passive resistance to authority continued for twenty years, nothing 
would persuade it from adhering to the course of its policy.”51
Resolution
Ten weeks after the tax deadline, some 4,000 of the 8,000 Malaitans liable 
for the 1951 tax, and almost all of those in ‘Are‘are, had refused to pay. But 
Allan imposed no stern measures in the south or sweeping police actions 
in the north, or any punitive measures at all.52 He was leaving. He recalled 
later that he was sick and “exhausted and had run out of steam.” A former 
officer told me that he was informed Allan was removed because he was 
succumbing to the job’s pressures, something I had already guessed from 
his writings of the time. Even by the end of 1950 they reveal a deepening 
hatred of Malaitans, particularly those in the SSEM, Catholics, or anyone 
else he thought was interfering with his administration. His frustrations 
are evident in some of his formal reports, which boil over into rants or 
seethe with bitter sarcasm. Readers will have noticed his fondness for faux 
psychological analyses of Malaitans, sometimes joined with crude anthropo-
logical ones, an approach that anchored his master’s thesis but became pro-
gressively harsher back on the island: He declared Malaitans “paranoid,” 
“schizophrenic,” “fanatics,” and to be suffering “fear complexes” (“like 
other primitive people”) and displaying “extraordinary” levels of “neuras-
thenia, obsession, mania and deranged behavior.” Malaita was “a festering 
sore,” a condition Allan seemed desperate to blame on anything but gov-
ernment actions—Christian missions, Americans, white malcontents, and 
above all psychotic Malaitans.53
A late 1951 report reveals Allan’s awareness of one key to his and the gov-
ernment’s problems. In describing the singular success of a unique com-
munity development project administered by Sandy Peebles at Hauhui, just 
south of Su‘u in ‘Are‘are, he wrote: “I have not yet observed among a Malaita 
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community a better spirit of goodwill and a genuine desire for self improve-
ment than that which now pertains at Hauhui. . . . There is little doubt that 
[Peebles’s] own particular friendly and optimistic approach, untainted by 
the haranguing approach, that the very character of the Malaita people 
inculcates into its administrative officers—a most unfortunate tendency 
which has to be deliberately and consistently avoided—has been largely 
responsible for this most hopeful attitude.” He added, in a rare positive 
statement about Malaitans, “The Hauhui Survey has shown . . . something 
of the drive and mainspring of the Malaita people.” Even if one declines 
to read between these lines, Allan must have recognized that he had suc-
cumbed to the very unfortunate tendency he lamented, and that this 
approach, in which, as he wrote, he was not alone, had played a significant 
role in the colonial failure. A great barrier to the government achieving its 
objectives, particularly the central one of gaining Malaitans’ respect, had 
been the deep pattern of officers publicly and relentlessly disrespecting 
Malaitans.54
In late February 1952, Allan was replaced by Valdemar (Val) Jens Ander-
sen, a New Zealander, who from 1947 into 1948 had been district commis-
sioner of the Eastern District, and more recently Gregory-Smith’s secretary 
to government. After Davies, the angry Forster, Masterman, and then Allan, 
Andersen brought to Malaita’s administration a desperately needed change 
in attitude. James Tedder, who from 1952 to 1954 served under Andersen as 
‘Aoke’s and then Malu‘u’s district officer, remembered, “Perhaps his best 
trait was the way he could talk to the Islanders as equals and gain their 
confidence,” and this portrayal is borne out by his actions and successes.55
Andersen was hampered by his Malu‘u officer, John Wrightson, who had 
been posted there in late 1951, and the contrast between them highlights 
the broader change that 1952 would bring in the government’s approach. 
From Wrightson’s writings it appears he saw Malaitans much as Allan did, 
and his attitudes and actions were distinctly prewar in tone. He sent his 
superior, Andersen, condescending lectures arguing that the only thing 
Malaitans understood was force and that “more strong and bold acts [like 
mass arrests] will be necessary before Government ideals are irrevocably 
implanted in the minds of the bush people here.” Before leaving, Allan 
had ordered reimposition of prewar pig-penning laws, and in protest some 
To‘abaita people loosed all of their swine. Wrightson had his police shoot 
pigs at Rerede and force their owners to carry the carcasses to Malu‘u, which 
led loyal Headman Ba‘etalua to visit Andersen at ‘Aoke to complain and 
even suggest that he might join the people against the government. Ander-
sen told Wrightson his actions were obviously illegal, ordered restitution to 
be paid to the pig owners, and informed him that their overall policy had 
to be directed at “gaining the confidence of and the friendship of the main 
body of the people.” He continued more broadly, “While I agree that the 
Government of Malaita largely rests on force we cannot hope to develop 
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a sound indirect administration based on it and administrative ends must 
be obtained without the use of force as far as possible even to the extent of 
accepting an inferior result.” Andersen also thought it time to reign in Tam-
buri and his Western Solomons police, whom Ba‘etalua said were frighten-
ing people. Wrightson responded that it was impossible to follow the law 
under Malaita’s circumstances, and that his action had “served its purpose 
and generally I think that it went within an ace of hoisting the people here 
onto another rung of the ladder that reaches to social and political enlight-
enment.” “There are times,” he wrote, “when the Law is a damned nuisance 
in my opinion.” He also pushed to be allowed to destroy birth huts, a step 
he argued, citing decades-old texts, was necessary to reverse population 
decline, avoid “committing sick primitives to the grave,” and overcome “the 
evils of indigenous culture,” which was “rotten to the core.” Andersen, who 
forbade such actions, had reached different conclusions, including that the 
Federal Council or an equivalent would be around for some time to come 
and that it therefore had to be brought into the system of legal authority 
by incorporation into a district council. If its adherents would follow the 
law, the Federal Council could become a political party and “a power for 
good on Malaita.” For this reason, he minimized police raids and met with 
Anifelo and other leaders who were willing.56
Andersen was also convinced that Maasina Rule and the Federal Coun-
cil had deep roots in economic disparities, and that in the longer term 
only development would change the Malaita political scene. His motiva-
tions clearly went beyond political ones, and Tedder recalled his great 
concern with “providing opportunities for people to earn cash without 
leaving the island.” Development was now becoming a more tangible pos-
sibility because Gregory-Smith, who left for good on 1 April, had kept his 
promise to find funding for education, medicine, and cash crop schemes. 
He had proposed each project specifically as a means to address Malaita’s 
political crisis. Colonial Development and Welfare money had now been 
approved for several elementary schools; a central school at ‘Aoke (King 
George VI); a hospital at Rerede and the rebuilding of the ‘Aoke one; and 
a major cocoa-planting scheme. These projects were now coming on line 
and lacked only the broad Malaitan support without which they could not 
effectively move forward. An added difficulty was that a census, needed to 
properly allocate services, could not be conducted on Malaita due to its 
previous use as a coercive weapon.57
Malaita’s officers devoted much of the first half of 1952 to holding 
meetings around the island to urge people to select delegates for a district 
council and to try to discredit Federal Council ideas. But though they were 
no longer demanding that people pay tax as a prerequisite for a council, 
Malaitans were a poor audience. They boycotted meetings northern head-
men called on the topic (even in Lau), and even after officers told head-
men to stay away from meetings most people still refused to attend. Malai-
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tans argued that they had chosen leaders before and the government had 
put them in jail, and some leaders now feared being chosen for a council. 
Sometimes when a leader did show interest, his followers quickly reined 
him in. In June, Andersen decided to minimize tax arrests so as to improve 
the atmosphere for discussions of the council.58
However, by late July things were worsening in the north; still more peo-
ple were relocating to the bush, and even former loyalists fled from Wright-
son, who described “a great surge forward in Federal Council activities.” 
In the south, people were vowing not to pay tax or put forward council 
delegates until they received what they called “four signs”: education, medi-
cal help, agricultural help, and councils and courts. Despite this, officers 
pushed ahead, and on 29 July managed to inaugurate a four-day District 
Council meeting. The 29 members, most of them loyalists, chose ‘Atoomea 
as “the native leader of the Council and of Malaita,” meaning he was to be 
the vice president under Andersen. So strong was northern feeling against 
‘Atoomea for this that his village of Aniuke was largely abandoned. Still, 
though the bulk of Malaitans did not accept the District Council, delegates 
told people at home about the meeting, and it was said that some Federal 
Council leaders and adherents showed interest.59
The difficulty was that the Federal Council was perfectly capable of crip-
pling or derailing the District Council. As Allan had written in mid-1951, 
“Only in two or three areas is it possible to detect among the people as a 
whole that essential good will without which a constituted local authority can 
fail to work. . . . The Council will fail ignominiously if it is established on an 
artificial basis—that is the basis of lip service paid by a passive, platitudinous, 
and patronizing minority.” The body could only function as a popular one.60
The legal deadlines for prosecuting nonpayment of taxes from 1949, 
1950, or 1951 had passed, and thus there was now little pretext for arresting 
most Federal Council leaders or followers. But on 30 August officers would 
be able to jail people for not paying the 1952 tax. Andersen decided that 
because officers’ intensive efforts and eight months without major govern-
ment raids had failed to improve the situation, on that date they would 
have to “revert to a policy of force.” Police would conduct “massive raids” 
using “maximum force” over a four-month period, striking various loca-
tions from Kwara‘ae and Fataleka in the north, to Uru in Kwaio, and south 
into ‘Are‘are. He said he wanted the operation “to be a force tempered 
with kindness,” and that when police confronted people, be they leaders or 
followers, they were to be allowed to pay up and avoid arrest. He thought 
that if leaders did so that would weaken them politically more than would 
jail terms, which had always proved ineffective. Andersen did not want offi-
cers to be directly involved in the raids but rather to continue to tour, writ-
ing: “The Malaita man has by centuries of family vendettas developed an 
unforgiving nature and the less he has to forgive the better.” At the cam-
paign’s end people would be told they did not need to pay the 1949–1951 
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taxes, and the Federal Council would be offered the nine open seats on the 
District Council. If that did not work, then another period of raids would 
commence.61
When the 30th of August came, very few Malaitans contravened Federal 
Council instructions by paying tax. Andersen thought they were waiting to 
see “whether the District Council was really going to do anything.” Wright-
son told Andersen that after six years of conflict, north Malaitans were 
tired of resisting, and that the more they pressured them, the faster they 
would give up. Again and again he pressed Andersen to launch a broad 
crackdown.62
This was not to be. Andersen submitted his attack plan to Honiara on 11 
August, but the next day Acting Resident Commissioner Philip “Pip” Rich-
ardson asked him to put it on hold while he consulted the new high com-
missioner, Robert Stanley, though he said this would mean only brief delay. 
Then, while Andersen was patrolling east Kwara‘ae in late August, he was 
met by Kifo with a message from Takanakwao saying that he and the other 
main Federal Council leaders wanted to meet with the high commissioner, 
who was soon to visit. Four days later, Stanley telegrammed Richardson and 
Andersen that he wanted to discuss in Honiara “the Malaita situation in 
light of the latest information available.” Further, he wanted to meet Fed-
eral Council leaders at ‘Aoke in September. The 50-year-old Stanley would 
be visiting in preparation for the relocation of the Western Pacific High 
Commission from Fiji to Honiara at year’s end. Stanley was a veteran of 
over 20 years in the colonial service, most recently as chief secretary and 
sometimes acting governor of Northern Rhodesia.63
Once in Honiara, Stanley forbade further tax arrests, a decision that 
Andersen later praised as “wise.” Stanley explained his reasoning in a let-
ter to London months later: “I had decided on a conciliatory approach as 
the only one likely to succeed and if there was to be any chance of success 
I had to reduce any conditions I felt it necessary to impose on the accep-
tance of the Federal Council’s representations . . . to what I considered to 
be the minimum essential to ensure recognition of my own authority as 
well as obedience to the laws of the Protectorate.” He also hoped to chan-
nel Malaitans’ political energies toward constructive ends. Gregory-Smith 
had departed holding a very different view. In front of an ‘Aoke meeting 
with Federal Council representatives in mid-November, he had torn up a 
document they gave him, writing afterward, “I believe that we are making a 
mistake in admitting even the existence of this ‘Federal Council.’ . . . I think 
from all I have seen of the members of this ‘Council’ that they are just 
a band of otherwise unknown and unimportant local scalawags, and my 
impression is that we are placing them on an unwarranted high pinnacle by 
recognizing them and talking about this Council.”64
The Federal Council leadership was now said to be “the big four”: 
Takanakwao, Sau, Anifelo, and Irofiala. Salana Ga‘a had decided to sup-
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port the council and was urging the others to do the same. Through Ga‘a 
and Dausabea, Andersen sent them and other leaders ground rules for 
the meeting and told them that Stanley had important announcements to 
make. Takanakwao said they also wanted to meet with the District Council 
members about a possible amalgamation with the Federal Council, though 
this was not raised again until Stanley suggested it. Andersen proffered sev-
eral explanations for the shift: the government’s nonaggressive policy had 
made people appreciate quiet, the government had started real develop-
ment projects rather than just talking about them, and people had learned 
more about the council due to the constant touring. He believed Federal 
Council leaders had come to recognize that the District Council gave Malai-
tans what they wanted and that the government now genuinely sought to 
help them.65
From 25 through 27 September, Stanley, with Richardson and Andersen, 
met at ‘Aoke with 12 Federal Council and District Council representatives, 
with Ga‘a acting as spokesman for the Federal Council. Stanley told them 
he wanted to forget the past, and what he proposed went far beyond what 
government had offered Malaitans over the past two years: (1) Council 
members would not be evenly divided between government appointees and 
popular choices but would instead consist of 30 members selected by the 
people, and just ten, one from each sub-district, by the government; (2) the 
Malaita Council would elect a president, who would be the “big man” for 
Malaita; (3) a new name, “the Malaita Council,” would mark the transfor-
mation; (4) after a year, delegates from each sub-district would be elected, 
with representation to be worked out by the council and Andersen; (5) 
there would be no more arrests for taxes, and those from before 1952 were 
now waived; (6) the council’s president could become a member of the 
Advisory Council; and (7) they could choose their own flag “emblematic 
of Malaita.” The new name was Andersen’s idea, and attendees said they 
would discuss this, since many wanted the name Federal Council. Malaitans 
had demanded a Malaitan president for years, and Andersen had told Stan-
ley the leaders were unlikely to concede this. Stanley did not specify that the 
“big man” had to be a council member, and the possibility was raised that 
they might pick Sisili, still in jail. Stanley said that if they did so he might 
have Sisili released if he would agree to cooperate.66
Federal Council representatives for their part agreed tentatively: (1) to 
accept the high commissioner’s formal authority (he would eventually retain 
the power to veto their actions) and to work with Andersen as their adviser; 
(2) to later let the Malaita Council’s president be chosen by all Malaitans 
(something Malaitans had demanded for some time); and (3) to have the 
Malaita Council collect taxes and pay them into a council fund to be used 
for the Malaitan people. The leaders said that they wanted no taxes col-
lected until November since they wanted October to explain everything to 
the people, obtain their agreement, and let them choose representatives.67
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This was the major turning point. Afterward, following Stanley’s instruc-
tions, Andersen ordered that no officer was to tour with more than two 
police, and that no police would patrol except in extreme circumstance. 
There would be no further tax arrests, no tax would be collected for previ-
ous years, and people would not be pressed for the 1952 tax. Every effort 
was to be made to befriend Federal Council people.68 Andersen welcomed 
the meeting’s results with “sober optimism” but said the agreement could 
only be preserved by quickly developing economic projects. One reason 
for his caution was that Takanakwao, Irofiala, and Sau (who was ill) did not 
attend the meeting, and people of the northern sub-districts other than 
Kwara‘ae had few representatives there. However, it was said and later con-
firmed that the three absent leaders approved of what had been done.69
Just after the ‘Aoke meeting, Andersen undertook a round-Malaita tour, 
traveling in the south with Anifelo, Dausabea, and two other speakers, and 
in the north with Ga‘a, Ba‘etalua, and two others (mission representatives 
accompanied them also). These men explained the agreement to wait-
ing crowds. Responses were enthusiastic throughout Kwaio and the south. 
In the north there was suspicion in many places but no open opposition. 
“There was a general feeling of jubilation,” wrote Andersen, “because it 
appeared that the long drawn out struggle between the pro- and anti-Gov-
ernment factions was coming to an end.” There was also a general belief 
across the island “that the Federal Council had won a great victory and was 
now in charge of the district.” Andersen noted this “misconception,” but 
after the tour he dropped the “sober” from his declaration of optimism. 
Not everyone was so pleased. Wrightson at Malu‘u, dismayed, called the 
agreement “a political coup d’etat” and all but predicted its failure. Six days 
after the ‘Aoke meetings, he received orders to transfer to Guadalcanal and 
not to wait for his replacement, Bartle. Wrightson’s views were obviously out 
of step with and a threat to the new agenda.70
The Malaita Council’s first meeting was held on 6 November, which 
today is a public holiday on Malaita called “Maasina Rule Day.” There were 
35 delegates in attendance, including 23 Federal Council men, 3 former 
Maasina Rule leaders, and 6 senior headmen. The council voted Salana 
Ga‘a its first president by secret ballot with 26 votes. Justus Ganifiri was a 
distant runner-up; some delegates had argued that one of Maasina Rule’s 
original head chiefs should be chosen “because they had started this work.” 
This idea lost favor after Takanakwao arrived and said at one of many infor-
mal meetings held nearby that the main Federal Council leaders should 
choose the president, which in essence they did. Andersen told the council 
that their work would be to help people make money, to improve medical 
and educational services on the island, to see that all people obeyed the law, 
and “to make good laws about Customs for the people.” He emphasized, 
“The Council did not belong to the Government it belonged to the people 
of Malaita.” The council decided that when the high commissioner gave 
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Ga‘a formal authority in January, each “line chief” on Malaita would give 
him strings of shell money, much as Timothy George had received in 1945. 
It would be his not to keep but to pass on to his successor. It was “to make 
him the biggest chief on Malaita.”71
Once the council began and police action and threats ceased, relations 
between the people and the government, including headmen, dramati-
cally improved. Andersen reported a “friendlier spirit” in Kwara‘ae and the 
south. Tedder recalled how “a notable change occurred,” and while tour-
ing Kwara‘ae near the end of 1952 he wrote, “Previously when we entered 
a village people had turned their back or walked away and did not return a 
greeting. Now they were staying to talk.” The north, where suppression had 
been most severe, was less accepting of the council at first due to its asso-
ciation with the government, though this varied by place. There, some saw 
delegates as government agents and would not attend meetings they called 
to discuss the council. Some wanted loyalists to be punished with fines or 
a special tax for their role in past suffering. Things improved over time, 
however, and by January Andersen—whom Stanley called “by nature a bit 
of a pessimist”—guessed that 75 percent of Malaitans supported the coun-
cil. Then, on 27 January, Sau, Takanakwao, and Irofiala met with Stanley, 
Figure 8.1. Delegates to the first Malaita Council, ‘Aoke, 28 January 1953. Ga‘a 
wears the beaded vest. (Photo by and courtesy of former District Officer James Ted-
der, the only person on scene with a camera.)
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Andersen, and Ga‘a in ‘Aoke. They had come, Takanakwao said, “to shake 
hands with the high commissioner.” The next day they attended the inau-
guration of Ga‘a and the Malaita Council. Three to four thousand people 
came from across Malaita, including northern leaders who had opposed the 
body. Ga‘a wore a waistcoat and hat decorated with shell money. A Malaitan 
choir sang “God Save the Queen.”72
This was a hopeful moment, especially after the hard years since August 
1947. Malaitans and officers alike were relieved at the apparent end of con-
flict and at the chance to return to a semblance of routine. Malaitans had by 
no means become lovers of government, and many troubles lay ahead, some 
of which are touched on in my final chapter. Nonetheless, Andersen could 
write in his next Annual Report, “By the end of 1953 Malaita contained no 
major political problems and the District was as quiet as it has ever been.” 
The year 1954 was also calm, and that April Andersen reported, “Of the orig-
inal Marching Rule leaders all except T. George have accepted some form 
of appointment in the Native Administration organization. . . . Only Irofiala 
of the important Federal Party leaders has not accepted any appointment 
and he remains in seclusion near Auki.” Sisili had just become the council’s 
vice president, and the next year he was elected as its president and Irofiala 
its vice president. The years of overt repression and resistance were over.73
327
Chapter 9
Gains and Losses
The general consensus in writings about Maasina Rule has been that it was 
largely a failure and that Malaitans in the end resubmitted to government 
rule. Many authors have credited Gregory-Smith’s mid-1950 release of the 
head chiefs—conceived as a conciliatory gesture to a movement already 
dying—with ending serious resistance. Some have presented the Federal 
Council phase as a localized resurgence or as—to use a favorite govern-
ment euphemism—“remaining pockets of resistance” quickly put down in 
humbling fashion.1 No one to my knowledge has told of the full breadth 
and perseverance of Malaitans’ refusal to be dominated and dictated to by 
the government, of colonial officers’ despair at their inability to reimpose 
control or find resolution, or of the pressure Stanley, Andersen, and others 
felt in the last half of 1952 to compromise and finally accede to Malaitan 
demands that the government had rejected for so long. Sometimes these 
omissions appear to reflect reliance on BSIP Annual Reports, which con-
cealed the extent of the government’s difficulties, confusions, frustrations, 
and ultimate concessions, and later, through 1974, portrayed Maasina Rule 
as a cargo cult that “needed a show of force to control it.” Other authors 
have simply repeated distortions found in the secondary sources, passing 
them along.2
As relieved as most officers were when overt conflict ended, those serving 
at the time saw no government victory over the movement. We see this in 
Acting Resident Commissioner Peter Hughes’s observation, “The Federal 
Council requests . . . are suspiciously like the demands made of Mr Sandars 
in 1946,” and in Wrightson’s condemnation of the settlement as a Malai-
tan “political coup d’etat.” In his Malaita Annual Report for 1953, District 
Commissioner Andersen wrote, “Apart from the wish to be independent 
the only major aim of the Marching Rule and Federal Party movements 
which has not been achieved is an increase in the basic wage.”3 This was an 
overstatement, but these comments indicate officers’ perceptions of the 
agreement.
To ask if Maasina Rule was a success or a failure poses a simplistic ques-
tion about a long and complex process. We have seen that movement fol-
lowers had multiple, diverse, and often-subtle goals that changed over time, 
particularly in reaction to shifts in government policies. Some have judged 
Maasina Rule a failure for not having won formal Malaitan independence.4
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That was never in the cards in the mid-twentieth century, and by such a mea-
sure the movement was doomed from the start (those who reduced it to a 
“cargo cult” would say the same). But few Maasina Rule adherents wanted 
independence in the sense of Malaita being left on its own in the world with 
no benefactor, and most who held hopes for American assistance eventually 
gave them up. Before arrests began, many Malaitans foresaw an abiding if 
diminished role for the colonial government in their lives, and during the 
years of suppression many more accepted this as likely, inevitable, or even 
desirable.5 This was clearly expressed in the ongoing demands for funda-
mental changes in the state’s relationship with the people, toward one in 
which they would be allowed more self-determination and participation in 
governance, be offered economic options beyond poorly paid and socially 
destructive plantation indenture, receive education and medical care, and 
be treated with respect rather than as backward, inferior “natives.”
While Maasina Rule’s outcome can be evaluated partly in terms of for-
mal political and economic gains or failures, other fundamental issues at 
stake were critical for Malaitans, and I want to highlight those here since 
most writers have overlooked them. In addition to Malaitans’ positive goals, 
this was a movement of defiance, anchored, particularly during its last five 
years, in a resolve to resist a return to the colonial status quo. Therefore, 
we must also consider the government’s objectives and the degree to which 
Malaitans successfully thwarted those to which they objected. Most studies 
have given little attention to the state’s aims, which they appear to have 
taken for granted. But the government’s agendas changed considerably 
in dynamic relationship with Maasina Rule in its various configurations. 
Twice, new district commissioners—Davies, and later, Andersen—critically 
altered government objectives and approaches.
A common assertion has been that changes Malaitans sought and felt 
they won through Maasina Rule would have occurred anyway, because the 
colonial outlook had already changed. From this view, Maasina Rule accom-
plished nothing but only obstructed progress. It is true that there were plans 
for gradual administrative and economic development on Malaita as well 
as on other islands. Most officers seem to have been sincere about imple-
menting these, though they came to see them as urgent on Malaita only in 
response to rising discontent.6 But arguments that attitudes had fundamen-
tally shifted are difficult to sustain in the face of the government’s Malaita 
policies and actions and the writings of many officers from mid-1947 into 
1952. Davies, Germond, Forster, Masterman, and Allan—to mention only 
senior Malaitan officers—all thought and acted in ways that would have 
played well in the 1930s. If one does argue that the Maasina Rule period 
hindered progress, then a goodly portion of blame must be placed on the 
government itself, especially its decision to try to destroy the movement 
across the length of Malaita and its futile campaign to discipline Malaitans 
into becoming obedient colonial subjects. These were expressions of an 
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antiquated mindset, and one of Maasina Rule’s major accomplishments was 
that it ended suppression as a viable state response to political dissent and 
resistance.
An appraisal of the impacts of Maasina Rule must consider not just the 
outcome of 1953 but also its longer-term legacy. The period transformed 
Malaitan-government relations in enduring ways. This was foreseen, at least 
by junior officers in regular contact with the people; we have read Cam-
eron’s warning to Noel in mid-1948 that the mass arrests were “going to 
influence their attitude toward us, hence Malaita politics, for the next 30 
years, possibly permanently,” and a year later Russell reported that Maasina 
Rule had become “an integral part of the social structure of Malaita” and 
was “likely to remain for some years.”7 They were correct, and even after 
Malaitans suspended overt resistance, key features of Maasina Rule ideol-
ogy and practice persevered, including the importance of kastom as a politi-
cal ideology and organizational framework.
Malaitans at the beginnings of Maasina Rule had two basic sets of objec-
tives: the first was to reject the low status and position Europeans imposed 
on them and end unwanted government interference in their lives; the 
second was to reorganize their societies and work for social change and 
development in harmony with Malaitan sensibilities. Many saw these to be 
inseparable, since they thought that officers and headmen were dedicated 
to maintaining prewar policies of discrimination and white control and to 
thwarting Malaitan efforts to raise themselves up—as indeed some were.
Yet, for a time, Malaitans and key government officers partially shared 
certain goals. That is, these officers, too, sought social reorganization and 
political, social, and economic development, and from 1945 into 1947 
many of them, especially Sandars, recognized positive aspects of the move-
ment and tried to varying degrees to work with Malaitans to find common 
ground and direction. Sandars was willing to significantly sacrifice control 
in order to harness Malaitan energies toward developing the island. While 
he would not allow fully independent courts or councils, both he and For-
ster experimented with allowing people much more say over them, and 
Sandars even offered to help Malaitans form a labor union.
The main disputes during this period were over the degree and pace of 
change and the extent to which Malaitans would be in charge of it. The 
government planned to reinstitute and gradually expand the embryonic 
prewar model of native councils and courts under close regulation by offi-
cers and headmen. Malaitans wanted rapid institution of both, with popu-
larly chosen rather than government-appointed leaders, so they would be 
free of the unpopular appointed headmen and could make decisions and 
settle most disputes according to indigenous ideas and methods. They also 
wanted a popularly selected Malaita-wide council headed by a man of their 
own choosing. In the island’s southern half, most leaders and people were 
willing to work with officers, while in the north, where people were con-
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tending with powerful and hostile headmen and their followers, some were 
more aggressive in seeking separation from the colonial apparatus. That 
many northern headmen forcefully opposed any cooperation with Maasina 
Rule followers as dangerous appeasement greatly contributed to the more 
confrontational atmosphere there. Nonetheless, Sandars expressed faith in 
Maasina Rule’s leaders and believed progressive compromise was possible 
if the situation was managed with tact and care. He saw in Malaitan enthusi-
asm and mobilization not just a challenge but also an opportunity.
Though Sandars verbally supported Malaitans in some of their goals and 
activities, he offered little of the financial or logistical help that only a gov-
ernment could access; he suggested that they pay for building and running 
schools and hospitals themselves. Given the lack of state funds, plans, or 
personnel for significant near-term expansion of educational or medical 
services, one cannot blame Sandars personally for this lost opportunity to 
actively work with Maasina Rule—he could not single-handedly catch the 
Solomons up from decades of neglect. Three years later, though, in 1950, 
the government did hurriedly develop such plans and obtain money for 
them when it was realized, as Gregory-Smith put it, “A pistol is being shown 
at our heads.”8
Roy Davies was the most obstinate critic of working with the movement, 
and once he replaced Sandars his misunderstanding and hatred of it radi-
cally changed the government’s approach and aims. Noel adopted Davies’s 
portrayal of sinister chiefs oppressing a clueless and helpless populace; 
both of them were determined to eradicate the movement and free Malai-
tans from its clutches. Many Malaitans continued to live in towns and tend 
farms, settle their own disputes, and organize politically, but sustained mass 
arrests over the years that followed crippled their ability to pursue Maa-
sina Rule’s grander programs of social transformation. Thus the state suc-
cessfully destroyed this aspect of Maasina Rule, and many Malaitans would 
never again work collectively for such goals, even when urged to by their 
own leaders or subsequent governments.
This left Malaitans to concentrate on their other objective: to avoid a 
return to their previous relationships with the government and whites or 
otherwise submit to them. In 1949 Allan reported in the north a view widely 
held on Malaita. He said To‘abaita people were no longer resisting due to 
“positive goals” of Maasina Rule, “but rather on the negative principles, 
directed against previous misrule, Maekaleism, Government-native courts, 
enforced communal work on the road, bad plantation conditions, bogus 
councillors, misunderstanding of native custom, and the rule of petty Gov-
ernment chiefs, tax gatherers and pimps. . . . The people seem to believe 
that to comply with the census is to accept all the old irritations.” Many 
Kwaio have explained to me their resolve at that time in similar ways. Sim-
ply to be left alone would have satisfied some; others still sought a role in 
governance, but on new terms that would end such “irritations.”9
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From 1948 into early 1952 this remained the main grounds for con-
frontation. Most officers by the end of 1947 realized the movement was 
a popular one, and most must have recognized that the decision to carry 
out Operation Delouse had been disastrous. But it was thought too late to 
turn back without losing face, and the government’s overriding mission for 
the next four years became to reassert government power and legitimacy 
and restore “the respect for authority . . . necessary if Government were to 
prevail.” Officers doggedly pursued the chimera of forcing Malaitans to 
cease all resistance and fully submit—failing, as Marquand observed, to rec-
ognize that officers no longer possessed the capacity to accomplish this. 
The government, they believed, would become “feared and respected,” by 
displaying the “power to impose its will.” Malaitans had to accept that the 
government would “not tolerate Marching Rule in any shape or form,” and 
the state had to show that it was “determined to stamp it out and obtain the 
submission of the people to its authority and to that of its approved native 
officers.” Any sign of willingness to negotiate or compromise, even toward 
goals that the government and Malaitans still shared, had to be vigorously 
avoided since it might be taken as a display of weakness. If enough punish-
ment and humiliation were dished out, Malaitans would fully surrender.10
Officers underrated the will of Malaitans, and their endeavor was doomed 
to failure as surely as any Malaitan pursuit of formal independence. Only 
when it was abandoned did a settlement become possible. Though the gov-
ernment could intimidate some people into being censused or paying the 
tax to avoid prison, this meant little if they remained hostile and unwilling 
to cooperate in any other way. As Marquand put it, “Everything to do with 
the Government and every plan put forward was very successfully boycot-
ted. The District Officer’s hands were completely tied.”11 At the heart of 
the matter was a contradiction between trying to force Malaitans to bend 
before the government’s uncompromising will, while also trying to con-
vince them that the government was a friend and partner with which they 
could collaborate toward political and economic advancement. The latter 
agenda transcended local officers, since senior colonial officials abroad 
began to apply pressure to move forward. The Protectorate’s methods of 
administration had been anachronistic even before the war, and by 1950 
direct rule through unending suppression was an unacceptable and embar-
rassing mode of governance. Early that year Gregory-Smith was sent out to 
resolve the crisis, and then in 1952, more emphatically, Stanley.
The Malaitan triumph over the government’s efforts to break them 
through gendarme suppression was an important victory for Maasina Rule. 
Though officers hoped to coerce “respect” from Malaitans by instilling in 
them a fear of government punishments, what emerged was a government 
respect for Malaitans in the same sense—a fear of their reaction if repres-
sive measures were again applied. One reason that many have seen Maasina 
Rule as a failure is that they have missed the degree to which Malaitans 
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forced the government to stand down in this matter. Again, some might 
respond that the old methods of rule were antiquated and would have 
disappeared eventually even if Malaitans had capitulated. But one could 
say the same thing about colonial rule in India, or racial segregation in 
the United States, or the targets of any number of other resistance move-
ments—yet few would dismiss the movements that fought them as irrel-
evant to the historical turns they forced through. Episodes of liberation 
often appear preordained in the hindsight of more liberal times.
This victory had long-lasting consequences for how the government 
dealt with Islander political actions in the years to come, and not just on 
Malaita. For example, in 1988 William Davenport, who advised the gov-
ernment on the Moro movement on Guadalcanal in 1964, told me that 
he learned that “The High Commissioner [Robert Foster] was considering 
whether or not to send a police contingent over to the weather coast to jail 
everyone connected. He was being urged to do so by a group of hard-case 
veterans from Maasina Rule days. In the end he decided against it, citing 
early mistakes made during Maasina Rule, and instead he directed Honiara 
administrators to invite Moro and his aides to come to Honiara and set up 
a sort of ‘headquarters’ Custom House.” Two years later, anthropologist 
Francis Harwood wrote that the government had “acted very reasonably” 
toward the Christian Fellowship Church she was studying in the Western 
Solomons, “and cooperation between government and the CFC grows pro-
gressively closer for two reasons: A. CFC leadership are as shrewd a bunch 
as one can find. . . . B. Government has learned from Marching Rule to avoid 
direct confrontation.”12
The change was clearest on Malaita itself. Time and again older Malai-
tans have told me about past, aggressive government rules and actions 
they found humiliating and then added: “This was before Maasina Rule.” 
I thought at first they were using Maasina Rule as a chronological marker, 
but I soon realized that they meant Maasina Rule itself had put an end to 
such things. Beginning in 1952, officers replaced harangues with negotia-
tion, force with persuasion. They also abandoned the most resented intru-
sions into people’s lives, such as compulsory labor projects, domineering 
headmen, bullying soldiers, the shooting of pigs, and arrests for census 
refusal or tax default. Maasina Rule did not win Malaitans control over the 
government, but it did cast off a good measure of the government’s control 
over Malaitans. The significance of this is perhaps hard for some European 
readers to fully appreciate, as it is now for many Solomon Islanders who 
never had to suffer an oppressive and demeaning colonial rule.
Once people realized that the new Malaita Council was to be part of the 
colonial government, many did not fully support it or refused to cooperate 
with it. How district officers responded to their contrary actions displayed 
the shift in their attitudes and policies toward the island’s people. More 
broadly, this was a critical period for the emergence of a new Malaitan rela-
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tionship with the government that was typified by selective cooperation, 
ambivalence, and avoidance of overt discord, and the development of a 
new politics of kastom as a basis for autonomy and self-direction. For most 
Malaitans, the government remained an alien entity rather than a coopera-
tive partner in collective endeavors.
It soon became apparent that many Malaitans had misunderstood the 
1952 agreement, particularly regarding what the Malaita Council and its 
powers would be. When officers and delegates alike told them that the 
council “belonged to them,” they took this to mean that it was in no way a 
part of the colonial government, which, not surprisingly given recent his-
tory, many still regarded with varying degrees of suspicion or hostility. In 
December 1952, Andersen wrote that, among Malaitans, “It is now gener-
ally accepted that the Federal Council is in the process of obtaining all that 
it has sought for Malaita and that it has virtually won its long struggle,” and 
he later said that after the Malaita Council’s formal inauguration in 1953, 
“Many people thought that the District had been given ‘Freedom’ and were 
surprised to find Government Officers still on Malaita.”13
Some council delegates found themselves caught between officers ini-
tially wary of their political pasts and followers who suspected they were now 
puppets of those same officers. Over the next election cycles, various dele-
gates were turned out by their people in favor of men expected to challenge 
the government more. Andersen believed this was a key reason the council 
elected Sisili to replace Ga‘a as its president in 1955, though officers were 
relieved, and many supporters disappointed, when Sisili was dutiful and 
cooperative. Fearful that Malaitans would fully reject the council, officers 
tried to disguise their direct connections with it. Andersen had Ga‘a and 
Sisili tour without him for this reason, and Allan wrote that actions taken by 
the central government (in which he now served) had to be falsely credited 
to the council if they were to be accepted. A later district commissioner, 
W St G Anderson, advocated giving the council control over headmen in 
order to help remove “suspicion that Government is interfering with the 
politics of the Malaita people. . . . It may be argued,” he said, “that by this 
move Government will lose its last remaining hold on the people. This is 
far from being the case, insomuch as the council in its short history has 
given adequate evidence of its loyalty and ability to cooperate with Central 
Government.”14
It was a tricky balancing act for the government to try to persuade Malai-
tans that the council was their own and was running Malaita, but at the 
same time show them that the government was still in charge and claimed 
authority. Likewise, delegates had to convince constituents that they were 
carrying out their wishes, while they also worked with government officers 
to keep the council viable. The Malaita Council has sometimes been por-
trayed as powerless and unrepresentative or as a sort of political spackle 
intended merely to quiet resistance.15 This can seem the case if one only 
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reads the formal rules by which it was established, under which the high 
commissioner appointed delegates and could veto any of their decisions. 
In practice, though, the government dreaded the consequences of council 
collapse and was loath to either antagonize its members or undermine its 
status in the eyes of Malaitans. In practice, the people selected their own 
council members—sometimes, as I have said, because they openly hoped 
that they would oppose the government—and I know of no high commis-
sioner having rejected their choices. Moreover, officers tried to choose 
for some of the government’s few appointed seats men who would not 
antagonize their constituencies, some of them former resistance leaders. 
Even before the council was created, Russell warned that if the government 
was forced to quash its decisions it would be rendered “inefficacious” and 
that this would lead Malaitans to set up their own alternatives. The govern-
ment thus wanted to avoid bluntly negating council decisions it disliked or 
thought impracticable, and preferred for the district commissioner to try to 
convince members of their inadvisability when those matters were consid-
ered. More often than not, the problem was a lack of money. This is likely 
what Andersen meant when he said he sometimes interfered in discussions 
when members “developed fantasies of their own.” Members and their con-
stituents had big ideas and plans, but the council had to work with a tiny 
budget and feeble infrastructure.16
Most members of the Malaita Council did try hard to make it work, but 
few possessed the know-how or training to administer the complex finan-
cial and other aspects of governing the island. Andersen recorded that, by 
the end of 1953, “President Ga‘a and some members realised Council could 
not stand on its own two feet, but they had difficulty in convincing their 
followers of this.” Few delegates wanted to estrange their people by telling 
them of the council’s limitations and dependence on government officers, 
and some did not properly consult with their communities or report to 
them on their work. This left the people feeling shut out of the governing 
process, as Malaitans always had been. Malaitans still sometimes complain 
that their representatives do not keep them properly informed.17
Council delegates soon became more sophisticated in the fiscal aspects 
of their work, though a few were embittered by financial and other limita-
tions and blamed them on government paternalism or interference. None-
theless, in September 1954, when Russell returned to Malaita, now in a 
more benign role, to replace Andersen as district commissioner, he found 
the council a “power-house” that was, he said, more dynamic, imaginative, 
and efficient than those of other districts.18 Many Malaitans were develop-
ing a different perspective, however. Though officers like Andersen and 
Russell clearly wanted the council to succeed and worked hard for it, they 
wished it to do so as part of the state, and the central government was anx-
ious to keep control. Dissimulation could not for long conceal this truth 
from suspicious Malaitans, and many did not like it. As time passed, disap-
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pointment grew over the council’s nonrevolutionary nature and its failure 
to provide development to the degree hoped for. A large proportion of 
its tax-supported budgets during the 1950s was spent not on the Malaitan 
people but on council salaries and its operation.19
Officers believed that the council was fulfilling Malaitans’ political ambi-
tions. There was truth to that belief with regard to former resistance leaders 
and others who belonged to it, but it repeated the old mistake of focus-
ing on the views of leaders instead of the populace. District Commissioner 
Anderson observed astutely in 1957, after six months on Malaita, “Undoubt-
edly the council has gone far towards satisfying the political aspirations, 
but one wonders at times, whether it has only satisfied the more vociferous 
inhabitants of the island, and the more backward look upon the council as 
just another Government institution foisted upon them.”20
Many of those deemed “more backward” were in the southern half of 
the island, where fewer government projects were put in place. John Nai-
toro described the perspective from ‘Are‘are: “In reality, there were few real 
advantages from the Council. It marked the restoration of central govern-
ment power on the island. The Council came to be used, with headmen 
and assistant headmen, as another means of maintaining order and sta-
bility, with only limited scope for promoting development. It hadn’t been 
operating long before people were expressing their dissatisfaction with it. 
They looked for other ways to satisfy local level aspirations and interests. 
Attempts at more independent local organization continued. Some of 
this activity was a continuation of things that were started during Maasina 
Rule.”21 In Kwaio, with the largest proportion of people living inland, even 
less help had been forthcoming and anti-council feelings were rife.
Not all Malaitans were so unhappy with the council. Some areas ben-
efited more from its work; a few schools were quickly established, and some 
medical services were provided and these increased over time. Some Malai-
tans successfully pursued business endeavors, particularly in Lau, To‘abaita, 
Langalanga, and parts of Kwara‘ae. In other places, however, such as the 
south, Baelelea, Baegu, Fataleka, and almost all bush areas, many people 
increasingly saw the council as doing little for them. Even in these areas, 
though, few were openly hostile in their interactions with government offi-
cials, who were no longer harassing or arresting people. Face-to-face rela-
tions were more amiable than they had ever been, and for the most part 
they remained so for years after. Neither officers nor Malaitans wanted a 
return to open hostility, and most Malaitans saw little to gain by kicking up 
a serious fuss.22
Officers worked hard to help businesses, start people growing cash crops 
(particularly cocoa and copra), and further develop the council. But in 
addition to a shortage of funds and an inadequate infrastructure, they 
and the council remained hampered by a deep Malaitan distrust of gov-
ernment that had not dissipated. Some feared government schemes would 
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leave them dependent upon or indebted to the state or would otherwise 
cost them their independence so were unenthusiastic about or shunned 
them.23 Another problem was that many basic tools of governance had so 
recently been used as weapons to punish and discipline Malaitans or as 
tools of European domination—headmen, taxation, censusing, sanitary 
regulations, labor on government-sponsored projects (on which thousands 
had recently worked as prisoners), and, of course, government courts. For 
many Malaitans during the 1950s and even after, these remained evocative 
symbols of government as something done not for the people but to them.
As Andersen handed over to Russell in September 1954, he told him that 
disillusionment with the council had produced “a slight resurgence of past 
malpractices in some of the poorer areas” and that “the present form of 
militant political thinking on Malaita will persist until more wealth brings 
higher living standards.” But he warned, “Punitive measures or threats of 
them for political purposes would be a very retrograde step until the gen-
eral outlook changes considerably.”24
Tensions were most notable around taxation and native courts, and a 
brief look at how these developed will illuminate broader patterns in post–
Maasina Rule Malaitan-government relations. The council quickly realized 
that it needed more money to pursue any real agenda, and one of its early 
acts was to increase the tax rate. Andersen had decided to give a low prior-
ity to tax enforcement so as to focus on the economic development that he 
saw as so crucial to both social and political progress. He did urge Malaitans 
to pay, telling them, “Tax is the blood of the Council,” but over the years 
that followed, many did not.25 Few refused outright or declared political 
reasons for defaulting; most instead pleaded poverty. How officers reacted 
to this during the 1950s displays the new, softer approach toward those who 
disobeyed them. One area where few paid was inland Kwaio, which received 
virtually no government services (as has remained the case ever since). Sub-
Inspector Allan Lindley, in charge of Malaita’s police, patrolled the area in 
May 1958, at a time when a tax hike to £2 was planned. In meetings with the 
community and council delegates about the tax, he found himself pitted 
against masters of friendly resistance. His report captures the frustrations 
of tax collection in parts of Malaita during the decade:
There is and has been a great deal of talk about the new tax. The general atti-
tude as far as I could make out, and was told, was that there is not any outright 
refusal to pay out but they say they just do not have the money in the bush. I was 
told at both meetings that they would try hard to pay but only if all the saltwater 
and the remainder of the bush people of Malaita had paid. It was told to me that 
Delegate [Toloasi Teoboo] was only elected to the council last year because he 
went around saying he had worked the custom not to pay the higher tax. . . . It is 
said that a large number of people have not paid their tax (5/-) for last year, not 
because they have not got it but that Delegate Anifelo does not collect it or go 
Gains and Losses 337
round but only fishes. . . . Koio [Kwaio] is crawling with rumors about tax such as: 
if they pay the new tax the B.S.I.P. will become a Colony; that Guadalcanal is £5 
and Malaita will also be that and pigs and gardens will be taxed; all women will 
have to pay tax; that Waiparo and Alic Nonohinimai said they must not pay (a 
statement without foundation to the best of my knowledge). When I asked the 
bush people if they had tried to find work I was met with the answer that the 
wives of married men did not trust them out of Malaita alone (laughter at the 
meeting) and that the single men spent their money on rubbish at stores. I sug-
gested the Baunani Plantation [in west Kwaio] but was told the boss-boy would 
not employ bush people but only saltwater, also that the recruiting ships did not 
stay long enough in one place to allow time for news to come up and them to get 
down. When I suggested that they could “pay” for their tax by working on roads, 
council buildings and so on it was not met with enthusiasm, in other words I was 
met with all manner of excuses. . . . At Fa‘agania . . . the people were troubled by 
the tax saying that they had paid certain monies to [Maasina Rule] and that they 
now wanted that money back to pay the tax. . . . When it was suggested that they 
grow rice it was put to me how could they get it out to the coast.26
Lindley left unsatisfied, but he did not berate the people, and he could not 
have arrested anyone even had he wished to, since there was now no law for 
prosecuting tax violations. Shortly before this, Anderson, disturbed by the 
many defaulters on Malaita, had asked Colin Allan, still in Honiara, what 
he might do about it. Allan assured him that he could arrest them under a 
law that he had used for this purpose during Maasina Rule, and an acting 
legal adviser seemed to concur. Anderson’s doubts were confirmed, how-
ever, when, in 1958, the first four convictions he obtained were quashed. It 
appeared that the government’s tax arrests during Maasina Rule had been 
illegal all along. Anderson feared this legal decision might be “sufficient to 
destroy the slender thread of administrative authority on Malaita.”27 The 
next year a new law was instituted that allowed local councils to take civil 
action against those who flouted the new £2 tax and officers to file crimi-
nal charges if they could show that the defaulter had had the money. But 
the legal procedure involved proved cumbersome for officers, who in any 
case did not have sufficient manpower to chase violators down, particularly 
through the mountains, and the law was too complex for native courts to 
prosecute. Tax collection would remain problematic in the years to come.28
The government also encountered problems with the courts, of a nature 
that will by now be all too familiar to readers. Officers had quickly reinsti-
tuted them across the island. The courts were supposed to apply certain 
government laws and also, under section 12 of the 1953 Native Courts Reg-
ulation, “native custom” and to handle both using English legal procedure 
and rules of evidence.29 Permitting courts to highlight “custom” was crucial 
to gaining Malaitan acceptance of them. Officers’ conception of custom, 
however, was the same as in the past: to be legitimate, a custom had to be 
338 Chapter 9
pre-European in origin. Forewarned by, but still not fully grasping Maasina 
Rule usages of kastom, the government in 1953 tried to shore up the custom 
concept, and a “Native Court Book,” issued under the name of the Malaita 
Council, gave courts guidance for determining whether or not a practice 
qualified: “When Native Courts judge these troubles they must make quite 
sure that they are against a proper native custom and not against a new cus-
tom that has not been going for a long time. The Court can always ask some 
of the old men to come into Court and tell them all about the old customs 
but these old men cannot help to judge cases.” The booklet also warned, 
“Do not let anybody start new customs.”30 The same message was stressed 
in a 1957 instructional book issued to the courts: “The custom which is 
broken must be an old one from before the time Government came to the 
Solomons. It would be no use a Council Member saying that a man who 
did not do what he said was breaking the native custom: Council members 
are a very new thing. Also be careful not to mix up what is in the Bible 
with law and custom. . . . It would be a good thing for Presidents [of courts] 
to write down wrongs in their sub-districts against which there were tabus 
long ago, and to show these to the D.C. or D.O. These should be read out 
in the Council and possibly passed as Resolutions so that they would not 
be forgotten.”31 We have seen the past artificiality and unworkability of this 
custom concept, and the idea that there were living authorities on details of 
pre-European ways was even more fictional in the 1950s. As before, officers 
knew little of indigenous rules or their newness or antiquity.
The results were predictable, again. In many places by mid-1953 few 
disputes were being brought to headmen or the police, and instead they 
were taken to what one government officer referred to as “custom men” to 
settle. Only when one party was dissatisfied did people turn to the govern-
ment—colonial justice was utilized primarily when it suited litigants, drawn 
on more as a power of convenience rather than one to be reckoned with. In 
1954, Russell found only two courts (and “possibly” two others) on Malaita 
were “working within the bounds of natural justice. One cannot say more. It 
is quite certain that not a single case in the other courts and only the excep-
tional case in the better courts would pass the scrutiny of a legal officer on 
review.” By the next year there were 13 courts in operation, but Russell said 
that reporting crimes to the police was “the exception rather than the rule.” 
Most of the southern half of the island, moreover, was “totally unpatrolled.” 
In other words, most native courts were operating much as had most of 
the Maasina Rule legal bodies. But this time no “Operation Delouse” was 
launched. In the realm of law, many Malaitans were getting much of what 
they had wanted.32
The courts were not supposed to judge as custom any crime also cov-
ered by a British law, and they were allowed to impose only limited punish-
ments for custom offenses, which Russell called “petty native affairs.”33 But 
by 1958, Anderson complained the courts were awarding “fabulous com-
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pensations” for violations of “minor ‘custom’ laws,” and Attorney General 
J N Glover bemoaned the “vague and almost unlimited jurisdiction” they 
enjoyed under the Native Courts Regulation. Glover thought their jurisdic-
tion over customs should be limited to customs made into resolutions and 
approved by the high commissioner. This was not done, and a decade later 
“custom offences,” handled mostly as torts, continued to dominate native 
courts. Officers by then believed the courts had much improved, at least in 
their procedures. District Commissioner Richard Turpin in 1967 reported 
Malaita’s 14 native courts heard 1,000 cases annually. He supposed cus-
tom might “cease to be applicable as the people grow away from old ideas 
although judging from many indications received a ‘reversion to custom’ 
may well be possible as a reaction from too much westernization. . . . I con-
sider Government should now accept that native courts should be given a 
full and proper part in the administration of justice and not be regarded 
as a necessary evil until custom, pagans and District Commissioners have 
died out.”34
During the 1950s, the government’s biggest court problems were in 
‘Are‘are. As the Malaita Council absorbed most of the major Maasina Rule 
and Federal Council leaders, Waiparo of Takataka emerged as the key resis-
tance leader across the southern half of the island. His activities set a style 
that would be followed by many other kastom movements across Malaita 
in years that followed. Waiparo was introduced earlier in this book as a 
founding figure of Maasina Rule, and then as an ‘Are‘are leader with links 
to the Federal Council and a rival of Nono‘oohimae and his attempts to 
work with the government.35 Now, under Waiparo’s leadership, ‘Are‘are, 
parts of Small Malaita, and later Kwaio set up a structure of “sub-district 
committees,” conceived as a political and administrative alternative to the 
Malaita Council and to the government generally. These comprised smaller 
committees designated by functions (eg, “Farm Committee,” “Shell Money 
Committee”) similar to those in Maasina Rule. Waiparo was head of his 
area’s “Kastom Committee.” At the center of the committees were alaha, 
and a key part of Waiparo’s message was that they were ‘Are‘are’s legiti-
mate leaders and that the Malaita Council should not be allowed to under-
mine their authority. Areas without traditions of alaha appointed them (eg, 
Kwaio alafa), or “chiefs,” to lead kastom political activities.36
There had been talk of Waiparo, too, becoming a Malaita Council mem-
ber, but as Russell reported in 1955, it was thought that “By association with 
Europeans or the Malaita Council he is likely to have his knowledge con-
taminated by what is not pure Ariari custom.” A trope in kastom discourse is 
that foreign and indigenous knowledges and behaviors are to some degree 
incompatible. This stems partly from Malaitans’ experiences with people 
who gain sophistication or education in foreign ways and thereafter dispar-
age local ones and become alienated from home communities. Some have 
kept their children from schools for this reason. More to the political point 
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here, the fear was that the government might absorb Waiparo as it had 
other resistance leaders, undermining the entire thrust of his kastom mes-
sage advocating autonomy from it. At the same time, a headman informed 
Russell that Waiparo had to approve any Malaita Council plans before 
people would cooperate. “The inference,” Russell concluded, “is that only 
measures consonant with local custom will be given the full publicity that 
the Malaita Council hopes for.”37 The degree to which this activity opposed 
or contested government agendas was left unsaid or explicitly denied, but 
Andersen worried that the committees might try to “usurp the powers of 
the Council,” which, as indicated by Naitoro’s remarks earlier, lacked sup-
port in the south. Waiparo, however, presented the ‘Are‘are movement as 
in no way opposed to the council—it was qualitatively different from and 
parallel to it. He and his people would work on kastom, and the government 
would do its work; there was no reason for argument.38
Kastom was even more prominent in the ‘Are‘are movement’s ideology 
than it had been in Maasina Rule, but now it was couched more in terms of 
preserving “old custom.” Waiparo warned that if kastom was not “straight-
ened out” and codified it would be lost forever. His own sweeping knowl-
edge of Malaitan traditions was widely asserted. Years later many recalled 
him simply as “a man who knew all about kastom” or “the man who woke up 
kastom” after Maasina Rule ended. But although some officers at times took 
this at face value and worried that Waiparo was leading ‘Are‘are backward 
to an obsolete past, the political thrust of his message was unmistakable. He 
and his followers pursued fundamental goals that were also central to Maa-
sina Rule: autonomy, self-determination, and freedom from interference 
in their affairs. Also like Maasina Rule, kastom was particularly important in 
the legal realm, where it was juxtaposed with and unabashedly given prior-
ity over “government law.”39
Waiparo deftly played to the European conception of kastom as “old 
Malaitan custom” and manipulated the ambiguity of the movement’s politi-
cal position when dealing with officers, leaving them unsure of his inten-
tions and without grounds for accusing him of subversive intent. In this 
way he extended the subtle political strategy of ‘Are‘are leaders during the 
early years of Maasina Rule. At an ‘Are‘are meeting in 1955, when Rus-
sell and Malaita Council President Sisili pushed attendees to participate in 
council-run development initiatives, Waiparo responded, “The committees 
were not opposed in principle to progress or new things. But they were con-
centrating on codifying their custom, writing down their genealogies, and 
listing land boundaries. When this work was complete they would decide 
what new things could be admitted without danger to their social structure. 
They were not against planting of cocoa but the older generation were in 
favour of concentrating on subsistence crops. If the younger generation 
wanted new crops let them go ahead.”40 Waiparo’s message here, framed 
in terms of “old custom” and “the older generation” obscured the facts 
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that many of his followers were young; that he was a savvy, modern political 
operator; and that many of the “customs” at issue were fully recognized to 
be contemporary in origin.
When Andersen toured southern Malaita to instruct people on running 
native courts, he thought the ‘Are‘are bodies were “a little dominated by 
thoughts of ‘Custom’ ” and so persuaded Waiparo and his alaha to sit in on 
his training session. Wrote Andersen, “He had the idea that I should give 
the Court members training about ‘law’ and that he should then give them 
training about ‘Custom.’ My insistence on his being present was something 
of a boomerang as Waeparo produced a parallel in custom for everything 
but dynamiting fish and licensing a firearm.” Though Waiparo late in life 
voiced some approval of the Malaita Council, the ‘Are‘are committees dur-
ing most of the 1950s became in essence its rivals, as did similar groups else-
where on Malaita. Waiparo later talked of generating a united kastom that 
would amalgamate all of Malaita, but, though his influence was widespread, 
this never eventuated in any formal sense, and since Maasina Rule, kastom 
movements have been mostly local or regional in scale. Nonetheless, kastom 
remains an idea that can at times unite Malaitans as a single people with a 
common outlook, particularly when they interact with non-Malaitans. The 
bonds that formed during Maasina Rule have never fully disappeared.41
This was the template for much of the kastom political activity on Malaita 
over the decades to come as movements came and went, some existing 
briefly, others for decades, still others from time to time changing their 
names but little else. I will not address these later movements in this book, 
but to take just one moment in time, in 1968 a Honiara conference dis-
cussed “custom movements on Malaita,” attended by a representative of 
the “Special Branch,” which was investigating them. Their brief listed ongo-
ing movements as the “Political Condition Movement” in Baegu, Baelelea, 
Fataleka, and Lau; the “Gwanataru Bush Landowners Custom Committees” 
in west Baegu and west Fataleka; the “Fataleka Bush Landowners”; the 
“Fifi‘i Custom Movement” in east Kwaio; “Olofimae’s Custom Committee” 
in Kwarekwareo; Timothy Bobongi and Sade Maeli’s movement on Kwaloai 
island in Lau; “Dausabea’s Malaita Landowners” in Kwara‘ae; and the 
“Maroupaina Committee” in east ‘Are‘are. There were others as well, and 
officers worried they might coalesce and noted that several Malaita Council 
members were prominent in them.42 In some cases, the movements were 
a means for council members to mediate their relationships with the gov-
ernment and their people. Most kastom movements, like Waiparo’s, have 
not portrayed themselves as against the government, but all have to some 
degree been presented as alternatives to it and as a means to interact with 
it from a position of autonomy and equality. All have been at pains to con-
trast their kastom platforms with the policies of the government, though 
they have sometimes urged the government to adopt their agendas as being 
more fitting for Malaitans.
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In this way, many rural Malaitans distinguish their polities from a govern-
ment they continue to view as an external entity that cares little about their 
welfare. This feeling of separation in some ways deepened after Maasina 
Rule, both during and after the colonial period, as money, development, 
and investment were concentrated in Honiara, and as endless official dis-
cussions of and plans for decentralization or devolution of power came to 
naught. The state was not prepared to allow “chiefs” or other rural lead-
ers a significant role in governance. In the decades since Solomon Islands’ 
independence in 1978, rural alienation has been further and increasingly 
aggravated by the corruption widespread among elected and other govern-
ment officials. I once watched a politician’s representative carefully oversee 
distribution of small bribes to each of a community’s men before a parlia-
mentary election, and afterward I listened to recipients bemoan the lack of 
a “real government” that would offer them something more. When I asked 
why they took the money, one man quickly answered, to general agree-
ment, “What else will we ever get from government?” I have heard elderly 
Maasina Rule veterans observe that, whatever their faults, at least colonial 
officers were honest and hard working, unlike government men today.
The ongoing estrangement many Malaitans feel from the state, for bet-
ter and worse, is in part a legacy of Maasina Rule. Just as Cameron and 
Russell more than six decades ago warned might happen, the years of sup-
pression forever altered Malaitan attitudes toward politics and the state, 
and the clock cannot be turned back. During those years, Maasina Rule’s 
political ideology congealed as an integral feature of rural Malaitans’ world-
views, particularly the refusal to surrender autonomy and direction of their 
affairs to the state and its laws, programs, and “foreign” ways of thinking.43
Many young people have told me that they still follow this creed because “It 
is what our fathers taught us,” often accompanied by descriptions of dan-
gers that government presents to society. Today this perspective permeates 
political thought and activity in much of rural Malaita, and many Malaitan 
communities in Honiara, though it often competes with or is contextually 
overridden by desires for “development” and opportunity, or for the indi-
vidualism of the capitalist economy. The ideology itself is referred to as 
kastom. Kastom in this usage is not an anachronistic longing for the past, or 
an attempt to preserve or revive lost traditions per se, but rather a modern 
and evolving political philosophy born from the colonial and postcolonial 
experience. Kastom on Malaita is deeply rooted in a long, common history 
of resistance to domination and exploitation, and shared recognition of the 
social costs of wholesale embrace of “modern” ethics and behaviors.
I have in this book given considerable attention to colonial conflations 
of kastom and “custom,” and how these so often confused Europeans as 
to what Malaitans were saying and seeking. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
anthropologists and historians established a large and productive body of 
work on “custom” in Melanesia. It generated many insights and greatly influ-
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enced my own thinking. But despite this literature’s contributions, readers 
familiar with it cannot but have noticed similarities between the colonial 
confusions of custom and kastom and the way many scholars conflated 
kastom and “culture.” Anthropologists often relied on a commonsensical 
understanding of the term and its origins, frequently expressed in a simple 
etymological aside: “kastom (from the English ‘custom’),” prefacing an ahis-
torical analysis. Not only did this oversimplify but, left by itself, it could 
also distort the concept’s history and meanings. Anthropologists writing 
on “custom movements” generally saw “culture,” or “custom,” as the focal 
meaning of kastom, and they were understandably interested in exploring 
how “culture” was politicized. This is a legitimate question, but for Malai-
tans, the focal meanings of kastom have always been modern, political ones, 
which they sometimes—and sometimes not—“culturize” by linking them 
to specific Malaitan traditions. Even when Malaitans use kastom in ways that 
seem to more closely resemble “custom” or “culture” (including sometimes 
in recent years with a usage of kalsa or “culture”), it almost always carries a 
contemporary political subtext or framing.
This false conflation prompted anthropologists to sometimes ask ques-
tions that led to analytical dead ends: Was this or that aspect of kastom “real 
culture,” or was it a “spurious,” “manipulated,” or “invented tradition”? Why 
did Christians who openly renounced ancestral ways still organize them-
selves around kastom, sometimes allied with non-Christians, who were “still 
living kastom”? How, given the tremendous cultural diversity of Melanesians, 
could they possibly use kastom as a shared symbol for overarching identi-
ties, and did this not mean that for such purposes kastom had to remain 
semantically empty?44 For Malaita, these questions become moot, or at least 
simplistic, with the understanding of kastom as a political ideology rooted 
more in shared historical experiences and ongoing political realities than 
in any common commitment to specific past cultural ways. Kastom was not a 
synonym for or often even about “culture” in the anthropological sense of 
the concept at that time.
This is not to argue, of course, that kastom is never used as a gloss for “tra-
ditions” in the European sense (particularly moral values attributed to the 
past), that it is somehow acultural, or that it does not become intertwined 
with and shaped by local cultures. I have elsewhere published detailed anal-
yses of how the latter can occur, and how kastom ideology is significantly 
changing religious practice in the Kwaio area on Malaita where I work, and 
I would be surprised if broadly similar processes are not ongoing elsewhere. 
In places where kastom has for decades been a central aspect of local life, 
it has become part of what Marshall Sahlins called people’s “culturally spe-
cific modes of change.” I also do not wish to be reductionist; kastom is an 
extremely polysemic and dynamic term, and Melanesians have employed 
nearly as many usages of it as anthropologists have of “culture.” Not only 
are its meanings contextual, but they also vary greatly from place to place 
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and over time. For example, kastom’s meanings on Malaita differ in many 
ways from those found in Vanuatu, where it has a very different political 
history and where the government has more successfully brought kastom 
within its outlook and policies than has the Solomons state. Even in other 
parts of the Solomons, kastom can mean very different things than it does 
on Malaita, particularly in places where Maasina Rule never took hold. One 
weaker aspect of the anthropological kastom literature was that its overarch-
ing analyses of “kastom in Melanesia” were often insufficiently attentive to 
the great diversity in the concept’s meanings across the region.45
Today many Solomon Islanders besides Malaitans express hostility toward 
their government, but it is on Malaita that alienation has been most steady 
and enduring. There, in recent years, some kastom groups have loudly cri-
tiqued the government’s shortcomings such as its corruption and disre-
gard for rural areas, the hoarding of power and resources in Honiara, and 
the obvious declines in the country’s economy and infrastructure. Their 
message to the state today is often a complaint of abandonment and mal-
feasance rather than a vow to defy its control—gross neglect is difficult to 
“resist.”46 But enduring anger and resentment toward government is always 
close to the surface. This facet of Malaitan kastom ideology differentiates it 
from kastom applied as a less contentious mediation of old and new ways or 
as a more subtle form of politico-economic enclavement (though kastom 
has also played those roles on Malaita).47
For most Malaitans, kastom has never lost its grounding as a challenge 
to the government, and this theme has in recent years moved to the fore 
as anger at the Solomon Islands state has grown. Shared discontent in the 
late 1980s and 1990s inspired normally rival Malaitan groups to undertake 
coordinated actions on Honiara’s streets to demand compensation from 
the central state, and then more tragically during the political crisis at 
the century’s turn to intimidate the government and drain its coffers with 
militant actions and compensation claims.48 It is within these scenarios of 
dissatisfaction and rebellion that various government officials have most 
blatantly attempted to harness kastom sentiments to their own interests, par-
ticularly through the historically and politically evocative act of compensa-
tion claims. In doing so, they try to tap into not indigenous “culture” in the 
older anthropological sense but rather kastom’s political, ideological force. 
Because most politicians are unwilling to delegate real political power to 
rural peoples and many hold them in low regard or even contempt as politi-
cal actors, it should surprise no one that their evocations of kastom are often 
manipulative and trivializing—they are, after all, self-serving politicians. 
The militant actions of the late 1990s and early 2000s were in some cases 
thuggery and extortion, but many militants had political motivations. To 
frame these events merely as state representatives attempting to manipulate 
“culture” or “custom” obscures the political meanings kastom has acquired 
over the past 60-plus years (particularly regarding law and compensation). 
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Furthermore, as Matthew G Allen has shown in a recent study, if we per-
ceive politicians as simply stage-managing these activities, as manipulating 
ignorant, rank-and-file Malaitans, we make the same fundamental error as 
did British officers who analyzed Maasina Rule in the same terms. Many 
Malaitan (and Guadalcanal) former militants gave Allen heartfelt kastom-
linked explanations for why they acted as they did, sometimes while dispar-
aging their leaders. Of course many other Malaitans, and even some of the 
militants, viewed the tragic aspects of these events with as much dismay as 
did other Solomon Islanders.49
Despite the perseverance of kastom ideas and anger at politicians, few 
Malaitans want to bring down “the government” per se (as opposed to par-
ticular politicians), and kastom movements since Maasina Rule have typi-
cally not sought this. Like so many Solomon Islanders, most just want a 
better government, though few are optimistic for the future. My late friend 
Ma‘aanamae, who grew up in the hamlet of Basiana, the man who blud-
geoned Officer William Bell’s skull with a rifle barrel, was a veteran of more 
than a half century of kastom political actions. When my father visited me 
in Kwaio many years ago, friends performed for him a five-hour ancestral 
chant about the killing of Bell and its aftermath, and in the middle of the 
concert Ma‘aanamae made a formal speech and asked me to translate it for 
my father. In it he employed the events of 1927 as a metaphor to express 
how many Malaitans view the enduring relationship between kastom and 
gafamanu:
Officer Bell was killed because he tried to bring his own law here and use it to 
put an end to kastom law. Then government came again and arrested Basiana 
and others who killed and took them away and hanged them. The government 
wanted kastom to be finished. And Basiana, he wanted the government to be 
finished. That is what the two of them were thinking, and that is why they killed 
each other, why they took Basiana and hanged him. But how is kastom going to 
be finished? It is still here today. And the law, even though they killed Mister Bell, 
how is it going to be finished? It’s still here. So although the law stands today, so, 
too, does kastom stand today. They wanted to finish it. But no!
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Introduction
1. My oral historical accounts and knowledge of Malaitan cultures are biased 
toward Malaita’s midsection because I have spent most of my time in the Solomons 
(something over five years) in the Kwaio area, and anthropologist Roger Keesing 
also produced a body of work on Kwaio that is relevant to this book. Furthermore, 
the best data I have from elsewhere were collected in neighboring Kwara‘ae by 
anthropologist Ben Burt, who has generously made material available to me. To bal-
ance this somewhat, there is less archival material about Kwaio than other parts of 
Malaita, particularly about the inland areas where most Kwaio lived during the years 
covered here. I am writing another book that is a more cultural analysis of kastom 
ideas, practices, and history, particularly with regard to Kwaio women (Akin nd).
2. In places I include with Malaita the island of Ulawa, which, partly due to close 
cultural and historical links with south Malaita, in late 1947 was for a time made part 
of Malaita District. Naitoro discussed a conception in ‘Are‘are in southern Malaita 
of “greater ‘Are‘are” as including western Makira, east Guadalcanal, Ulawa, and 
the Three Sisters islands to Ulawa’s south (1993, 26–28). Readers seeking historical 
information on the Solomons as a whole can start with fine studies such as Bennett 
1987 for socioeconomic history; Laracy 1976, Hilliard 1969 and 1978, and O’Brien 
1995 on Christian missions; and Lindstrom and White 1990 on World War II. On 
the Queensland and Fiji labor trades, see Corris 1973b and Moore 1985, among 
many other detailed analyses.
3. Said 1979; Cohn 1996; Dirks 1996, ix, passim; Ballantyne and Burton 2005. 
For a good overview of debates over colonial knowledge, see Ballantyne 2008. Bani-
vanua-Mar has coined the term “Melanesianism” for the distinctive Orientalism 
applied to the Western Pacific, which emphasized Islander savagery, violence, can-
nibalism, and the like (2007); Malaitan peoples were often portrayed as epitomizing 
these traits.
4. Cohn 1996, 16; Dirks 2001, chap 3, passim.
5. Guha 1989; Irschick 1994; Thomas 1994, 15–16; Cohn 1996, 21–22, passim; 
Trautmann 1997, 135–136, 217–222; 1999, 44, passim; 2009; Peabody 2001; Wag-
oner 2003; Newbury 2003; Pierce 2006; see also Breckenridge and van der Veer 
1993; Mir 2010.
6. Thomas 1994, x; see also Thomas 1992a.
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7. From 1921–1928, the resident commissioner was Richard Kane, who arrived 
from Fiji, where schemes of indirect rule had been in place since the nineteenth 
century (see Kaplan 1989, 1995; Thomas 1990, 1994). We will see that Kane wanted 
to develop similar policies in the Solomons but was frustrated, particularly on 
Malaita. On broad imperial models applied to colonized people, especially those 
who resisted, see Stoler and Cooper 1997, 13–14, and Goh 2007. For the conveyance 
of administrative models and legal codes from India to African and other colonies, 
including as carried by transferred officials, see Metcalf 2007, chap 1. Influences of 
these models and codes are perceptible in the Solomons, but they came indirectly, 
filtered through African colonies.
8. Steinmetz 2003, 42.
9. Hogbin was the only professionally trained anthropologist to work on Malaita 
until the 1960s. Ivens published excellent linguistic (1918, 1921, 1929, 1932/1934) 
and ethnographic studies (1928a, and esp 1972; see also Fox 1925; Hopkins 1928; 
Codrington 1969). Hogbin in 1933 began advocating establishment of native courts 
and councils, and after the war he advised the government on reinstituting them 
and on how to contend with rising political discontent (see this book, chapters 
3 and 4). Later, Officer Tom Russell published a good paper in Oceania (1950a). 
Cadet Cyril Belshaw (who did not work on Malaita) became a well-known anthro-
pologist. I discuss aspects of Belshaw’s work and writings by Officer Colin Allan later 
in this book.
10. See Stoler and Cooper 1997, 7–8.
11. For the broader context of this confusion, including interconnections 
between anthropological and colonial modes of analysis, see Johannes Fabian’s 
seminal critique of anthropology made at the time much of the literature on kastom 
was being published (1983).
12. Im Thurn 1922: xvii; Roberts 1927, 154; Barrow nd, part 3, 55.
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1. For studies of the labor trade, begin with Scarr 1967, 1970; Corris 1973b; Saun-
ders 1980, 1982; Bennett 1987; Shineberg 1999; Banivanua-Mar 2007; re Malaita, 
see esp Moore 1985. For recruiting voyage accounts, see Rannie 1912; Dickinson 
1927; Cromar 1935; Giles 1968; Melvin 1977; Palmer 1973; Philp 1978; Wawn 1973.
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5. Woodford 1897a; Mahaffy 1902; Edge-Partington 1910a; Northam 1913, 6; 
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Fox expounded cultural fatigue and substitution ideas well into the 1960s (1967, 
47–49).
86. Some anthropologists supported indirect rule policies as a means to mini-
mize disruption of colonized societies (see, eg, Roberts 1927, section 4; Mair 1936; 
Malinowski 1945, 138–150; 1961, 466; Horton 1965, 14; Porter 1975, 292–293; see 
also Bertram 1930, 92; Bodley 1982, 81).
87. Bengough 1936a, 3–4.
88. Sandars 1938b. Ashley cited in Bennett 1987, 237–238.
89. Barrow nd, part 3, 55; see BSIP 1940a.
90. That this project might have influenced Maasina Rule was first noted in pass-
ing by Keesing (1978a, 47), apparently as suggested by Ian Frazer. See also the mas-
ter’s thesis by Frazer’s student, Naitoro (1993).
91. MAR 1931, 5; Hogbin 1934, 263; see Bell 1922b; Ivens 1927; Sydney Herald 
1933; Lambert 1934b, 8. In 1925, Bell had noted that all Malaitans were “retain-
ing their virility” except those “northwest of the Maramasike Passage” (MAR 1925). 
Fowler, who served under Barley, referred to the “apathetic, zestless and declining 
people of Ariari” (1936, 3). The BSIP Annual Report of 1936 gives statistics showing 
overall births significantly outpacing deaths for 1934, 1935, and 1936, despite high 
influenza tolls in 1936, but provides no Malaita-specific numbers (AR 1936, 6).
92. Barley writing in MAR 1931, 3; MQR June 1931; and Lambert 1933, 3 June; 
1934a; 1934b, 8; and 1941, 330, based on talks with Barley; see Fox 1925, 7; MAR 
1930, 25; 1950, 2; Innes 1938, 8.
93. Ashley 1929b, 9; MAR 1929, 1930, 1931; MQR June 1930, March 1931, June 
1931; Barley 1931a, 1931b; Fletcher 1932.
94. MQR June 1931; Barley 1931b; Horton 1965, 97; Lasaqa 1972, 295; see MAR 
1931, 4; Chinnery 1932.
95. MAR 1929; Lambert 1934a, 31–33; Innes 1938, 23; Ashley 1934; 1935b; see 
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Allan 1949c, 19. Barley on Makira had set penalties of 10 shillings or a month in jail 
for failure to report births, deaths, or marriages to salaried “district chiefs” (1920). 
Malaita’s 1931 census counted only 603 boys and 285 girls between the ages of 6 and 
16, of an estimated 40,067 total people (Lambert 1934a, 32). Though the census 
spawned repopulation efforts throughout south Malaita, only on Small Malaita did 
it indicate a significant sex imbalance (Barley 1931b). In 1937, tax lists led Sandars 
to greatly undercount mountain populations even in more accessible north Malaita 
(Innes 1938, 8, 23). Counting problems continued for decades. In mid-1947, 
when very few Malaitans were abroad, Sandars found at ‘Oloburi and neighboring 
Maanawai in ‘Are‘are that women outnumbered men 371 to 331, and in every age 
category, while at nearby Takataka 336 men outnumbered 258 women, a contrast on 
which he made no comment (1947d). In 1948, citing the still-standing 40,000 num-
ber, Germond wrote, “I submit that this figure is a fiction and that the last census 
does not in any way reflect the true figures,” and, “How many . . . hill villages there 
are and how numerous their inhabitants is not known but it is certain that there are 
far more than will be admitted by the headmen” (1948b, annexure A).
96. Bengough 1934, 3, 10, passim; Malaita District 1939b; BSIP 1940a; see SCL 
Nov 1910, 744; May 1937, 68; MQR June 1934; Deck 1937; Naitoro 1993, 38–44, 
54–55; de Coppet 1981, 189–191; ‘Are‘are 2005b. The ‘Are‘are word houra or houraa 
(Sa‘a houlaa, Kwaio foulaa) literally means fame, renown, and prestige—what par-
ticipants seek for their groups and their leaders (Geerts 1970, 38; Ivens 1972, 100, 
160). Charles Fox was a rare European who appreciated the value of feasts, writing, 
“European influence has been against these feasts, condemning them as a heathen 
custom, a waste of time, and so on. The people’s time would be better given to 
making copra. But our Church helped to keep them, by and large, turning them in 
some islands into Christian festivals” (1962, 55; see Hogbin 1970, 214–216). Ivens 
1972, chapter 7, summarizes types of feasts in the Sa‘a area of neighboring Small 
Malaita. One of Deck’s SSEM teachers, Hamuel Hoahania, compiled a list of 17 
negative effects of houraa and said that current practice was not true custom. Deck 
submitted the list to Sandars (Deck 1937).
97. See Bennett 1987, 275; Akin 1999, 124–126; cf Naitoro 1993, 76.
98. MQR March 1941, 2; see MQR Oct 1934; Deck 1937; Bengough 1941b.
99. Marchant quoted from Malaita District 1939b.
100. BSIP 1947e, 54, 60. Even in 1957, District Commissioner W St G Anderson 
was telling Malaitans that until brideprice had been reduced to the “absolute mini-
mum . . . your country will be unable to develop its natural resources” (1957b).
101. See, eg, Ashley 1932b; White 1932b; Deck 1932, 1948c; Sandars 1937a, 
1938b; Bengough 1940a; MAR 1941, 3; Germond 1948f. Allan later wrote that on 
Malaita, “Failure of the District Officer to conform to the ‘Mission Line’ in mat-
ters of marriage dispute, illicit fornication disputes, divorce, feasting, bride price, 
the authority of teachers, and the such like would result often in threats from the 
worthy heads of the mission like the Decks, that pressure would be brought to bear 
and the wretched young man would lose his job. The mission authorities through 
the Young family who ran the Malaita Company . . . had direct and powerful access to 
the High Commissioner and to the Colonial Office. Often the wretched young man 
would have to comply” (1951b, 7). There is no truth in this. Allan loathed the SSEM.
102. Sandars 1938b; Hogbin 1970, 211–212. More than once young men, on 
hearing such explanations for bachelorhood, have whispered to me with a smile, 
“The real reason he didn’t get married is that he was afraid of vaginas.”
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MQR June 1939; June 1941, 22; Malaita District 1941a, 22 May and 18 July; Sandars 
1943b; Allan 1950a, 77; Bennett 1987, 275; cf Fox 1962, 55.
104. Bengough 1941b, 1. Naitoro summarized aspects of the Haumatana project 
and gives a table of government population figures 1934–1940 (1993, 76–83). He 
argued that the further decline was likely due more to a severe 1936–1937 flu epi-
demic than to the cultural practices Bengough blamed. This west ‘Are‘are area still 
has one of Malaita’s lowest population densities. Cadets in charge at Haumatana 
were Martin Clemens (Feb–July 1940), Michael Forster (Oct 1940–March 1941), 
and David Trench (touring May and July 1941). Native Medical Practitioner Geof-
frey Kuper was there July 1940–July 1941, except when Guso Rato Piko relieved him 
from December to March. Later, Jock Beveridge was the agricultural officer. Plans 
for a second “central camp” inland along the “road” to Takataka never materialized 
(Marchant 1940b; Bengough 1941b). Piko was from Choiseul and in 1936 had grad-
uated from Suva training and taken over ‘Aoke’s hospital. He later carried ‘Are‘are 
project ideas to Santa Cruz, where, when war came, the district officer left him in 
charge of Nidu. Piko there imposed rules including slashing brideprice and abol-
ishing sexual compensation. Apparently against his wishes, people took his ideas 
further as “Guso’s New Law,” a fuller rejection of marriage and sexual rules, which 
sparked copulatory abandon in places. When Bill Davenport and I compared notes, 
we realized that the Haumatana project was thus an antecedent of not only Maasina 
Rule but also the Santa Cruz movement (see Innes 1938; Davenport 1970, 1989).
105. Bengough 1941b, 2.
106. Marchant 1940a; MQR March 1941; Bengough 1941b, 3, 7; and see Ben-
gough 1939a, 6.
107. Thomas 1990, 164–167; 1994, 120–122; Scott 1998, 1. On nucleated villages, 
see Ivens 1918, 191; Campbell 1918, 42; Kane 1923b; AR 1933, 7; Deck 1948c; Chap-
man and Pirie 1974, 236–240; Nelson 1982, 37–38; Bennett 1987, 112; Scott 2007, 
chap 2. On Melanesians’ fleeting residence in them, see Barley 1921, 2; Thurnwald 
1936, 351–352; Eastern District Annual Report 12 Jan 1945, 3; Oliver 1967, 15–17; 
Thomas 1994, 122; Tedder 2008, 79.
108. Marchant 1940b; Bengough 1941b; MQR March 1941; Clemens 1988; 1992 
pers comm.
109. MAR 1925 (cf MQR June 1931); Garvey quoted in Knox-Mawer 1986, 61; 
various Kwaio personal communications; see Bengough 1938b; Sandars nd, 113–
116; Keesing and Corris 1980, 103. For a broader discussion of the problems that 
fluid systems of personal naming have historically caused political regimes, and 
attempts to impose legibility through standardized naming practices, see Scott 
1998, 64–71.
110. Bengough 1939a, 5, 6; 1941b; see Colley 1940; Deck 1948c.
111. Bengough 1934; Deck 1940; Luke 1945b, 90; Forster 1946c, 4; Laracy 1983, 
18; Fifi‘i 1989, 62; Clemens 1992 pers comm; Davies nd, 72. Fifty years later, Cle-
mens asserted that he, not Bengough, deserved the major credit for the ‘Are‘are 
project, adding, “I believe I was really responsible for Marching Rule as I made them 
stand up and do something for themselves” (1988; see also Clemens 1998). Decades 
after, Davies wrote, weirdly, that in the mid-1940s Hoasihau was virtually alone in 
being concerned about Malaitans’ future (nd, 72).
112. Malaita District 1941a, 17 July; Sandars 1943b; MAR 1944, 5; Forster 1946c, 
6; Naitoro 1993, 75; ‘Are‘are 2005b, 3; Davies nd, 72. Davies asserted that Sandars 
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later banned houraa completely, due to a brawl at one (nd, 308). The partially fin-
ished roads were completed in 1964 as part of a cocoa-farming endeavor (Naitoro 
1993, 123). On 24 July 1943, Bengough, while acting resident commissioner, was 
killed at age 36 when Japanese Zeros downed a plane he was aboard as a Defense 
Force observer over the Western Solomons (Cooper 1946, 56; Homewood 2005).
113. See Isabel Annual Report 1941; Trench 1941; Wright 1941; Barrow nd, part 
3, 22.
114. Marchant 1940b; BSIP 1941; [1947f?]; Kennedy 1967, 5; Campbell 1978, 
286; Bennett 1987, 281–282. Hogbin later (1946, 38) said these early bodies were 
modeled on his proposals in Experiments in Civilization (1970), but I found no refer-
ence to that book in relevant government records, and councils were started in the 
second quarter of 1939, the year it was first published. He did influence the process, 
however (see Trench 1943; Hogbin 1944, 1945; Allan 1960, 161).
115. Malaita District [1941b?]; MQRs June 1939, March and June 1940, and 
March, June, Sept 1941; MAR 1941, 2–3; BSIP [1947f?]; Marchant 1940b, 7; Hogbin 
1946, 38, 65. In mid-1940, Marchant asked Officer Donald Kennedy to design an 
experimental native administration scheme on Gela to respond to “passive resis-
tance to Government,” likely referring to Fallowes’s meetings and discontents in 
their wake. In 1941, Kennedy initiated a structure of courts (with power only to refer 
cases to district officers) and village delegates who attended meetings presided over 
by headmen. Kennedy later said “enthusiasm was remarkable,” and he blamed war-
time discontent on Gela on officers Sandars and Forster—posted there for a time—
having failed to revive his program. He linked his project to Maasina Rule since 
Tulagi policemen from Malaita and Guadalcanal participated in it. Kennedy even 
proposed that the name “Maasina Rule” derived from his having called his initiative 
“Marchant’s Rule” when meeting with disgruntled Gela people in early 1944 (1967, 
3, 6–9). Brian Murdoch later published an article about Kennedy’s claim and, like 
Kennedy, exaggerated the Gela scheme’s relevance to Maasina Rule’s origins, if 
indeed it had any (1980).
116. MQRs June 1939, June 1940, and March, June, Sept 1941; Bengough 
1940a, 1941a, 1941b; MAR 1941, 2; see Clemens 1941; Campbell 1978, 287; White 
1991, 199.
117. Marchant 1940a; MAR 1940, 6; MQRs June 1940, March 1941; BSIP 1941; 
Bengough 1941a; Sandars 1941a.
118. Bengough 1941a, 2; see Forster 1946c, 12; A Sandars 1950, 14, 16–17.
119. Bengough 1941a, 2–3.
120. Marchant 1942a; BSIP 1942b, 1943a; Campbell 1978, 286.
121. Hogbin 1946, 65.
Chapter 4: The Wartime Opening
1. Malaita saw scattered fighting incidents. A week before the US invasion, a 
boatload of Japanese soldiers raided ‘Aoke, purloined a still-warm ham from Ben-
gough’s breakfast plate (a crime for which it was said he never forgave Japan), 
and defecated on his table. While Bengough, clerk Alec Maena, sergeants Sau and 
Irofiala, and Tome Toloasi Teoboo watched with binoculars from atop a hill, the 
Japanese used sign language to direct 26 Langalanga men, under Sale “One-Arm” 
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Fotarafa (or ‘Abakomu), to carry loot to their ship. To the bemusement of these sea-
soned stevedores, the Japanese rewarded them with a sea biscuit for each box car-
ried. Maena took down the men’s names and Bengough later had them imprisoned. 
Japanese also looted Anglican Fauaabu hospital (Marchant 1942–1943, 31 July 1942; 
Baddeley 1943; Fox 1962, 122; Teoboo 1982 pers comm to author and Kathleen Gil-
logly; Osifelo 1985, 21; Waleanisia 1987; Fifi‘i 1989, 45; see White 1989, 56–57). On 
7 August, US planes bombed Laulasi and Fo‘odo islands in the Langalanga Lagoon, 
killing as many as 30 people (including 19 women and children) and destroying a 
shell money mint. The attack was due to navigational error, but many Langalanga 
today still believe it was punishment for their men having carried those boxes for 
the Japanese, and since the 1950s they have been calling for government compensa-
tion for the attack. In the 1980s, the Laulasi Cultural Committee demanded SI$14.7 
million from the British government, which they claimed had received US repara-
tions but kept the money. The SSEM’s Joan Deck detected the hand of God in 
ancestral Laulasi being bombed rather than a nearby Christian island, but that same 
day the SSEM launch Arosi was bombed at Onepusu. The SSEM’s Robert Vance 
said US bomber pilots told him, “They were given to believe that there was no one 
on Malaita . . . apart from ‘Nips’ and cannibals” (Bentley 1944b; J Deck [1943?], 3; 
WPHC 1943; Vance 1945, 9; Laracy 1988 pers comm; 1988a, 24; Guo 2001, 98–100; 
see Marchant 1942–1943, 13 Aug 1942; Anderson 1958b; Solomon Islands Broad-
casting 1987; Waleanisia 1987; Laracy 1988a, 24; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 1989, 
370; Fifi‘i 1991, 44). At Afufu on 5 November 1942, people of Malu‘u and Fo‘odo 
led police and US Marines to wipe out a Japanese observation post that had been 
there since July, and Headman Maekali hunted down and killed three Japanese 
who escaped (Bentley 1944a; Fox 1962, 123–124; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 1989, 
358–359; Fifi‘i 1989, 45–46; Clemens 1998, 232; see Akin 1993, 407). Later, a US 
bombing at Uru in Kwaio killed the man Diki in his canoe, after people had play-
fully pointed sticks like rifles at the plane. Everyone there fled to the mountains 
(Noel 1944a; NIV Sept 1944, 4; Saelasi Lounga 1987 pers comm; Riufaa 1996 pers 
comm). Malaitans watched spectacular nighttime displays of firepower from Gua-
dalcanal and sea battles, and people decades later recalled the war as “the time 
when planes filled the sky like whiskered tree swiftlets,” a metaphor later used to 
describe an apocalyptic war that some feared would follow campaigns to suppress 
Maasina Rule (see this book, chapter 7). The 1st Fijian Commando unit trained 200 
Solomon Islands Defence Force men at Baunani on the west coast of ‘Are‘are in 
early 1943 (Trench 1956, 260; Ravuvu 1974, 32).
2. BSIP 1943d; Forster 1946c, 3; see Laracy and White 1988, appendix A; Laracy 
1988a, 19.
3. On the Solomons conflict and its larger context, see several works and col-
lections edited by Geoffrey White and Lamont Lindstrom; Laracy 1988a; and Ben-
nett 1987, chap 13. For the war’s impacts on neighboring New Guinea, start with 
Read 1947; Wolfers 1972, 107–112; and Nelson 1980; 1982, 171–173, chap 22. In 
the 1980s, Hawai‘i’s East-West Center ran a project to study Pacific Islanders’ war-
time experiences, directed by White and Lindstrom, which published many oral 
accounts (eg, Laracy and White 1988; White and Lindstrom 1989; Lindstrom and 
White 1990). The British Colonial Office published an “Official Story” of the war 
in the Solomons and Gilberts, by Public Relations Officer Harold Cooper, con-
taining much false propaganda but also useful information. A theme was that all 
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Solomon Islanders had displayed undying loyalty toward the colonials: “These back-
ward people, clutching the humblest hem of the democratic heritage, could not 
be persuaded to loose their hold” (Cooper 1946, 30; see PIM 1943; PIM Oct 1950, 
101). This idea was dear to many hearts, and in 1948 Resident Commissioner Noel 
pointed to it as a vindication of prewar “native policy” (1948a, 2; see Allan 1950a, 
78). In 1988, White and others published The Big Death, a collection of Solomon 
Islander oral histories of the war often critical of behaviors of some officers. Former 
officers in letters berated its translator-editors (myself included) for publishing per-
nicious distortions. Many Islanders did display great loyalty to British officers, some 
with great valor, particularly former policemen who surrounded the “coastwatchers” 
working behind Japanese lines. Nevertheless, as this chapter makes clear, many saw 
in the war an opportunity to resist and reform the colonial system or even expel 
the government. Some war heroes later became resistance leaders, and the govern-
ment canceled the war medal of at least one for that. Some Defense Force veterans 
later refused or returned war gratuities offered them (Marquand 1950, 40; George 
Maelalo 1987 pers comm).
4. See Deck 1942a; Baddeley 1943; Feldt 1946; Trench 1956; Lasaqa 1972, 45; 
Lord 1977; Rhoades 1982; Bennett 1987, 288–290; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988; Gegeo 
and Watson-Gegeo 1989, 358; Laracy 1988b; Clemens 1998; Barrow nd. Marchant 
later downplayed the hardships of his war experience, including scanty rations at 
Fulisango, but it left him with permanent health problems that forced his departure 
from the Protectorate in May 1943 and an early retirement (Marchant 1943f; Porter 
1949; Teoboo 1982 pers comm to author and Kathleen Gillogly).
5. Tulagi evacuation officer “Spearline” Wilson in a 1942 report recorded his 
disgust as Levers Plantation manager Charles Widdy and companions prepared to 
flee to Australia and told Wilson “they did not care what arrangements the gov-
ernment had made, or might make” (Wilson 1942). Fellow plantation manager 
“Snowy” Rhoades later credited aspects of the evacuation to Widdy’s “organizing 
prowess” (1982, 1). Widdy returned after the US invasion as a second lieutenant 
in the Royal Australian Air Force and took command of the Labour Corps. Most 
Chinese residents were not evacuated but were sent to southern Makira under For-
ster’s supervision. On the evacuation, see Wilson 1942; 1946; Baddeley 1943, 24–25; 
1945, 8; Hogbin 1943c, 5; Fox 1962, 119–120; Bennett 1987, 288; Boutilier 1989, 
332–333; Laracy 1988a, 20–21; Clemens 1992a, 55–57; 1998, 61, 322, 57–70. After 
the fighting, the Adventists pushed to return to the Solomons, and missionary Nor-
man Ferris in mid-1943 met with Sandars in Sydney, and in mid-1944 with Widdy. 
Sandars told Ferris that the Adventists could not return since they had “deserted” 
their flocks, while Widdy told him that the government “appreciated” those mis-
sionaries who had obeyed evacuation orders and would support their bids to return 
(Reye 2006, 50, 52).
6. Clemens 1942, 15 and 17 April; 1992a, 57; see also Clemens 1998, 70, 86, 97; 
Deck 1942a, 5; 1942b, 3; Kennedy reports summarized in Marchant 1942–1943, 6, 
11, and 20 March 1942; Marchant 1942a; Belshaw 1947a, 190; 1949a, 447; Sisili 1949, 
1; Fox 1962, 120; Laracy 1976, 111; 1983, 15; 1988a, 22; Rhoades 1982, 2, 56–57; 
Bennett 1987, 288; Boutilier 1989, 333–335; cf Cooper 1946, 14, 20. Marchant in 
a secret report told London that Australian servicemen started the looting (Laracy 
1988a, 22, 26; see Nelson 1982, 196–197; Clemens 1992a, 57–59). Gela suffered 
some bungling or bullying officers and police before the war (Hogbin 1943c, 2–4; 
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Belshaw 1947a, 189; Kennedy 1944; 1967, 5; Campbell 1978, 292; Butcher 2012). 
Deck said that as the Japanese approached Tulagi, the Burns Philp and Carpenter 
stores were thrown open to locals to take what they wanted (1942a).
7. Klerk 1941–1944, 14 and 21 Jan 1943; BSIP 1942a; 1943d, 5; Bengough 1942; 
Marchant 1942–1943, 3 Nov, 21 and 26 Dec 1942; Hogbin 1943b; Widdy 1943a; San-
dars 1943b; Crass 1947d; Belshaw 1949a, 448; Lord 1977, chap 4; Rhoades 1982, 27, 
58; Bennett 1987, 291; White and others 1988, 177–178; Joseph Pali quoted in Sanga 
1989, 24; Frazer 1990, 195; Clemens 1998, 184; cf Hogbin in Beckett 1989, 28. In 
an extreme case, Belshaw jailed three headmen for discouraging recruiting (Allan 
1989–1990, 70; see Belshaw 1949a, 24; 1950a, 68). He later pushed for conscription 
on Gela after antigovernment sentiments made finding volunteers there “a farce” 
(Belshaw 1945b). Bengough ran SILC recruiting on Malaita; Clemens thought he 
did a terrible job and sent only men seeking material gain (1989; cf Bentley 1944a). 
By mid-1945, there had been over 8,000 recruitments, though many of those were 
reenlistments.
8. Wa‘ii‘a 1987. Some groups walked overland to ‘Aoke, while ships collected 
others. Davies described recruiting and returning procedures at ‘Aoke just before 
SILC recruiting ceased in May 1945 (nd, 48–49).
9. The name came from the US “First Marine Division,” which was gradually 
replaced by the Second Division from the end of 1942 into 1943.
10. MQRs Sept 1939, June 1940; Orite‘elamo 1982 pers comm; Riufaa 1996 pers 
comm; Wa‘ii‘a 1987; see Lansner 1987, 33; Lindstrom and White 1990, 169–170; 
Fifi‘i 1991, 37, 39.
11. Widdy 1942; 1943a; Marchant 1942b; 1943d; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 208; 
White and others 1988; Fifi‘i 1989, 49; 1991, 40–41; Akin 1993, 408; cf Cooper 
1946, 34.
12. A bombing of Tulagi on 4 March wounded six. Soon after, Dikwa of Kwaio 
was killed and several others wounded when a Tulagi ammunition dump exploded, 
purportedly sparked by a discarded cigarette (Fifi‘i 1991, 40; Riufaa 1996 pers 
comm; see Akin 1993, 408).
13. Barrow 1942–1947, part 1, 12; Marchant 1942–1943, 28 Jan–17 Feb 1943; 
1943a; 1943b; 1943d; Widdy 1943a, 1943c, 1943d; Deck 1943, 6; Time 1944; Ngwadili 
and Gafu 1988, 208; Fifi‘i 1989, 49; 1991, 41.
14. BSIP 1943d, 3; Hogbin 1943b; 1943c, 6; Bengough 1943; Klerk 1941–1944, 
13–16 Jan 1943; Widdy 1943b, 1943d, 1943f, 1943g; Deck 1944, 6; Crass 1947b; Fifi‘i 
1982b; 1991, 41; Alaikona 1987, 3, Akin translation from his Pijin; see Trench 1956, 
233; White and others 1988, 130–131, 199; Clemens 1998, 169, 290–291; Davies nd, 
34, 48.
15. Bengough 1942; 1943; Widdy 1943b, 1943c, 1943d, 1943f, 1943g, 1943h; 
Marchant 1943a; 1943c; Fifi‘i 1982b; 1987 pers comm; 1991, 41–42. Widdy told 
Marchant they had to grant a demand for Sundays off since a US officer in charge 
of labor had promised it (Widdy 1943b, 1943c; Marchant 1943c). Fifi‘i said some 
Kwaio talked of killing British SILC officers, but that he dissuaded them (1988 pers 
comm; 1991, 43; see Rhoades 1982, 19). The government’s official history lauded 
Solomon Islanders as “reluctant to accept wages” (Cooper 1946, 35; see Luke 1945a, 
68), much as Resident Commissioner Noel later told the Advisory Council that dur-
ing the Depression Islanders had “realized the situation and accepted lower wages” 
(BSIP 1945–1949, 22 Nov 1945).
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16. BSIP 1942a; Widdy 1943b; Marchant 1943e; cf Trench 1956, 233. Accord-
ing to Ian Frazer, SILC officers prosecuted 783 disciplinary actions, three-quarters 
for “disobedience or insubordination,” but he provided no breakdown by year 
(1990, 196).
17. Widdy 1943b; 1943d; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 209; see Noel 1946b, 1; Fifi‘i 
1989, 51–53; Russell 2003, 40–41.
18. Many Gela houses had been destroyed in the war. Hopkins 1934, 36; Belshaw 
1949a, 340; 1950a, appendix 2, 69n; Keesing 1978a, 65; Ma‘aanamae 1982 and 1987 
pers comm; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988.
19. Bowman 1946, 427–431; Lasaqa 1972, 45–49; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 205, 
211; see Burt and Kwa‘ioloa 1991, 97. A 1945 aerial photo of Honiara is in B.S.I.P. 
News Sheet 6, 31 March 1969, 1. The main farm was at Ilu, about 20 kilometers from 
the center of present-day Honiara.
20. See Holton 1945; Lindstrom 1981, 104; Lindstrom and White 1990, 77; 
Frazer 1990, 196; cf Sandars nd, 79. In places, “native trading posts” were erected 
where soldiers bought curios. So lucrative was the business that Americans, espe-
cially “Seabees,” began manufacturing “native artifacts” to market to greenhorn sail-
ors off ships. One Australian veteran told Michael Quinnell of fights on Bougain-
ville between Yank and Aussie entrepreneurs over art-marketing territory (Quinnell 
2003 pers comm). On the art trade, see BSIP 1942a; Hogbin 1943a, 1943b; MAR 
1945, 3; Stansfield 1946, 97–101, photos; Belshaw 1950a, 68; Oliver 1961, 383; Tip-
pett 1967, 370; Lasaqa 1972, 48; Knox-Mawer 1986, 117; Akin 1988–1989. Bennett 
wrote that US soldiers told Islanders that the government had taken wages meant 
for them (1987, 292). The government rebuilt its ship fleet with £79,706 in Colonial 
Development and Welfare funds (Marquand 1950, 18).
21. Waddell, Trench, and Bentley 1945, 7; Laracy 1979, 99; Fifi‘i 1988a, 224; see 
also Fifi‘i 1988b; 1989, 51; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 208, and see 211–212. To com-
municate with Islanders, some US soldiers learned Pijin, while others employed a 
rough sign language.
22. Sisili 1949, 2, 4; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 209. Few Malaitans had contact 
with Japanese on Guadalcanal, but some saw prisoners and several told me they 
pitied their miserable condition. On Gela, Japanese quickly made enemies of locals 
by taking clothing and food (Fox 1943, 13; Bingiti quoted in Clemens 1998, 124). 
Re Sisili’s bitterness over his lack of education in English, see Keesing 1978a, 63n29.
23. Norden 1925, 91; J Deck [1943?]; Read 1947, 107; Keesing nd, handwritten, 
undated 1962 note, in archival box 34, folder 5; Leckie 1965, 315; Lansner 1987, 32; 
Buckley 2001, xxiv, 260–261; Bielakowski 2007, 18–19, 44–45. Read described a simi-
lar scene in New Guinea’s Eastern Highlands, but there Australian soldiers were the 
preferred whites, and people referred to unpopular Australians as “British” (1947, 
106–110; see Trench 1947h, 1).
24. Keesing 1978a, 49; personal communications from Sulafanamae 1980, Siu-
fiomea 1987, Biri ‘Asu‘ani 1996, and Riufaa 1996; Titiuru 1987; Fifi‘i 1988a, 224; 
1989, 52–53. See Nelson 1982, 173. Burt was told that some Malaitans identified 
blacks “biblically as ‘Egyptians’ ”(1994, 173).
25. Trench 1947h, 1; Fifi‘i 1982b; 1989, 53–54; Titiuru 1987; Vaea quoted in 
Lansner 1987, 32; Biri ‘Asu‘ani 1996 pers comm; see Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 205; 
Davenport 1989, 271–272.
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ing 1978a, 54–55; Davies nd, 124; Laracy 1983, C29; Fifi‘i 1989, 64; Bennett 1993, 
129–130; Burt 1994, 179–180. By 1918, the Malayta Company had plantations at 
Baunani, nearby Hulo, Su‘u, and Maanaoba. Christians saw their coastal land rights 
as particularly tenuous (Keesing 1978a, 57; Moore 2009, 28).
64. See Holton 1945; Barrow 1946; 4; Forster 1946c, 2; Marquand 1947d; San-
dars 1947b; D.R.D.V. [1947?]; Davies writing in MAR 1947, 5; and nd, 88, cf 124; 
Allan 1950a, 46; Burt 1994, 179–180; see also this book, chapter 7. Colin Allan later 
told Resident Commissioner Gregory-Smith that land alienation fears were due to 
“loose American talk in the war,” to which Gregory-Smith observed that such fears 
were “a hardy annual anywhere that native administration functions” (Gregory-
Smith 1950–1952, 4 May 1951; and see Gregory-Smith 1951d).
65. Barrow 1946; see Scott 2007, 100–129, passim.
66. For good summaries of early BSIP land laws and alienation, see Allan 1957a, 
chap 3; and Bennett 1987, chap 8. In mid-1947, loyalist east Kwara‘ae Headman 
Siru, whom Tedder later called “an original smooth ‘con man,’ ” caused a stir by tell-
ing people there that Sandars planned to take land (Sandars 1947f, 2; Deck 1947b; 
Tedder 2008, 26). Davies soon after did lobby Noel to seize Kwai land for a gov-
ernment station (1947j, 3). Davies’s 1947 Malaita Annual Report, one of the most 
distorting government documents ever written about Maasina Rule, stressed fear of 
land loss as a motivation for creating towns. Davies had recently transferred from 
Makira, formed many of his ideas about the movement there, and at times insisted 
it was exactly the same on both islands. In reports he was keen to place rumors 
and fear at the heart of Maasina Rule thought, often asserting without evidence 
that leaders calculatedly concocted and spread them to manipulate the “primitive” 
populace (see MAR 1947, 5; and see this book, chapters 6 and 7).
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67. Marquand 1947c; Trench 1947a; Russell 1950j, 18. Allan claimed that 
Rame‘ai town in Makwanu District in Baelelea had nearly 1,000 residents. Burt was 
told that at least some inland Kwara‘ae hamlets were neglected and “fell down,” and 
that when people ascended to tend bush gardens they stayed in small garden houses 
(John Gamu 1983 pers comm to Burt). Kwaio people have told me they minimally 
maintained their hamlets, but some may not have.
68. See Marquand 1950, 55; Russell 2003, chap 6. Malu‘u officer Russell later got 
his intelligence from headmen: “Many had been suborned by the Movement and 
were virtually double agents reporting to the Government what the Marching Rule 
was up to, and vice versa” (2004, 5).
69. Clark 1947; Burt 1994, 181. A photograph of Clark is in PIM June 1952, 51.
70. Barley writing in MQR June 1930; Allan 1950a, 45; Zoleveke 1980, 43. Town-
residence choices in east Kwara‘ae are detailed in Burt 1994, 82–83, 180–181.
71. Clark 1947, 5, 6; see Marquand 1950, 40; Naitoro 1993, 93.
72. Clark 1947, 6; see Barrett 1947, 29 Jan; Allan 1950a, 45; Burt 1994, 181; 
Molaina‘o 1996 pers comm. Officer Alexander MacKeith in 1951 still found A‘arai 
“the largest MR town I have seen on Malaita” (1951b, 2).
73. Marquand 1947c; Allan 1950a, 44; Fox 1962, 130–131; Burt 1994, 180 (told 
by Gamu in 1983); Ma‘aanamae 1996 pers comm; Molaina‘o 1996 pers comm. 
There was much variation by area and over time; for example, in 1948 in inland 
Kwaio many towns behind Sinalagu had fences and towers, while fewer behind Uru 
and ‘Oloburi did (Laefiwane 1982 pers comm; Ma‘aanamae 1996 pers comm). But 
in about 1950 Tome Waleanisia passed through several towns in the mountains 
behind ‘Oloburi that had towers he estimated at some 21 meters high, each with a 
two-square-fathom house at the top (1987, 7). See Scott 1998 for discussions of the 
importance in social engineering schemes of resettlement models and the imposi-
tion of grids and other structural plans on cities, towns, and villages.
74. On marketing plans, see Forster 1948c; Russell 1949a, 2; Zoleveke 1980, 43; 
Titiuru 1987; Fifi‘i 1989, 66; Burt 1994, 179. On suspicions of fund misuse by avari-
cious chiefs, see Davies 1947f, 1947h, 1947i; Noel 1947a, 3; Zoleveke 1980, 43.
75. MAR 1947, 5; Forster 1948a; personal communications from Sulafanamae 
1982, Ma‘aanamae 1996, and Riufaa 1996.
76. See, eg, Hopkins 1904a; Sullivan 1933, 6–7; Deck 1943, 4–5; Marquand 
1947e, 6; Russell 1949a, 2; Hogbin 1970, 216; White 1991, 191. Deck said Malai-
tans stopped supporting teachers this way during Maasina Rule (1947b), but many 
teachers had become chiefs.
77. Codes [1946f?], [1946g?], 1947a; Fox 1948, 22; 1962, 129; Zoleveke 1980, 44.
78. Clark 1947, 5; Noel 1947a, 2–3; 1947b; 1947c; Codes 1947a; Marquand 
1947e, 1; 1948b; Russell 1949a, 2; Burt 1994, 183 (John Gamu 1983 pers comm); see 
Davies 1947f, 1948a.
79. Noel 1947a, 2; Russell 1949a, 2; Zoleveke 1980, 43; Buloli 1997 pers comm to 
Guo Pei-yi; Davies nd, 31; cf Marquand 1950, 44. Except for rice and cocoa, Malai-
tans had planted these sorts of crops within inland taro and potato gardens long 
before Maasina Rule.
80. Davies 1947i. Today people have coastal gardens where weary soils allow but 
suffer low yields and erosion. In some places coastal residents have for decades 
trekked miles inland to work better land. Mountain soils were once fallowed 10–20 
years between crops. Soil degradation was a problem for coastal Christians by the 
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early 1920s (NIV 1921, nd, 3; Northcote Deck 1923, 3; Frazer 1987; Tedder 2008, 
32). Frazer reported that the blight Phytophthora colocasiae crippled To‘abaita taro 
production in 1957–1958. The disease was first reported in north Malaita in early 
1950. In 1949 Russell found sweet potato surpassing taro as the staple in the north, 
probably reflecting needs of Maasina Rule gardening and residence patterns, the 
fact that only men grew taro, and that, more than potatoes, proper taro gardens 
required rituals for ancestors (Russell 1949a, 1–2; 1950b, appendix B; Frazer 1973, 
26). In Kwaio the 1950s blight ruined taro that had not yet recovered from ruinous 
diseases of the 1920s and 1930s (see Allan 1989, 91; Akin 1993, 230–234).
81. Davies 1947f; 1947i, 1; see Noel 1947a, cover letter; Marquand 1947e, 1948a; 
Fox 1962, 129.
82. MAR 1946, 4; Davies 1947j (cf Davies 1947i); Cameron 1947d, 1947e, 1947j; 
see Cameron 1947i, 1; Marquand 1947e, 1; Sandars 1947b; Malu‘u 1947; Worsley 
1968, 181. In mid-1949 Russell thought farms, by then mostly abandoned in the 
north where he was, might be usefully revived later if they could be depoliticized 
(1949a, 2). Malaita suffered a plague of rats in 1947 that damaged some farms.
83. Sandars 1947b, 1947c; Ma‘aanamae 1987 pers comm; see Zoleveke 1980, 43. 
Penned pigs could not forage, so people had to feed them more and thus had to 
plant more gardens.
84. Forster 1948c; Cameron 1947j, 1947k; Allan 1950a, 46; Zoleveke 1980, 43; 
cf MAR 1947, 6B; Tedder 2008, 58–59. Forster visited Furi‘itolonga town in cen-
tral Kwaio and spent a friendly night with chiefs at nearby Go‘isi‘ini. He also vis-
ited Looa town under chief Laefiboo, ordered it torn down, and took three men 
to jail for two months. Before they returned, Looa was abandoned (Ma‘aanamae 
1996 pers comm; Siufiomea 1996 pers comm). Marquand thought towns should 
be encouraged. He said in 1947 that some were poorly planned with unhygienic 
houses of bad design but that more permanent ones were planned. He was based 
along the northeast coast to Malu‘u, where more towns lacked permanent residents. 
In early 1948 he toured 54 towns and found them improved, but he considered the 
bush-style dirt-floor houses unhealthy and some sites malarial (1947e, 1948b; see 
Russell 1949a, 4, and Masterman comments). In June 1948, Forster by arrests and 
fines forced people, mostly Adventists, to abandon Lau’s Sulione town since, he 
said, it was at an unhealthy location (1948d). Later Russell reported during mass 
arrests, “Imprisonment is now given as the stock excuse for dirty villages, bad health 
and neglect of any kind” (1949a, appendix 3).
85. Cameron 1947e, 1947i, 1947j; Sandars 1947b, 1947c; Russell 1949a, 4. Remo 
Guidieri said that Maasina Rule wished to protect Malaitan languages and therefore 
rejected English and Pijin (1988, 189), but most Malaitans saw more English literacy 
as a long-term movement goal, and many codes were written in Pijin or English to 
target readers across languages and, sometimes, colonial officers.
86. BSIP 1947e, 94.
87. Noel 1946b; Zoleveke 1980, 44; see Codes [1946i?]; Clark 1947, 5; BSIP 
1947e, 43; Naitoro 1993, 93. Hedley Heber testified at the chiefs’ trial that Sandars 
when asked in 1947 agreed “That no man could be absent from his village for more 
than one day without permission of his headman or chief” and “that people should 
work as directed by the village chiefs.” Extant law required one’s headman’s permis-
sion to travel outside one’s district (BSIP 1947e, 80). Zoleveke was on Malaita from 
May 1951 into 1955, first at Hauhui in west ‘Are‘are, then at Malu‘u, and for six 
402 Notes to Pages 195–198
months of 1952 at Rerede Hospital in the north. In 1953 he toured the south and 
east, based for a time at Naafinua. His description of Abu town sounds to be from an 
earlier phase of Maasina Rule and may be at least partly secondhand.
88. Frazer 1973, iii, 99.
89. Forster 1945b, 1948c.
90. Willingness to hand murderers over to the government was Malaita-wide, 
but I do not know intricacies of ancestral death compensation in the north. Sandars 
thought people there wanted the government to prosecute both murder and rape; 
Allan said assault cases as well, though in 1947 Maasina Rule courts heard assault 
cases. All could spark intergroup violence (Sandars 1947f, 4; Allan 1950a, 43; see 
Codes 1944d). Hopkins related a 1904 case at Fiu, before the government had a 
presence on Malaita, in which relatives of a man accused of conspiring to murder 
mission teacher Arthur Ako paddled him the 40 kilometers to Tulagi to surrender 
himself to Woodford, apparently to escape vengeance by Ako’s relatives (1934, 48; 
see BSIP 1947d, 23).
91. On codes, see “Codes” in References; Laracy 1983, E1, E3, E5; Akin 1993, 
appendixes 4–8. On meanings of codification, see Akin 1996, 170; 2004.
92. Deck 1940, 3; Bengough 1940b; Sullivan 1944; NIV Dec 1945, 6; Sandars 
1947f, 5; see Ganifiri [1940s?]. For examples of these types of codes, see Codes ndd, 
1944c, 1944d, 1946d; Akin 1993, appendixes 4–7.
93. Personal communications from Lounga 1982, Folofo‘u 1982, and Fifi‘i 1987; 
see Codes 1944c.
94. In 1942 some 18,000 Malaitans belonged to the three largest churches: 9,000 
SSEM, 5,000 Anglicans (of 25,000 in the Solomons), and about 4,000 Catholics (in 
1946, 5,410 Catholics). Overall, two-thirds of Solomon Islanders self-identified as 
Christian (Hilliard 1974, 93, 111; Laracy 1976, 126). There were fewer Adventists 
in the Solomons then. Dennis Steley (1990, 617) gave a Solomons SDA number in 
1940 of 1,151, and Anderson and Anderson (1980–1981, 6 April 1981, 10) counted 
4,128 in 1950, 1,628 of them in the Protectorate’s eastern half (see also Ross 1978b, 
185–187). Whiteman, citing mission sources, estimated that from 1942 to 1950 the 
proportion of Malaitans who were Christian rose from under one-half to three-
quarters (1983, 315). Colin Allan in late 1951 thought two-thirds were Christian 
(1951m), and Tom Russell four years later thought about 60 percent were (1955c, 
3). Roy Davies said that on Malaita “there had certainly been few conversions to 
Christianity in the war years” (nd, 32). Caution is in order; tallies almost always 
undercounted inland non-Christians, who were harder to count and often disliked 
being counted. For example, even in 1961, Malaita’s District Commissioner Michael 
Townsend wrote to Roger Keesing that there were between one and two hundred 
people living in inland Kwaio, with a caution that his estimate might be “inaccu-
rate in the extreme” (1961b). There were thousands there. Sandars in the mid-
1930s estimated 10 percent of Malaitans were Christian, certainly an undercount, 
but wrote, “If you could believe the mission figures they claimed that everybody on 
the island was a Christian” (nd, 30). Another complication is that mission tallies of 
“Christians” often include only their own denomination.
95. For example, Codes nda, 1944b, [1944e?], [1946f?]; Russell 2003, 45.
96. Michael Scott 2001 pers comm; see Sandars 1947f, 4; Burt 1994, 184. In 
some contexts Malaitans distinguish between affairs and rules of ancestral spirits 
and those of “living people,” and Christians between “God’s law” and “church law.” 
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These divisions can be crucial to how rule violations and disputes are managed, and 
people, particularly Christians, sometimes disagree as to where such lines should 
be drawn. Moreover, ancestors or God can be quickly drawn into “secular” disputes 
if disputants curse, kill each other, or evoke spiritual powers (see Akin 1999b, 46, 
53). Nonetheless, it is a distortion to apply the Western concepts of “religious” and 
“secular” as distinct realms to Malaitan life overall.
97. Compare Babadzan 2004, 326, with Akin 2005, 81.
98. Re brideprice limits, SSEM founder Florence Young had warned Norman 
Deck of “a danger in encouraging the native church to lay down ‘laws,’ even when 
the object is desirable” (1932). But Deck and his colleagues continued to advance 
legalistic views of mission rules.
99. Clark 1947; Davies 1948a; Fifi‘i 1987 pers comm; Ma‘aanamae 1987 pers 
comm; Akin 2004. ‘Elota in his autobiography (Keesing 1978b, 160–168) described 
disputes during Maasina Rule, though most of them occurred later, when people 
had returned inland; Kwaio in oral histories often extend the “Maasina Rule” period 
well into the 1950s or later. Though Kwaio produced many codes, they did not keep 
written case records. Before, specific compensation amounts had been negotiated 
or sometimes coerced. In 1987, Fifi‘i told me they set amounts to be low so that even 
those with little wealth could pay them—codes served as a social-leveling tool. There 
was also concern to avoid divisive compensation disputes (Teoboo 1982).
100. On fear of spies: personal communications from Inaarobo (re Baegu) 
1982, and Mariano Kelesi (Lau), Waleanisia (Langalanga), and Biri (Kwara‘ae), all 
1987. Re confusions over the status of courts, see, eg, Cameron 1947i, 1947j; see 
Codes 1946c; Russell 2003, 60.
101. Forster 1946c, 4; Fifi‘i [1947?]; Burt 1994, 185; see BSIP 1947d, 1947e; and 
this book, chapters 6 and 7.
102. Cameron 1947f, 1947i; Marquand 1950, 14, 35; and see this book, chapters 
3, 4, and 6; see Cameron 1947e.
103. Clemens 1941; BSIP 1942b, section 13–14; 1942c, number 13; 1947e, 81; 
1945e; Hogbin 1944, 262; 1964, 96; Tomlinson 1949; Belshaw 1950a, 125; Osifelo 
1985, 22; Tedder 2008, 157. Such a sentence to labor was sometimes called a koda-
lake (from “contract”). Years before, Legal Adviser J G Bates, citing a Native Affairs 
Regulation draft, wrote, “The new definition of ‘imprisonment’ will permit of an 
offender being in a proper case sentenced to a limited term of compulsory labour in 
connection with ‘public works.’ This form of punishment, which can be effectively 
supervised by the local native authorities, will be more efficacious in certain cases 
(particularly cases of convictions for breaches of the ‘Local Rules’) than imprison-
ment in the usual sense of the term: the particular community to which the offender 
belongs will be directly benefited and the ends of justice will be equally served” 
(1918, 2). Sentences over a month had to be served in a government jail, and after 
the war native courts tried to keep to that or shorter sentences so that those they 
convicted could stay home (Davies 1947k, 2).
104. For examples from around Malaita, see Ivens 1928a, 62; Hogbin 1970, 
17–18, 113–115; Ross 1973, chap 6; Keesing 1982c, chap 5; Burt 1994, 56–58; Guo 
2001, 120–130; Akin 2003.
105. Clark 1947, 4; see Norman Deck 1923; Northcote Deck 1923, 5–6; Hogbin 
and Wedgwood 1943, 4. Some Lau, Langalanga, and related ancestral communities 
from small islands relocated to towns on the coast during Maasina Rule.
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106. Clark 1947, 4; see Northcote Deck 1923, 5–6; Innes 1938, 16; SCL June–
Sept 1957, 48.
107. Laracy 1971, 103.
108. Marilyn Strathern’s concept of “partibility” is useful toward understanding 
the nature of big men and big ancestors and the exchanges they are party to and 
generate (1988, chap 8, passim). For Malaitans, the construction of personhood 
need not end at death; for those who become active ancestral spirits it continues 
through their evolving relations with expanding or contracting constellations of 
descendants who exchange with them (see Fox 1987, 174–175; Bloch 1993).
109. Fox 1962, 128–129; Akin, 1996, 170; 2004, 305, passim; see Ross 1973, 263–
264; Keesing 1978b, 21. Dzenovska and Arenas analyzed events in Latvia and Mexico 
to show how material “practices of protest” themselves shape social movements and 
create collective identities that bridge formerly deep ethnic and political divisions 
(2012). During Maasina Rule, this became still more important after the govern-
ment used mass arrests to suppress Malaitan abilities to pursue constructive social 
projects together (see this book, chapters 6–8).
110. For a few examples of conflicts, see MARs 1935, 11; 1936, 15; Horton 
1965, 28.
111. Laracy 1983, 109; see Clark 1947; Marquand 1947c, 1948a; Allan 1950a, 
44–45; Burt 1990, 214–215. On the use of oaths in disputes, see this book, chapter 2.
112. Marquand wrote, “The Marching Rule leaders ‘came to an agreement’ 
with the ancestor devils, that lies told, even on heathen oath, for the benefit of the 
Marching Rule, would be forgiven” (1950, 35). No Malaitans I asked had heard of 
this, but that something of the sort was done in places is plausible, for Malaitans 
have an entire genre of magics that allow one to utter ancestral oaths with impunity 
(see this book, chapter 2). Davies, unaware of this, read such false oaths as indicat-
ing a terrible psychological hold Maasina Rule had over adherents (nd, 90).
113. Oloi‘a quoted in Keesing 1987, 41. Oloi‘a’s husband, a priest, died in 
1982 (several years after this interview), and she and their children became coastal 
Christians to flee further punishment by ancestors still angry over past taboo viola-
tions, including that her husband had visited Christians too often and eaten their 
food (personal communications from Molaina‘o 1982 and 1996, Maeana 1982, and 
Oloi‘a 1982 and 1996).
114. Personal communications from Riufaa, ‘Oitalana, and ‘Otaalea, all 1996; 
see Clark 1947, 4; Akin 1996; 2004; nd.
115. Lewis 1986; see Fox 1962, 131; Akin 1996, 2003, 2004, nd.
116. Noel 1944c; MAR 1944; Clark 1947, 4; BSIP 1947e, 58–59; Burt 1994, 185; 
see Codes 1944c, 1944d; Allan 1950o, 5; Akin 1999b, 54.
117. Clark 1947, 6; personal communications from To‘oni 1982, Kwailoboo 
1982, and Ma‘aanamae 1997.
118. Burt 1994, 41, 164; see Codes 1944c, 1–4.
119. Personal communications from Kwailoboo 1982, and Siufiomea, 
Ma‘aanamae, Maenaalamo, Basiberi, and Gwanu‘i, all 1996; see Akin 1999a, 127–
130. For another marriage exchange innovation, see Davies 1948a, Uru notes.
120. Later, as religious divisions reemerged, all rejected this payment method as 
illegitimate, but since the 1980s some Christians, including Malaitans, have revived 
this and other strategies to mitigate church brideprice limits (see Akin 1999a, 
127–130).
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121. See Akin 2003, 396–398; nd.
122. For example, Codes 1946b; Allan 1980b, 112; see Codes 1944c, 1944d.
123. Personal communications from Sangosoea 1981; from Basiberi, Sulafana-
mae, Geniilefana, and Le‘aa, all 1982; from Ma‘aanamae, Na‘oni‘au, and To‘oni, all 
1983; and from Wa‘ii‘a 1987; see Naitoro 1993, 93.
124. Thomas 1992c, 81, passim; see Thomas 1992b; Sahlins 1993.
125. For example, MAR 1947, 5B–6; Davies 1947c; nd, 241; AR 1948, 26, 38; 
Allan 1957a, 153, 251–253; 1989–1990, 154; BSIP 1945–1959, 20 Feb 1948, 27; 
Hearth 1956a; Laracy 1976, 124; Russell 2004.
126. See Akin 1996.
127. Kaakalade 1982 pers comm, in conversation with Geniilefana.
128. Wa‘ii‘a 1987 pers comm; John Naitoro 1995 pers comm. A similar argu-
ment on the need to approach development projects through kastom opens an early 
statement of Maasina Rule’s purpose, likely written under Nono‘oohimae’s and 
Nori’s direction (see Codes 1945b).
129. There are Malaitan concepts that partly overlap with “custom,” such as 
Kwara‘ae falafala or Kwaio tagi.
130. Barrow nd, part III, 55; see Belshaw 1947b, 10–11; MAR 1947, 5B–6; Allan 
1957a, 253; 1960, 162; Davies nd, 70, 90, 132. It is also likely that officers and Malai-
tans often thought they were talking about the same thing—focusing on the partial 
overlap—when they were not, a type of miscommunication also common between 
missionaries and Malaitans.
Chapter 6: Maasina Rule and the Government
1. MAR 1945, 3; Forster 1946c, 9; Noel 1946b, 1; see BSIP 1947e, 51; AR 1947, 3; 
Allan 1950a, 25; Davies nd, 245.
2. Davies nd, 38–43; see Marquand 1950, 15. As late as October 1946 Forster 
had to write about Maasina Rule, “Details are difficult to obtain and much of the 
evidence is of a circumstantial nature.” In 1946 Malaita’s officers spent just 169 man-
days on tours, most of them by Forster (Forster 1945c; 1946c, 6–7; Davies nd, 40–43, 
74, 93–94). Ironically, District Commissioner Andersen a decade later bemoaned 
that Hoasihau, still headman, “just cannot adapt himself to indirect administration 
and he is being ejected from Wairokai” (1954a, 1; see Hoasihau 1951).
3. Forster 1945b, 1945c (quote). Davies later claimed Forster returned from 
‘Are‘are telling them there was “a large scale conspiracy afoot . . . and thought that 
the movement should be smashed at all costs” (1948d, 44–45). This is contradicted 
by Forster’s more positive and nuanced appraisals after the tour, just summarized. 
As we will see, Forster’s views of Maasina Rule shifted back and forth over time. On 
this tour he learned Hoasihau had not given up the idea of a regional chief and that 
Assistant Headman Timothy George had been chosen as leader (Forster 1945b, 
1945c).
4. Forster 1946c, 1; BSIP 1947e, 75 (and see 105); Davies nd, 41–45.
5. BSIP 1947e, 94; Davies nd, 83–84. Sandars later said he first met Nori on his 
return when Nori asked to see him, and that he told Nori he did not object to the 
movement’s work (nd, 137).
6. In December Sandars met with Kwara‘ae and then Malu‘u council mem-
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bers and, Davies said, lectured them against contacting Americans, embarking on 
“patrols,” or levying fines, and forbade any relocations to the coast without his per-
mission. According to Davies, at Malu‘u Sandars railed at Nori’s stupidity, warned 
that government would not tolerate his meddling, and ridiculed the idea that he 
offered what government could not; the government, he told attendees “had always 
been solicitous of the people’s welfare” (Davies nd, 83–84; cf BSIP 1947e, 105).
7. MAR 1945, 3–4; Sandars 1945b; cf Davies nd, 46, cf 81. In 1950 Resident 
Commissioner Gregory-Smith was still blaming “Negro troops” for Maasina Rule 
(1950f, 4).
8. MAR 1947, 6.
9. Crass 1946a, appendix B, 29 May; BSIP 1947d, 132–133; 1947e, 54–55, 65, 
75–79, 105, 110; Marquand 1950, 11; Davies nd, 95.
10. Forster 1946c; Crass 1946a, 1; Pulei quoted in Crass 1946a, appendix B; cf 
Belshaw 1946, 1; see Kane quoted in White 1991, 189; Russell 2003, 36; Scott 2007, 
106. As late as 1951, Resident Commissioner Gregory-Smith thought the Malaitan 
village of Bina, on the western Kwara‘ae coast, should all be “pulled down” as unsan-
itary and asked Colin Allan to look into his legal powers to do this (1950–1952, 10 
May 1951).
11. Belshaw 1946, 2–3; Crass 1946a, 2; Loloito, Waneunga, Taheolo, Pule, and 
Matanigabu quoted in Crass 1946a, appendix C. Years later Davies claimed that 
Belshaw was “surrounded and threatened and jostled” (nd, 186), but all accounts 
refute this.
12. This paragraph’s quotations and attributions are from telegrams appended 
to a confidential Crass report (1946a, appendix B): Belshaw, 23 May; Forster, 29 
May; Barrow, 31 May; Acting RC Trench, 2 June. Laracy, citing a letter of priest T 
Parsonage, identifies catechist John Apui as leader of Ulawan resistance at this time, 
but though Parsonage and Belshaw suspected Apui of anti-government activity (and 
he had been jailed), he was that May on Malaita and not involved in this episode 
(Belshaw 1946, 1–2; Laracy 1971, 110; 1976, 130–131; see Laracy 1983, 27; Apui 
1947). Belshaw later said George’s “words had been distorted and exaggerated to 
a degree that can be imagined only by those who have had experience with native 
rumours” (1947a, 192), apparently referring to stories he and Parsonage heard after 
the event. A son of Kuper later assaulted a Maasina Rule man and threatened to 
shoot others who stayed in the movement, but the officer Val Andersen on Makira 
recommended he not be prosecuted since to do so would give Maasina Rule a vic-
tory (Andersen 1947; 1948; see Burrows 1950; Davenport 1970, 166–170).
13. Crass 1946a. Men had canoed to visit George on Malaita shortly before 
Belshaw’s return to Ulawa. Ulawa District Headman Loloito, as a government wit-
ness in October 1947, testified they likely brought back instructions to not do any 
government work (but that he had not actually heard anyone say this) and that he 
thought this led to the row with Belshaw. Loloito himself later went to Malaita and 
spent two or three months with George who, he testified, told him that as headman 
he should work with officers but let people go ahead with Maasina Rule, and that if 
the government saw their work was going well they would leave the Solomons. He 
said George told him Americans would send material help (Loloito 1947; see Fifi‘i 
1989, 67).
14. Crass 1946a, 1, 3, and Loloito, Timothy, Maria, and others quoted in Crass’s 
appendix C.
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15. Noel 1946b, 2; Belshaw 1947a, 191–192; see Allan 1950a, 25–26; 1951a, 99; 
1989–1990, 70; Davies nd, 186. Elsewhere, Belshaw foregrounded enforcement of 
sanitary rules as a necessary but lacking response to Maasina Rule needed to incul-
cate respect for law and order, and social responsibility (1947b, 11; see Belshaw 
1950a, 79; 2009, 40, 50; Allan 1982a, 222). Headman Loloito told Crass that Belshaw 
was the only officer who went inside people’s houses to inspect them and that peo-
ple did not like it. Village Headman Lugu testified, “Mr Belshaw’s conduct was not 
the same as other Governments [ie, officers]”; Government Councillor Asehu Pulei 
said that other officers had been kind (and Ulawans had compared Belshaw specifi-
cally and unfavorably with Alexander Waddell), but that Belshaw was a “Larrikin 
man” (Pijin for “troublemaker” or “lawbreaker”; see also Maria, all in Crass 1946a, 
appendix C). The point is that Ulawans reacted here against not government policy 
but rather Belshaw’s actions, and they had discussed confronting him the previous 
December, before they joined Maasina Rule. Belshaw for his part told investigator 
Crass that his house burnings “did not effect in the slightest the warmth of the wel-
come, which was accompanied by dancing and singing” (1946, 1). Of those whose 
statements Crass collected, only Parsonage, who traveled to Ulawa with Belshaw, 
and Parsonage’s Makiran “boss boy” Haga (the Wainoni headman but later a Maa-
sina Rule leader there) supported Belshaw’s reading. They said they had heard that 
George was stockpiling weapons for a violent revolt and that people were defying 
government rather than Belshaw personally. Parsonage declared Belshaw’s conduct 
“admirable,” and said, “I felt proud of this representative of the Government” (Crass 
1946c, appendix C; on Haga, see Barrow nd, part 3, 30). In years to come, Belshaw, 
as an anthropologist, published influential statements on Maasina Rule, sometimes 
asserting its violent nature. His writings, with those of Allan and Cochrane, con-
tributed to Maasina Rule being pigeonholed as a “cargo cult” (eg, Belshaw 1947a; 
1950b; 1950a, 74, 126–129; 1972; 1976). Then again, some of his writings on the 
period, even on Maasina Rule, were insightful and valuable, particularly his pre-
scriptions for economic reforms to improve the Protectorate’s economic health and 
Islanders’ lives, and I cite his work often in this book (see Belshaw 1948; 1950a; 
2009, 63). He began his recent autobiography with a baffling account of this same 
Ulawa incident (Belshaw 2009, chap 1).
16. White 1928–1931, 8 Oct 1929; Lambert 1933, 31 May; Forster 1946c, 9–10; 
BSIP 1947e, 55; Waleanisia 1987. In Kwaio during Maasina Rule, a famous area 
artist, Sulafanamae, finely carved wooden rifles (Sulafanamae 1982 pers comm). 
In 1979 I watched elders there perform a smart drill with stick-rifles as a playful 
reenactment of Maasina Rule times. Today government police still perform creative 
drills that look like dances. On drilling, see Edge-Partington 1910d, 1914a; Hopkins 
1911, 30; 1928, 177–178; 1934, 42; Young 1925, plates facing 160 and 180; March-
ant 1940b, 18 July; Widdy 1943b, 1943e; Barrow and Davies 1947, 2; BSIP 1947e, 
30A, 55, 77; 1947f, 14; Vance 1963, 23; Hogbin 1970, 180 plate 22; Keesing 1978a, 
47; Saunders 1984, 230; Laracy and White 1988, 14. At the chiefs’ trial, a good deal 
was made of duties wearing sashes. Sandars had told Kakalu‘ae (while Kakalu‘ae 
was still a Maasina Rule head chief) to allow duties to wear sashes with white calico, 
“but not with khaki” (BSIP 1947e, 81, 82). When he was still a police corporal, in 
1920, Fotarafa lost his symmetry to a dynamite stick while reef fishing on Makira. In 
1927 Bell sent Fotarafa back to ‘Aoke when his patrol proceeded to Sinalagu. He 
toured with Lambert, White, and others working to eradicate yaws and hookworm, 
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and served two jail terms in the 1930s. Sandars wrote, “In the ordinary way he was 
a very pleasant fellow but a complete rogue and he had been in prison on numer-
ous counts during the course of his career.” When Fotarafa told him he was a chief, 
Sandars recorded, “I told him that if Marching Rule chose to accept a fellow of his 
caliber as chief I had no time for them.” Sandars depicted him as one of “many bad 
hats” that exploited Maasina Rule for personal advancement (nd, 139). In 1946 
officers were still angry with Fotarafa for organizing the Langalanga men whom 
Japanese employed to carry boxes when they looted ‘Aoke in 1942 (see this book, 
chapter 4, note 1). He was later imprisoned for refusing to pay tax and be censused 
during Maasina Rule. On Fotarafa, see Eyerdam, 26 Jan 1930; Lambert 1941, 17, 
283; Forster 1946a, 10; Trench 1946; Allan 1951j; BSIP 1951a; Waleanisia 1987; Fifi‘i 
1989, 45.
17. Forster 1946c, 10; Davies nd, 98; Waleanisia 1987, 3–5. Davies later claimed 
that Fotarafa had held an illegal court, but a woman who reportedly complained to 
a headman subsequently said it was mere arbitration. Sandars’s and Forster’s reports 
and letters say nothing of this. Later, Catholic Father Jim Wall heard and believed 
the complaint of the prisoners, by then in jail in Honiara, that they received no 
proper trial, and he protested to the government (Davies nd, 97, 112; Fotarafa was 
Catholic). In October, Pacific Islands Monthly fibbed, “One prominent native who 
lived near the Administration station on Malaita would not join [Marxian Law], and 
he was savagely beaten. He was rescued, after a sharp fight, by District Officer Foster 
[sic] and his native police, and 40 of the aggressors were arrested and gaoled. The 
strength and tact being displayed in an ugly situation, by DO Foster, a young Eng-
lishman, are warmly praised” (1946b). In 1949, Forster was reprimanded for illegal 
summary arrests and jailings in ‘Are‘are, which the legal adviser called “a travesty,” 
and those prisoners were later released (see this book, chapter 7).
18. Forster 1946a, 15 June, 1 July; 1946c, 10; Noel 1946b; Trench 1946.
19. Forster 1946a, 15 June; Deck 1948b; Davies nd, 100–101. People who knew 
Kifo remembered him to me as brash and impetuous, but even his political enemies 
seem to have kept a fond spot for him amidst derisive humor about his outlandish 
political moves (personal communications from Toloasi Teoboo 1982, Ma‘aanamae 
1987, Fifi‘i 1988).
20. Forster 1946a, 17 June; Davies nd, 110. Maena (see figure 2.4), illegitimate 
son of Harry Wickham of Gizo and a Roviana woman, married a Langalanga girl. He 
died in 1948 in a drunken brawl. Two sons of F M Campbell, Malaita’s first police 
officer in 1912, were acquitted of his murder (Allan 1989–1990, 26). Fifi‘i said that 
when he and other head chiefs were arrested in September 1947 Maena treated 
them cruelly and told them they would die on Guadalcanal and never see their 
families again (1989, 82–83).
21. Forster 1946a, 15 and 17 June; Waleanisia 1987; Davies nd, 110. Davies gave 
a rousing blow-by-blow account of both incidents, especially the Langalanga epi-
sode (and another less serious one in October at Lau). He urged that Fotarafa be 
banished to distant Vanikolo on completing his sentence but was told that it would 
be “gross interference” with Fotarafa’s rights. Davies told the legal adviser and sec-
retary to government that if they insisted the law be followed then the law should be 
changed: “If we had to rely solely on the law as it then stood, there seemed a good 
chance we should lose the struggle with Marching Rule entirely.” This previewed 
Davies’s attitude toward law when he battled Maasina Rule as district commissioner 
Notes to Pages 222–225 409
in 1947–1948 (nd, 101–110, 112, 136; see this book, chapter 7). In an interesting 
twist of oral history, by the 1960s some Langalanga were claiming that Langalanga 
people never took part in Maasina Rule, which some still assert (Cooper 1966; Guo 
Pei-Yi 2005 pers comm).
22. Forster 1946a, 1946b; BSIP 1947d, 81–83, 120; 1947e, 77–78; Davies nd, 111, 
113, 123; Fifi‘i 1982 pers comm.
23. BSIP 1947d, 133; 1947e, 3, 14, 54, 63, 65, 75–78, 83–84, 105, 110–111; Ger-
mond 1948b, 1; Davies nd, 124–126, 134, 139, 143. Later Noel credited the “easing 
of tension” during this period to four British naval vessels casually passing through 
at various times in later 1946. Crews socialized with locals on shore, and rumors later 
spread that they were American. These visits were scarcely noted in reports at the 
time, and Noel’s later claim for their pacifying effect was made as part of his efforts 
to convince the high commissioner to send warships to attend arrests of Maasina 
Rule leaders (Noel 1947h, 7). In January 1947, Sandars asked Nori to convince 
people of Uru in east Kwaio to allow land for an Adventist hospital, but they refused 
(BSIP 1947e, 78; Sandars nd, 140).
24. Forster 1946a; see BSIP 1947e, 55; Davies nd, 81, 96, 138, 139, 141–142.
25. Forster 1946c, 1, 10–11; see MAR 1946, 18; 1947, 3. Forster had just met with 
a conference of headmen at ‘Aoke and with SSEM teachers at nearby Abu. Davies 
decades later dismissed this Forster report (which he had at hand while writing his 
own account that contradicted it) as “out-of-date and over-optimistic” (nd, 134), but 
in late 1950 he opined that it contained “the surest reflections on Marching Rule” 
yet written (1950c).
26. Asa Hoe 1946; Belshaw 1946, 3; Crass 1946c; 1947d, 3; Noel 1947a, 1947o; 
BSIP 1947d, 43; Sandars nd, 139–141; Davies nd, 139–140, 145–146, 180; Allan 
1980b, 111; Laracy 1983, C10. Davies’s and Allan’s statements about Sandars must 
be read cautiously, but archival and oral evidence confirm that such ideas were rife. 
Marquand said that chiefs also tried to hire a government medical officer for £300 
a year, but, oddly, in the same paragraph wrote that that they expected Europeans 
“to provide efficient medical services, free of course” (1950, 9; see Allan 1950a, 51).
27. Forster 1946c, 10; BSIP 1947d, 133, 139–140; 1947e, 78; Sandars 1947f; nd, 
139–141; Davies nd, 110, 121–122; Laracy 1983, C10; Naitoro 1993, 91.
28. Sandars nd, 137; Trench writing in MAR 1944, 3; see Woodford 1890b, 23; 
Ivens 1928a, 28–29; Grantham 1947; Noel 1947a, 4; Belshaw 1950b, 116. With their 
“force of character,” Bell wrote of Malaitans, “The lack of cohesion among them 
makes the Mala problem much more simple than it otherwise would be. It is to be 
hoped that no native will arise with criminal tendencies and sufficient personality to 
bring about any material cohesion” (1916g, 9). Even after Malaitans had organized 
a potent political system some officers still voiced the prewar regret that there were 
no chiefs or groupings on which to build indirect rule (eg, Germond 1948b, 3). 
The BSIP 1948 Annual Report (pages 34, 39) said that Maasina Rule expressed “the 
anarchistic tendencies natural to the Solomons Islanders,” and that “Mission teach-
ers and catechists acquired over the years a dominating position rivaling that of the 
traditional elders. This loosened the bonds, based mainly on magic and supersti-
tion, that had united the elders with their people.”
29. Fox 1962, 128–129; see Noel 1946b, 1; MAR 1946, 5; BSIP 1945–1959, 10 Nov 
1947, 28; Mair 1948, 67; Fox 1948a, 20; Hogbin 1964, 98.
30. Codes 1946e; MAR 1946, 5.
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31. MAR 1946, 6, 7; Grantham 1947; BSIP 1947e, 80, 82, 109; Charles 1948a, 
3–4. Later, against the charge of holding illegal courts, Heber testified, “I only did 
what Mr. Forster had taught us” (BSIP 1947e, 80, 81).
32. MAR 1946, 7; Sandars 1947f; Laracy 1983, 21; see Fifi‘i 1989, 67–69. Visiting 
‘Aoke was Sale Vuza, now retired from the police. He had engaged in nongovern-
ment political activity, but after this visit came out openly for Maasina Rule, and 
the movement spread rapidly through Guadalcanal with Vuza as the key leader (see 
Crass 1947d, 2; Laracy 1983, 22–23). Later he was spared the arrest and imprison-
ment so many Malaitans suffered despite ample proof of his extensive anti-govern-
ment actions. Instead, he was sent to visit Fiji to be shown how things worked there 
(contra Keesing 1981, 133, he was not “exiled” to Fiji). Vuza and Steven Sipolo, then 
head of Malaitan police and later dismissed for Maasina Rule involvement, were mar-
ried to sisters—Salome (see figure 2.4) and ‘Aeringi—from Kafusiisigi in east Kwaio.
33. Davies nd, 151–152, 153; Personal communications from Toloasi Teoboo 
1982, Tagii‘au 1982, Ma‘aanamae 1987, Fifi‘i 1988, Molaina‘o 1996.
34. MAR 1946, 4, 5; Noel 1947a, 3, 4. Marquand guessed 80 percent of Malaitans 
were “active members or fellow travellers” (1950, 2). There are no accurate num-
bers, and they changed through time, but Marquand worked in the far north, home 
to the only large anti-Maasina Rule factions.
35. Davies nd, 157.
36. Grantham 1947. Alexander Grantham was later governor of Hong Kong.
37. Bengough 1941a, 1; Sandars 1947f, 5; [1966?], 21; Deck 1948b; see Master-
man 1947a; BSIP 1945–1959, Feb 1947; Davies nd, 81.
38. Forster 1946c, 6; Marquand 1950, 37; see Noel 1946b, 2; BSIP 1947e, 92. San-
dars said ‘Atoomea “half-concealed” his To‘abaita activities (BSIP 1947e, 3). Allan 
exaggerated the secrecy, and then offered it as typifying Melanesian religions, cults, 
and “secret societies” (1950a, 56–57, 91).
39. Davies nd, 96. See Forster 1945c; Takataka 1946; Codes 1946d; MAR 1947, 3; 
Barrow and Davies 1947; Cameron 1947d, 1947i; Davies 1947f; Trench 1947d, 3–4; 
BSIP 1947d, 133; Marquand 1950, 35; Nori quoted in Allan 1980b; Laracy 1983, C2; 
Russell 2003, 44; cf ‘Otalifua 1947.
40. Marquand 1950, 20.
41. BSIP 1945e, 1947a; Marquand 1950, 36.
42. BSIP 1945e, 1947a; Marquand 1950, 57.
43. Rutter 1947.
44. Insightful in many ways, Marquand’s paper (1950) also displays a striking 
lack of knowledge of Malaitan lives and aspirations, of what had occurred before his 
arrival on Malaita, and even of Sandars’s Maasina Rule policies while he was there. 
This would seem to substantiate Clemens’s complaint, quoted in chapter 2, that 
Sandars did not collaborate or share information with his cadets. Marquand went 
to England for the Devonshire training with Colin Allan, whose anthropology thesis 
written there (1950a) contrasted starkly with his. Allan’s thesis became influential, 
while Marquand’s essay was mostly ignored and forgotten.
45. Davies also said neither man knew Pijin but does not explain how, then, 
they conducted in-depth conversations they reported having with a wide variety of 
Malaitans (nd, 265–266). Davies lobbied against Cameron’s ideas for democratizing 
the native administration system, for which Marquand also argued (eg, Cameron 
1947o; Davies 1947k, 1947l; Marquand 1950, passim).
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47. Sandars 1947f, 1–2; nd, 136–138, 164; AR 1947, 6; BSIP 1947d, 81, 112–113; 
1947e, 3, 47–48, 51; Davies nd, 51–52, 147; Keesing and Corris 1980, 169; Laracy 
1983, 26–27. Davies said Forster told him Sipolo’s and Sau’s actions came to light 
when all employees were asked to declare they would not strike, and both refused 
(MAR 1947, 7; Davies nd, 203). Sipolo later testified he had no enthusiasm for a 
strike and was trapped in the middle, pressured by other Malaitans and afraid of 
losing his land if he snubbed them. He said he was not dismissed but resigned, giv-
ing a month’s notice and leaving 30 April. Other testimony supports Sipolo’s, which 
varies from impressions taken by Sandars, who probably overestimated Sipolo’s role 
as a strike organizer (BSIP 1947e, 47–50). On Sipolo, see Hogbin 1943c; MAR 1944, 
4; Kennedy 1967, 3; Laracy 1983, 25; 2000, 9; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 1989, 358. 
Both men lost their pensions. The police now came under Sergeant Paul Iromea 
of Agia, east Baegu, later a headman, then government appointee to the Malaita 
Council (Notes on the Records [1953?]).
48. Noel 1947a; Sandars 1947c; 1947f, 1, 4; 1947e, 79, 109; BSIP 1947e, 55–56; 
Laracy 1983, 25.
49. Laracy detailed how Malaitans still worked for the Catholic Church in places 
but did so decidedly on their own terms, sometimes refusing wages (1971, 109).
50. BSIP 1947e, 76; MAR 1947, 5; Noel 1947a, 4; Trench 1947d, 3; Allan 1950a, 
52; see Russell 2003, 46. Trench reported Malaitans were perfectly happy with the 
old wage, since they did not really need money (1947d, 4–5). Belshaw, citing the 
£12 call, wrote, “In the meantime it must be recognized that the demands of local 
labour are at least in part legitimate: Industry in the New Hebrides, for instance, 
is able to pay six times the wage offered in the Solomons [the latter £2/month in 
1947] with the same technical background” (1950a, 85). Even so, Noel instructed 
district commissioners to proffer the New Hebrides to Malaitans as an example of 
a colonized people working rather than striking (1947b, 3). The New Hebrides 
economy emerged from the war in better shape than the Protectorate’s, but the 
contrast in wages is notable nonetheless.
51. Forster 1946c, 11; Noel 1947b, 4; Marquand 1950, 17, 21, 23; cf Allan 1950a, 
52–53.
52. BSIP 1947b; Sandars 1947a; 1947d, 1; Noel 1947a, 2; Marquand 1950, 25–26, 
31, cf 33; Russell 1986, 4. Davies described people telling him they had no money to 
pay the tax, but then when he forced them under threat of arrest to find and tender 
money he triumphantly declared this proved they were lying (nd, 215).
53. Bell 1921b, 1922c (quote); Meillassoux 1981, 91–98, passim; Bennett 1993, 
149–151; see also Bell 1916a, 9. Another part of the argument is that capitalist states 
therefore benefit by preserving “traditional” communities. Allan, likely drawing on 
Ivens, supposed Malaita was purposely left undeveloped so as to preserve a populace 
dependent on laboring. I know no evidence of such an overt conspiracy regard-
ing Malaita, excepting the early-twentieth-century worries about “pacifying” Malaita 
since warfare aided labor recruiting because people left to get guns or flee trouble. 
As seen earlier, Resident Commissioner Ashley and others cited Malaitan self-suffi-
ciency to justify low wages. Allan’s suggestions that Kwaio was left especially under-
developed, and that officers encouraged hatred of Kwaio so as to divide Malaita 
down the middle, are concocted slurs on his predecessors (Ivens 1928a, 21; MAR 
1949–1950, 4; Allan 1950a, 76; 1982b, 369; see Keesing 1992a, 165–166).
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56. Forster 1948a. See SCL Sept 1925, 134; Hogbin and Wedgwood 1943, 9–11; 
Sandars 1947c; BSIP 1947e, 55; Marquand 1950, 24–25, 33; cf Allan 1950a, 52–53. 
See this book’s chapter 4 re hardship from SILC over-recruitment. Though cash was 
scarce, Malaitans maintained their own local currencies, and shell money produc-
tion increased during Maasina Rule. Hill was told in Lau that dolphin hunts and 
related social activities, which had declined since the mid-1920s, were revived dur-
ing the movement to address dwindling supplies of dolphin teeth, a key island-wide 
currency (1989, 2; see Trench 1945a; Sandars 1945a; Akin 1993, appendix 2; 1999a). 
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57. Forster 1948b; and see Forster 1948c (Small Malaita). See also Bell 1918c; 
BSIP 1947e, 54, 76, 77; BSIP 1947d, 91, 94 (I do not know who translated and 
transcribed the court proceedings); Germond 1948g; this book, chapter 3, note 
4. Fairymead Sugar Company already ran a profit-sharing scheme at Su‘u. Allan 
wrote, “The traditional system on Malaita had always provided for the welfare of the 
aged and infirm. For many years before the war young men had gone off in their 
thousands to the plantations and had left the old people to look after themselves as 
best they could. Marching Rule preached against the evils of this exodus, and whilst 
expressly forbidding young men to go to the plantations said they must not leave 
their communities unless they were paid wages at the rate of £12 per month.” Allan 
then portrayed the men who stayed home as pathetic loafers (1950a, 52; see Mar-
quand 1950, 2). In his 1950 Malaita Annual Report, Allan said there was no longer 
a population problem in ‘Are‘are due to Bengough’s brief repopulation project 
(page 2; and see Allen 1960, 159). Noel’s successor Gregory-Smith, too, dismissed 
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Bishop Aubin and others (see Gregory-Smith and Bentley 1951; and Germond’s 
comments on Forster 1948a).
58. Thomas 1990; see Lal 1992, introduction and chap 1; Kaplan 1995, 70–74.
59. Forster 1948b; Nicoll cover to Noel 1947a; Bennett 1987, 308–309; 1993, 
162–163; Frazer 1990, 199–203; see Naitoro 1993, chap 5. Frazer 1990 gives an 
excellent summary of later changes in the labor system. He observed that recruit-
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als to enlist (1990, 193; see also Frazer 1973, figure 3.1; this book, chapter 3). He 
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ture and partly blamed government’s reluctance to do so on “the alarm of planters 
at the prospect of having to deal with free labourers, able to leave employment at 
any time they chose” (1950a, 86).
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Davies said Noel told him Nori also tried to arrange labor with Levers in Honiara 
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ber to discuss the issue, but arrests began on 31 August (BSIP 1947e, 84, 89). Many 
Kwaio Maasina Rule veterans recalled to me a universal enthusiasm for maintaining 
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61. A more basic problem was how to feed workers. In the same memo, Trench 
told Noel that some of the plantation workforce had recently “been paid off for lack 
of rations” (1948b, 1, 2). Davies recalled that a lack of overseas shipping in 1947 
“made it virtually impossible to feed labourers in the numbers required even if they 
had been available” (nd, 160).
62. Noel 1947a, 3–4; 1947b; see Davies nd, 213.
63. Noel 1947c, and cover letter to Sandars; Charles 1947a; Sandars 1947f, 1; 
Cameron 1947f.
64. Noel 1947c.
65. Noel 1947c; see Crass 1947a, 1947b.
66. Cameron 1947b, 1947c, 1947d, 1947g; and see Cameron 1947h; Sydney Her-
ald 29 Aug 1947, 1; BSIP 1947d, 80; 1947e, 57. Ganifiri was away during the water 
confrontation (BSIP 1947d, 83). As detailed in chapter 5 of this book, Cameron 
later determined Kwai area “courts” had been legal and their standard of justice 
high (1947f; see 1947e). Russell was told that “Cameron was picked bodily up and 
thrown back into his dingy at Kwai [or possibly Fokanakafo]” (1986, 1), but Cam-
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wrote that he always met “red-eyed hostility” at Kwai, and that Siru was “a dogmatic, 
domineering old reactionary” but with “a high sense of duty” (nd, 77, 79). Siru 
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in northern Kwara‘ae. He was a movement adherent but later a loyalist and crucial 
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Siru on 1 August 1952. Before that, Colin Allan again suggested Ganifiri to replace 
Siru, though Ganifiri had by then spent three years in prison for sedition for his 
Maasina Rule leadership (1952b, 8).
67. Sandars 1947d, 1947f; MAR 1947, 7B.
68. Waleanisia 1987. Writing this after mass arrests were ongoing, Marquand 
added, “Surely the Government owes such people better consideration than they 
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meetings held before the arrests (which he did not see) as “accompanied by mass-
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me people were angry at leaders for failing to arrange for enough food, a basic duty 
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Kifo had warned the head chiefs not to bring all of their followers to meetings due 
to insufficient food (Laracy 1983, C28, C30). Fifi‘i’s book confuses the two ‘Aoke 
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70. Ivens 1918, 77; 1972, 57, chap 5; Sandars 1947d, 1947e; BSIP 1947e, 56.
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membership be officially opened to others, Davies sharply opposed this, wanting to 
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The Marching Rule has created hordes of ‘New Men’ without traditional authority, 
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Rule, in its present mood of destructiveness, not be allowed to destroy what such 
traditional hereditary authority exists” (1947k; see Forster 1948i; Germond 1948a).
72. MQR June 1940; Bengough 1941a; Waiparo 1944; Sandars 1947f, 3; Davies 
nd, 41–42.
73. Noel 1947h, 6; Germond 1948d; Forster 1948a, and Germond comments.
74. Sandars 1947c; 1947f, 3; BSIP 1947e, 56. The record is confused here since 
‘Are‘are people used the terms alaha and alaha‘ou‘ou interchangeably, and alaha 
had been helping arbitrate cases there for years (BSIP 1947e, 68). People retroac-
tively also applied alaha‘ou‘ou to leaders before July 1947, even where the title was 
not used before that (eg, BSIP 1947e, 69).
75. Sandars 1947c, 1947d, 1947f; BSIP 1947d, 134; 1947e, 2, 42, 56–57, 66, 95, 
109. Nori, Heber, and George were not at this meeting. Helpful to Sandars on alaha 
was Anifelo of Kwaio, then in his late thirties. He had under Sandars been a young 
police bugler, a corporal, and then assistant headman. Sandars called him “a good 
man, loyal and fairly well educated.” Anifelo outlined to him a plan for the alaha 
system, but it is unclear how much it was a Maasina Rule plan and how much his 
personal vision. Having known him well, I suspect it was partly the latter. He alone 
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told Sandars a paramount alaha would stand for all Malaita (Anifelo 1947; Sandars 
1947f, 5). After the June meeting, Noel and Nicoll had to deny rumors in the inter-
national press that Malaitan “native warriors” had attacked Honiara “with spears 
and blowpipes” (Chicago Daily Tribune 1947).
76. Sandars 1947f, 4, 5; and see Sandars 1947c; BSIP 1947e, 95.
77. See Anifelo 1947; Forster 1948c, July; Marquand 1950, 15; Keesing 1978a, 
65; cf Trench 1947d, 4.
78. See Marquand 1950, 15; Akin 1993, preface; Boggs and Gegeo 1996, 288–
289. Geoff White described how people of neighboring Isabel, unified as Anglicans, 
have by contrast with Malaitans preferred to combine these bases of leadership in 
one person (1991, 203). This encapsulates a fundamental difference in the outlook 
of the two islands’ peoples. Forster told of quite different generational relations 
toward Maasina Rule in east Guadalcanal (1950, 2).
79. In court, Kifo testified, “The chiefs tried to stop Alaha-ohu from being used 
but the people said they were to function.” By this he meant that most chiefs wanted 
to wait until Sandars gave them Noel’s reply, but the “common people” refused 
to wait (BSIP 1947e, 89; see also BSIP 1947d, 134). Sandars was unusual among 
senior officers in having an inkling of the meaning of alaha‘ou‘ou. Allan bizarrely 
wrote, “Alaha‘ohus were appointed as a kind of gestapo to maintain unity in the 
ranks of the movement and ensure that the directions of the nine chiefs were fully 
understood and obeyed” (1950a, 32; see Trench 1947d, 4). In his 1970s manuscript, 
Davies said Maasina Rule “established alaha‘ohu and held illegal courts through-
out the length and breadth of the island,” though in his 1947 Annual Report he 
described the position (highly distorted) as planned but never realized (nd, 243–
255, 262; MAR 1947, 5B–6A).
80. Sandars 1947e; see Sandars 1947f, 4–5; MAR 1947, 7B; ‘Elota quoted in Kees-
ing 1978b, 157.
81. BSIP 1947d, 9, 21, 23; 1947e, 43. Later, in 1948 and 1949, there were occa-
sional reports or rumors that men here and there had been chosen to be alaha‘ou‘ou. 
Anifelo later claimed to be Kwaio’s alaha‘ou‘ou but was little recognized as such.
82. See BSIP 1947d, 112–113; 1947e, 3, 38, 47–51, 52. A “kastom book” by Gani-
firi ([1940s?]) lists three offices below alaha‘ou‘ou: alahaba‘ina (big alaha), alaharamo 
(alaha of fighting), and alahatotora (meaning unknown). These were likely the three 
“assistant alaha‘ou‘ou” positions. Belo was from the Tae Lagoon in northern Lau.
83. ‘Atoomea 1947a; Marquand 1947a, 2; 1947b, 2, 4; MAR 1947, 8; BSIP 1947d, 
21–22; 1947e, 44, 53, 80, 81; Ma‘aanamae 1996 pers comm; cf M. R. Meeting 1947.
84. Cameron 1947g; see also Cameron 1947e.
85. Davies nd, 97, 139.
86. Davies nd, 94, 127, 136, 158.
87. Davies composed the work (which is nicely written) with his diary and his 
own and other officers’ reports at hand. Though he rarely cited the latter specifi-
cally except when quoting them verbatim, their presence is evident to anyone with 
access to the same reports. Davies said he had read most academic writings about 
Maasina Rule (nd, ii).
88. Davies nd, 186, 215, 225, see also 306–308.
89. Davies nd, 343.
90. MAR 1948, 3; Davies nd, ii, 244, see also 157, 206, 215–216, 228. Belshaw, like 
Davies, said Malaitans did not understand their own movement: “The purpose and 
416 Notes to Pages 247–252
program of the movement are not comprehended by the ordinary native, if indeed 
they are by the leaders” (1947a, 192).
91. Davies nd, 164.
92. Davies nd, 240, see also 234. As I mentioned earlier, Noel in May did cite 
intelligence from Davies and his superior Ken Crass when warning High Commis-
sioner Nicoll that suppression might soon be required on Makira (1947c).
93. Davies nd, 267.
94. Cameron 1947h. Malaitans treat gravely curses by children due to the dan-
ger they pose to others, and responsible language use is a basic part of a child’s edu-
cation. A serious curse by a boy of nine would typically lead to his relatives paying 
compensation. In this case, five-shilling fines were levied. Noel later told the high 
commissioner that the court’s crime was not in hearing the case but in imposing 
fines rather than compensation. This followed the practice of government-sanc-
tioned courts: when parties were Christians whose church forbade paying or accept-
ing compensation, a fine might instead be paid into the treasury. Noel later cited 
this aspect of the case to explain to the Advisory Council how Maasina Rule courts 
did not follow true “native custom” as claimed (Noel 1947h, 3; BSIP 1947e, 32, 101; 
1945–1959, 10 Nov 1947).
95. Cameron 1947h, 1947k; Marquand 1947b; Davies 1947c; nd, 264, 267; Mas-
terman 1947e; Noel 1947i, 3. Charles later found four of the justices (Lenisi, Taloi, 
Iduina‘o, and Taba‘ania) innocent of the charges but guilty of “attempting to effect 
a public mischief” (1947e).
96. Davies nd, 268–269.
97. Davies 1947c; nd, 268, 269, 271; Noel 1947e.
98. Charles 1947b; Noel 1947i, 5, 7.
99. Noel 1947g; Cameron 1947f.
100. Cameron 1947k; Marquand 1947b, 2.
101. Cameron 1947j, 1947k; Davies 1947c, 1947d; Nicoll 1947c.
102. Masterman 1947e; Marquand 1947a; Noel 1947g; 1947i, 7; Charles 1947e, 
2; Deck 1948b, 2; Nori quoted in BSIP 1947e, 83, on people’s answer to Sandars. 
After the arrests, Noel renamed anti–Maasina Rule factions “moderates” intent on 
resisting Maasina Rule’s “extremist leaders” (BSIP 1945–1959, 10 Nov 1947, 27).
103. Cameron 1947k, 2; Noel quoted in Masterman 1947d.
104. Cameron 1947k, 3; ‘Atoomea 1947b; Marquand 1947a; Noel 1947i, 1–2; 
BSIP 1947e, 54, 78, and esp 105–106; Idukana 1948. Maekali in 1947 resigned under 
pressure, but the next February Davies convinced him to reassume the position 
(Davies nd, 337). Six months later Cameron wrote, “Maekali’s . . . conception of Gov-
ernment is that of a former era, almost of ‘time belong Mr. Bell’ ” (1948g; Maekali 
headed Bell’s constabulary for over a decade). Kwai was different: Headman Siru 
was scorned and almost everyone there belonged to Maasina Rule. Siru’s contin-
ued presence impeded cooperative relations, but officers feared his dismissal would 
be read as the government backing down. The mid-June appointment of Assistant 
Headman Dausabea as Siru’s de facto replacement had alleviated but not trans-
formed the situation (see Cameron 1947e, 1947g, 1947k; BSIP 1947d, 79–82; 1947e, 
54, 111; Allan 1952b, 8).
105. BSIP 1947d, 9, 20–23; 1947e, 10, 87–90, 91; Burt 1994, 193. Kifo did tell 
some that Sandars had said he had to ask Noel, but that he had replied that they 
would not wait. But he told others that the government had given them permission 
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to go ahead and hold courts. Bobongi and others at the chiefs’ trial blamed Kifo for 
fooling them into holding courts, and Kifo, against court advice, took blame “for all 
that is wrong in Lau district.” Kifo later blamed the other chiefs for not telling him 
and others what Sandars said, but he participated in both the 30 June and 1 July 
‘Aoke meetings (BSIP 1947d, 22, 37–38, 39, 125–126; 1947e, 43–45, 87–89).
106. Noel 1947g; 1947i, 2–6; Nicoll 1947a; Tomlinson 1949; see also Noel 1947h.
107. Noel 1947h; 1947i, 5, 6, 7; 1947j; 1947k; 1947m; Nicoll 1947b, 1947e, 1947f; 
Davies 1947d, 2; see PIM 1947a. For a photo of Nicoll, see PIM Jan 1953, 19.
108. Cameron 1947l; BSIP 1947d, 23–24; 1947e, 10–11, 99–100; AR 1947, 7–8. 
Lau’s first head chief, Loea (who had just returned from prison), was Molea’s father 
and approved his becoming assistant headman. Increased tensions at this time may 
have been fed by leaks of the arrest plans. For example, on 5 August, ‘Aoke Hospi-
tal’s Senior Dresser Sam Lamani wrote a letter to Maukona in the north, warning, 
“Take back your £1 from the Marching Rule. . . . The things I told you last time, it 
soon be happen, not very longer, not very soon,” and saying that when he heard it 
was happening he was to “run quickly to ‘Fauabu’ ” and say “I am not in M.R.” This 
letter was circulated and soon came into Nori’s hands. Arrests had already been 
made by Crass on Gela and by Colin Allan on Isabel (Lamani 1947; Noel 1947k; 
cf Trench 1947a, 1; BSIP 1947d, 124; see BSIP 1947e, 10–11; Davies nd, 273, 282).
109. See BSIP 1947d, 23–24; 1947e, 10–11, 99–100; AR 1947, 7–8. In finding 
Maasina Rule seditious, the judge Charles cited remarks by unknown persons in 
the crowd about not wanting Kakalu‘ae as “we don’t want the headmen,” though 
there was testimony that Kakalu‘ae alone was the target of the people’s animosity 
there (BSIP 1947e, 100). In Pijin, a distinction between singular “headman” and 
plural “headmen” is unmarked, unless oloketa (from “altogether”) is added to make 
it inclusive.
110. Davies 1947e; nd, 274–277; Noel 1947k, 1947l, 1947m, 1947n; Nicoll 1947d.
111. Davies nd, 274, longer quote 276.
112. Davies 1947f; nd, 280, 282.
113. Davies nd, 283; MAR 1947, 8b; BSIP 1947d, 32, 37. On Belo going to ‘Aoke, 
see also BSIP 1947e, 99. Deck alleged that the previous spring there had been “a 
secret move of the people of north Malaita to ‘fight’ the Government,” but that 
Nono‘oohimae had stopped it (1948a). I know no evidence for this.
114. Noel 1947o.
115. Davies nd, 281, 282; Noel 1947o. Sandars remained “disappeared” in the 
archives for years; references to past Malaita administrations name Barley or Ben-
gough, but rarely Sandars. Russell wrote in error that Sandars left Malaita to retire, 
“and it is arguable that he avoided any confrontations with the Movement while 
he was still in charge” (2004, 4), which might imply that he intended to pass the 
problem on to his successor. Russell told the facts as he knew them, and what his 
misreporting suggests is the degree to which Davies’s view of events became the 
accepted one that later officers learned (see also Russell 1986). Sandars’s autobi-
ography refers to Davies only briefly, as “a very nice fellow,” and says merely that 
Sandars decided to retire after his operation (nd, 124, 142).
116. Article 24 in the Order’s original 1877 version allowed the high commis-
sioner to demand a security from a British subject he thought “has committed or is 
about to commit an offence against the Pacific Islander Protection Acts of 1872 and 
1875 or is otherwise dangerous to the peace and good order of the Western Pacific 
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Islands” (quoted in Boutilier 1984, 4). Charles did not cite this article, which was 
clearly targeted at unsavory Europeans.
117. Charles 1947d; BSIP 1947c; see also Allan 1950a, 26, 59.
118. Noel 1947p.
Chapter 7: Suppression and Resistance
1. Davies nd, 280 (re Fijian soldiers). Many Malaitans for decades after resented 
people of the west, especially Choiseul, for their role in suppression, and some 
blamed Nori’s early death from meningitis on 30 November 1952 on Choiseu-
lese sorcery (see, eg, Russell 1950e; Andersen 1952o; Parliamentary Debates 1981, 
225–227; see Zoleveke 1980, 44). Allan later took pains to play down the legacy of 
divisiveness caused by the use of Western Solomons police (1989, 96–98; cf Allan 
1950m, 4; Germond 1949b). Assisting in early arrests were European “special con-
stables” from Honiara: Harvey Gorrie, Charles Lamond, and John Bergelin.
2. Trench 1947a, 1947b, 1947e; Cameron 1947m; MAR 1947, 9; Noel 1947s; 
BSIP 1947d, 33–35. Noel falsely told Nicoll that the only exceptions to his “native 
complaint” reason were two men who obstructed arrests. By early October arrests 
totaled 100 on Malaita (most in the north), 10 on Guadalcanal, 20 each on Gela and 
Isabel, and 40 on Makira. By the end of October, 230 had been jailed, and by early 
December, 380 (Noel 1947x). After that, most of those arrested would be Malai-
tans, followed by Makirans (Noel 1947s; MAR 1947, 9). Allan later perpetuated the 
“native complaint” justification and a falsehood, passed on to later officers, that the 
chiefs were all arrested in a one-day operation (1950a, 61; see Russell 2003, 47).
3. Trench 1947a, 1947b; Cameron 1947m; Noel 1947r, 1947s; Marquand 1947d, 
my translation of his Pijin; 1947e, 4; 1950, 15; PIM 1947a; BSIP 1947e, 97; Lamond 
testimony in BSIP 1947e, 39; Allan 1950a, 61 (cf Davies 1947l, 2). Nicoll, concerned 
to distance the warships from the punitive actions, told the press that the visit of 
Warramunga, and by implication the other warships, was coincidental and had been 
planned for months. Submarine HMS Amphion called at Santa Ana off the eastern 
tip of Makira (PIM 1947a; Manchester Guardian 19 Sept 1947, 8).
4. Cameron 1947m, 1947n; Davies nd, 304.
5. Cameron 1947n; BSIP 1947e, 59; personal communications from Sulafana-
mae 1982, Laefiwane 1982, Ma‘aanamae 1987, Gwanu‘i 1996, anonymous 1996; see 
BSIP 1947e, 59, 72. Fifi‘i’s uncle Kwarialaena, who translated Cameron’s speech, 
and the other headmen feigned surprise when Cameron told them he had come to 
take Fifi‘i. In 1982 and 1987 Fifi‘i gave me detailed accounts of his arrest, and his 
book has another (1982b; 1987; 1989, 78–81). I verified with several witnesses Fifi‘i’s 
claim to have averted a clash, perhaps saving the lives of Cameron, his party, and 
many Kwaio. Fifi‘i’s account matches Cameron’s on most of the points that both 
cover. One man pressing Fifi‘i to resist was Alefo, who had spent 14 years in prison 
for killing one of Bell’s soldiers. A close friend of his told me that he was still bitter 
over his time in jail. Cameron guessed the crowd at 400, but a much larger group, 
including most of the women, was in a nearby clearing (Fifi‘i 1982b; 1987; 1989, 
78–81; personal communications from Tagii‘au 1981, Ri‘ika 1982, Ma‘aanamae 
1996). For more on Alefo, see Keesing and Corris 1980, 142, passim. Davies said 
Cameron told him that Kwaio “had been working themselves up into a frenzy” when 
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he arrested Fifi‘i, while Wairokai people met his “Maasina Rule must finish” speech 
as he arrested Nono‘oohimae with “puzzlement” (nd, 301, 304).
6. Davies 1947f (see also Davies nd, 347); Nicoll writing in BSIP 1945–1959, 10 
Nov 1947, 27. See also AR 1948 (page 27), from which the Manchester Guardian pub-
lished quotations (24 Aug 1949, 4). In his later manuscript Davies said Basi “was sup-
ported. . . . by a band of very aggressive thugs and maintained his position by threat 
of force, which was not a remark one could conscientiously make about most of the 
other main Marching Rule leaders” (nd, 12). The yellow press, most notably the 
reactionary Pacific Islands Monthly, often outdid even Davies’s portrayals, stressing 
communist inspiration and guidance (eg, PIM 1947c, 1948a, 1948b).
7. Noel 1946b; BSIP 1947e, 61 (Ganifiri), and 86 (Nori); Marquand 1947a; 
1947b, 4; 1950, 29 (quote).
8. Noel 1947d; Trench 1947h, 3; Marquand 1950, 29; ‘Atoomea 1947b; BSIP 
1947d, 47, 57; 1947e, 45, 54, 61, 82, 105, 109; Cameron 1947o; cf Allan 1950a, 28, 
41–42, 90. Laracy noted the popular nature of the movement (1983, 31). For a 
broader statement of this colonial perspective re African leaders, see Furse 1962, 
306; see also Guha 1989. The court verdict on the chiefs said they were guilty of con-
spiracy regardless, since, “If the real leaders were the rank and file of the movement, 
as the nominal leaders have alleged, [they were bound] to them not to disclose the 
criminal objects of Marching Rule” (BSIP 1947e, 131). Russell later wrote, “While 
Chiefs and a hierarchy of sub-chiefs were appointed island wide they were, I believe, 
representative rather than a cabinet of policy makers” (2004, 9). For Allan, chiefs 
embodied “the rise of the hero-leader” typical of messianic movements (1950a, 
95–96). Belshaw portrayed followers’ relationship with leaders as, “We’d cut off our 
hands if he told us to” (1947a, 192).
9. Marquand 1950, 27. Marquand argued that headmen were “paid tools of the 
Government” and so should no longer be heads of councils, and that in any case 
they would never be accepted as such (1950, 48). Allan advocated reviving the long 
and fruitless colonial search for a hereditary Malaitan leadership on which to base 
indirect rule and explained the chiefs’ popularity and headmen’s unpopularity by 
asserting that few headmen had hereditary status while more chiefs did (1950a, 
40–42). The nonhereditary chiefs, he said, were mere “upstart politicians” (MAR 
1949–1950, 12; cf Allan 1960, 163).
10. Davies 1947g; Marquand 1947c; Noel 1947s; Newman 1947; BSIP 1945–1959, 
10 Nov 1947, 26–27; Sydney Herald 18 and 19 Sept 1947.
11. Nicoll in BSIP 1945–1959, 10 Nov, 26, and Noel on page 28; Noel 1947b; 
Davies 1947i (but cf Davies 1947k); Cameron 1947o; Trench 1947h, 5, 6; AR 1948, 
26; see also Caulton 1950. Councils and courts were suspended on Malaita, Makira, 
and Guadalcanal in September, although a few continued with ambiguous status 
(BSIP [1947f?]). On how difficult it was for Islanders to complain about prewar 
labor conditions, see Frazer 1990, 194.
12. Trench 1947h, 4–5, 7; Allan 1950a.
13. Noel 1947j, 1947q, 1947t, 1947u; Davies writing in MAR 1947, 9; Marquand 
1948b, 1; Waleanisia 1987, 6; see Nicoll 1947e and 1947h for measures he wanted 
taken to resume normal relations.
14. Trench 1947d, 1947f; Nicoll 1947i; Noel 1947v, 1947w; Charles 1947b. 
Charles in the new year advised that some prisoners be charged not with conspiracy 
but with “public mischief” or assault and false imprisonment, and he laid out evi-
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dential guidelines, which were contradicted by much of the evidence he would soon 
accept in the sedition trial (Trench 1948a; see Charles 1948a).
15. Noel 1947w; Moore 1947; Trench 1947g, 1947h, 2; BSIP 1947e, 1; see Fox 
1942–1949, 20 May 1948; Sisili 1949, 1. Davies later wrote, “The accused were not 
provided with legal aid, nor did they ask for it, although Marching Rule funds could 
have well afforded the cost. . . . It was of course not a satisfactory situation to have as 
examining magistrate a person like myself who had been responsible for the arrest 
of the accused and unearthing all the evidence against them. While I did my best to 
conduct the hearing as if I knew nothing about the case I was privately convinced of 
the guilt of most of them. . . . My original understanding had been that Headquarters 
would deal with this case and most of the other legal work involved in the arrests, 
and my personal view was that not only had I been let down but that it was wrong 
in principle to involve me in the case” (nd, 321–322). I can find no evidence that 
Davies protested at the time. On Charles’s guilty verdict, Davies said: “At least now 
an independent judge had found that Marching Rule was a subversive conspiracy, 
and that it did not exist solely in Davies’ fevered imagination. Charles was no tool 
of the Administration either, even if he was concurrently its Legal Adviser, and I 
had no doubt that he had done his damnest to be even-handed” (nd, 338). Fifi‘i in 
1987 told me that funds were set aside for legal defense or to pay fines, and later 
(1989, 85) said it was Davies himself who refused their requests for a lawyer. Six 
months after the trial, Charles wrote in reference to other cases that a sedition case 
“is a difficult one to try, and one in which the accused should have benefit of a trial 
before a lawyer who can also assist him in his defence” (1948e, 3). One key pros-
ecution witness, John Siho of Small Malaita, testified that Davies had coached his 
exam testimony, and complained that in the transcript Davies had attributed to him 
more incriminating statements than he had actually made about a defendant. Siho 
was bitter about Maasina Rule people’s criticism of the Anglican Church, for which 
he was a lay teacher. He remained an informant, receiving pay, at least into 1952, 
reporting on Malaitans and Catholic priests. Allan called him a “self appointed spy. 
Not usually reliable.” By early 1949 he had been barred from every village in south-
ern Malaita and moved to Honiara (BSIP 1947e, 32, 33; Siho 1949, 1950; Allan 
1952b, 15).
16. As historical evidence, these transcripts must be used cautiously. Several wit-
nesses testified to wrong dates or chronologies. Some for the prosecution obviously 
distorted events to vilify defendants. Some defendants overstated their unequivocal 
cooperation with the government, and Kifo, at least, lied. A few testified that they 
had never heard anyone speak angrily about the government or that they had heard 
nothing of Maasina Rule being on other islands, both clearly false claims, at least as 
translated. The translation of multiple spoken Malaitan languages and Pijin into an 
English transcript was fraught with hazards in this legal context where precise word-
ing could be crucial. For example, a Pijin statement, “Mi nating save long Maasina 
Rule on other islands,” might be translated as “I don’t know about,” perhaps a true 
statement, or alternatively, “I don’t know if there is,” surely a false one. The govern-
ment thought such knowledge a key point to the charge of widespread conspiracy. 
Some translators translated from languages that were not their own. Page numbers 
on the trial transcripts are multiple, with errors and duplications; for citations I 
numbered pages after the index consecutively.
17. One seized code was presented as asserting “the claim to impose the death 
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penalty,” coupled with a separate “black list” of movement enemies. I have seen 
several 1970s and later codes that list a death penalty for certain offenses, but their 
group authors, people I know (and I watched some of these codes composed), gave 
the old penalty simply to stress the severity of offenses that had become more com-
mon (eg, incest) and the consequent need for serious penalties. Across Malaita 
from 1944 through 1947 individuals and groups produced many hundreds of docu-
ments stating varied opinions, and many were sent to chiefs. This is still common 
in kastom politics, and any chief receives unsolicited papers. I have watched groups 
compose codes targeted at and even sent to rivals to enumerate disagreements with 
them. This occurred during Maasina Rule as well, for example the codes discussed 
in chapter 5 compiled by Christians to protest kastom codes with ancestral rules. 
Thus any chief might hold documents that did not express and might attack his own 
ideas. Further, multiple copies of forged letters circulated purporting to be from 
everyone from US officers to head chiefs. The latter continued to appear after the 
chiefs were jailed (see, eg, Letter 1948a; 1948b, likely forged as Nono‘oohimae’s 
[see Allan 1950e; 1950g, 8–9; Masterman 1950f, 6]). The government presented 
writings in different hands, authors unknown, to incriminate chiefs in whose village 
they were seized as well as “the Marching Rule” writ large. Any lawyer would quickly 
have exposed their worthlessness as evidence (eg, BSIP 1947d, 33–35, 99–101; 
1947e, 39–41).
18. This charge was at the top of each defendant’s “Statement of the Accused,” 
filed at the end of the preliminary exam record (BSIP 1947d), and also opens page 
1 of the trial transcript (BSIP 1947e). Charles selectively applied the date change, 
presumably made because the movement was not forbidden until 15 August, and 
then only verbally. His verdict stated, “Although as to some of [the defendants], 
the evidence does not establish any active participation in Marching Rule activi-
ties after 14th August 1947, I have no doubt from their admissions as to the dura-
tion of their membership that they continued to be members after that date.” Six 
lesser defendants he judged not guilty due to lack of evidence of participation after 
that date (BSIP 1947e, 131). Most defendants would have been unaware before 
their arrest that the movement had been verbally declared illegal, except perhaps 
through rumor. Indeed, the declaration was apparently not itself legal. After the 
trial Divisional Officer Germond indicated that it had not yet been made illegal 
(1948c), and High Commissioner Nicoll on 2 September suggested looking into 
whether it should be (1947g). Norman Deck told Germond the next May, “At pres-
ent many are quite puzzled when a sweeping condemnation of the movement is 
made” (1948c; see also Geerts 1948). Germond replied, “I am not keen for the 
moment on defining what Government says is illegal in Marching Rule—My line is 
that Marching Rule is wrong—the whole of it! I am sure that the Native will under-
stand that better than if we start saying that this is wrong and this is not and that 
can pass and that cannot!” (1948b, 7; see also Germond 1948f; Nicoll 1947g). Three 
years later Russell suggested Maasina Rule be declared “an unlawful society” (1950j, 
11). Ian Frazer observed that the Unlawful Societies Act and the Seditious Meet-
ings Act were used to suppress worker actions in early industrial England (1990, 
191–192).
19. BSIP 1947e, 120, 122; MAR 1947, 9; Fifi‘i 1982b, 36. More potent evidence 
was presented at the trial implicating Diote‘e than most other head chiefs, including 
that he helped conduct a court and kept a prisoner sentenced in it. But Davies and 
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Forster “considered he did more good than harm,” and he was kept as a headman. 
In 1949 and 1950 he was suspected of further movement activity, or at least of turn-
ing a blind eye (BSIP 1947d, 84; Trench 1949; Allan 1950k, 4–5; cf Davies nd, 320). 
Deck said George had renounced Maasina Rule at a September SSEM conference, 
and though conceding he likely did this to “save his own skin” (arrests were ongo-
ing), argued that he should serve a shorter sentence than other chiefs (1948b, 2).
20. See Charles 1947b; for a post-trial explanation of this to chiefs, see Germond 
1948d.
21. In 1950, when officials in London asked why so many people were being 
arrested (and they only knew about the tip of the iceberg), they were told that these 
courts had “imposed fines on those who were unwilling to co-operate with Maasina 
Rule” as part of movement “attempts to coerce the local population into obedience 
with its dictates” (Secretary of State 1950; see Tomlinson 1949; Manchester Guardian 
6 Nov 1951, 6). Trench and Gregory-Smith also gave the press false propaganda (see 
Sullivan 1948; PIM 1950c). Colin Allan wrote in his master’s thesis, “Offences which 
came under the notice of these tribunals included refusal to accept the principles of 
the movement, disobedience of communal orders, non-payment of marching rule 
taxes, and breaches of native custom which had been recognized by the movement” 
(1950a, 32).
22. See Charles 1948a for his instructions to officers on these issues. The month 
before the trial, Marquand had written, “There has been much talk of violence 
but since arrests of members of the Marching Rule organization began, there has 
been no charge of violence. The only approach to violence being one case of rape 
and several cases of duties carrying truncheons” (1947e, 4). I know of no rape con-
nected to Maasina Rule. As noted earlier (this book, chapter 5), Marquand thought 
these courts better than the government ones (1950, 14, 35). Six months after the 
trial, Cameron recommended that courts be soon restarted in the north with par-
ticipation by “former Marching Rule justices” (1948g).
23. Bobongi and Heber received the same sentences as the other head chiefs. 
Tried with them was Brown Zalamana of Santa Isabel, charged with carrying Maa-
sina Rule there and to Gela from Guadalcanal. He had not been to Malaita since 
before the movement started. The government tried but failed to connect him 
directly to the Malaitan activities, despite one witness falsely placing him in ‘Are‘are 
during their organization. Since Brown was not so connected, I do not deal with 
him here (see Charles 1947c; BSIP 1947e, 35–37, 113–117; White 1991, 200–203).
24. BSIP 1947d, 3. Kakalu‘ae, son of Kwaisulia, the most powerful late-nineteenth 
century “passage master” in the north, had been reappointed Lau’s headman the 
week before Nori’s visit. Sandars, whose brief testimony mostly favored defendants, 
was moved up to appear first in the actual trial since he was about to leave the 
Protectorate (BSIP 1947e, 1–4, 11). The timing of his departure was lucky for the 
government (or perhaps something other than luck) since defendants would surely 
have called him as a witness. Laracy published excerpts of trial testimony and cross-
examinations, mostly of Kakalu‘ae, Steven Sipolo, and John Siho (1983, 114–134).
25. BSIP 1947d, 4–13, 15–20; 1947e, 77, 86; see Fifi‘i 1989, 66–67. Saeni testified 
he was Kakalu‘ae’s “servant,” and said, “I am as his son,” but denied that Kakalu‘ae 
had told him what to say (BSIP 1947e, 8–10). Kakalu‘ae acted as court translator for 
Lau witnesses and defendants. England Kwaisulia remained a Lau resistance leader 
into 1952, and later helped found the Remnant Church (see Burt 1983; Maetoloa 
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1985). After meeting England Kwaisulia in 1961, District Commissioner Michael 
Townsend wrote, “He appeared to be mentally deficient” (1961a).
26. Writing in the 1970s, Davies appears confused here; he struck out “June” 
and replaced it with “1945,” but June 1946 was correct for Nori’s tour of the North. 
Trench, the trial’s prosecutor, thought Nori had patrolled Lau and spoken with 
Kakalu‘ae in 1944 (Trench 1947h, 2–3; see Davies nd, 250, 328).
27. Davies nd, 115.
28. See, eg, Trench 1947h, 2–3; MAR 1947, 5B; Germond 1948b, 2; Davies 
1948a; nd, 328; Allan 1950a, 56–59; Russell 2003, 44; 2004, 10. SSEM missionaries 
also propagated this tale (eg, NIV Sept 1949, 11). After this Davies often reported 
“usual bogus villages” where he visited, even after months of open defiance, but did 
not say what their new deceitful purpose was. By then, other officers were reporting 
too many people living in some towns. Russell later recalled many towns in the north 
“were not occupied all the time” from mid-1949 into 1950, a period of government 
raids and mass arrests, but he also thought they were deserted when he visited “as 
a deliberate act of unfriendliness toward Government,” and because people were 
away during certain gardening cycles (MAR 1947, 5B; Russell 1949a, appendix III; 
1986, 2; see Moore 1950). Again, many bush people had alternated between inland 
and coastal towns, and many lived primarily in the former after arrests began.
29. BSIP 1947d, 2; see also BSIP 1947e, 5–7, 24, 62–63, 70, 99, 102. Kakalu‘ae 
may have recognized that being head chief would wreck his relations with his long-
time benefactor the government, but defendant “Kabouie” (Kaoboe, “Cowboy”) put 
it to him in cross-examination that he really resigned because the Lau people were 
about to depose him and he quit to avoid that humiliation. Kakalu‘ae did not refute 
this and said perhaps people disliked him because he was cautious (BSIP 1947d, 
11). It was England Kwaisulia, with Loia, who had informed Kakalu‘ae that he was 
to be head chief (BSIP 1947d, 10–11; 1947e, 4). An officer later described Kakalu‘ae 
as “Self-educated, reserved, the complete snob, yet a die-hard Tory. . . . imposing his 
own brand of enlightened despotism” (Notes on the Records [1953?]).
30. BSIP 1947e, 123, 128, 130, 131; see PIM 1948a.
31. Noel 1948b. Defendant Ifiamae was convicted with the others but put under 
a £5 bond and ordered to report regularly to Davies since “The only thing against 
him is that he was a member of Marching Rule,” and he “did not participate in any 
harmful activities” (Charles 1948c; see note 18, this chapter.) For the full list of 
defendants and their sentences, see Laracy 1983, D1.
32. Vaughan, 4 Sept minute, encl in Freeston 1948a; Charles 1948g. Charles 
retained his BSIP position until May 1953, when he departed to become a Hong 
Kong magistrate (1953–1956), high court judge in Nigeria (1958–1963), then a 
judge in Northern Rhodesia, and (dates unknown) a puisne judge on the Zambian 
Court of Appeal. In 1966 he became a special lecturer in law at Australia’s Monash 
University.
33. Davies 1947j; MAR 1947, 9; see Burt 1994, 190. Given the deep resentment 
of Siru in the area, the dismantling was probably a protest, but Davies said he did 
not know for sure.
34. Marquand 1947e, 2. He counseled against arrests for refusing communal 
work (eg, tax house repairs), which would “undoubtedly result in the arrest of a 
considerable number of people which, in view of our intention to collect tax, might 
not at the moment be advisable.” Instead, Marquand said, if Charles approved, they 
424 Notes to Pages 273–277
should fine “heads of lines” if men in their communities failed to do such work, and 
if they refused to pay, imprison them (1947e, 3).
35. AR 1947, 9B. As Tom Russell told Ben Burt in 1986, “It was a holy writ here in 
London that the tax was symbolic of fealty to the crown,” and for this reason, even 
when it was destined for deposit in local council funds, it was seen to be crucial that 
government officers collect it (Russell 1986, 4; see also Russell 1950f, 4). Forster had 
censused ‘Are‘are, so they were not required to be censused now, but Masterman in 
April 1950 nonetheless used the census as a weapon to send ‘Are‘are men to prison 
(Masterman 1950f, 1–2, 6).
36. Noel had split the Protectorate into two “divisions,” each headed by such 
an officer: The Southern, containing Malaita, Makira, and Santa Cruz, was run by 
Germond based at ‘Aoke. The Northern, containing Western District (New Geor-
gia, Isabel, Choiseul, and the Shortlands) and Central District (Gela, Russells, and 
Guadalcanal), was run from Tulagi by Peter Hughes, also fresh from Africa (Basuto-
land). The system proved unwieldy and the respective duties of district commission-
ers were poorly defined. In early 1949 a new system was adopted, with four districts: 
Western, Central, Malaita, and Eastern (AR 1948, 33; A Sandars 1950, 1).
37. Davies nd, 339; Germond 1948a, 1948b; Noel 1948a, 1948b, 1948c; see A 
Sandars 1950, 1–6.
38. Davies nd, 339. Davies on this same page suggested Noel was pressured to 
take a mild approach by the Labour government in London, and perhaps also by 
officials in Fiji due to their “personalities” or career worries. I have found no evi-
dence of either, or of Davies having called for sterner measures that Noel rejected. 
Davies never returned to Malaita, but Noel soon made him district commissioner of 
the far more benign Western District.
39. Germond 1948a; 1948b and cover letter; see Davies nd, 324–328, 333, 339.
40. Germond 1948b, cover letter.
41. Marquand 1948a, 1948b; Deck 1948a, 4 and 21 March; Forster 1948a; Davies 
nd, 339.
42. Marquand 1948a; Forster 1948c, 1948e, 1948i; Ma‘aanamae 1987 pers comm. 
Allan, who was not then on Malaita, said the first fence was built at Irofa‘alu’s vil-
lage near Malu‘u. Some artificial island dwellers at Ferasubua, ‘Ataa, and elsewhere 
moved from coastal towns back to their islands, which Forster thought had no politi-
cal meaning. Later some of them occupied coastal towns yet again (Forster 1948e, 
Lau; Russell 1949a, 4; Allan 1950a, 63–64).
43. Marquand 1948a; Germond 1948e; Forster 1948a, 4; see Kwara‘ae Native 
Affairs Book, 8 May 1952. The fences’ cleaning function would be to demarcate the 
area that needed to be kept in order—bush hamlets have exact borders for this and 
for purposes of taboo application. Town populations typically included people with 
primary land rights there and, under Malaitan land tenure principles, the right to 
permit others with no such rights to live there. Christian villages had been settled on 
this basis for decades, often over objections of other primary owners.
44. Noel 1948d; Masterman 1948; A Sandars 1950 (quote, while acting RC). 
By mid-1948 only seven Malaitan policemen were serving on Malaita; in mid-1950, 
there were 23.
45. Noel 1948e, 1948f; Germond 1948k; Charles 1948d, 1949b; Forster 1948d; Ger-
mond 1949f. See Charles 1948e and 1948f on his expansive definition of “sedition.”
46. Cameron 1948a, 1948b, 1948d; Germond 1948i; Allan 1952a. Allan (1949c, 
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15–17) and Russell (2003, 51–52) described Malu‘u station in 1949; for Malu‘u later, 
see Frazer 1973, 44. It had been hoped to also open a station at Kwai, but resources 
were insufficient.
47. Noel 1948f; 1948g, 4; Forster 1948b; Allan 1949c, 19; see PIM 1949.
48. Cameron 1948d; Noel 1948g, 2.
49. Germond 1948i; 1948l; Cameron 1948d; 1948e. Germond suggested that 
when the To‘abaita soon surrendered officers should set up trade classes, run soc-
cer games, and show movies to win over the young men (Germond 1948j). Allan 
said India’s independence in August 1947 passed unnoticed in the Solomons (1989, 
90), and I found no evidence that Malaitans had heard of Gandhi, or for that matter 
of colonial India.
50. Noel 1948g, 2, 3; Freeston 1948a; Germond 1949a. Newspapers often pre-
sented as fact government accounts of Maasina Rule, but in late 1949, after Noel 
had left and Germond was acting in his stead, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported, 
citing no source, “The Solomons, although governed by a resident, are adminis-
tratively under Fiji, three days away by small ship. The resident can easily block Fiji 
from learning what goes on. His sole opposition comes from an advisory council. 
When the discussion there gets awkward, he shifts it into camera (secret), which 
means that no minutes are sent to Fiji for his boss to see.” Consistent with this, 
the reporter said Freeston had just told the press, “Marching Rule is broken up 
and . . . whole districts have decided to accept British authority” (Pope 1949).
51. Cameron 1948f, 1948g, 1948h; Forster 1948e, 1948g; Marquand 1948c; Deck 
1948e. Later, SSEM head K E Griffiths gave sermons with a similar message (MQR 
30 Sept 1951, 2).
52. For example, in November 1948 Freeston reported to Secretary of State 
for the Colonies Creech Jones that the situation was much improved, though it 
demanded “unremitting surveillance.” Freeston anticipated the time—“I trust 
that this will not be long delayed”—when people would stop regarding officers “as 
oppressors and not as advisers and friends” (1948b).
53. Marquand 1950, 15, 17, 22–23, 26, 47.
54. See Allan 1949c, 4; 1950a, 40–41; MAR 1949–1950, 8.
55. Forster 1948f, 1948g; Germond 1948m; ‘Elota quoted in Keesing 1978b, 160; 
personal communications from Tagii‘au 1981, Sulafanamae 1981, Saelasi Lounga 
1982, Fifi‘i 1982, Gwanu‘i 1996, Basiberi 1996, Ma‘aanamae 1997. Former police-
man Titiuru told me in 1987 that some structures were so massive as to require a full 
day to destroy with axes, and Kwaio have boasted to me of their sturdiness. Russell 
saw some built of sunken logs over three meters high (1949a, appendix III, 2; 2003, 
47). After this same tour Forster stated, “Marching Rule will come to an end in the 
Lau Lagoon in the near future” (1948e). For months officers sought Anifelo and his 
US carbine, which his younger brother Laefiwane kept in the Kwaio bush until the 
1980s (Anifelo 1981 pers comm; Laefiwane 1982 pers comm).
56. Forster 1948h, 1948i; Hughes 1948; personal communications from Sulafa-
namae 1980, Anifelo 1981, Ma‘aanamae 1987. Hughes called Naafinua people “pas-
sive but surly” and 70 were jailed. ‘Aoke had a women’s prison in the 1930s, mostly 
for adulteresses (Sandars nd, 36).
57. Forster 1948h (and Trench response); 1949b, To‘abaita; Father Stuyvenberg 
to Dubois, 29 Oct 1949, in Laracy 1971, 101; Fox 1962, 131 (and see 129); see Rus-
sell 1949a, 3; 2003, 48; Allan 1949c, 5, 12; 1950g, 18; and Forikeo 1951. I have also 
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not found what befell women Marquand arrested for “inciting others” after they 
rebuilt Abu’s fences, as noted earlier (1948c). Forster reported that in March 1949 
men were assigned to stay home in the Malu‘u area, where all the area’s other 
men were soon jailed (1949b). Four months later, though, Russell saw malnutrition 
among northern women and children, and an Anglican doctor, George Hemming, 
was “gravely concerned by this result of Government policy” (Russell 1949a, appen-
dix III). The next year, then–District Commissioner Masterman wrote, “The arrests 
and comparatively severe sentences on whole sections of the native communities 
have naturally led to misery in the villages; indeed, I have used this misery of the 
women and children to point the moral of the law-abider as against the law-breaker, 
and the Missions have not sought to influence my actions in principle” (1950f, 10; 
see Gregory-Smith 1950e). On 10 October 1948, Noel went on leave, then retired.
58. Germond 1948o; 1948p, 2 (quote); ARs 1948, 26; 1949–1950, 38. For the 
idea that “degradation of women was a measure for the degradation of a society,” 
see Thomas 1994, 102, passim; see also Thomas 1992a.
59. Hughes 1949a; Allan 1949c, 7, 12 (and see 5); 1949a, appendix III; Titiuru 
1987, 5.
60. Titiuru 1987, 5. This is probably the incident Fox referred to: “There was 
[an] occasion when a District Officer, threatened by a large and hostile crowd of 
armed men, had to retreat with his police into the sea.” Fox, often unreliable, also 
said he saw police beaten in one town (1962, 131). I have found no other reports of 
either episode—a puzzle, given the eagerness of some officers to portray the move-
ment as violent. Titiuru held sympathies toward Maasina Rule. He was at one time 
a warder over the head chiefs, who liked him for his kindness, especially in secretly 
giving them extra food (Titiuru 1987 pers comm; Fifi‘i 1987 pers comm).
61. Belshaw 1947a, 190 (and see 192; 1950b, 128); AR 1949–1950, 38; Allan 
1950a, 26, 59–61; 1951c, 96; 1951e, 3; Davenport and Çoker 1967, 128; Campbell 
1978, 298; Zoleveke 1980, 44; Laracy 1983, 177; Guidieri 1988, 189; Davenport 1989, 
274; see also Grover 1955, 13; Hogbin 1964, 98; Worsley 1968, 179–180; Coates 
1970, 295; cf Stanley 1975, 180. Oddly, several scholars wrote that the Maasina Rule 
man killed the policeman (Worsley 1968, 180; Laracy 1976, 125; Campbell 1978, 
300—all citing AR 1949–1950, 39, though that source has it correctly, ie, the other 
way around). Russell received a concocted history of violence from his predecessors 
or their reports (1950f, 13), and perhaps others did as well. Belshaw seemed to refer 
to the ineffectual Langalanga protests at ‘Aoke in June 1946, described in chapter 
6 (though he spoke of them as “demonstrations”). He then warned of flare-ups: 
“Sudden shouting by distant men, an action trivial in itself yet mystifying to natives 
in the vicinity, is enough to work them into a frenzy of excitement, which, in the 
presence of mass hysteria, can make them irrational and savage” (1947a, 192–193). 
Later the same year he wrote, “Two or three incidents occurred, but nothing of 
real importance” (Belshaw 1947b, 11). Against violent portrayals, the New York Times 
years later reported the “Marxist-tinged” movement had promoted a policy of “free 
love” (Durdin 1966; see Belshaw 2009, 14). The true numbers of arrests for civil 
disobedience were concealed from the press (eg, Fiji Times 1950).
62. Hughes 1949b; Russell 2003, 4. Malaitans had portrayed jail time as “eating 
government rice” since the 1920s (eg, Hogbin 1933), and such stoic portrayals bol-
stered a fallacy among some whites that Islanders did not mind imprisonment and 
required still harsher punishments like flogging.
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63. Allan 1949c, 8; MAR 1949–1950, 9; Marquand 1950, 38; Russell 2004, 5. 
From March 1949 until he left in June, Marquand as DO Auki was relieved of most 
arrest duties (Germond 1949b).
64. Germond 1949a; 1949d; Allan 1949c, 3; Marquand 1950, 16, 17; Russell 2003, 
47–48 (cf Russell 1949a). Leaf shelters slept 200 prison laborers each, overseen by 
one warder (Russell 1986, 2–3; see Allan 1949c, 16). District Commissioner Stanley 
Masterman later stopped work on the road and sent more prisoners to Honiara 
(1950c, 7).
65. Germond 1948p; see also Germond 1948n; Masterman comments on Rus-
sell 1949a, 6. Russell recalled the census was “not in any way related to taxation” 
and that it was illegal to use census data for that (1986, 2), yet Germond is clear 
here and elsewhere that for him the census was intended for tax roll compilation 
(see Germond 1949a, 2, 3). Allan claimed in mid-1950, “It was found in 1949 when 
it became necessary to execute mass arrests on the fence and census issues in North 
Malaita, the headmen in the different areas were able to sit down and write out the 
names of every adult male between 16 and 60 in their respective areas. This would 
have been sufficient for assessing the population for taxation purposes” (1950g, 
26). After its use as a political weapon, it was years before the government could 
conduct a true census; Allan wrote in 1952, “Vital statistics cannot yet be collected 
as census is still politically blacklisted. The mere suggestion of counting heads 
sends the population running for miles” (1952b, 24). Some refused to be censused 
even in the 1980s.
66. Forster quoted in Malaita District 1949; Hughes 1949b; Germond 1949b. 
Cameron went to Fiji and never returned.
67. Cameron 1949; Forster 1949a; Charles 1949a; Germond 1949c; Hughes 
1949a, 1949b. Three weeks later Freeston remitted the sentences but did not refer 
the cases to the appeals court. A few months later a “manifesto” by Ariel Sisili was 
labeled possibly “seditious” because it said, among other things, that people had 
been “arrested and sentenced without fair trial” and Sisili was later imprisoned 
partly for writing it (Sisili 1949, 1; Russell 1949c, 2; see Laracy 1983, 162).
68. Andersen 1954c, 2; Russell 1986; 2004, 10. For arrest numbers, see Noel 
1947x; AR 1948, 21. The coming year would be no better in Eastern District, from 
which Fred Bentley reported an “appalling” figure, as of 31 May 1950, of 2,000 
arrested without incident (1950).
69. This highlights the cost of discontinuity of knowledge across generations of 
officers, with no organized system to transmit it. At other times confusions or mis-
representations were passed down for years, a prime example being Davies’s 1947 
Malaita Annual Report, which taught officers into the 1950s about the tyrannical 
nature of Maasina Rule before Operation Delouse. This could lead them to con-
tinue policies that had generated the very problems they inherited.
70. Germond 1949a, 1949b; Allan 1949b. Langalanga and west Kwara‘ae were 
under the district officer at ‘Aoke until mid-1950, when the district commissioner 
was relieved of touring and he became responsible also for all of Kwara‘ae, Kwaio, 
‘Are‘are, and Small Malaita (Masterman 1950c, 2). Of 2,147 Jericho arrests by 
early March, 847 were for census refusal (Allan 1949a; Marquand 1949b; Germond 
1949a). Keesing erred in saying Allan was Malaita’s district commissioner in charge 
of Operation Delouse in 1947 (1992a, 148–149, 165).
71. Allan 1949b. Also popular at this time were beards, which Russell was told 
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on an old practice of a murdered person’s survivors adopting mourning dishev-
elment until the killing was avenged or compensated. The SSEM’s Gibbins, too, 
noticed Maanawai and ‘Oloburi men “wearing the Moscow beard and hat which is 
a tenet of their creed” (1950).
72. Allan 1949c, 7, 9–14, 18, see 19, and for detailed arrest statistics, appendixes 
I and II. The 1,060 would not have been 76 percent of men north of Kwara‘ae; 
perhaps Allan meant the percentage of men arrested in just the To‘abaita area that 
surrounded Malu‘u station.
73. Germond 1949b; Freeston 1949b; Masterman 1949; Devlin 1949; A Sandars 
1950, 6–7.
74. BSIP 1935; Masterman 1935; Ashley paraphrased in BSIP 1938; Russell 1986, 
2; 2003, 57. Prison Superintendent E Nelson Turner, a man with his own malevo-
lent reputation among Malaitans dating at least to the 1927 punitive expedition, 
reported, “There was not the slightest justification for this assault” (1935). Ashley 
answered Masterman with sympathy: “I am sure you regret your action and I realise 
that you did it in a fit of temper which, in this climate, it is not always easy to have 
under control, but I trust you will be more careful in future” (Ashley 1935c; see 
Masterman personal file BSIP 1/P1/M58/22/1, esp Masterman 1949c). Russell was 
told that Masterman was the oldest platoon commander at the Normandy landing 
(2003, 56).
75. Collins 1950. Masterman for a time headed the punitive expedition base camp 
at Sinalagu, and patrolled inland, in 1927–1928. There were no riots in east Kwaio.
76. Germond 1949e. Later, Resident Commissioner Gregory-Smith was upset 
that men jailed for refusal to pay tax were, on their release, ordered to pay it; he 
considered this illegal, as in fact it was (1950–1952, 19 Nov 1951; see BSIP 1951a; 
Russell 2004, 5).
77. Masterman 1949a; see Masterman 1950f; Fox 1951; and documents in BSIP 
4/SF108/V. On rumors of violence, see Masterman 1949b. Masterman denied and 
Germond rejected Ulawan allegations. Witnesses whom Masterman interrogated in 
‘Aoke withdrew their statements. It is hard to know what really happened, but many 
Malaitans undoubtedly heard of and believed the charges.
78. Russell 1949b. Russell later described foot tours of the sub-district, which 
took 10–14 days (2003, 54–55). Masterman toured almost exclusively by ship (Rus-
sell 2010 pers comm).
79. Russell 1949a, 6, appendix III, 1, and Masterman comments; see Russell 
2004, 10. Some small children still run screaming from unknown white visitors, for 
their parents have warned, “If you don’t behave, a white man will come and get 
you,” a remedial tactic predating Maasina Rule.
80. Proverb from Ivens 1928a, 280.
81. Lindstrom 1993a, chap 2. See Cochrane 1970; Belshaw 1972. Anthropologist 
Ian Hogbin did not revisit the Solomons after 1945 but portrayed Maasina Rule’s 
later stages as a “millenary cult” that claimed to be “divinely revealed,” with rituals 
that would bring cargo (1964, 96–98; see Lindstrom 1993a, 36–37). The cargo cult 
model attained perhaps its most pathetic crudity in the hands of John Gutch, high 
commissioner from 1955 to 1961 (1961, 77; 1987, 113; see also Belshaw 2009, chap 
1), although his predecessor Harry Luke wrote that Bell had been assassinated by 
cargo cultists (1962, 133).
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2001, “Messianic Movements”; 2009, chap 1; Davies 1950c. Elsewhere Belshaw said 
the movement’s concerns were largely economic, and that it was “an irrational 
expression of legitimate grievances” (Belshaw 1948, 97). At times he advised sen-
sible solutions to problems behind the grievances (see Belshaw 1947b). In his 1950 
article, for information on Maasina Rule he said he was “indebted to conversations 
with administrative officials in London during 1949”; he did not say if they included 
Allan, then in England writing his thesis on Maasina Rule (Belshaw 1950b, 15). F E 
Williams’s The Vailala Madness (1977) greatly influenced Allan (1950a) and, later, 
Officer Glynn Cochrane (1970).
83. Allan 1950a, 54, passim; 1952b, 1 (see 1957a, 52, 249–254; 1960, 162); Dav-
enport 1998 pers comm; see Barrow nd, part 3, 5; AR 1968, 100; Gutch 1987, 113. 
Allan summarized his thesis in Corona and South Pacific (1951a), after approval by 
the then–resident commissioner, Gregory-Smith, who encouraged him to place it in 
popular venues (BSIP 1950c; see Allan 1950h, 3). The Manchester Guardian (1951) 
quoted the latter to praise government’s handling of Maasina Rule (and see PIM 
April 1951, 90). The first BSIP usage of “cargo” per se appears in Davies’s 6 April 
1947 notes for a report to Crass on a US survey ship visit to Makira and beliefs that 
“Americans were soon coming back to drive out the Government, and that all the 
people must belong to the Masina Rule by that time; that free cargo would be dis-
tributed to members of the Masina Rule and that the Americans would kill those 
who were not members” (undated note in front of BSIP 8/IX/6; Davies 1947a [the 
report]; see Crass 1947b; Davies quoted in Laracy 1983, 150–151).
84. AR 1948, 28; Allan 1950a, 1. See also BSIP 1945–1959, 1 Nov 1949, 6; Kaplan 
1995, xiv, passim. On Malaitan avarice and laziness, see Forster 1946c, 2; Barrett 
1947, 1 Jan; Noel 1948a, 4; 1948c; Russell 1949a, Masterman comment; Allan 1960, 
162–163; Burt 1994, 200. When Malaitans refused material lures to abandon resis-
tance, this, too, could be attributed to the movement’s “mystical appeal” (eg, Russell 
1950f, 11). David Gegeo wrote that Salana Ga‘a, Federal Council leader and then 
president of the Malaita Council, believed the British used the cargo cult portrayal 
to undermine the movement’s legitimate platforms (1991, 32). See Guha 1983 
for examples from British India of colonial portrayals of resistance movements as 
psychological or religious phenomena, which denied insurgents true political con-
sciousness. Later, former District Officer Glynn Cochrane took the opposite view 
and argued Maasina Rule had little to do with material concerns and was about 
status deprivation (1970; see Belshaw 1972; Anderson and Anderson 1980–1981, 
6 April 1981, 11). Cochrane’s dissertation adviser, Kenelm Burridge, presented a 
broadly similar but far more sophisticated analysis of New Guinea movements (eg, 
Burridge 1970).
85. Sydney Herald 1951 (1st quote); 1950 (2nd). See Fiji Times 1950 for devious 
distortions, including Maasina Rule reduced to a cargo cult, attributed to Resident 
Commissioner Gregory-Smith. On “stock cargo themes,” such as natives awaiting 
refrigerators, see Lindstrom 1993a, 139–142; 1993b. Refrigerators were included in 
Europeans’ lists of cargo items Maasina Rulers were said to wait for, particularly lists 
provided to the press by Makira planter Henry Kuper. Also quoted by the press was 
Major H S N Robinson, the Melanesian Mission’s general secretary, who told Pacific 
Islands Monthly that he saw a neat row of 43 houses built on Malaita’s coast awaiting 
expected cargo (later quoted in Worsley 1968, 178; see PIM 1946a; Sydney Herald 
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story (PIM 1947b; see Time 1947; South Pacific Sept 1947, 17; Burrows 1950). In 1950, 
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some structures were (1950f, 6), but I was unable to find any Kwaio who had ever 
heard of such houses. See Buck 1989, 158, on invention and exaggeration in “creat-
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86. Russell, for example, noted that people erected “cargo houses for the Ameri-
can food” and “cut large stacks of firewood to cook it,” and that this led to Maasina 
Rule being called a “Cargo Cult,” but he said that such ideas “were always a periph-
eral element in the movement” (2003, 46; see Russell 1949a, 1–2, and cf Masterman 
comments; 2004, 3; see Osifelo 1986, 22. See also note 85).
87. Worsley 1968, 182; Keesing 1978a, 68, 243 (quote); Laracy 1983, 150; see 
Ross 1978a, 184; Fifi‘i 1982a, 17; Osifelo 1986, 22.
88. MAR 1946, 5; Sandars 1947f. Sandars was that July the first Malaitan officer 
to use “cargo” in this connection, though kago was also an everyday Pijin word for 
goods or baggage. An informant report from Makwanu said Head Chief Loia “gave 
to the people a great deceiving that’s on January 1st 1946 the cargo will come.” The 
letter, which contains other dates, was written later, by “Gilbird Chief of Funafou,” 
probably in early 1947 (Gilbird [1947?]). I do not know if Loia really said this.
89. Translated from Kwaio except for the Pijin terms. Lounga here likely con-
densed several rumors into one statement. At Maka in the south in March 1945, 
Melanesian Sisters and a Brother said they saw submarine silhouettes and heard 
engines, and Davies believed Japanese subs had recharged batteries there. More 
important, in mid-1946 Royal Navy subs Tally Ho and Talent visited the Solomons 
and one of them called at most of Malaita’s main harbors (Bentley 1945; Trench 
1945b; Davies nd, 35, 119–120). Some Malaitans had also seen submarines during 
World War II.
90. Lounga 1982 pers comm. Mountain people who helped build the palisades 
and towers, but did not live there, also told me that Forster accused people of 
preparing for war, and that this surprised them since they had not envisioned the 
structures serving that purpose (personal communications from Ma‘aanamae 1981, 
1982, Laefiwane 1981, Sulafanamae 1982).
91. Forster 1948i; Ma‘aanamae 1987 pers comm (quote). Fewer non-Christian 
Kwaio families lived on the coast then; Lounga’s was one. Some ‘Oloburi bush peo-
ple stayed on the coast for as much as a week, but police did not raid there then (per-
sonal communications from Sulafanamae 1980, Lounga 1982, and Basiberi 1996).
92. Keesing 1978a, 70; Laracy 1983, 150–151; Burt 1994, 200. Burt, too, collected 
multiple and contradictory perspectives on cargo, in east Kwara‘ae (Burt 1983 per-
sonal communications, and his 1983 interviews with Ben Banau, Adriel Rofate‘e, 
and John Gamu).
93. Field 1949b, 4; Russell 1954b, 3; 2003, 58; Keesing 1978a, 68–70; Davies nd, 
83–84, 123–126, 134; Fulbright 1986, chap 4; Burt 1994, 200; see Davenport and 
Çoker 1967, 134. See this book, chapter 8, note 44, for one influential PIM article 
copied and circulated around Malaita, in a related context. Fulbright suggested 
that Allan brought the cargo idea to Malaita from the Western Solomons, but the 
timing denies this. Allan on 1 March 1947 reported Western District rumors that 
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Americans would bring a “political millennium,” and people were planning to make 
curios to sell to them, but he said nothing of “cargo” ideas. He did note that rumors 
were on the rise with increased contacts with north Malaita, implying that they were 
flowing east to west (Allan 1947, 4; see Allan 1989).
94. SCL Oct 1950, 243; Teoboo 1982; Waleanisia 1987; Fifi‘i 1988 pers comm; 
1989, 71; Gegeo 1991, 32; Burt 1994, 194, and his 1983 interview with John Gamu; 
McDonald 2003, 72. Many archived letters tell of meeting Americans or claim they 
will soon arrive (eg, “To Every Passage” 1948; Laracy 1983, F1–F3). Those who 
spread rumors could be jailed (eg, Russell 1949a, appendix 3, 2). There were prec-
edents of loyalist headmen starting rumors to rile people: Siru spread word that 
Sandars was about to seize land at Kwai (see this book, chapter 5, note 66), and 
later Headman ‘Itea (from Fokanakafo) told ‘Ataa people that “if they did not pay 
their taxes the Government was coming to kill the men, cut off the breasts of the 
women, steal all the pigs, burn the houses, slaughter the children and generally 
cause havoc far and wide” (Allan 1950o, 8). ‘Itea, whom Russell (2003, 66–67) said 
was his main informant for his Oceania article, about this time suffered a mental 
breakdown. Allan blamed the illness on the guilt he guessed ‘Itea must have felt 
for teaching Russell about “custom,” and on the fear Allan imagined ‘Itea had that 
“If the people persisted in holding the Government to custom, there would be 
no progress, no enlightenment, no development. The people would continue to 
be down trodden by ancient and useless taboos, embittered and jealous old men, 
pig headed priests, frauds and the like.” However, there is no indication that ‘Itea 
told Allan this. Two years later, ‘Itea became an ancestral priest, until he became 
an Adventist in 1957 (Allan 1950o, 10; Clive Moore 2012 pers comm; see Russell 
1950a; 2003, 65–67).
95. See Laracy 1983, 150–151; cf Cochrane 1970, 96. On the rationality of 
“cargo” responses in Melanesia, more broadly, see Worsley 1968. Burt, too, stressed 
that cargo was “not associated with spiritual forces” and was grounded in recent 
experiences (1994, 200). On predicted American punishment of loyalists, see, eg, 
Kenipuria 1949. Keesing discussed cargo ideas in terms of “anticipations of religious 
escape” (1978a, 67). While rumor and ignorance led some Malaitans to consider 
ideas that were erroneous and fantastic, the same was true for some officers; officials 
as late as 1950 considered plausible the idea that a white or black person, perhaps 
an American deserter, was orchestrating Maasina Rule operations in secret or from 
a mountain hideaway. Officers worried over secret communist ties, or that there 
might be a war during which an unnamed “reactionary force” would arm recalci-
trant Malaitans (eg, Noel 1946b, 4; 1947d; PIM 1946a; 1947b; Gregory-Smith 1950e, 
2; 1950f, 4–5; Masterman 1950f, 12; Germond 1950b; Russell 1950j, 3; Allan 1951k; 
see PIM 1950b, 83; Caulton 1950; cf Cameron 1948c).
96. AR 1948, 26, 38. See also Davies 1950c; Allan 1950a, 92–94; 1951a, 99.
97. Holton 1945; MAR 1945, 1; Trench 1945b; Burt 1994, 186–187; and 1983 
personal communication to him from Ariel Rofate‘e. Oral accounts I have are 
mostly Kwaio and Kwara‘ae. Little history has been published on this topic from 
elsewhere on Malaita (for Makira, see Davies 1947a and esp Scott 2007).
98. Fifi‘i 1982 pers comm; 1988 pers comm (quote); 1989, 70–71; and quoted 
in Keesing 1978a, 66. Fifi‘i at times confused the two ‘Aoke meetings with San-
dars. Here, in a 1964 statement to Keesing, and in his book, he said that Kifo said 
Americans would come in January, placing it after the Boxing Day meeting. But 
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in parts of his book and in an interview with me he seemed to say Kifo’s talk came 
after the 30 June meeting (Keesing 1978a, 65; Fifi‘i 1987 pers comm; 1989, 70–71). 
Other Kwaio can provide no date except “shortly before Fifi‘i’s arrest.” Davies said 
hopes of American arrival intensified in late 1946 and early 1947 (MAR 1947, 5), 
consistent with the earlier date. But that people emphasize that it was just before 
the arrests suggests the latter, which also coincides with north Malaitans’ worsening 
relations with the government and Kifo’s rise to prominence.
99. In Kwaio, only Noto‘i’s group at Uogwari stayed in the mountains, and some 
very old and young people (personal communications from Toloasi Teoboo 1982, 
Fifi‘i 1988, and Gwanu‘i, Ma‘aanamae, Bebea, ‘Otomoori, ‘Otaalea, Molaina‘o, 
and Riufaa, all 1996). Davies’s 1947 Malaita Annual Report (page 5B) told of old 
people abandoned to starve, and burnings of houses of those refusing to locate to 
the coast in response to rumor. But this did not happen in Kwaio, nor is it reported 
anywhere else, and like much in Davies’s report, it is probably a concoction. Davies 
also related that some old people were carried to the coast, and some Kwaio who 
were living near the sea did do this (Gwanu‘i 1996 pers comm). Fifi‘i said loyalists 
misled Kifo; Kifo was his friend, though he came to see him as a rascal (1982b; 1988 
pers comm; 1989, 711; see Kwaio Native Affairs 1951, 17 Aug). Keesing guessed 
Kifo intended his actions to divert the movement from moderate southern leaders 
(1978a, 67), though I know of no evidence for this.
100. Fifi‘i 1989, 71; and quoted in Keesing 1978a, 66. Accounts I have of this 
event focus squarely on liberation, not cargo. Around this time, Nono‘oohimae 
told recruiter Palmer that they had heard about fighting in Indonesia and feared it 
might spread to the Solomons (Noel 1947e, 2). Fifi‘i in 1982 told an interviewer, “I 
get angry when I hear about this cargo. The only cargo we know is the cargo that’s 
imported by ship from Australia. . . . People said we were coming down to the coast 
to wait for cargo? . . . This is something we can’t make any sense of. We are not a 
crazy, lunatic people. . . . We didn’t expect other people to feed us. That is not our 
way. We have our own gardens” (1982a, 17).
101. Forster 1949b (Fataleka), 2; Ma‘aanamae 1987 pers comm; Titiuru 1987, 4 
(translated from Pijin); see ‘Elota quoted in Keesing 1978b, 156–57; Toloasi Teoboo 
1982 pers comm. In 1949, Protectorate officials arranged to fly in American anthro-
pologist Felix Keesing (Roger’s father) to tell Malaitans that Americans would not 
return, but the trip had to be cancelled due to scheduling problems (Maude 1970).
102. See, eg, MAR 1947, 5–6; Allan 1950a, 91; Marquand 1950, 16; Davies nd, 88, 
140. Some people said they had heard the head chiefs say cargo or Americans would 
come or had heard other people say they had said this, but we saw earlier that many 
statements credited to the head chiefs did not originate with them (eg, BSIP 1947d, 
66–68, and see also 102; 1947e, 23).
103. Fifi‘i in 1964 said he heard that ‘Atoomea spread a rumor that soldiers were 
hiding in the To‘abaita bush, landed by US submarines. Whether ‘Atoomea believed 
this, as Fifi‘i did Kifo’s stories at first, is unknown. Others blamed such rumors on 
Sukulu, the West Kwara‘ae chief who, with Nori, was said to have met a US general 
on Guadalcanal, and whom Forster had arrested with Kifo in June 1946 (Waleanisia 
1987; Fifi‘i 1987 pers comm; and quoted in Keesing 1978a, 66; see Laracy 1983, F1). 
Fifi‘i in 1987 told me people sneaked up to the prison fence to ask the chiefs about 
rumors about Americans, and they told them they were false. After Kifo was jailed, 
letters forged in his name continued to spread rumors and advise resistance (Dausa-
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bea 1952). See this book, chapter 6, for a claim that Timothy George said Americans 
would send material help.
104. See, eg, Marquand 1949a; Forster 1949b; Russell 1949a, appendix III, and 
Masterman comments; 1949c; Allan 1950g, 22; 1950h; Laracy 1976, 125. There 
had been some rumors of this sort in the south early on (eg, Bentley 1945; Trench 
1947b; Davies nd, 36–37). Some tales of evil government plans originated with loyal-
ists (see Sandars 1947f, 2; Moore 1950, 3).
105. Marquand 1949a; Russell 1949a, appendix III, 2; 1949c, 1; 1950b; 1950j, 3; 
Forster 1949b (Fataleka); Gregory-Smith 1950e. In Kwaio, many thought building 
shelters a waste of time (Basiberi 1997 pers comm). By later 1950, Allan was saying 
cargo stories were no longer believed, but for some people hopes for American help 
never fully vanished, and in places they were for decades an undercurrent of some 
kastom politics, with new rumors surfacing sporadically (MAR 1949–1950, 8; see Ross 
1978b, 184). Even now some voice them, though often in desultory or semi-sarcastic 
ways. But in one 1985 case, a Kwaio leader was able to convince some that Americans 
would help them to derail a controversial government election (personal commu-
nications from Busumae 1987, Dangeabe‘u 1987, Basiitau 1987, Fifi‘i 1988). Today 
some in north Malaita hold unrealistic expectations for help from Israel, which has 
in fact become involved in Malaitan politics through “development.”
Chapter 8: Attrition and Compromise
1. BSIP 1949; Russell 1949a, IR, 1; 1949c, 2–3; 1950e; 2004, 1; Germond 1950a; 
Masterman 1950f, 1–3. Marquand, back in England, denounced men who had 
agreed to labor (about 300 by late 1949) as “a few weak-willed traitors to the March-
ing Rule who lack the courage of their convictions and who have been driven by the 
fear of gaol and the wrath of the Government creeping and crawling to the white 
man as labour. Such people can only be despised” (1950, 33; the labor count is from 
Masterman’s comment on Russell 1949a).
2. Russell 1949b; 1949c, 2–3; 1950f, 4; 1950j, 11; Germond 1949a, 1949e, 1949f, 
1949g; Masterman 1949c. Allan later said the leaders targeted were “holding the 
people against their will” (MAR 1949–1950, 12). Russell also started to post sten-
ciled flyers, like Maasina Rule ones but criticizing the movement (see file BSIP 12/
VI/10; Laracy 1983, I2–I5; Russell 2003, 69). On 9 February 1950, flyers of biblical 
quotes urging tax payment and avoidance of violence were airdropped. Wrote Rus-
sell, “The pamphlets, which were about four-inches square, stuck together as the 
print was not dry. Packed in bundles the size of bricks, they came hurtling down 
in one piece, bursting through thatched roofs before disintegrating. They were 
collected as souvenirs and stimulated the thought: ‘What on earth is the Govern-
ment going to do next?’ ” Officers spread word that a new technology let them see 
from planes through clouds and roofs and into houses (2003, 70; see Masterman 
1950f, 4).
3. Allan 1949c, 3; (and see 1950c; 1950o, 2); Malaita 1949, 4; Russell 1949c, 
appendix III; 1950f, 11; 1950h, 5; MacKeith 1950b, 1–3. Allan repeated his pre-
diction of continued resistance in his anthropology thesis the next year. But while 
in the just-quoted document he based this on people’s determination not to sur-
render politically, his thesis explains it as a result of deep-seated “beliefs in magic, 
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superstition, sorcery, kinship, the complicated system of leadership, and customary 
law” (1950a, 92, see 26). On pressures emanating from London at this time to end 
indenture, decriminalize breaches of contract, and improve work conditions, see 
Frazer 1990, 201. Frazer here also pointed to a shift that occurred from coercive 
to positive incentives for completing contracts (see Davies 1951a). Allan explained 
the labor system as of early 1952: “A man . . . promises to work for his employer for 
six or twelve months as the case may be. In law, such an agreement is on the month 
to month basis and may be terminated by either party with a month’s notice. That 
is the only contract which exists” (1952b, 21). Bennett described how the penal 
enforcement of indenture was dropped in 1948 after negotiations between the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the British government, though this 
did not immediately register with all officers. She also noted that postwar pressures 
from Levers and other planters to reinstitute the two-year indenture period failed 
(1987, 308–309); the government refused them, by the early 1950s citing ILO con-
ventions (PIM 1953b; BSIP 1955, 3–4).
4. Masterman 1949d; Sisili 1949; MAR 1949–1950, 11, 13; Teioli 1951; BSIP 
1951d, exhibits G1 and L; Laracy 1983, 30–31; Burt 1994, 195. Various manifesto 
versions appeared over time.
5. Russell’s account of this meeting has Masterman coolly walking away from an 
angry crowd to take tea with his officers. Teioli later testified in court that Sisili led 
men off the field as Masterman rejected each point, and by the time he reached 
the last no audience remained. Allan, who was not there, later cited the latter as 
an intolerable Malaitan insult to justify blocking further meetings, but in his next 
Annual Report gave the tea-taking version (Russell 2003, 62–64; 2004, 5; and quoted 
in Knox-Mawer 1985, 115–16; Burt 1994, 195; Masterman 1950f, 3, 8–9; cf Russell 
1950f, 12; MAR 1949–1950, 14; Teioli 1951; Allan 1950g, 23; 1951e, 3). Masterman’s 
reply, “To All People of Malaita,” is appendix 6 to his handing-over report (1950f); 
and in Laracy 1983, I8. For his Advisory Council picks, see Masterman 1950f, 6, 
8–9. He also insisted the government’s choices for any future district council had 
to be senior headmen (Masterman 1950f, 9–10). Allan counseled that the idea of 
such a body “has considerable difficulty in penetrating the native mind,” but did 
not say why (1950g, 23). Advisory Council representation was a key goal of Matthew 
Belamataga’s “Development Society for Native Races” movement on Guadalcanal, 
which had some parallels with Maasina Rule (see Laracy 1983, 156–161; Bennett 
1987, 299).
6. Masterman 1949e; Russell 1950b, 1, 3–4; 1950f, 5; 2004, 5.
7. Russell 1950b, 4; 1950f, 6, 7; 1950j, 12; 1986, 3; Allan 1950k, 5; 1952b, 26; 
Bartle 1951a, 10; see Burt 1994, 195.
8. ‘Itea 1950; Ridley 1950; Masterman 1950f, 2; Russell 1950f, 6; 2003, 65–67; 
2004, 10 (quote); see Tedder 2008, 31. See correspondence in BSIP 12/V/12 on 
rumors and fears of attacks on ‘Aoke and Malu‘u in February and March of 1952. 
Allan later sometimes reported rumors of planned violence as established fact, 
which justified his policies (eg, MAR 1949–1950, 14).
9. Russell 1950c; 1950f; 2003, 67–70; Taburi 1950; see Masterman 1950f, 10. The 
meaning of the older man’s exclamation came out later; Taburi did not understand 
it at the time. Assuming Taburi’s statement accurate, it seems certain the men would 
have killed the wounded soldier. Russell was displeased when Masterman would not 
order an official inquiry.
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10. BSIP 1950a; Bartle 1950; Russell 1950e, 1; 2003, 70; Masterman 1950f, 5; Ted-
der 2008, 17. Russell credited the muted Malaitan reaction to government actions, 
including the aforesaid pamphlet-dropping plane flight one day after the shooting 
(1950f, 7; see note 2, above).
11. WPHC 1950; BSIP 1950a. Masterman later presented both the decision to 
evacuate ‘Aoke after Ramositau’s death and the idea of releasing Nono‘oohimae as 
his own (1950f, 4–6). Research into Gregory-Smith’s Kenya experiences might illu-
minate the approach he brought to the Solomons. His photo is in PIM Feb 1950, 13.
12. BSIP 1949; 1950a, 1; Davies 1950a, 1950b; Gregory-Smith 1950a; Fifi‘i 1989, 
86–87.
13. Gregory-Smith 1950a; 1950b; 1950e; 1950–1952, 19 March–5 April 1950; 
Russell 1950f, 8. A photo by George Milner of officers meeting loyalists at ‘Ataa on 
this tour is in Burt 1994, 193.
14. Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 19 March–5 April 1950; Masterman 1950a; 1950f, 
4, and appendixes 14 and 15. Most people also avoided Gregory-Smith’s next major 
tour, and with his backing Allan had Moore arrest vulnerable Langalanga and 
‘Aoke-area people in punishment (Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 4–19 Sept 1950, 12; 
Allan 1950k, 5). Masterman had just issued another “Administrative Order” forbid-
ding anyone joining together to meet with an officer without invitation. Ten months 
later, Charles called this “of doubtful validity” (see note dated 21 Dec 1950 in front 
of file BSIP SF108/VIII/5).
15. Gregory-Smith 1950d, 1950e; Russell 1950d, 1, 4; 1950h, 4; Colchester-
Wemyss 1950; Allan writing in MAR 1949–1950, 12; 1950g, 5; see MacKeith 1950b, 2. 
North Malaitan 1949 tax payment percentages by language group as of 10 May 1950 
were Lau 100, To‘abaita 94.2, Baelelea 55.2, Baegu 32.7, and Fataleka 19.4, totaling 
64.7 percent. Russell thought there were many more taxable men than estimated, 
however, and that if exempted men were included the true proportion who had paid 
was significantly less than half, with “considerable numbers to tax even in To‘abaita 
and Lau.” Only 27 percent of northern people had been censused. Tax payment 
numbers fell quickly as one moved south across the island, especially in Kwara‘ae 
areas away from ‘Aoke, and in Kwaio (Russell 1950f, 8–9; 1993, 71; see 1950j, 15). 
Two months later, after many hundreds more had paid taxes, Allan in a letter to 
Gregory-Smith guessed Malaita payments might be nearing half of the lower 1930s 
tax numbers (1950h, 2; cf 1950g, 27). ‘Are‘are and Small Malaita were exempt from 
the census since Forster had already conducted one there, and tax collection focused 
on the north. See Masterman 1950f, 7–9, appendix 9, for his June tax calculations.
16. Allan 1950g; Burt 1994, 196. Fifi‘i in 1982 told me Masterman goaded them 
when Gregory-Smith was not there, telling them that they would not really be freed. 
Fifi‘i’s autobiography employs a Malaitan narrative style that has the effect of col-
lapsing shifts in government policy over a longer period into mid-1950 conversa-
tions with Gregory-Smith (see 1989, 87–93). A plea to be released by Nelson Kifo, 
whose wife and children died while he was in prison, was refused. He was let go, 
along with Belo and Maesiedi, in November 1951, on the same terms as the head 
chiefs had been. Kifo did then spread a message of cooperation, telling people the 
government had agreed to all of Maasina Rule’s demands. Gregory-Smith, acting as 
high commissioner in June 1952, fully remitted the head chiefs’ sentences so they 
could serve on a Malaita-wide council (Kwaio 1951, 17 Aug; MAR 1951, 17; Dausa-
bea 1952; and see this book, chapter 9).
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17. Russell 1950f, 10; 1950h; 1993, 72. The northern headmen’s verbatim com-
ments on the head chiefs’ release are provided in Masterman 1950f, 6–7.
18. Russell 1950f, 12; Masterman 1950b; 1950f, 5–6, 13–14; Burt 1994, 196. Basi 
was rearrested in early 1951, suspected of antigovernment activity, but Allan saw he 
was too weak from tuberculosis to have done anything. He died the next year (Allan 
1950g; Bartle 1951a, 3–4).
19. Russell 1950f, 1 (quote); 1950h, passim; 1950j, 1, 15; 2003, 72; Allan 1950c; 
1950d; 1950g, 4, 8, 11, 15, passim; 1950h, 2; 1950k, 7; Masterman 1950f, 6. Master-
man said that other chiefs had, like Nono‘oohimae, sent letters to their people 
from jail, but he did not say which chiefs or if officers delivered their letters (1950f, 
5). To know this might help explain different homecomings given different chiefs. 
In mid-1949, Malaita’s 32 sub-districts had been reorganized into just ten, roughly 
following, and inspired by, those laid out by Maasina Rule, each headed by a senior 
headman with several assistants (MAR 1949–1950, 5; 1955, 10).
20. Allan 1950e; 1950g, 1, 2, 8–10, 27; 1980b, 111; Russell 1950g; 1950h, 3. Rus-
sell said there were fewer “extremists” but more “waverers” in Lau (1950j, 15), but by 
January, Bartle reported most had paid the tax (1951a). Just after noting George’s 
key role in helping the government, Allan cited his record of “letting down” officers 
since Edge-Partington, and added, “one can do little but hope that he will soon die, 
and thereby solve the problem of his own accord” (MAR 1949–1950, 18). Elsewhere 
Allan said he thought Small Malaita was cooperating due more to Nono‘oohimae’s 
influence than George’s (quoted in MacKeith 1950a). But it was soon arranged for 
George to visit Ulawa to try and help there. On the Catholic Welfare Society, which 
later reformed, see Allan 1950i; 1950k, 8; Gregory-Smith 1950f, 3–4; MAR 1954, 15, 
18; Laracy 1976, 131–134; Campbell 1978, 304–306. Leaders of other missions some-
times encouraged officers’ hostility toward Catholics (see, eg, Gregory-Smith 1951d; 
Gibbins 1952b). In 1977 Allan said he had come to recognize positive aspects of the 
society and that it was not necessarily subversive (Campbell 1978, 305).
21. Allan 1950f; 1950g, 3, 11–12; Russell 1950g; BSIP 1950d; Kwaio Native Affairs 
Book 1951, 4 June.
22. Allan 1950g, 8; see Allan 1950l.
23. Allan 1951e, 12; Bartle 1951b, 9; Luluakalo testimony in BSIP 1951d; Ridley 
1951a; Bokelema statement in BSIP 1951d; see MacKeith 1950b, 2. Allan often por-
trayed Maasina Rule and the Federal Council as very different, based largely on his 
misunderstandings of both, but at other times said they were the same (eg, MAR 
1951, 19; MQR 30 June 1951, 8; see Allan 1960, 159, note 1). He called those who 
still used “Marching Rule” in late 1950 “ignorants and diehards on the periphery” 
(MAR 1951, 5). Anifelo in the early 1980s always used “Maasina Rule” in telling me 
about the work he had led.
24. Field 1949a; Forster 1949b (Fataleka); Allan 1950g, 15–17; Russell 1950h, 4, 
6; Davies nd, 50. In the early 1950s, Irofiala asked for his medal back, but officers 
could find no record of it. I do not know if he ever got it.
25. Mariko 1946; Russell 1950f, 7; Allan 1950g, 18; Sandars nd, 46; Anifelo 1981 
pers comm. Another leader, Ramo‘oli of Baelelea, was convicted with the head 
chiefs and given two years for sedition. Kakalu‘ae had appointed him a full chief 
of the Kwarade area, and both he and Ramoalafa were charged with hearing illegal 
courts (BSIP 1947d, 1947e). For an account of Ramoalafa’s capture of the Japanese 
pilots, see Fifi‘i 1991, 38. On Alaikona’s patrols, see Sandars 1942–1943, 7, 15.
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26. Lambert 1933, 23 and 31 May; 1941, 287; Allan 1950g, 20; 1952b, 13; Ander-
sen 1952o, 6; Zoleveke 1980, 44; Ngwadili and Gafu 1988, 205.
27. Among secondary leaders, Raurau of Mota in Baelelea, a relative moder-
ate, had been the Makwanu headman and vice president of its native court and an 
original Maasina Rule leader there. He was tried with the head chiefs but found 
not guilty. He was later made an assistant headman, but in 1949 he was dismissed 
and jailed for three months for accepting donations on behalf of Maasina Rule 
and afterward avoided all contact with officers (MQR 30 June 1951, 6). SSEM 
teacher Jason Frankie had been a clerk to the government’s Anoano Native Coun-
cil and then a Maasina Rule chief and clerk at Uru. Nelson Fo‘ogau, from near 
‘Aoke, spent his childhood around Sandars and the constabulary and was an 
early Maasina Rule leader (see Osifelo 1985, 12; Allan 1950k, 3–4). Mamarodo 
of To‘abaita, who became more important in 1952, was ex-constabulary, as was 
the leader Fuli‘oa. Funuga of Lau had been Sandars’s cook and an early Maasina 
Rule activist, and had served several jail terms (Allan 1950g, 18). Irofiala, Sau, 
Alaikona, Ramoalafa, and Mamarodo had all fought as members of the Solomon 
Islands Defence Force.
28. Chamberlain 1948; see Dausabea 1951.
29. MAR 1949–1950, 13, 19; Allan 1950g, 18 (2nd quote); 1950k; 1950n; 1950o, 
8 (1st quote); 1951e, 2; Kafebai and Diote‘e statements in BSIP 1951d; Teioli 1951.
30. Russell 1950h, 4. John Naitoro detailed links formed by ‘Are‘are who 
attended meetings at Bina organized by Sisili and his brother Maekiki in 1948, and 
the work that sprung from them, including a resurgence of town building (1993, 
92–94). See Kwaio Native Affairs Book 1951, 17 Aug.
31. MAR 1949–1950, 12; BSIP 1951d, exhibit M3; Ridley 1951a; Laracy 1983, 
164, 172. In 1943, a US war propaganda campaign employed the Four Freedoms, 
and artist Norman Rockwell designed posters for each “freedom,” which were mass-
produced. Solomon Islanders may well have been exposed to this campaign.
32. Noel 1947a; BSIP 1947d, 42; 1947e, 11, 56, 71; Marquand 1950, 22, 29; 
Kwara‘ae Council 1950; Russell 1950h, 3. Laracy’s book also has Sisili’s “Declara-
tion,” and “manifesto” (1983, section H). For the import of the Four Freedoms in 
Belamataga’s Guadalcanal “Freedom Movement” in 1948, see Laracy 1983, 156–160, 
and Bennett 1987, 299. Later, officers tried to use the Freedoms for propaganda, 
arguing that people already had them (Malaita Newsletter July 1952). Thirty years 
later, government compensation for Maasina Rule’s chiefs was still being discussed 
in Parliament (Parliamentary Debates 1981, 225–227; see Akin 1999b).
33. West Council Malaita 1950; Martin 1950; BSIP 1950b; Allan 1950g, 19; 1950k, 
appendixes I and II; Gregory-Smith 1950d; Andersen 1950; Russell 1950h, 4; 1950j, 
2; Shone statement in BSIP 1951d. The June bundle is often called “the Shone let-
ters” after the man they were handed to. They were later used to prosecute Sisili 
and are in the file for his trial, BSIP 12/V/9. For an account of a failed 1949 Sisili 
attempt to send money to Americans, see Burt 1994, 194.
34. MAR 1949–1950, 8, 20; MAR 1951, 6; Allan 1950k, 2–3, appendix I, passim; 
1950n; 1951e, 16–17; MQR 30 June 1951, 1; Maekiki and Luluakalo statements in 
BSIP 1951d, exhibits B and C. Sisili’s previous ideas about getting American help 
are unclear—Allan blamed him for all cargo rumors, but Allan routinely did so with 
all Maasina Rule leaders, including many with no links to rumors. Shone gave to 
Nelson Fo‘ogau Bertrand Russell’s Road to Freedom, a source of more ideas found in 
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documents (MQR 30 Sept 1951, 2). Also drawn on was Albert DeLa Vergne’s 1941 
book, U.S. Army Service Memories.
35. Russell 1950j, 1, 5–6.
36. MacKeith 1950a; Gregory-Smith 1950f, 3, 6, passim. At the Sinalagu confer-
ence were Allan, Russell, Alexander MacKeith (‘Aoke’s cadet officer since April, 
who took notes), and John Bartle, who was about to take over Malu‘u from Russell.
37. Allan 1950g, 20–21; Gregory-Smith 1950f, 8; 1950–1952, Sept 1950; Mac-
Keith 1950a. Sandars had once hunted down a north Malaitan murderer using local 
men supervised by police, and young men of the party damaged taro gardens and 
stole pigs. Sandars made them compensate the owners. Missionaries complained to 
the resident commissioner that “enormous damage had been done and innocent 
people assaulted,” but Sandars did not believe them. A formal inquiry sided with 
Sandars, and Sandars produced an old document authorizing Bell to “call out the 
population” to hunt murderers, which had never been canceled (nd, 95–96).
38. Allan 1950m, 1. This singular Allan report reads throughout as if written by 
a different officer than the man who usually penned angry, vicious ones, and was 
clearly composed in a moment of introspection. A reader familiar with his usual 
style is surprised by his expressions of understanding for Malaitans, their plights, 
concerns, and strengths. This report even argues for raising the plantation wage 
(unchanged since 1946); for giving the Federal Council a position, with a loyalist, 
on the Wages Advisory Board (Nono‘oohimae was chosen), and for the government 
to work with SSEM teachers toward mass education (1950m, 6, 9; see Frazer 1990, 
202). One detects here a longing to pursue positive development work rather than 
suppression, and it provides a glimpse of the officer that might have been.
39. Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 14 Sept 1950; Allan 1950j; MacKeith 1950a, 3.
40. Gregory-Smith nd, 13 Sept 1950; Allan 1950j; 1950l, 1, 3; MAR 1953, 3; see 
Andersen 1954d, 2, 12. Malaita had had headmen for just 27 years.
41. Allan 1950j; Bentley comments attached to Allan 1950l; and see Allan 1960, 
158. Eighteen months later Allan wrote of Malaita’s headmen, “At present a good 
deal more than half are in no way respected. Many of them are hated” (1952b, 10; 
and see Allan 1960, 160).
42. Allan 1950g, 21; 1950o, 8; Russell 1950h, 5; 1950i; Dausabea 1951.
43. Allan 1951e, 1, 3 (quote), 4–8; see also note 5, above.
44. Russell, 1950h, 5; MAR 1949–1950, 21; Dausabea statement in BSIP 1951d; 
Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 3 May 1951. Another paper was a copy of a Pacific Islands 
Monthly article that Nelson Fo‘ogau had brought to Sisili from Honiara, which 
argued for the Solomons to be put under Australian administration. This was a 
change that many European residents hoped for and discussed widely, and that 
Malaitans feared as the establishment of a “colony” that would steal their land. 
The article was hand-copied and circulated around Malaita. High Commissioner 
Freeston had presented an argument for Australian administration to the secretary 
of state for colonies in mid-1949, noting, “It is idle to inquire whether such a change 
would be acceptable to the indigenous population of the Protectorate, the bulk of 
whom are too primitive to appreciate its significance” (Freeston 1949a; PIM 1950a; 
Allan 1951e, 3, 7; Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 4 May 1951). For the larger context of 
this issue, see Hyam 2010, chap 7.
45. Allan 1951e, 8 (this report contains details of the arrest). Burt was told that 
police beat up Sisili’s wife and that Sisili forbade resistance (1994, 197). Allan later 
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warned the arrest was an anomalous, “lucky case” not likely to be repeated with 
other hunted leaders (1952b, 2).
46. For the prosecution, see file BSIP 12/V/9; Burt 1994, 197. Legal Adviser 
Charles told the prosecution that the letter seeking weapons had been left out of 
the explicit charge because the letter was ambiguous, and “it seems to me undesir-
able to drag in our American Allies in connection with a charge of Treason Felony” 
(Charles 1951). But this and other letters sent to Guadalcanal were introduced as 
supporting evidence. Sisili was also convicted of illegally possessing US currency for 
the confiscated “bank.” In mid-1952 that money was credited to Malaita Council 
funds, with close to £1000 Allan had taken at ‘Ataa in 1949 (Allan 1952b, 6; see Ted-
der 1954; Frazer 1973, 61).
47. Allan 1951c; MAR 1951, 6.
48. Allan’s 1951 Annual Report says officers took the notices lightly, but they did 
not at the time. His June Quarterly Report says they had a bad effect in Lau; the 
Annual Report says none were posted there. Much of this Annual Report, Allan’s last, 
presents a much brighter picture than do the reports and correspondence surround-
ing it. ‘Are‘are were able to keep Rickwood out since Allan did not want to force the 
issue and undercut Nono‘oohimae, who claimed he had tried to convince people to 
allow him in (MacKeith 1951a; Allan 1951h, 1951i; Bartle 1951b; Notices 1951; MQR 
30 June 1951, 1–4, appendix A; MQR 30 Sept 1951, 1, 9; MAR 1951, 7–9, passim).
49. MQRs 30 Sept 1951, 9; 31 March 1952, 2; Allan 1951e, 16; 1952b, 1. The 
letter to Dugdale, “Malaita Decision for One Head of the Island,” is in Allan 1982a; 
see it and Dugdale’s speech in Laracy 1983, H6, I10. In 1982, Allan claimed that by 
August 1951 “headmen and the loyalists” embodied “60% of the male population,” 
who “were satisfied with the firm statements of the Minister,” but he would have 
laughed at this claim at that time. Dugdale also visited a new government education 
project at Hauhui and told the people “he did not think much of mass education,” 
leaving Allan to pick up the pieces (Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 30 Aug 1951; Allan 
1982a). The antiestablishment Pacific Islands Monthly called Dugdale “a babbling 
fool” and said his “general conduct and deliverances are still a subject of hilarity 
among those who met him in BSI” (1953a).
50. Waiparo 1944; Allan 1951i; 1951l; 1951n, 2; 1952b, 4, 15; MQR 30 June 1951, 
3, 4; MQR 30 Sept 1951, 7–8; MAR 1951, 8, 15–18; “Notices from Bina Council” 
1951; personal communications from Anifelo, Sulafanamae, Lounga, and Fifi‘i, all 
1982. Once the alaha turn against the government, Allan’s reports call them “petty 
chiefs.” One cannot discount that Nono‘oohimae, still on license (ie, parole), may 
have overstated his rivalry with Waiparo and inability to control people. Before 
Waiparo challenged the government, Allan wrote he “has considerable drive and 
ability and is extremely ambitious to bring some enlightenment to his pagan fol-
lowers, besides of course raising his own power and prestige,” and Allan had tried 
to bolster his position as a chief essential to the government’s position (1950k, 18; 
1950l, 11). On Waiparo, and Kwaio links with his activities at various times, see Fifi‘i 
1989, 103–105; Keesing 1992a, 123, 127–129; Naitoro 1993, 130–132; and this book, 
chapter 9. By the end of 1951, in east Kwaio nobody had paid taxes at ‘Oloburi, and 
very few had done so at Uru. At Sinalagu, which Allan said was “under firm govern-
ment control,” a few coastal and no bush people had paid. Only a handful paid 
taxes in west Kwaio (Allan 1951n, 2; MAR 1951, 10).
51. Allan 1951n, 4; MAR 1951, 16.
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52. Allan 1952b, 2, 4.
53. Allan 1989–1990, 7–8; anonymous personal communication. For a few 
examples of this attitude, see Allan 1950o, 10; 1950i, 1, passim; 1951d, 5; 1951e, 2; 
MAR 1949–1950, 5, 13, 19, passim; MQR 30 Sept 1951. The guess of 8,000 taxable 
Malaitans is Andersen’s (1954e, 3). Allan cited Freud and Malinowski to suggest the 
high levels of psychosis were “due to psychology of a patrilineal society” and sexual 
repression (MAR 1949–1950, 5). Someone who knew Allan 25 years later told me 
that his antipathy for Malaitans was still palpable. In 1978 he called Malaitans “a 
malign influence throughout the Solomons . . . comparable to the Jews in medieval 
Europe, the Indian merchants in East Africa and Indian Ocean and the Chinese 
in South East Asia” (Allan 1978). For years Allan continued to portray Malaitans 
as psychotic and blinded by primitive magical thinking, bewildered by change (eg, 
1960, 161–162). He reserved special contempt for Kwaio (eg, MAR 1949–1950, 4; 
Allan 1951m; 1982b; 1989–1990, 157, 158).
54. MQR 30 Sept 1951, 12; see also MQR 30 June 1951, 9; Marquand 1950, 26. 
The Hauhui project was carried out from 1950 under Onepusu Headman Japen 
Warahimae and Hamuel Hoahania. It was to be at Wairokai, but when resisted there 
Allan shifted it to the area’s one loyalist community. For a project summary, see 
Naitoro 1993, 119–121, 125–129. Soon after this, Peebles left loyalist Hauhui and 
took over Malu‘u and less pleasant duties, and his approach became as malign as 
anyone’s. For example, he wrote in a letter to Allan: “On the bright side, there is 
an unconfirmed report that Basi is dead,” and apropos two wanted men, “If I can’t 
pinch them then I will line up their friends and relatives as accessories or at least 
for suspicion of felony, and make a thorough go of it” (1951). Basi, feeble from 
tuberculosis, had been politically inactive since his release from prison. A photo of 
Peebles with Germond is in PIM Nov 1949, 8.
55. Tedder 2008, 27; see Andersen 1954d, 11; Fifi‘i 1989, 92.
56. Wrightson 1952b, 1952c, 1952d, 1952e, 1952f; Andersen 1952c, 1952d, 
1952f; MQR 30 June, 1, 2; see Sandars nd, 44–46. Just before Allan left, Wrightson 
reported Malaitans were massing to attack Malu‘u and ‘Aoke and to kill him and 
headmen, causing a panic. What Allan called “the planned Malu‘u putsch” turned 
out to have been a rumor (Allan 1952c, 1952d; Wrightson 1952a; Andersen 1952a, 
1; Tedder 2008, 31).
57. Andersen 1952i; 1954d, 1, 4, 10; Tedder 2008, 27, 33. On the cocoa scheme 
in the longer term in ‘Are‘are, see Naitoro 1993, and in To‘abaita, Frazer 1973, chap 
3. For the funding application for that scheme, see Gregory-Smith 1951b, and those 
for the other projects are in the same file (BSIP 1951c). The acting resident com-
missioner wrote on Andersen’s March 1952 Quarterly Report, “It must be impressed 
upon D.O. Malu‘u that under no circumstances must he give the impression of 
trying to take another Census.” Gregory-Smith had said in mid-1951 that Island-
ers had to be quickly brought into the administration, with opportunity to rise to 
its highest posts. When he in 1952 nonetheless suggested importing Fijian staff, 
Andersen insisted Solomon Islanders should fill the posts, even if they were not yet 
as efficient (Gregory-Smith 1951c, 2). Because Malaitans lacked ways to get cash 
crops to market, Andersen and Tedder toured on government ships to buy them 
(see, eg, Tedder 2008, 33).
58. MQRs 30 March 1951, 2; 30 June 1951, 1, 5, 7; Bartle 1951b; Ridley 1951b; 
Andersen 1952b.
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59. Wrightson 1952g; 1952h, 1; 1952j, 4–5; Andersen 1952q, 25 Aug; 1952m, 1; 
Malaita Newsletter Aug 1952; Malaita Council 1952; Stanley 1975, 175.
60. MQR 30 June 1951, 8.
61. Andersen 1952h; 1952j; 1952m, 1.
62. Andersen 1952k; 1952m, 1; Wrightson 1952i.
63. Richardson 1952; Andersen 1952h, 3; 1952m, 1. After a brief career as a 
journalist in England and the United States, Stanley entered the Colonial Service 
as a cadet in Nigeria, where he spent ten years. Between Nigeria and Rhodesia he 
had served in Cyprus, Barbados, and Gibraltar. His photo is in PIM Aug 1952, 29; 
see also Stanley 1975.
64. Gregory-Smith 1950–1952, 18 Nov 1951; Stanley 1953, 5; 1975, 175–176.
65. Andersen 1952l; 1952m, 2; Malaita Newsletter Sept 1952, 3–5. Ga‘a told 
Andersen that Takanakwao himself had requested the meeting with Stanley (Ander-
sen 1952l).
66. Allan 1952e; Andersen 1952l, 3–4; Malaita Newsletter Sept 1952, 3–4; Tedder 
2008, 32. Stanley ignored advice from loyalist headmen he met with at Malu‘u to 
fight Maasina Rule with further suppression (1975, 176–177). On past taxes, Stanley 
said, “I think that those who have not paid in the past have been punished enough 
and ‘I want you all to be friends now.’ ” This comment was likely added since some 
were saying they would not pay the 1952 tax if those who had not paid before were 
let off. Malaitans wanted as their symbol an eagle, a sacred bird on Malaita. Officers 
worried that it was an American symbol, but it was later incorporated into the Malaita 
seal. It was decided to distribute delegates proportionally by sub-district popula-
tions: Kwara‘ae 7; Kwaio 6; ‘Are‘are and Lau 5 each; South Malaita and To‘abaita 4 
each; Baelelea and Baegu 3 each; and Fataleka and Langalanga 2 each; totaling 41. 
In the end, only 8 were government nominated (Andersen 1952n, 1). Selections by 
populations were technically nominations, requiring approval and official appoint-
ment by Stanley, but in practice government was loath to overrule popular choices. 
In October, Fiji’s Supreme Court cut Sisili’s sentence to three years, and in May 
1953 Stanley commuted his sentence.
67. Andersen 1952m, 2; Malaita Newsletter Sept 1953, 3–5; Stanley 1975, 176–178. 
Stanley felt his success was partly due to his ability, since he had just arrived and had 
no history there, to separate himself from the BSIP government and present him-
self as the Queen’s representative (1975, 175, 177). For several years most Malaita 
Council members were chosen in Melanesian fashion via public discussion with no 
Western-style vote. Allan, exaggerating as ever the power of leaders, erred in say-
ing they appointed members without consulting the people. A whispered ballot 
was introduced in 1958 (see Allan 1960, 160; Stanley 1975, 180). Council members 
became entirely elected under the Local Government Ordinance of July 1963.
68. Stanley 1952; Wrightson 1952k.
69. Andersen 1952m, 3; 1952o, 8.
70. Andersen 1952m, 3; 1952n; 1952q, 4–27 Oct; Wrightson 1952k.
71. Andersen 1952o; Malaita 1952, 3; BSIP 1963; Fifi‘i 1988 pers comm; 1989, 
92; Tedder 2008, 31. It was emphasized that the council belonged to the people 
since it was rumored on the island that delegates were to be a sort of government 
headmen. The council voted against Ga‘a joining the Advisory Council (Andersen 
1952o, 5) but in 1953 reversed that decision.
72. Andersen 1952p; Bartle 1952; Stanley 1953, 2; 1975, 178–179; Malaita Dis-
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trict 1953; Tedder 2008, 32, 34–35, 52, 65. See also MAR 1953, 4. Like other colonial 
officers, Stanley arrived in the Solomons with little knowledge or understanding of 
events preceding him, or of Maasina Rule, which in his memoir he portrayed as a 
cargo cult, thanking Allan as his primary source of information (1975, 172–175, and 
see 205–207).
73. MAR 1953, 1, 2; Andersen 1954b. Future Malaita Council presidents would 
include Fifi‘i and Kifo, and Sipolo and Ganifiri were later vice presidents. Sau 
declined to be on the council but in early 1954 became Fataleka’s native court pres-
ident, by accounts one of the island’s best. Takanakwao became vice president of 
east Kwara‘ae’s court under its President Ganifiri. Timothy George’s not joining the 
council contributed to a decline in his popularity (Russell 1955b).
Chapter 9: Gains and Losses
1. See, eg, Allan 1960, 163; Ross 1973, 59; Keesing 1978a, 53; 1992a, 122; Camp-
bell 1978, 301; Laracy 1983, 29–31; Standish 1984, 101; Premdas and Steeves 1985, 
38–39; Bennett 1987, 296; Burt 1994, 196; Coppet nd, 4; see Naitoro 1993, 95. Burt’s 
book, with its bird’s-eye view from Kwara‘ae, stands out in stressing Maasina Rule–
Federal Council continuity and the fact that Malaitans gained government conces-
sions (1994, 192–198). Keesing acknowledged the ‘Aoke school, the council (which 
he portrayed as relatively powerless), and stronger native courts as partial fulfill-
ments of some Maasina Rule aims (1978a, 53).
2. See, eg, AR 1974, 135. The 1975 Annual Report, in a startling turnabout, 
describes Maasina Rule as “the most successful experiment in local government so 
far,” which “in many ways was more effective than the colonial administration,” and 
credits it with spurring the government to accelerate development of administrative 
bodies run by Solomon Islanders (150–151). Colin Allan’s often-cited writings have 
been a wellspring of misrepresentation.
3. Hughes 1952; Wrightson 1952k; MAR 1953, 4; see MacKeith 1950a.
4. In the Solomons one sometimes hears Maasina Rule credited with starting the 
country on the road to independence. The connection is indirect at best, and Brit-
ain left for its own reasons that had little to do with Maasina Rule. The movement 
did accelerate district council formation without the once-planned intermediary 
step of sub-district councils (see, eg, Anderson 1957a), and in this way probably has-
tened higher-level Islander involvement in government. According to Allan (1980a, 
385), in 1949 a former high commissioner, Arthur Richards, suggested there would 
be little need to worry about independence of possessions like the Solomons until 
near the century’s end, and for years after administrators gave it little thought.
5. Malu‘u officer John Bartle reported, just after the Malaita Council agreement 
was made and in the midst of rumors that government would soon leave, that many 
people wanted it to stay, at least for a while, perhaps “without any political power, 
solely as a police force” that would deal only with murder, rape, and larceny (1952).
6. See, eg, BSIP 1946, 10; Crass 1946c, 4; Hall 1946; Creech Jones 1946; 
Grantham 1946, 2; 1947; Nicoll 1947a; Noel 1947r, 2; WPHC 1947; Tippet 1967, 
207; Davies nd, 303. For an ambitious plan for change in the Solomons envisioned 
at the high commission level in 1943 but not enacted, see Bennett 1987, 301–302. 
Officers in the Solomons at that time entertained no thoughts of such rapid change 
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on Malaita. Recall, too, Marquand’s complaint that BSIP officials hampered the 
advance of councils and courts and thereby refused or undermined basic principles 
of the secretary of state’s directives to administrators in the colonies to hasten self-
government (1950, 57).
7. Cameron 1948d; Russell 1949b.
8. Gregory-Smith 1950f, 3.
9. Allan wrote this during his fifth month on Malaita while based at Malu‘u 
(1949c, 4). See also Fox 1962, 138; 1967, 48; and Timothy George’s letter quoted 
in Corris 1973a, 51. For later Malaitan refusals to work unpaid on government proj-
ects, see Russell 1955d.
10. Forster writing in Malaita District 1949 (1st quote); Davies 1947f (2nd); Ger-
mond 1948p (3rd); Marquand 1950, 22–23; see A Sandars 1950, 15–16, 18; and, in 
this book, Noel statements in chapter 7, and, in chapter 8, Masterman’s that Malai-
tans would get nothing until every man was taxed and censused. Missionaries and 
other Europeans pressed the government not to negotiate. Derek Rawcliffe, at the 
time headmaster at All Hallows School on the island of Pawa, in 2005 told me that 
most whites opposed the Malaita Council since “It was just giving in to the Maasina 
Rule people.” But, like some others, when resistance subsided, he decided officers 
had made the right decision and that Malaitan aspirations were legitimate (see Rob-
son 1952; BSIP 1954; Allan 1958, 7).
11. Marquand 1950, 15; see Allan 1950g, 5; MQRs 30 June 1950, 4; 30 June 1951, 
5; Laracy 1983, 177.
12. Harwood 1966. Harwood also mentioned that officers’ “anti-clerical” dis-
like for Methodist missionaries may have been a factor in the government’s good 
relations with the breakaway Christian Fellowship Church. Davenport was asked to 
investigate the Moro movement; his report was restricted, but later most of it was 
published (Davenport and Çoker 1967). Moro and a few followers were arrested in 
1957 after they surrounded and reportedly threatened a police patrol. Officers soon 
regretted the arrest for its having raised Moro’s stature and changed their approach 
to instituting development projects in the area (Davenport and Çoker 1967, 133–
139; see 131–132). The Christian Fellowship Church’s leader Silas Eto was arrested 
for sedition in the early 1950s but then released when Methodist missionary Goldie 
threatened legal action (Bennett 1987, 299–301; see Harwood 1978). Richard Fal-
lowes told David Hilliard that on his last visit to the Solomons in 1959 his main 
criticism of the government “was that it had become too sensitive of Melanesian 
opinion, and almost grandmotherly in its dealings with them” (Fallowes 1966).
13. Andersen 1952p, 1; 1954c, 1; Bartle 1952; Basiberi 1996 pers comm. In 1979, 
some Malaitans expected Solomon Islands independence would mean “no more 
government.”
14. Bartle 1952; East Kwara‘ae District Officer Diary, 6 Dec 1953; Andersen 
1954d, 1; MAR 1955, 22; Anderson 1957a; Allan 1960, 162; see Jack-Hinton 1958.
15. See, eg, Cochrane 1970, 93; Keesing 1978a, 53; 1992a, 171; Naitoro 1993, 95.
16. Russell 1950f, 12; 2003, 48; Andersen 1954d, 1; cf Premdas and Steeves 1985, 
39. High Commissioner John Gutch wrote in his memoir that in 1955 he considered 
rejecting Sisili’s selection as Malaita Council president (1987, 113; he mistakenly 
says it was Salana Ga‘a).
17. MAR 1953, 6; see Andersen 1954d, 1; see Fifi‘i 1989, 92.
18. Russell 2003, 90; 2004, 5; Stanley 1975, 180.
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19. An equivalent of 74 percent of Malaitan tax money was projected for Malaita 
Council salaries and administration in 1956. This was similar to budgets of other 
district councils in the Solomons at that time. Things improved in later years and 
more money was spent on development (National Administration Course 1955, 10; 
see Townsend 1961a; Premdas and Steeves 1985, 39).
20. Anderson 1957a.
21. Naitoro 1993, 95–96.
22. For example, Anderson 1957a; Tedder 2007 pers comm; 2008, 52.
23. Space constraints prevent examining here the economic projects that offi-
cers and the council worked to establish. Some succeeded and brought needed 
money into communities. Others failed, partly due to poor long-range planning 
and insufficient infrastructure. This is no surprise given the emergency nature of 
their implementation at the tail end of political unrest, but some project failures 
increased resentment of government and the council. Suspicion of the government 
led some to oppose the schemes from the start. Waiparo, discussed later in this 
chapter, was thought partly responsible for refusals in the south, which clearly frus-
trated Russell (see Russell 1954c, 1955a, 1955d; MAR 1954, 7; East Kwara‘ae District 
Officer Diary, 30 Aug 1953; MAR 1954, 7; Naitoro 1993, 130–135). Some refused 
to allow projects on their land or disputed the ownership of the land required. 
Bennett noted consequences that deeply rooted protectiveness of land in the Solo-
mons has had for the economy overall (2002, 13). I have dealt little with land issues 
and land courts in this book, but some of the same problems that weakened local 
courts also hampered local land courts, especially government neglect and failure 
to help them financially. For a recent study of their problems, see Futaiasi 2010. For 
detailed case studies of post–Maasina Rule economic development from opposite 
ends of Malaita, see Frazer 1973; Naitoro 1993.
24. Andersen 1954d, 1, 12.
25. Malaita District 1953; BSIP 1945–1959, 23 Feb 1953, 14–15; Andersen quote 
in East Kwara‘ae District Officer Diary 28 May 1953; Tedder 2008, 52.
26. Lindley 1958. Waiparo and Nono‘oohimae had already “vigorously” denied 
the claim that they told Kwaio not to tax (Russell 1955d; Teoboo 1982 pers comm). 
Most Kwaio really were cash poor and had few ways to earn money; most of the rea-
sons they gave for being poor were legitimate (cf Malaita District [1959?]). Saltwater 
people of Langalanga were refusing to pay the tax until they were compensated for 
the 1942 US bombing of Laulasi (Anderson 1958b; and see this book, chapter 4).
27. Anderson 1958a.
28. Malaita Newsletter Nov 1959, Dec 1959; Malaita District 1960; Townsend 
1961a; see Holland 1961. Section 85(1) of the Local Government Ordinance of 
1963 allowed punishment of any tax default with a fine of up to £50 and/or up to 
three months in prison.
29. Russell 1954d, 1, 2.
30. Malaita Council 1953, 6, 12.
31. BSIP 1957, 24–25; cf BSIP [1965?]. For post–Maasina Rule examples of the 
critique that things Malaitans put forth as kastom were not old and were thus spe-
cious, see Hearth 1956a; Allan 1957a, 153; 1960, 162–163, 251–253; 1989–1990, 154. 
Colin Allan recommended that an exception be made regarding customary land 
ownership: that a piece of land’s current ownership status should be regarded as its 
customary status (1957b).
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32. East Kwara‘ae District Officer Diary May 1953; Russell 1954d, 1; 1955c; see 
also BSIP 1956; Hearth 1956b, 1956c.
33. Russell 1954d; BSIP 1954.
34. Anderson 1958b; Glover 1958; Malaita District 1961; Turpin 1967; Mariano 
Kelesi 1987 pers comm. This book does not trace the later history of the courts, but, 
years later, they were little used on Malaita. Instead, “chiefs’ courts” applied “kastom 
law” to hear cases that disputants could not manage by themselves. In 1988 police 
in the southern half of Malaita recorded only 30 offenses. In 1986, courts on the 
island, then home to some 70,000 people, heard a mere 104 cases. By comparison, 
during the previous year courts in the Western Province, with a much smaller popu-
lation, heard 901 cases (Naitoro 1990, 21; see Akin 1999b, 50–52).
35. BSIP 1947e, 28; Laracy 1983, 85–86, 100; see this book, chapter 8. Attempts 
to arrest Waiparo during the Federal Council period failed (MQR 25 Oct 1951). 
Allan said Waiparo and Nono‘oohimae became “arch-rivals” (1989–1990, 154), but 
it is hard to know the extent to which this was posed for the benefit of officers (see 
Russell 1954c, 1955a). In 1988 (pers comm), Fifi‘i dismissed the idea of animosity 
between them and said neither was more powerful since they were about differ-
ent things: Waiparo worked on kastom and was not a politician. This placed them 
in a dual leadership of the sort discussed in this book, chapter 6, in relation to 
alaha‘ou‘ou.
36. MAR 1953; Russell 1955a; MQR 31 March 1956; Hearth 1956a, 1956b, 1956c; 
Malaita District [1956?], 8–9. On Waiparo’s influence in east Kwaio, which in the 
early 1960s spawned a rival but similar movement of Kwaio “committees,” see Fifi‘i 
1989, 104–105; Keesing 1992a, chap 13.
37. Russell 1955a. On views of local and foreign knowledge, see Akin 1994.
38. Andersen 1954e, 2; MAR 1954, 3; Tedder 2008, 42; Malaita Newsletter July 
1962. Kwaio men who visited Waiparo were told the same thing (Ta‘ika 1982 pers 
comm; Ma‘aanamae 1997 pers comm).
39. MAR 1954, 3; 1955, 22; Russell 1955b.
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